Educational qualifications mismatch in Europe. Is it demand or supply driven?

Most papers dealing with individual overeducation risks focus on labour supply characteristics and workers’ behaviour. On the other hand, only few studies consider labour demand characteristics and technological change. In this paper we analyse the influence of both demand and supply factors on educational mismatch in a set of 10 European countries. Our hypothesis, confirmed by results obtained using ordered probit model with sample selection, is that demand factors generally play a major role in reducing educational mismatch in technologically more advanced countries, whereas supply factors are more important in countries that are lagging behind in the international division of labour. At the same time, important cross-country and gender differences have been identified in how the demand/supply factors operate. All this calls for the fine-tuning of policies intended to tackle the problem of educational mismatch.     

Is the long-run equilibrium wage-led or profit-led? A Kaleckian approach

This paper presents a Kaleckian growth model in which (i) the rate of capacity utilization, the profit share, and the rate of employment are adjusted in the medium run, and (ii) the normal rate of capacity utilization and the expected rate of growth are adjusted in the long run. Both the Kalecki-type and the Marglin–Bhaduri-type investment functions are introduced. Using the model, we examine which regime is obtained in the long-run equilibrium, the wage-led growth regime or the profit-led growth regime.     

Is Cost–Benefit Analysis Anomaly-Proof?

In this paper we examine whether cost–benefit analysis is anomaly-susceptible or anomaly-proof. To do this, we address four questions. These are, which anomalies, or problems seem most troublesome for CBA? What coping strategies does the analyst adopt to address these problems? Do these adaptation strategies create new problems? And finally, does adopting these strategies invalidate the results of CBA, or reduce the power of its advice? The anomalies we consider are (i) the observed differences between willingness to pay and willingness to accept compensation measures of value; (ii) valuation given information limits, preference uncertainty and preference construction; (iii) hypothetical market bias; (iv) risk perceptions; and (v) risk and preference reversals. We focus our discussion on the estimation of non-market environmental benefits and costs.     

Reciprocity under moral wiggle room: Is it a preference or a constraint?

We analyze reciprocal behavior when moral wiggle room exists. Dana et al. (Econ Theory 33(1):67–80, 2007) show that giving in a dictator game is inconsistent with distributional preferences as the giving rate drops when situational excuses for selfish behavior are provided. Our binary trust game closely follows their design. Only a preceding stage (safe outside option vs. enter the game) is added in order to introduce reciprocity. We find significantly lower rates of selfish choices in the trust baseline in comparison to our treatments that feature moral wiggle room manipulations and a dictator baseline. It seems that reciprocal behavior is not only due to people liking to reciprocate but also because they feel obliged to do so.     

Is mortality spatial or social?

Mortality modelling for the purposes of demographic forecasting and actuarial pricing is generally done at an aggregate level using national data. Modelling at this level fails to capture the variation in mortality within country and potentially leads to a mis-specification of mortality forecasts for a subset of the population. This can have detrimental effects for pricing and reserving in the actuarial context. In this paper we consider mortality rates at a regional level and analyse the variation in those rates. We consider whether variation in mortality rates within a country can be explained using local economic and social variables. Using Northern Ireland data on mortality and measures of deprivation we identify the variables explaining mortality variation. We create a population polarisation variable and find that this variable is significant in explaining some of the variation in mortality rates. Further, we consider whether spatial and non-spatial models have a part to play in explaining mortality differentials.     

Is Hollywood a Risky Business? A Political Economic Analysis of Risk and Creativity

This paper seeks to explain why Hollywood’s dominant firms are narrowing the scope of creativity in the contemporary period (1980–2015). The largest distributors have sought to prevent the art of filmmaking and its related social relations from becoming financial risks in the pursuit of profit. Major filmed entertainment, my term for the six largest distributors, must discount expected future earnings to present prices with the forward-looking logic of capitalisation; and uncertainty about where creativity in cinema is going can produce financial uncertainty about the future earning potential of new film projects. Conversely, a degree of confidence in the expected future earnings of Hollywood cinema can increase when the art of filmmaking and broader social world of mass culture are ordered by capitalist power [Nitzan, J. and Bichler, S., 2009. Capital as power: a study of order and creorder. New York: Routledge]. For the period of 1980–2015, major filmed entertainment lowered its risk relative to the period before, 1960–79. This historical process of risk reduction is the effect of major filmed entertainment making the wide-release strategy (a.k.a., saturation booking) more predictable through an aggressive implementation of the blockbuster style and the high concept standard.     

Gender Equality and Economic Growth: Is it Equality of Opportunity or Equality of Outcomes?

This article explores the impact of gender equality on economic growth. In particular, we focus on the multidimensional nature of gender equality with the object of identifying the relative salience of different aspects of equality. Using exploratory factor analysis on five measures of gender equality, we identify two distinct dimensions: equality of economic opportunities and equality in economic and political outcomes. Regression analysis conducted on an unbalanced panel of 101 countries taken over nonoverlapping five-year periods from 1990 to 2000 reveals that a standard deviation improvement in equality in economic opportunity increases growth by 1.3 percentage points and a corresponding improvement in participatory equality improves growth by an average of about 1.2 percentage points. However, this impact is contingent on a country's stage of development: while developing economies experience significant improvements in growth from greater equality in opportunity, developed societies see significant improvements resulting from greater equality in outcomes.     

Is it my money or not? An experiment on risk aversion and the house-money effect

The house-money effect, understood as people’s tendency to be more daring with easily-gotten money, is a behavioral pattern that poses questions about the external validity of experiments in economics: to what extent do people behave in experiments like they would have in a real-life situation, given that they play with easily-gotten house money? We ran an economic experiment with 122 students to measure the house-money effect on their risk preferences. They received an amount of money with which they made risky decisions involving losses and gains; a randomly selected treatment group received the money 21 days in advance and a control group got it the day of the experiment. From a simple calculation we found that participants in the treatment group only spent on average approximately 35 % of their cash in advance. The data confirms the well documented results that men are more tolerant to risk than women, and that individuals in general are more risk tolerant towards losses than towards gains. With our preferred specification, we find a mean CRRA risk aversion coefficient of 0.34, with a standard deviation of 0.09. Furthermore, if subjects in the treatment group spent 35 % of the endowment their CRRA risk aversion coefficient is higher than that of the control group by approximately 0.3 standard deviations. We interpret this result as evidence of a small and indirect house money effect operating though the amount of the cash in advance that was actually spent. We conclude that the house money effect may play a small role in decisions under uncertainty, especially when involving losses. Our novel design, however, could be used for other domains of decision making both in the lab and for calibration of economic models used in micro and macroeconomics.     

Do Multinational Enterprises Contribute to Convergence or Divergence? A Disaggregated Analysis of US FDI*

It is widely held that foreign direct investment (FDI) has a positive effect on economic growth. To test this hypothesis, we perform convergence regressions derived from a theoretical model on the impact of FDI on endogenous technological change in small economies. The model includes FDI externalities that enhance growth, but also shows that FDI can crowd out host country income and reduce local innovation. The empirical analysis employs disaggregated US data for various FDI‐related activities—in addition to the conventionally used aggregate FDI stocks and flows. We estimate the net FDI impact on the convergence rate of per‐capita income to US levels, controlling for human development, financial development, and trade. We find that FDI accelerates convergence for high‐income countries only, otherwise slowing it down.