风险投资基金运作的国际经验借鉴和中国模式选择

中国的风险投资基金经历二十多年的发展,其间存在许多问题,如风险投资基金规模较小、抗风险能力差、组织模式不合理等。而在海外发达的国家和地区的风险投资基金拥有丰富的发展经验,已经形成完善的组织管理模式。借鉴国际先进管理经验,我们应建立起适合我国国情的发展模式并从机构层面、市场层面和监管层面进行改进,促进风险投资基金的发展。     

风险投资基金运作的理论分析

大力发展高科技企业、培育新的利润增长点是我国产业政策的首要目标。但如何对高风险、高收益的高科技企业在发展提供初创资本与运作环境的支持，是我国理论界和实际工作部门必须首先解决的重点问题。本借鉴国外发展风险投资业的经验与教训，通过对风险投资基金的内涵及功能的分析，勾画出运作风险投资的具体程序。     

发展我国风险投资的对策

风险投资在高科技产业的发展中起到了重要的促进作用 ,是高科技产业发展的主要动力。本文概述了我国风险投资的兴起 ,指出了我国风险投资存在的问题 ,提出了发展我国风险投资的对策。我国风险投资起步于1985年 ,我国政府十分重视 ,出台了一系列方针政策 ,但在发展中仍存在许多问题 ,包括有资金、人力、体制一系列的制约因素。发展我国高科技风险投资 ,政府要加大扶持力度 ,加大政策倾斜力度。建立风险投资基金 ,大力发展风险资本市场 ,构建多层次风险投资网络 ,并培养高素质的风险投资人才 ,健全法制 ,走向国际风险投资市场。本文重点探讨了证券市场的风险投资情况。     

我国风险投资组织结构模式的选择与探讨

在分析我国风险投资的现实发展及特点的基础上,分别研究和探讨我国风险投资机构的组织模式选择、我国风险投资业的组织结构设计以及我国风险投资资金来源等问题.     

企业集团开展风险投资的组织模式研究

组织模式是国际大企业集团成功开展风险投资的重要保证。基于理论和案例的分析表明:虽然目前风险投资的四种组织模式服务于不同企业集团的战略发展目标,但主流模式及其做法,仍可为我国大企业集团开展风险投资提供经验借鉴。     

有限合伙——我国风险投资组织形式的新发展

风险投资经过多年的发展,主要有三种形式:公司制、信托基金制和有限合伙制.2006年新出台的<合伙企业法>引入了有限合伙的模式,其自身的特性和诸多优点是其成为我国风险投资组织形式的最佳模式.     

国际风险投资在我国的投资运作研究

我国风险投资业带有明显的国际化色彩,国外风险资本对中国风险投资发展有着举足轻重的意义。本文通过近年来国外风投在中国的投资热点、投资阶段及其投资周期的分析,提出了促进国外风投在我国更好发展的系列建议。     

我国风险投资业的兴起和存在的问题及对策

风险投资在高科技产业的发展中起着重要的促进作用,是高科技产业发展的主要动力.本文概述了我国风险投资的兴起,指出了我国风险投资存在的问题,提出了发展我国风险投资的政策.     

美国风险投资的发展模式及启示

风险投资起源并兴盛于美国，并且对美国的高科技产业和整个经济增长产生了巨大的推动作用。论述美国风险投资的发展历程，分析美国风险投资的制度模式，可对发展我国风险投资提出借鉴与启示。     

国外风险投资运作主体模式及对我国的借鉴

我国的风险投资起步较晚，1985年我国第一家专营高新技术投资的全国性金融公司——中国新技术创业投资公司成立，之后又成立了广州技术创业投资公司、江苏省高技术投资公司等，由此我国的风险投资有了长足的发展。据统计，目前全国20多个省市     

我国创业投资引导基金运作模式研究

本文通过借鉴以色列、芬兰、美国等国家创业投资引导基金的发展经验,对比分析了国内主要城市的创投引导基金,指出我国引导基金存在政府干预较强、资金杠杆作用低、评价考核体系不健全等问题,并提出强化引导基金市场化运作、广泛引入社会资本等发展对策,以期为地方政府选择何种引导基金运作模式提供决策依据。     

养老基金参与风险投资问题探讨

本结合中外风险投资的融资现状，指出了一国的金融体制对其风险投资发展具有重要的影响，讨论了养老基金参与英美风险投资业的原因，得出了养老基金是风险投资的天然资本供给以及我国的养老基金必将成为我国风险投资业的主要投资的结论。     

Government venture capital and cross-border investment

We use data on venture capital investments from 26 countries from 1998–2013. We investigate the following questions: Do domestic government sponsored venture capital funds augment or curtail domestic private venture capital funds from cross-border investment? Do government sponsored venture capital funds attract or repel foreign private venture capital investment? The results show that a preponderance of mixed-structured over pure-structured government venture capital investment has a crowding-in effect overall: it attracts domestic and international private venture capital to the domestic venture capital market while simultaneously increasing total private venture capital investment. In contrast, a preponderance of pure-government over mixed-government venture capital fund investment repels foreign private venture capital investment (has a crowding out effect). We find that both these effects are more pronounced for domestic rather than foreign private venture capital and that the attraction effect is stronger than the repulsion effect.     

