Currency Hedging For Export-Flexible Firms *

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of a competitive exporting firm under exchange rate uncertainty. The firm possesses export flexibility in that it can distribute its output to either the domestic market or a foreign market, after observing the true realization of the exchange rate. It is shown that the separation theorem does not hold under export flexibility, i.e., the firm's optimal output depends on the firm's preference and on the underlying exchange rate uncertainty. Furthermore, the export- flexible firm underhedges its exchange rate risk exposure in a currency forward market where in the forward exchange rate contains a non-positive risk premium. [D21, F31]     

Export Flexibility And Currency Hedging*

This article studies the behavior of an export‐flexible firm under exchange rate uncertainty. We show that the separation theorem holds if selling exclusively in the domestic market is suboptimal even under the most unfavorable spot exchange rate. Otherwise, the firm's optimal output depends on its preferences and on the underlying uncertainty. We further show that the full‐hedging theorem holds only when the firm always finds it optimal to sell its entire output in the foreign market. Otherwise, export flexibility introduces a convexity into the firm's foreign exchange risk exposure, which calls for the use of currency options for hedging purposes.     

Currency Options and Export-Flexible Firms

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of a globally competitive firm under exchange rate uncertainty. The firm is risk averse and possesses export flexibility in that it can distribute its output to either the domestic market or a foreign market after observing the realized spot exchange rate. To hedge against its exchange rate risk exposure, the firm can trade fairly priced currency call options of an arbitrary strike price. We show that both the separation and the full‐hedging results hold if the strike price of the currency call options is set equal to the ratio of the domestic and foreign selling prices. Otherwise, neither result holds. Specifically, we show that the optimal level of output is always less than that of an otherwise identical firm that is risk neutral. Furthermore, an under‐hedge (over‐hedge) is optimal whenever the strike price of the currency call options is below (above) the ratio of the domestic and foreign selling prices.     

THE EFFECT OF FORWARD MARKETS ON MULTINATIONAL FIRMS

This paper presents a model of a risk averse multinational firm under exchange rate risk. The firm, which owns and controls assets in two countries, is engaged in production, sales and forward contracting whenever forward markets exist. First, we investigate the effects of exchange rate uncertainty without any risk sharing markets. It is shown that the firm internalizes missing hedging markets by increasing foreign production and lowering foreign sales. Therefore the firm hedges by repatriating foreign profits in the form of goods. Second, the implications of the existence of forward markets of global market decisions are discussed. It is shown that a separation theorem holds. This does not imply that the multinational firm shifts all the risk into the forward exchange market.     

Export Flexibility and Hedging

The paper considers a risk-averse international firm which sells its output in either the domestic or the foreign market. The firm possesses export flexibility, and so it can choose between the domestic and export markets after considering the foreign exchange rate. It is shown that a separation property holds if the proper hedging instrument is used: the firm's production depends on market prices and technology and does not depend on its attitude towards risk nor on its expectations. A full-hedge proposition is derived.     

Forward Markets and the Behaviour of the Competitive Firm with Production Flexibility

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty when a forward market for its output is available. The firm possesses production flexibility in that it makes its production decision after the resolution of the output price uncertainty, albeit subject to a capacity constraint on production. We show that the firm optimally acquires a higher level of capacity investment than an otherwise identical firm with no production flexibility. We further show that production flexibility allows the firm to implicitly hedge against its output price risk exposure by the ex post production decision. The firm as such under‐hedges its output price risk exposure in the forward market wherein the forward price contains a non‐positive risk premium.     

OPTIMAL EXPORT AND HEDGING DECISIONS WHEN FORWARD MARKETS ARE INCOMPLETE

This paper examines the behaviour of the competitive firm that exports to two foreign countries under multiple sources of exchange rate uncertainty. There is a forward market between the home currency and one foreign country's currency, but there are no hedging instruments directly related to the other foreign country's currency. We show that the separation theorem holds when the firm optimally exports to the foreign country with the currency forward market. The full‐hedging theorem holds either when the firm exports exclusively to the foreign country with the currency forward market or when the relevant spot exchange rates are independent. In the case that the relevant spot exchange rates are positively (negatively) correlated in the sense of regression dependence, the firm optimally opts for a short (long) forward position for cross‐hedging purposes.     

