Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments: A case study of public goods

Game theory provides predictions of behavior in many one-shot games. On the other hand, most experimenters usually play repeated games with subjects, to provide experience. To avoid subjects rationally employing strategies that are appropriate for the repeated game, experimenters typically employ a “random strangers” design in which subjects are randomly paired with others in the session. There is some chance that subjects will meet in multiple rounds, but it is claimed that this chance is so small that subjects will behave as if they are in a one-shot environment. We present evidence from public goods experiments that this claim is not always true.     

Disagreement over the emergence of private property rights: alternative meanings, alternative explanations

This paper is an exercise in the history of thought, which compares Austrian and neoclassical theories of the emergence of private property rights, and examines, in part, the extent to which Austrians can be said to offer a commonly-agreed upon explanation that parallels Carl Menger's exemplary story of the emergence of money. We address the sources of disagreement (and apparent conflict) among emergence theorists in both schools. We try to show that some of the disagreement hinges on an unclear meaning of the term “emergence,” which is resolvable, while other sources of disagreement are fundamental at the methodological level. JEL Code B25, E40, E53     

Defining national property rights to a common property resource: The case of the West Bank aquifers

This article introduces a methodology to define Israeli and Palestinian property rights to the three aquifers straddling the Green Line between Israel and the West Bank, i.e. the Yarqon-Tanninim, Northern, and Nablus-Jenin aquifers. A set of procedures for determining a fair division of waters is described for the hypothetical planning year 2000. Following this, the calculated allocation of water rights is evaluated in terms of the projected over-all water consumption and supply balance for Israel and a Palestinian sovereign authority (PSA) for the year 2000. Finally, the article concludes with some thoughts on the relative merits of this methodology.     

A model of the origins of basic property rights

This paper studies the origins of one of the most basic of property rights, namely, the right of an individual or an organization to the fruits of its labour. My objective is to address the questions of why, when and how this property right can emerge and be made secure. I develop a model of the strategic interaction between two players in the state-of-nature, which is an environment characterized by the absence of any laws and institutions (including property rights and the state). My analysis explores, in particular, the roles of the players' fighting and productive skills on the emergence and security (or otherwise) of this property right.     

制度变迁中土地产权的性质与合约选择:一个有关合作经济的案例分析

This paper discusses an evolutionary process of rural collective property rights or agricultural cooperation economy in detail. We convince that both the evolution of the household contract system and the rural cooperation economy in the market elaborate the key position of property rights’ multi-attribute in the formation of contract structure and organization shape. If there were strong externality between several elements of household, the collective property rights should be chosen. __________ Translated from Guanli Shijie 管理世界 (Management World), 2008, (6): 61–67, 94     

Legal positivism and property rights: a critique of Hayek and Peczenik

Scholars such as Friedrich Hayek and Aleksander Peczenik have criticized legal positivism for undermining constitutionalism and the rule of law, an implication of which is weakened private property rights. This conclusion is far from evident. First, I contend that legal positivism is compatible with a strong support for property rights. Second, the causal relationship between legal positivism and the degree to which property rights are applied and protected is analyzed. The main arguments for a negative relationship—that legal positivism centralizes and politicizes legislation and that it makes the legal culture servile in relation to the political sphere—are considered unconvincing.

The emergence of property rights enforcement in early trade: A behavioral model without reputational effects

The present article focuses on the conditions that allow governments to increase property rights protection because they expect enough income from such action. We develop a behavioral explanation, according to which the answer lies in the growth in the importance, size and wealth of merchant guilds in the medieval era in Western Europe as well as a somewhat surprising effect of volatile price structures. We add to prior research by showing that even uncoordinated embargo pressures among multiple guilds could get medieval rulers to offer high levels of property rights protection.     

Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm

The standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives, while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post negotiations. We explore the implications of such transaction costs. Prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned: A party may have stronger investment incentives when a non-investing party is the owner, and joint ownership can be the uniquely optimal ownership structure. Intuitively, an ownership structure that is unattractive in the standard model may now be desirable, because it implies large gains from trade, such that the parties are more inclined to incur the transaction costs.     

Defining the frontiers of the firm through property rights allocation: The case of the French retailer cooperative Leclerc

France harbours three large retailer cooperatives which, put together, account for more than a third of the national market share. The largest of these is Leclerc, a leading firm on the French territory. The paper presented here shows how, through the particular distribution of property rights and decision patterns, this cooperative, although hampered by an unstable size, manages to compete with integrated firms. Indeed, the processes that have been developed enable the cooperative to acquire long-term property rights on the specific assets (stores), while remaining in the cooperative framework. The system built is efficient because incentives remain high for members to increase their own performance.     

