积累性创新、信息不对称和激励

在积累性创新链中,创新收益在序贯创新者之间的分配是一个重要的激励问题,一个良好的创新激励机制应该使得积累性创新的利益在序贯创新者之间进行合理的分配。本文基于信息不对称的假定,研究了积累性创新中最优专利许可费大小和时序决定问题。与Green＆Scotchmer、Scotchmer的结论不同,我们发现,事前专利许可并不一定能够解决先期创新者对后续创新者的敲竹杠行为。本研究为现实中观察到的一些产业中事后专利许可现象提供了理论上的解释。     

非对称信息条件下最优承包合同的研究

承发包双方在合同变更中的机会主义和信息的非对称性,产生了“敲竹杠”和投资过小现象以及隐藏信息的道德风险问题。运用委托-代理理论建立了非对称信息条件下的最优承包合同模型,对上述问题进行了研究。证明在承包商隐藏信息务件下,最优承包合同将使承包商的专用投资水平下降、工程项目工期延长、业主效用降低。     

基于不对称需求信息的激励机制模型研究

针对由单制造商和单销售商组成的供应链,提出了供应链双方需求信息对称情况下的激励机制模型,并在此基础上建立了供应链双方在需求信息不对称情况下的运作策略模型。制造商通过折扣,运用激励相容机制使销售商诚实申报需求信息,使得供应链利润最大化的同时供应链成员实现双赢。数字试验结果表明:①所提策略是有效的;②该策略不仅能提高制造商利润,而且也能改善销售商的利润。     

对称信息情况下开发可再生资源的激励问题研究

本文用委托一代理理论研究了对称信息情况下政府管理可再生资源开发活动的激励问题。通过对立并分析资源可持续开发的数学模型表明,政府实施生态平衡管理有助于降低开发人对可生资源的开发努力,在政府及开发人都是风险中性的条件下,激励合同不仅依赖于所观察到的产出,而且依赖于生物种群的内禀增长率。     

Incentive Contract and Weather Risk

We study contracts designed to remunerate a farmer for the production of an ecosystem service with the payment dependent on the results of the farmer’s actions and on weather conditions. Two contracts are proposed: the first takes into account both the results of the farmer’s actions and a weather variable that reflects the actual atmospheric conditions during the life of the contract; the second bases the payment on the results alone incorporating only the average effect of weather. Social welfare is optimal when both the results and the specific atmospheric conditions are taken into account; however, this type of contract may be less acceptable to the farmer due to his perception of the level of risk involved.We thank two referees for valuable comments.     

An Asymmetric Information Model of Lockouts

This note proposes an asymmetric information model of collective bargaining where the firm has the bargaining power and the union the private information. Results show that the firm may use lockouts to induce the union to reveal its private information.     

企业人力资本与激励性契约

本文通过对企业的本质论述,把企业家定义为在具有"不完备性"的企业和约中有权支配和使用其他生产要素的那部分人力资本的产权主体,并通过对企业组织中各种人力资本的产权特征的分析,指出产权完整的企业家必须对产权残缺的工人和经理进行有效的激励,从而形成一种激励性契约,才能有效降低企业组织费用,实现企业对资源的有效配置。     

Equilibrium Partner Switching in a Bargaining Model With Asymmetric Information

We study a model in which the seller of an indivisible object faces two potential buyers and makes an offer to either of them in each period. We find that the seller's ability to extract surplus from them depends crucially on the value of the cost of switching from one buyer to the next. If the seller is pessimistic about the buyers' valuations and there is a switching cost, however small, then the market is a natural bilateral monopoly; the second buyer is never called on. If the switching cost is zero, or if the seller is optimistic, then switching, and possibly recall of the original buyer, may occur.     

基于契约经济学的公司激励契约的完备性分析

委托-代理理论对于建立完备契约,防治机会主义行为具有重要意义.通过比较分析三种参数化的委托-代理模型得出如下结论:在当前制度和市场环境下,委托人若以企业的净资产现金利润率为基础评价代理人的经营业绩,并以适当的标准强制发放现金股利,则代理契约的完备程度将增加,控股股东掠夺小股东和职业经理侵害外部股东利益等代理问题也将得到有效解决.     

转型期国有企业经营者的激励机制与激励契约

企业是要素市场一系列契约的结点。对企业经营者的激励契约问题进行研究,具有重要的现实意义。利用“激励相容”机制,可以实现“个人理性”和“集体理性”的统一。从博弈理论的角度来看,“激励相容”达到的是一个“纳升均衡”状态,这是达到帕累托最优的必要条件。     

The Simple Analytics of the Principal-Agent Incentive Contract

Going beyond previous studies of the effectiveness of high school economics courses, Saunders reports on his research findings which suggest that “as one moves from the Recogrtition and Understanding questions … through the Simple Application questions to the Complex Application questions, the differences in favor of those with high school economics become smaller….” The implications of these results for the introductory college course are discussed, with some specific suggestions for the course's content and orientation.     

