Vertical R&D Spillovers,Cooperation, Market Structure,and Innovation

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied: no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three "competitive externalities" (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors decreases R&D when horizontal spillovers are low; the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers are sufficiently high, and/or when horizontal cooperation is combined with vertical cooperation.     

R&D policy in a vertically related industry

In this paper, we analyze the effectiveness of public policy aimed to stimulate business-performed R&D in a vertically related market. We examine the role of an R&D active upstream supplier in a four-stage R&D model, where we incorporate public funding. The considered policy instrument is direct funding of firms’ R&D efforts. We calculate the optimal policies and show that they have a positive impact on firms’ R&D investments. From a welfare point of view, it is optimal to differentiate the subsidy rates between the upstream and the downstream markets. Competition in the product market leads to a higher subsidy rate to the upstream supplier than to the downstream firms. When concentration is high in the downstream market, the optimal solution is an R&D subsidy for these firms, otherwise the optimal solution is an R&D tax for the downstream firms.     

Spillovers,product innovation and R&D cooperation: a theoretical model

ABSTRACT

We analyze the impact of post-innovation knowledge spillovers on firms’ decisions to invest and cooperate in R&D, forming a research joint venture (RJV). We study the case of two potential investors involved in a non-tournament stochastic competition for developing a new but imitable product. We propose a theoretical model where cooperation may emerge as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a three-stage game. In the first stage, firms decide whether to cooperate; in the second, they decide whether to invest; and in the third, they compete. We show that firms cooperate in R&D when the spillovers are high enough and the fixed costs associated with R&D activities are low enough; however, our analysis suggests that forming an RJV may not always be socially optimal, and subsidizing R&D cooperation may not be efficient. We propose an optimal scheme of subsidies, which should be designed according to the intensity of the spillovers, the level of the R&D costs, and the probability of innovation success. Finally, we show that in the case of mergers the private incentive to invest is maximized, and firms may not need public subsidies to cooperate. When subsidies are costly, not hindering mergers may be the second-best solution.     

R&D policy with layers of economic integration

This paper examines whether the optimal unilateral R&D policy for an open economy is a subsidy or a tax. It constructs a general equilibrium model with three successive layers of international integration: (a) trade in goods, (b) trade in technologies with international R&D spillovers and (c) internationally-coordinated R&D policy. Trade in technologies introduces the possibility that an R&D subsidy will have such strong, negative terms-of-trade effects that it harms domestic welfare. Numerical simulations of the OECD show this is a possibility for the US and Japan. With international R&D spillovers a domestic R&D subsidy may reduce domestic innovation.     

Strategic timing in R&D agreements

We study the endogenous formation of R&D agreements in a R&D/Cournot duopoly model with spillovers where also the timing of R&D investments is endogenous. This allows us to consider the incentives for firms to sign R&D agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs are sufficiently low, firms may find difficult to maintain a stable agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In this case, the stability of an agreement requires that the joint investment occurs at the initial stage, thus avoiding any delay. When spillovers are sufficiently high, the coordination of R&D efforts becomes a profitable option, although firms may also have an incentive to sequence noncooperatively their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and knowledge mainly leaks from the leader to the follower, investing as follower may become extremely profitable, making R&D agreements hard to sustain unless firms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D.     

Assessing the influence of differentiation strategy and R&D subsidies on R&D cooperation

This paper explores the R&D cooperation determinants of the innovative companies belonging to the Spanish manufacturing sector. Our findings suggest that the variable R&D subsidy is endogenous, significant, and has a strong positive influence on R&D cooperation. This is a clear indication that the achievement of public aid is often conditioned by the obligation for companies to cooperate in R&D. We have also found that the differentiation strategy variable is significant and has a negative influence on R&D cooperation. Companies positioned in a differentiation strategy probably own and use some different knowledge from other companies. Consequently, they will not have much interest in taking advantage of the spillovers generated by other companies. It is therefore logical that they are reluctant to establish cooperation agreements on R&D. Therefore, companies positioned in the differentiation strategy need public policies to support R&D that are not conditioned to the establishment of cooperation agreements.     

Revisiting measure of R&D spillovers: empirical evidence on OECD countries and industries

Using data for 17 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries over 29 years for 28 industries, this paper estimates industry-wise research and development (R&D) spillovers from the largest R&D investors and the most R&D-intensive industries that contribute 80% of global R&D. In doing so, it tests several assumptions made in the literature, and data rejecting them, proposes a methodology on R&D return estimation devoid of these assumptions. Results show that R&D has substantial spillovers, justifying R&D support policy. Each dollar of R&D generates about 29 cents in spillovers domestically and 4 cents in foreign countries. However, both intra- and inter-industry spillovers vary by industries, implying that the policy of supporting each R&D dollar uniformly across industries is suboptimal. Contrary to industry heterogeneity, the R&D spillovers from an industry do not vary substantially across countries, suggesting that optimal R&D policy across OECD countries might be uniform. An industry-by-industry technology matrix shows that sometimes an idea generates a greater impact on other industries than where it is generated.     

