On the Endogenous Choice between Protection and Promotion

In a model of strategic interaction between firms in lobbying activity, I show that capitalists might prefer tariffs (protection) to production subsidies (promotion). This is due to the congestion problem arising from the government's convex welfare costs of providing subsidies as opposed to both the free-rider problem and the congestion problem acting in opposite directions in the case of tariffs. If an industry association exists, coordination can be achieved when lobbying for tariffs, but not in the case of production subsidies.     

The United States is a Small Country in World Trade*

Despite being the largest country in world trade and thus presumably having high optimal tariffs, the United States has long had low and declining levels of protection. This paradox suggests that the United States is failing to exploit its monopsony power by levying optimal tariffs. Using data on world output and trade flows, we find that the United States is a small country in world trade in that its trade policies have negligible impacts on world prices. In the median manufacturing industry, US tariffs reduce world prices by only 0.12%. United States optimal tariffs are also typically small (3.6% in the median industry) and are lower than existing US tariffs in most industries. It is no puzzle that the United States has been a champion of free trade since the 1930s—the United States, like other small countries, benefits economically from tariff reductions.     

Market Structure and Foreign Direct Investment

During the last decade the extent of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in the US has increased dramatically. An important aspect of industries where most FDI takes place is their high level of concentration. This paper investigates how strategic interactions among domestic and foreign producers influence the structure of the industry. Especially, it focuses on the foreign firms' choice between exporting versus servicing these markets by investing in a plant located in the host country when facing competition from a domestic oligopoly. The empirical investigation reveals that the relationship between FDI and tariffs is not as simple as previously thought. In highly concentrated industries, where strategic behavior may play an important role, high tariffs rather than low tariffs may lead to less FDI and more imports.     

Endogenous trade policy in general equilibrium: An interaction of redistribution rule,trade openness,and labor market condition

Using a general equilibrium framework, the paper derives trade policy endogenously for a small country. It shows that, contrary to the existing literature, a lobbying industry is not guaranteed trade protection; it may even face trade taxes. Besides lobbying, trade policy depends on other factors such as the trade revenue distribution rule, income distribution across groups, trade openness, factor substitutability in production, industry employment size, and labor market flexibility. The paper also shows that the observed phenomenon of government preference for import tariffs over export subsidies—a long overdue puzzle—is an inherent outcome of lobbying equilibrium. It also shows that trade policies such as import tariffs and export taxes that have the same impact on economic market—Lerner symmetry (1936)—are driven by the same forces in the political market.     

Electoral systems and protectionism: an industry‐level analysis

Our paper advances the previous literature on the relationship between electoral systems and trade protection in several ways. First, our paper is the first to incorporate disaggregated, product‐level data in a cross‐country study. We find that prior cross‐country results, based on national average tariffs, mask a great deal of underlying industry‐level variation. Second, we introduce an innovative proxy for geographic concentration of ownership that varies both by industry and by country. We find that geographic concentration helps to explain the industry heterogeneity. Greater geographic concentration is linked to higher average tariffs, a finding consistent with the theoretical model.     

Land inequality and the transition to modern growth

Can the initial distribution of land, in a country's early history, affect its subsequent economic development? In this paper, I show that when land ownership is sufficiently concentrated, the landed elite will lobby the government to raise barriers to industrialization in order to protect its rents in the rural economy. I develop a small open economy model in which barriers take the form of tariffs on the imports of intermediate inputs used in industry. Such tariffs can affect both the timing and the pace of industrialization. The quantitative application of the theory is motivated by an important question in economic history: why did Argentina not replicate Canadian economic success, despite reasonable expectations to the contrary in the late 19th century? I provide evidence that Argentina had a markedly higher inequality in land ownership than Canada. Taking as given the observed differences in land distributions in the early 20th century, the model produces differences in equilibrium tariffs similar to the ones observed at the time, and the ones required to account for the Canadian–Argentine income gap until 1950. Over time however, as land becomes unimportant in production, land inequality ceases to be a source of policy disparities and income gaps.     