CROSS‐HEDGING OF EXCHANGE RATE RISKS: A NOTE*

This note studies the optimal production and hedging decisions of a competitive international firm that exports to two foreign countries. The firm faces multiple sources of exchange rate uncertainty. Cross‐hedging is plausible in that one of the two foreign countries has a currency forward market. We show that the firm's optimal forward position is an over‐hedge, a full‐hedge or an under‐hedge, depending on whether the two random exchange rates are strongly positively correlated, uncorrelated or negatively correlated, respectively.     

The effects of abandonment options on operating leverage and forward hedging

This paper examines the behavior of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty when the firm is endowed with an abandonment option and has access to a forward market for its output. When the realized output price is less than its marginal cost, the firm optimally exercises its abandonment option and ceases production. The firm lets its abandonment option extinguish, thereby producing up to its capacity, only when the realized output price exceeds its marginal cost. The ex post exercising of the abandonment option as such convexifies the firm's ex ante profit with respect to the random output price. We show that neither the separation theorem nor the full-hedging theorem holds in the presence of the abandonment option. The firm under-hedges its output price risk exposure in the forward market wherein the forward price contains a nonpositive risk premium. When the set of hedging instruments is expanded to include options, we show that both the separation and full-hedging theorems are restored. We further show that the firm prefers options to forwards for hedging purposes when both types of contracts are fairly priced.     

Exports and Indirect Hedging of Foreign Currency Risk

We present a model of a risk-averse competitive exporting firm under exchange rate risk. Direct hedging instruments are not available. However, there are domestic assets whose prices are correlated to the foreign currency. We consider a market for futures contracts in these domestic assets and investigate the firm's indirect hedging and export policy. It is shown that the availability of many financial instruments correlated with foreign exchange may, under some circumstances, provide the same results as a perfect hedge.
JEL Classification Numbers: F21, F31.     

Modelling information and hedging: The exporting firm

The paper examines the economic role of modelling information on the decision problem of an exporting firm under exchange rate risk and hedging. Information is described in terms of market transparency, i.e., a publicly observable signal conveys more information about the random foreign exchange rate. We analyze the interaction between market transparency and the ex ante expected utility of the exporting firm. It is shown that more transparency on the foreign exchange market may result in higher or lower export production.     

Export,Exchange Rate Risk and Hedging: The Duopoly Case

Abstract. This paper studies a Cournot duopoly in international trade with firms exposed to exchange rate risk. A hedging opportunity is introduced by a forward market on which one firm can trade the foreign currency. We investigate two settings: First, we assume that hedging and output decisions are taken simultaneously. It is shown that hedging is exclusively done for risk‐managing reasons as it is not possible to use hedging strategically. Second, the hedging decision is made before the output decisions. We show that hedging is not only used to manage the risk exposure but also as a strategic device.     

Strategic Foreign Direct Investment and Exchange‐Rate Uncertainty

We investigate how exchange‐rate uncertainty affects the foreign direct investment decision of a risk‐neutral multinational firm (MNF). We assume the firm can open plants, each with decreasing average costs, in two different countries. Under certainty, the MNF would open only one plant. We demonstrate that with sufficient exchange‐rate volatility, the firm can increase expected profits by opening several plants. We also show that if the MNF faces a competitor in the foreign market, the exchange risk, by inducing the MNF to open plants in both markets, may prevent entry by the local competitor.     

The Impact of Regret on Exports

We examine optimal production and export decisions of a firm facing exchange rate uncertainty, where the firm's management is not only risk averse but also regret averse, i.e., is characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex post suboptimal alternatives. Experimental and empirical results support the view that managers tend to be regret averse. Under regret aversion a negative risk premium need not preclude the firm from exporting which would be the case if the firm were only risk averse. Exporting creates an implicit hedge against the possibility of regret when the realized spot exchange rate turns out to be high. The regret‐averse firm as such has a greater ex ante incentive to export than the purely risk averse firm. Finally, we use a two‐state example to illustrate that the firm optimally exports more (less) to the foreign country than in the case of pure risk aversion if the low (high) spot exchange rate is more likely to prevail. Regret aversion as such plays a crucial role in determining the firm's optimal allocation between domestic sales and foreign exports.     