STRATEGIC R&D AND NETWORK COMPATIBILITY

We analyse the effects of network externalities in strategic R&D competition. We present a model of two firms competing with R&D investments and prices in a differentiated consumer market. Buyers form firm-specific networks which can be compatible. A high degree of compatibility and large spillovers moderate price competition due to weak strategic value of firm-specific networks and R&D investments, respectively. Asymmetry in product qualities brings out network effects that cancel out in conventional symmetric settings. The lower quality firm increases R&D and decreases its price as spillovers or network compatibility is increased. This happens when R&D and firm-specific network size have high strategic value.     

R&D,free entry,and social inefficiency

We employ a three-stage game model with cost-reducing research and development (R&D) that is subject to spillovers to consider the problem of excess entry under free-entry equilibrium relative to the social optimum. Firms choose to enter or exit a market in the first stage, choose R&D in the second stage and output in the final stage. Results show that there is socially inefficient or excessive entry in equilibrium. However, we uniquely demonstrate that research spillovers hold the key to whether established results regarding socially inefficient entry hold. Specifically, excessive entry occurs as long as research spillovers are relatively small, but this is not necessarily the case with large spillovers. Some policy implications are discussed.     

A computational analysis of R&D support programs

We compare two common government R&D support programs, R&D tax credits and direct R&D grants. To study their effectiveness and the extent to which their design matters, we analyze these programs within a dynamic equilibrium model of imperfectly competitive industries. Adopting comprehensive welfare measures that take into account government, producer and consumer surpluses, we find that both schemes exhibit positive social returns. Mid-range R&D-intensive sectors exhibit higher social returns than either high or low R&D-intensive sectors. Both incentive schemes generate positive measures of R&D input additionality of magnitudes consistent with empirical R&D research. However, R&D grants that require firms to allocate subsidy funds to R&D spur less R&D than a more flexible R&D tax credit. Subsidy schemes can even induce competing firms to over-spend on R&D, generating negative producer surplus and possibly negative social returns.     

R&D and foreign direct investment with asymmetric spillovers

This paper analyzes how firms’ R&D investment decisions are affected by asymmetries in knowledge transmission, considering different sources of asymmetry such as unequal know-how management capabilities and spillovers localization within an international oligopoly. We show that a better ability to manage knowledge flows incentivizes the firm to invest more in R&D. By introducing geographically bounded spillovers, we also find that one-way foreign direct investment (FDI) stimulates the multinational enterprise to raise its own R&D and that an FDI equilibrium is more likely to occur. Finally, spillovers localization leading to two-way FDI is welfare improving when compared with non-localized spillovers.     

Trade-related R&D Spillovers in Vietnamese Manufacturing

ABSTRACT

This study aims to examine how Vietnamese manufacturing could benefit from R&D investment locally and from OECD countries through trade during a period marked with major trade liberalisations. Using the industry-level data during 2000–2009, it finds that the foreign R&D has accounted for the most part of the R&D spillovers in the sector, with a larger proportion earning from the other foreign industries’ R&D. The domestic industries’ own R&D has improved the sector’s total factor productivity, but in a relatively smaller magnitude compared to the foreign sources. In examining the localised effects of R&D spillovers in Vietnamese manufacturing, the results reiterate the important roles of trade-embedded foreign R&D spillovers from Japan, the US, South Korea, and Germany in the sector’s total factor productivity growth. These findings altogether give support to foreign technology diffusion as a major conduit for growth prospects in Vietnamese manufactures.     

Strategic R&D policy under multiproduct duopoly and quality-price competition

This paper analyses strategic R&D policy in a third-country trade model where multiproduct firms with different production technologies compete in a vertically differentiated market. I show that the optimal R&D policies for both countries are subsidies when the product market is under price competition.     

The effectiveness of R&D subsidies

In this paper, the effectiveness of R&D subsidies is analyzed in an oligopolistic model that we apply to the cases of international R&D competition and cooperation. We find that the existence of asymmetric information among firms on whether a rival (or partner) is being subsidized or not may play a key role in explaining whether subsidies are effective or not in increasing R&D investments. In particular, it is shown that if the existence of the subsidy is made public (e.g. because strict information release regulation about R&D subsidies is enforced) and depending on the strategic relationship between the firms’ R&D efforts, an R&D subsidy could even hurt the subsidized firm.     