A Simple Characterization of the Second‐best Two‐part and Block‐rate Tariffs Theory and Applications

The general necessary optimality conditions for second‐best discrete multipart tariffs are rather complex. In this paper, we derive a simplified characterization of these conditions for two‐part tariffs and for block‐rate tariffs for given thresholds of these tariffs. The simplified necessary optimality conditions are equivalent to the necessary conditions for a Ramsey‐optimum for goods with continuously variable individually demanded quantities. We demonstrate that this characterization of second‐best multipart tariffs can be helpful, when applying the usual regulatory mechanisms to these tariffs. In particular, we consider Vogelsang–Finsinger (1979) regulation as well as a particular form of price‐cap regulation which is related to the Laspeyres index of prices.     

中美“轮胎特保案”对我国轮胎业及宏观经济的影响——基于GTAP模型的一般均衡分析

美国宣布自2009年9月26日起对我国输美轮胎征收为期三年的惩罚性关税。本文利用GTAP模型就中美"轮胎特保案"对我国轮胎产业及宏观经济的影响进行模拟分析。结果表明:高于25%的惩罚性关税不仅给我国对美轮胎出口、轮胎产出与价格、贸易平衡以及产业收入与就业带来一定的负面冲击,也将对我国整体对外贸易条件、GDP增长及社会总福利产生不同程度的消极影响。     

Industry structure and trade policy under fluctuating import prices

When subsidies and tariffs are applied to imports with fluctuating prices, it is shown that the output response of domestic producers depends on market structure and their attitude toward risk. The domestic industry response is contrasted under two types of market structure, a monopoly and a competitive industry. Some unanticipated results suggest caution in the implementation of trade policy.     

Two-part tariffs in the online gaming industry: The role of creative destruction and network externalities

Playing computer games online is a fast growing, billion dollar industry which has received little academic attention. The industry exhibits a number of interesting economic features. The industry structure is determined by creative destruction as in Aghion and Howitt (1992) [Aghion, P., Howitt, P. 1992. A model of growth through creative destruction, Econometrica, 60(2), 323–351], with game makers experiencing market power within a genre until the game is superceded. Furthermore, the attractiveness of playing a game online depends on the existence of opponents (positive network externalities) while technical and reputational problems eventually arise (negative network externalities). We model the choice of two-part tariffs by a monopolist under creative destruction and network externalities and derive conditions for the multiple equilibria which currently exist in the industry.     

Tariff Elimination and the Wage Gap in an Industrial Specific Factors Model*

A specific factors model of 458 US manufacturing industries simulates the effects of eliminating manufacturing tariffs on unskilled and skilled wages. The model assumes constant elasticity substitution, industry‐specific capital inputs, and mobile unskilled and skilled labor. Tariff elimination slightly lowers both unskilled and skilled wages, and increases the skilled wage gap. Industry outputs and capital returns absorb the negative impact of the falling tariffs with losses concentrated in more highly protected industries and most industries enjoying small positive outcomes.     

Trade, Technology and UK Wage Inequality

This paper examines the impact of international trade and technical change on changes in the UK skill premium. We first measure trade as changes in product prices and technical change as TFP growth. Then we relate price and TFP changes to a set of underlying forces. Among our results are (a) changes in prices, not TFP, were the major force behind the rise in inequality in the 1980s; (b) changes in OECD prices and UK tariffs significantly raised 1980s skill premia through their effects on prices, and that industry concentration significantly raised 1980s skill premia through its effect on TFP.     

Common markets and trade liberalization

Abstract.  The GATT Rounds show that trade liberalization is essentially a cooperative non‐stationary dynamic process. Therefore, the impact of Regionalism on trade liberalization possibly changes over time. I adapt the trade liberalization model of Devereux (1997) to examine how this impact varies. Common markets lead to a one‐time shock in immediate tariffs, as well as to a change in their rate of decline. I find that common markets that happen late in the trade liberalization process are more likely to lead to a decline in immediate tariffs. Common markets also increase the rate of decline of tariffs after their formation. JEL Classification: F03, F15     

Subsidies for renewable energies in the presence of learning effects and market power

We study the impact of learning by doing, learning spill-overs, and imperfect competition in a model with two types of electricity producers, an oligopolistic sector of polluting fossil-fuel utilities and a competitive fringe of non-polluting generators of electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E). Furthermore we consider an upstream industry of RES-E equipment producers engaged in learning by doing. We show that a first-best policy requires two instruments, a tax in the fossil-fuel sector and an output subsidy for RES-E equipment producers. We then study second-best-optimal feed-in tariffs that are paid to the generators of RES-E. By means of simulations we calculate the welfare loss of a second-best-optimal feed-in-tariff policy and analyze how market structure impacts on second-best-optimal feed-in tariffs.     