Cyclical dumping and correlated business cycles in imperfect markets: empirical applications to the Canadian pulp and paper industry

This paper deals with theoretical and empirical aspects of firm behaviour under imperfect competition and uncertainty. It contains an analysis of the behaviour of a firm facing a stochastic demand curve for its output in the ordinary (home market), but in addition with access to a backstop (international) market. The theory is thus a variation of the theory of dumping. Since the expected volume in general differs from the volume at the expected price, a price-setting mode is not equal to a quantity mode. Cyclical dumping, in the sense of a negative correlation between domestic and foreign sales, would occur if the firm adhered to a pricing mode in the ordinary market, and was able to learn about the demand conditions in the ordinary market before it decided how much to sell in the international market. The expirical part of the paper is an illustration of how to test for different behavioural modes and cyclical dumping by applying the model to the CAnadian pulp and paper industry. In the empirical exercise the domestic markets are the North American market for pulp and newsprint, while the backstop market are the corresponding European markets. One of the main results of this exercise is that the Canadian industry seems to operate under pricing behaviour for both pulp and newsprint, while cyclical dumping on the European market applies only for pulp.     

Domestic and Foreign Sales When Prices in Both Markets are Uncertain

This paper obtains comparative static results for a firm that sells a single output domestically and abroad when prices in both markets are uncertain. Results are obtained for both constant absolute risk aversion and for Ross decreasing absolute risk aversion, using a diagrammatic analysis which exploits the properties of expected marginal utility contours. The results depend crucially on whether foreign and domestic sales are net substitutes or complements. The model is more complex and yields fewer unambiguous results – particularly in the case of substitutes – than when there is price uncertainty in only one market.     

Tariffs as Signals of Uncompetitiveness

In this paper, a domestic and a foreign firm compete as Cournot duopolists in the domestic market. The foreign firm has incomplete information about the costs of the domestic firm, but the domestic government and the domestic firm are completely informed. It is shown that the domestic government can use its tariff to signal about the costs of the domestic firm. In the separating equilibrium, the domestic government signals the uncompetitiveness of the domestic firm by setting a lower tariff than is optimal under complete information.     

PRICE CONSTRAINTS,FORWARD MARKETS AND THE COMPETITIVE FIRM UNDER PRICE UNCERTAINTY*

This article proposes a model of the competitive firm simultaneously facing price constraints and forward markets under price uncertainty. The incorporation of a forward market is shown to be very important because a risk-averse firm will set its production decision to the forward price regardless of its attitude toward risk. In addition, we show that risk aversion is a sufficient condition for a decrease in risk to reduce the amount hedged when risk is reduced through a mean-preserving price squeeze.     

Risk aversion,exchange‐rate uncertainty,and the law of one price: insights from the market for online air‐travel tickets

Abstract We argue that risk aversion driven by exchange‐rate uncertainty causes a wedge between the domestic and foreign prices of a homogeneous good. We test our hypothesis using a unique micro‐data set from a market with minimum imperfections. The empirical findings validate our hypothesis, as accounting for exchange‐rate uncertainty we are able to explain a significant proportion of deviations from the law of one price. Overall, our analysis suggests the possibility of a new solution to the purchasing power parity puzzles.     

Foreign Direct Investment, Licensing, and Incentives for Innovation

In a two-period duopoly model, this paper considers a foreign firm's choice between licensing and FDI and studies the relative impact of these modes of technology transfer on the incentives for innovation of that firm and its domestic rival. Relative to licensing, FDI limits technology spillovers to the domestic firm but dissipates more rents in the product market. Internalization allows the foreign firm to build on an existing technological advantage. While the local firm develops its best technology if initial licensing is followed by FDI, the foreign firm transfers the most efficient technology under FDI in both periods.