Payments for environmental services as an alternative to logging under weak property rights: The case of Indonesia

Decentralization reforms in Indonesia have led to local communities negotiating logging agreements with timber companies for relatively low financial payoffs and at high environmental cost. This paper analyzes the potential of payments for environmental services (PES) to provide an alternative to logging for these communities and to induce forest conservation. We apply a game-theoretical model of community-firm interactions that explicitly considers two stylized conditions present in the Indonesian context: (i) community rights to the forest remain weak even after decentralization, and (ii) the presence of logging companies interested in the commercial exploitation of the forest. Intuition may suggest that PES design should focus on those communities with the lowest expected payments from logging deals. However, we show that these communities may not be able to enforce a PES agreement, i.e., they may not be able to prevent logging activities by timber companies. Moreover, some communities would conserve the forest anyway; in these cases PES would not lead to additional environmental gains. Most important, the introduction of PES may increase a community's expected payoff from a logging agreement. A failure to consider this endogeneity in expected payoffs could lead to communities opting for logging agreements despite PES, simply allowing communities to negotiate better logging deals. Our results indicate that PES design is a complex task, and that the costs of an effective PES system could potentially be much higher than expected from observing current logging fees. Using data collected in Indonesia on actual logging fees received by communities, we illustrate how the theoretical results could be used in empirical analysis to guide PES design. Our results are likely to be useful in other cases where local people make resource use decisions but have weak property rights over these resources, and where external commercial forces are present. The results highlight the importance of understanding the details of the local context in order to design PES programs appropriately.     

The reduction of the UK budget deficit: a human rights perspective

This paper contributes to new thinking in economics by employing a human rights perspective to examine the budget deficit reduction strategy of the UK coalition government, as set out in 2010 in the June budget and October Spending Review. Focusing on economic and social rights, the paper explains the human rights obligations of governments and key human rights principles. As examples of how they should be applied to examine the deficit reduction strategy, it examines the implications of the policy changes for child poverty and gender equality, and finds that in both cases there is evidence to suggest non-compliance with the human rights obligations of the UK government.     

Uncertainty and the Choice of Policy Instruments: A Note On Baumol and Oates Propositions

Baumol and Oates' propositions, the irrelevancy of benefit uncertainty and the importance of cost uncertainty on the choice between a tax and a system of marketable permits, are limited to a large-number case in which the opportunities for victims of pollution to participate in a permit market are non-existent. However, with the evolution of environmental groups and coalitions of victims in neighborhoods, the large-number case can easily transform into a small-number case. This paper shows that when the pollution standard, set at what appears to be optimal ex ante, is excessively lenient, the system of marketable permits offers such groups a flexibility to buy pollution permits in a competitive market and destroy them until the optimal solution is realized. In the reverse situation, however, Baumol and Oates propositions are unambiguously valid.     

The public and private provision of pure public goods and the distortionary effects of income taxation: a political economy approach

Abstract .  A pure public good is provided by the government and the voluntary contributions of two types of households. The government finances its contribution by means of income taxation. The latter has distortionary effects. A third type of household never makes contributions. We analyse the effects of changes in the income tax rate on (a) the provision of the public good, (b) the private contributions of the households, and (c) changes in the distribution of income and welfare between contributing and non-contributing households. We derive a simple and testable condition under which the lowering of the income tax entails a Pareto improvement.     

Pushing on a String: How policy might encourage private doctors to compete with the public sector on the basis of quality

Results from the Philippine Quality Improvement Demonstration Study show that a policy that expands insurance coverage improves quality of care, as measured by clinical performance vignettes, among public physicians, and induces a spillover effect that improves quality among private physicians.     

Channels of transmission of environmental policy to economic growth: A survey of the theory

Economists generally hold that environmental regulations impose constraints on the production possibilities set and are therefore potentially harmful to economic growth. In recent years, however, it has been recognized that environmental regulation can enhance the prospects for growth if improved environmental quality increases the productivity of inputs or the efficiency of the education system. It is also held that environmental regulation promotes pollution abatement activity and can lead to the exploitation of increasing returns to scale in abatement. Furthermore, expectations of a better environment may encourage households to save. Finally, it has been conjectured that environmental regulations can stimulate innovation because R&D is a relatively clean activity and because the market share of clean innovations increases. Future empirical research should shed light on the relative importance of these different channels of transmission of environmental policy to the growth rate of the economy.     