Calculating the welfare costs of import restrictions in the imperfect substitutes model

This paper supplies equations for partial-equilibrium calculations of the welfare effects of tariffs and quotas when the imported good and the competing domestic good are imperfect substitutes in demand. The equations take into account the response of the price of the domestic substitute. Although other studies have acknowledged this response, they have failed to account for it in their welfare calculations. To demonstrate the importance of this response, it is shown how it affects the calculations for the welfare costs of tariffs and quotas on US imports of footwear. It is shown that ignoring the response of domestic prices leads to significant overstatement of the welfare costs of tariffs and significant understatement of the welfare costs of quotas for the industry.     

国际货物运输代理业经营风险及其控制

国际货物运输代理业是国际商品流通过程的必然产物,也是国际贸易不可缺少的重要组成部分。国际货物运输代理业所面临的风险主要有货物损毁、员工或操作人员的错误或过失、对第三人责任、罚款与关税、费用等。根据风险控制理论与方法,国际货物运输代理业风险控制的方法主要有加强员工在职教育训练、签订完整的合同、明确约定标准交易条件、作出财产状况征信、投保责任险等。     

Endowments,Specialization, and Policy

The paper explores the relationship between industry shares in production and their determinants including factor endowments, technology, and government policies, in a GDP–function framework. We use a new international panel dataset on production and trade compiled by the World Bank. As an intermediate step we calculate Hicks‐neutral productivity indices that vary across industries, time, and countries. We find that own‐TFP is robustly associated with industry shares across time and countries and that, after correcting for these productivity differences, output shares are related to factor endowments (Rybczynski effects) in a plausible way. Once Rybczynski effects are controlled for, we find little evidence of demand‐side policies (import tariffs) affecting the allocation of resources; we find, however, more role for supply‐side policies as the relative size of capital‐intensive industries is positively associated with infrastructure–capital endowments.     

Welfare Effects of Tariff Reduction Formulas

World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations rely on tariff reduction formulas. Formula approaches are of increasing importance in trade talks, because of the large number of countries involved, the wider dispersion in initial tariffs (e.g. tariff peaks), and gaps between bound and applied tariff rates. This paper presents a two country intra‐industry trade model with heterogeneous firms subject to high and low tariffs. We examine the welfare effects of applying three different tariff reduction formulas discussed in the literature that were used and proposed in previous and current General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO negotiations (1) a proportional cut, (2) the Swiss formula and (3) a tiered formula. No single formula dominates for all conditions. The ranking of the three tools depends on the degree of product differentiation in the industry and the achieved reduction in the average tariff.     

Trade liberalization and the inter-industry wage premia: the missingf role of productivity

The literature concerning the effect of tariffs on the inter-industry wage premium has not addressed the role of total factor productivity (TFP) in determining both the wage premium and tariffs. This omission not only overlooks an important determinant of wage premium but also invalidates the use of the pre-reform tariff level as an instrument for the change in tariffs. Based on an analysis of Colombian data, I find that including TFP in the estimated model of the effects of tariffs on the wage premium leads to a 41% decrease in the effect of tariffs on the inter-industry wage premium relative to the model that omits TFP. More specifically, a 10 percentage point decrease in tariffs reduces the wage premium by 1.01%, whereas a 10% increase in TFP raise wage premium by 1.6%. This finding suggests the importance of using policies that boost productivity to offset the effect of tariffs on the wage premium.     

Political support for trade policy in the European Union

We adopt the Stigler–Peltzman model of policy-making as developed by Hillman for application to the politics of international trade, in which the government is represented by a political support function trading-off the industry rents stemming from protection against the losses accruing to the general population. As a starting point, we examine the economic impact of actual government action as revealed by the structure of protection, backing out the weights implied by the marginal welfare effects of the set of EU import tariffs across sectors. We build on Tyers' application of methods to international trade employing a numerical general equilibrium model of the EU. This captures direct marginal effects of sector-level protection on protected industries, indirect effects on upstream and downstream industries, and the effect on overall welfare. We then deconstruct the revealed weighting pattern along the lines of industry nationality and related industry characteristics.