Infra-industry spillovers and R&D cooperation: Theory and evidence

We analyse both the theoretical and the empirical side of the issue of R&D spillovers. Each firm's R&D costs are increasing in the amount of information transmitted to other firms, and we account for the possibility that firms control spillovers. We consider both Cournot-Nash and Cournot-Stackelberg behavior. The empirical analysis suggests that (i) firms' control on spillovers is relatively low; (ii) the cost-saving effect associated to joint ventures or R&D cartels is confirmed for industries where firms rely mainly upon own R&D as a source of innovation; (iii) R&D cooperation may increase information sharing, thereby enhancing spillovers.     

Strategic Product R&D Investment Policy under International Rivalry in the Presence of Demand Spillover Effects

Abstract

We develop a model of product (i.e., quality-improving) research and development (R&D) investment competition in a horizontally differentiated duopoly. In particular, based on a third-country market model, we consider the optimal product R&D investment policy under international rivalry in the presence of demand spillover effects associated with improving the quality level of a product. We show how the optimality of a non-cooperative and a cooperative R&D investment policy depends on the strength of demand spillover effects. Furthermore, we consider the same issues in the case of heterogeneous consumers and alternative utility functions.     

Strategic Exports and R&D with Internationally Mobile Skilled Labor and Exchange Rate Volatility*

This paper extends the Spencer and Brander (1983) model of strategic exports and R&D by introducing exchange rate volatility and R&D activities that require internationally mobile skilled labor. We find that an increased volatility reduces both the levels of optimal export subsidy and R&D tax. We also find that the endogeneity of skilled wage increases the level of export subsidy and reduces the level of R&D tax if the country is an exporter of skilled labor.     

R&D and productivity: evidence from large UK establishments with substantial R&D activities

ABSTRACT

We use Office for National Statistics' micro data for large UK establishments in the production industries in the period 1997–2008 to study the relationship between their productivity and the presence of substantial R&D activities, either at the production unit itself, or at other UK reporting units owned by the same enterprise group. We estimate that total factor (revenue) productivity is on average about 14% higher at the establishments which have substantial R&D themselves, compared to those with no R&D. Among the establishments with no R&D themselves, we estimate that productivity is on average about 9% higher at those which belong to enterprise groups which do have substantial R&D elsewhere in the UK in the same sub-sector. For the establishments with substantial R&D themselves, we also estimate a significant positive relationship between current productivity and past R&D expenditure using dynamic specifications which allow for both establishment-specific ‘fixed effects’ and a serially correlated error component.     

University patents,R&D competition,and social welfare

Although university patenting has increased dramatically over the past three decades, debates persist regarding the broad economic implications of the phenomenon. This article examines the social welfare implications of university patenting in a model of R&D competition in which firms develop innovations on the basis of the disclosure of a university invention. When such disclosure does not preempt the patenting of downstream innovations, university patenting enhances social welfare only if a regime of open access to university inventions is characterized by excessive aggregate R&D from the viewpoint of social welfare. When the university invention disclosure preempts patenting on firms’ innovations, the nature of the open access equilibrium in the R&D market depends on the threat of imitation ex post. Only when the threat of imitation is sufficiently strong firms will not invest in downstream R&D in the open access regime. In this case, university patenting promotes R&D investment and increases social welfare.     

The impact of public R&D expenditure on business R&D*

This paper attempts to quantify the aggregate net effect of government funding on business R&D in 17 OECD Member countries over the past two decades. Grants, procurement, tax incentives and direct performance of research (in public laboratories or universities) are the major policy tools in the field. The major results of the study are the following: Direct government funding of R&D performed by firms has a positive effect on business financed R&D (except if the funding is targeted towards defence activities). Tax incentives have an immediate and positive effect on business-financed R&D; Direct funding as well as tax incentives are more effective when they are stable over time: firms do not invest in additional R&D if they are uncertain of the durability of the government support; Direct government funding and R&D tax incentives are substitutes: increased intensity of one reduces the effect of the other on business R&D; The stimulating effect of government funding varies with respect to its generosity: it increases up to a certain threshold (about 10% of business R&D) and then decreases beyond; Defence research performed in public laboratories and universities crowds out private R&D; Civilian public research is neutral for business R&D. * We thank the participants to various seminars, including the OECD Committee for Scientific and Technology Policy and the NBER 2000 Summer Institute on Productivity for helpful comments and suggestions. All opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect necessarily the views of the OECD or Université Libre de Bruxelles.