Implementing technology roadmap process in the energy services sector: A case study of a government agency

Energy sector has become increasingly sensitive to emerging new technologies as our society is seeking alternative energy sources. Many utility companies and government agencies have started to implement technology planning processes for roadmapping their future technology portfolios. This paper focuses on technology planning in the government energy services sector. Through a case study research method, the paper documents how technology planning and specifically technology roadmaps were implemented at a federal agency tasked with managing power transmission in the Northwest United States. Three application areas are covered: transmission, renewables and energy efficiency. The paper provides details on the Energy Efficiency Roadmaps. Through the review of the case a technology planning methodology based on technology roadmaps is detailed. Key conclusions were reached on how to manage such process implementation in similar organizations. Some of these conclusions can be generalized to those that are implementing technology planning processes for the first time. We concluded that adoption of such methods would require a longer time than anticipated. Organizational changes to adopt the process will likely reduce the time it takes to deliver the required roadmaps. We also found that a typical sequence of events would be Technology Gap Analysis and Identification of Technology Candidates, Evaluation and Prioritization of Technologies, Roadmapping of Technologies and Allocation of Resources to the R&D Programs or to the direct acquisition of the technologies.     

Complementarity between water pricing, water rights and local water governance: A Bayesian analysis of choice behaviour of farmers in the Krishna river basin, India

To ensure efficient water allocation and use, policy designers have adopted various strategies, including price setting, decentralising irrigation water management or improving water rights. Most of these strategies have been applied individually, without considering the complementary relationships between them. This paper uses a discrete choice model to analyse the scope for combinations of tools for irrigation water demand management and farmers' acceptance of these. In terms of local irrigation water governance, the presence or absence of collective irrigation water management, in the form of a Water Users Association, is considered. Water rights are specified in terms of the duration and quality of the entitlement and its transferability. Finally, four types of water pricing methods (area, crop, block and volumetric pricing) are considered. Using a choice experiment, we elicit the most preferred water pricing method, under different water rights situations, at different price levels and under various contexts for local irrigation water governance. Our results indicated that under conditions of improved water rights, preference for volumetric pricing increases, whilst the presence of a Water Users Association reduces this preference. Furthermore, it was found that using an appropriate combination of water demand management tools considerably increases the willingness to pay for a change in scenario.     

A study of benefits compensation mechanism for agricultural water rights trading under the restriction of ecological reconstruction: case study of Shiyang River basin

Agricultural water allocation system based on priority rights has caused regional conJtiets and downstream ecological degradation.It is the urgent need to introduce the concept of the initial water rights and establish benefits compensation mechanism to resolve such problems.This paper takes the Shivang River basin as an example to calculate the opportunity cost of 0.97×108m3 of agricultural water encroached by the middle reach based on initial water right allocation system under which water is allocated in accordance with the ratio between agricultural population of two different regions concerning the downstream ecological reconstruction needs with Bio-economic model (BEM).The results suggest that the total economic loss of Minqin County for ecological econstruction amounts to 2.57×108 yuan,of which 1.68×108 yuan is ecological compensation,representing the economic loss Minqin suffered for ecological reconstruction which should burden beneficial groups of eeological reconstruction and 0.89×108 yuan is the economic loss Minqin suffered due to Liangzhou's encroachment behavior which should be compensated by Liangzhou.     

A cost-utility study of the use of pregabalin added to usual care in refractory neuropathic pain patients in a Swedish setting

Abstract

Objectives:

Patients refractory to older therapies for neuropathic pain (NeP) have few remaining therapeutic options. This study evaluates the cost-utility of pregabalin in the treatment of patients with refractory neuropathic pain in Sweden, from a healthcare and a societal perspective.

Study limitations:

The use of non-randomized (observational) data to determine the effectiveness of treatments for NeP. The use of non-Swedish data for some input parameters in the model.

Methods:

A previously constructed discrete event simulation model was adapted to compare pregabalin combined with usual care to usual care alone in a Swedish setting. Pain profiles were generated using clinical data from five non-randomized pregabalin studies in refractory NeP patients. Utility data were generated from a UK survey of patients with NeP. Cost data were generated from the Swedish Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Board (TLV’s) product price database, a national NeP register, and a regional registry study. Indirect costs were estimated from published sources. One-way and probabilistic sensitivity analyses evaluated uncertainty in the model’s output.

Results:

The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) for pregabalin plus usual care treatment compared to usual care was 51,616 SEK/€5364 and 123,993 SEK/€12,886 with and without indirect costs, respectively. One-way sensitivity analyses confirmed the clinical input data as the main driver of the model; even considerable changes to all other input parameters had only a modest effect on the ICER. The ICER remained well below a conservative threshold of 347,495 SEK /€36,113/£30,000 in all scenarios modelled.

Conclusions:

This study found pregabalin combined with usual care to be cost-effective compared to usual care in patients with refractory NeP from a Swedish Health Care perspective. Moreover, sensitivity analysis showed pregabalin’s cost-effectiveness to be robust in all scenarios modelled.