Should Venture Capitalists Put All Their Eggs in One Basket? Diversification versus Pure‐Play Strategies in Venture Capital

Managing the different companies in which they invest while at the same time performing portfolio optimization for themselves, venture capitalists position themselves as a pure-play or diversified conglomerate through their cumulative portfolios. I examine the effects of two investment strategies of venture capitalists:  1)  a specialist "pure-play" strategy that maximizes venture capital involvement and  2)  a more generalist strategy of diversification at the "firm" level that minimizes portfolio risk. I find that neither strategy optimizes both venture capital growth and time to entrepreneurial exit, which highlights a need for institutional investors to clarify fund objectives at the time a fund is established.     

TOWARD A GLOBAL MODEL OF VENTURE CAPITAL?

While the U.S. still accounts for about two‐thirds of the world's total private equity fund‐raising and investment, other countries have been adopting American practices and are experiencing significant growth in their private equity markets. In fact, a case can be made that a global market for venture capital and private equity is emerging, at least in Western Europe and North America, where venture markets are seeing significant convergence in funding levels, investment patterns, and realized returns. To date, however, the European Union has had little success in establishing community‐wide commercial laws, taxation regimes, or corporate governance policies, so each country's private equity funds are organized in segmented national markets, and investment also tends to be largely localized. The Asian markets are even more fragmented: venture capital shows no sign of taking root in Japan, and China lacks the basic legal infrastructure needed to support a vibrant venture capital market. Venture capitalists create value through their role as active investors, and government and business leaders around the world have come to realize that venture capital and private equity investing can be a significant force in promoting economic development and technological progress. In general, countries with English common law codes offer greater protection to inves‐tors; the ratio of venture capital spending to GDP for common law countries is nearly double that in civil law countries. Government efforts to promote venture capital would probably be better focused on eliminating regulatory road‐blocks, lowering taxes, and provid‐ing a favorable investor climate. In the meantime, it appears that pri‐vate equity fund‐raising and invest‐ment have hit their cyclical lows and are poised to surpass $250 billion globally within three or four years and to reach one‐half trillion dollars by the end of the decade. The author also predicts that India, whose history as a former British colony has given it a common law framework as well as system of elite universities and technical institutes known for the quality of its gradu‐ates, should become one of the five leading venture capital markets by the end of this decade.     

The determinants of venture capital funding: evidence across countries

This paper analyses the determinants of venture capital for a sample of 21 countries. In particular, we consider the importance of initial public offerings (IPOs), gross domestic product (GDP) and market capitalization growth, labor market rigidities, accounting standards, private pension funds, and government programs. We find that IPOs are the strongest driver of venture capital investing. Private pension fund levels are a significant determinant over time but not across countries. Surprisingly, GDP and market capitalization growth are not significant. Government policies can have a strong impact, both by setting the regulatory stage, and by galvanizing investment during downturns. Finally, we also show that different types of venture capital financing are affected differently by these factors. In particular, early stage venture capital investing is negatively impacted by labor market rigidities, while later stage is not. IPOs have no effect on early stage venture capital investing across countries, but are a significant determinant of later stage venture capital investing across countries. Finally, government funded venture capital has different sensitivities to the determinants of venture capital than non-government funded venture capital. Our insights emphasize the need for a more differentiated approach to venture capital, both from a research as well as from a policy perspective. We feel that while later stage venture capital investing is well understood, early stage and government funded investments still require more extensive research.     

Venture capital financing in the eSports industry

We examine the drivers of venture capital financing raised by eSports companies, using the Crunchbase database containing information on private and public companies receiving any type of venture capital funding worldwide. We find that companies located in Asia-Pacific and Americas attract more funding than in Europe. Venture capital funds are more likely to fund late stage and older companies, than innovative early stage and younger firms. We also observe that the founders’ previous experience plays a significant role in explaining the level of funding. Companies with at least one founder with previous eSport, managerial or start-up experience are more likely to get more funding by venture capital funds. Our research provides new evidence on how venture capital funding is allocated between late stage and early stage firms as well as between older and younger companies in the eSport-industry and in different markets.     

Do venture capitalists imitate portfolio size?

Venture capitalists face the challenge of determining how many entrepreneurial ventures they should invest in. Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (J Corp Finance 9:521–534, 2003) develop a theoretical model based on economic factors that shows how a venture capital fund should set its portfolio size in order to achieve optimal returns. Determining the required economic inputs to this model is difficult in practice however, given the informational asymmetries, uncertainties and ambiguities present in the decision-making environment of venture capitalists. Hence, we contend that general partners of venture capital funds also use their prior venture capital fund management experience, which we refer to as social capital, to overcome the difficulties they face in solving the above optimization problem. Our results support our hypotheses that portfolio size is explained by the interplay of economic and social factors.      

Fund size, limited attention and valuation of venture capital backed firms

This paper examines the effect of fund size on investee firm valuations in the venture capital market. We show a convex (U-shape) relationship between fund size and firm valuations. We further document that firm valuations are positively correlated to measures of limited attention. In addition, we show a concave (inverse U-shape) relationship between fund size and venture's performance measured as the probability of successful exits. Further, this relation is particularly strong when the pre-money valuation of the investment is high. Our findings hold across a wide range of robustness checks, including but not limited to sample selection and correction for unobserved company-level value drivers. Our findings support the notion that there is diseconomy of scale in the venture capital industry, which is partially due to the constraints from the quality and quantity of human capital when fund size grows.