信息不对称资本市场的实验研究

我们采用经济学实验研究方法构建了信息不对称的实验室资本市场,研究信息是否可以通过市场迅速传递。实验结果表明,在信息不对称的情况下,资本市场是非有效的;市场对信息的传递和价格反应是有条件的而且也是需要时间的;资本市场中的投资者并非完全理性,而是具有认知和行为偏差的普通人,存在过度自信和过度交易的情况;信息不对称还可能引起市场操纵行为,从而导致价格泡沫的形成。     

Asymmetric Information in Simple Bargaining Games: An Experimental Study

Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at stake: in some cases, the proposer is better informed, in others, it is the responder. We analyze the effects of both types of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto power: the ultimatum and the dictator game. We find that the extent to which proposers demand less in the ultimatum as compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information position. Further we find informed proposers to exploit their informational advantage by offering an amount that does not reveal the true size of the pie, with proposers in the ultimatum game exhibiting this behavioral pattern to a larger extent than those in the dictator game. Uninformed proposers risk imposed rejection when they ask for more than potentially is at stake, and ask for a risk premium in dictator games. We concentrate on proposers, but also explore responder behavior: We find uninformed responders to enable proposers’ hiding behavior, and we find proposer intentionality not to play an important role for informed responders when they decide whether to accept or reject an offer by an (uninformed) proposer.     

信息不对称下金融衍生工具的风险成因

信息不对称是金融衍生工具风险形成的主要原因.在金融衍生工具公司内部、交易者、经纪机构、监管者之间存在着信息不对称,容易引发逆向选择和道德风险问题.本文运用博弈论方法,通过分析衍生工具公司内部所有者与交易员之间的委托代理问题,说明了收益比率和风险选择是造成交易员过度承担风险的主要原因.     

Asymmetric Information and Annuities

The standard Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) analysis of adverse selection economies is extended to a particular model of annuity market which features both elements of moral hazard and adverse selection. Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to time preferences and they make investments in health care that affect their survival probabilities. The main case considered is that where both preferences and investments (and hence the endogenous survival probabilities) are unobserved. Thus, the model captures a further source of inefficiency that is particular to annuity market: an endogenous correlation between the desire for annuities and the survival probabilities. The basic insights of Wilson (1977) —as worked out by Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled (1985) —are worth also in this new setting. When the equilibrium is separating, the government intervention may yield Pareto improvements. If the equilibrium is pooling, the government intervention may improve the well‐being of individuals affected by the inefficiencies and the negative externalities caused by the asymmetric information.     

非对称信息下政府对企业节能减排激励机制研究

综合考虑经济增长与节能减排的双重任务,将消费者购买行为、节能减排努力准入标准、政府监督信号考虑在内,构建了政府与企业之间的多任务委托‐代理模型。分别探讨了对称信息和非对称信息下政府如何设计有效的激励机制,鼓励和引导企业积极进行节能减排。结果表明:节能减排努力市场准入标准越高,政府应给与企业越多的固定补贴;政府应根据观测到的企业不同节能减排努力水平设计激励机制;政府监督对促进企业节能减排具有重要作用。     

回购契约下供需双方利润激励问题研究

对一个供应链实施回购契约,需要保证供需双方的利润水平都不比分散式决策下的水平差。基于这个约束条件,主要阐述了两方面的工作:首先进行了契约可行性分析,验证了需方通过契约,一定能够得到更多利润,而供方却不一定能够得到更多利润;其后,采用一个参数修正的办法,解决了供应商利润激励的问题,最终实现了供应链系统在回购契约下完全的优化协调。     

信息不对称条件下的科研基金监管研究

科研基金管理关系着我国科技事业的未来发展。通过建立博弈局中人——财政部门和科研单位的不对称信息博弈模型,研究博弈双方的混合策略纳什均衡和策略反应函数,并在混合策略纳什解的基础上,提出了提高科研基金监督效果的政策建议。     

不对称信息与风险投资——一个博弈分析框架

风险投资体制作为解决不对称信息问题的一种低交易成本的契约安排,是参与人之间层层博弈后达成的均衡结果,本文剖析了不对称信息与风险投资之间的关系,从一个完整的博弈框架出发,探讨可能的解决方案,包括内生的契约,如有限合伙制、分阶段多轮次投资、投资工具选择、报酬体系等,外生的机制,如法律框架、资本市场、风险投资家市场等.