THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION: AN ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION

European monetary unification (EMU) - the creation of a single European currency and a European Central Bank - is both an economic and a political phenomenon. Yet few studies have attempted to address simultaneously the political and economic dimensions of the process. In this introduction, we review and extend the relevant literatures. The evidence leads us to conclude that EMU is driven mainly by political rather than economic factors, although our understanding of even these political forces remains incomplete.     

Competing models of international lending activity

Four competing models of the World Bank's lending to developing countries are constructed and econometrically estimated by pooled time series and cross-section data. The analysis suggests that a model combining economic and political determinants performs best. Besides per capita income, inflation, balance of payment and budget deficit, external debt and past growth, political determinants such as the ‘capitalist’ climate or political instability are also important, as well as a recipient country's former status as a colony or dominion. This politico-economic-model is successfully used to forecast the distribution of IBRD loans and IDA credits among the developing countries.     

HETEROGENEOUS BORROWERS IN QUANTITATIVE MODELS OF SOVEREIGN DEFAULT*

We extend the model used in recent quantitative studies of sovereign default, allowing policymakers of different types to stochastically alternate in power. We show that a default episode may be triggered by a change in the type of policymaker in office, and that such a default is likely to occur only if there is enough political stability and if policymakers encounter poor economic conditions. Under high political stability, political turnover enables the model to generate a weaker correlation between economic conditions and default decisions, a higher and more volatile spread, and lower borrowing levels after a default episode.     

Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?

We investigate whether elected members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the World Bank, using panel data for 157 countries over the period 1970–2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and the number of World Bank projects a country receives, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional, country and year effects. The size of World Bank loans, however, is not affected by UN Security Council membership.     

Response of Asset Prices to Monetary Policy under Abenomics

In this paper, I investigate the causes of the recent sharp response of the yen and Japanese stock prices to the discussion of, and the subsequent implementation of bold monetary easing by the Bank of Japan as demanded by Prime Minister Abe. I present statistical evidence that the response of the two asset prices have indeed been unusually large relative to the past experience with nonconventional monetary policy (NCM) even after allowance is given for the rise in global economic activity and asset prices. I also point out that the rally has been led by speculative trading by foreign investors, while domestic investors have largely stayed on the sidelines. I discuss possible reasons for such foreign investor behavior. Simply put, the unprecedented political pressure raised hopes of the adoption of bold measures by the Bank of Japan. I discuss, however, the possibility that the room for further action by the Bank is quite limited apart from what might be called a targeted helicopter drop of money. I also point out the possibility that investor behavior may have not been based on economic fundamentals. The asset price volatility since April 2013 is interpreted in the light of such discussions.     

The effect of political factors on sovereign default

This aricle examines the effect of political factors on sovereign default. Using a theoretical model, we find that political instability increases the likelihood of default. To test this theoretical implication, we use a panel logit model to estimate the effect of long- and short-run political factors, along with other macroeconomic variables, on the probability of default. Data from 68 developed and developing countries between 1970 and 2010 is used to conduct the study. Our findings suggest that a country is more likely to default when (i) it has a relatively younger political regime in place; (ii) it faces a higher chance of political turnover; and (iii) it has a less democratic political system. Economic factors are also vital; a country with stronger growth and less external debt is less likely to experience sovereign default. Robustness tests using alternative measures of political risk, trade balance and EMBI sovereign bond spreads also support the baseline findings.     

A lattice approach for pricing convertible bond asset swaps with market risk and counterparty risk

This paper proposes a new lattice framework for valuing convertible bonds (CBs) and asset swaps on CBs (CBASs) with market risk and counterparty risk, where interest rate is assumed to follow a mean-reverting square root process. The reduced-form approach is generalized to include a constant elasticity of variance (CEV) process for equity price prior to default. In order to approximate the CEV process while taking into account stochastic interest rate and the correlation between stock price and interest rate, I first propose a transform that is uncorrelated with interest rate, and then construct a new lattice method which can ensure the validity of branching probabilities for all nodes. The lattice framework performs properly when it is used to value European call options. Based on the empirical results in Duffie et al. (J. Fin. Econ. 83(3): 635-665, 2007) and Jankowitsch et al. (J. Bank. Fin. 32(7): 1269-1285, 2008), a novel default intensity process is constructed which is specified as a function of time, stock price, and interest rate. When valuing the asset swaps, the counterparty risk is taken into consideration. Based on the results of the numerical experiments, the impacts of different parameters on the prices of CBs and CBASs are explained.     

Insolvency regimes and firms' default risk under economic uncertainty and shocks

One of the arguments often advanced for implementing a stronger insolvency and bankruptcy framework is that it enhances credit discipline among firms. Using a large cross-country firm-level dataset, we empirically test whether a stronger insolvency regime reduces firms' likelihood of defaulting on their debt. In particular, we examine whether it reduces default risk during increased economic uncertainty and various external shocks. Our results confirm that a stronger insolvency regime moderates the adverse effects of economic shocks on firms' default risk. The effects are more pronounced for firms in the top half of the size distribution. We also explore channels through which improved creditor rights influence firms' default risk, including dependence on external finance, corporate leverage, and managerial ethics. Our main results are robust to an alternative measure of default risk, inclusion of currency and sovereign debt crisis episodes, and alternative estimations.     

The macroeconomic effects of the LTV and LTI ratios in Ireland

We use the Central Bank of Ireland’s Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model to investigate the introduction of regulatory loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios in 2015, which form part of the Central Bank’s macroprudential measures. The main finding is that while the measures dampen economic activity in the short run, they bring benefits in the medium and long run. Household leverage declines, which lowers the default rate on bank loans. Households deleverage and foreign debt decreases significantly.     

Here today,gone tomorrow: Can dynamic incentives make microfinance more flexible?

This paper presents a model of microfinance lending to individuals that uses dynamic incentives, in the form of access to additional loans, to discourage borrowers from strategic default, or the unwillingness to repay a loan once a positive outcome is realized. We propose an improvement on contracts currently used by microfinance institutions (MFIs) by endogenizing the default penalty, while constraining the MFI to maintain sustainable lending operations. Furthermore, accounting for the risks that the poor face by including a negative economic shock, we show that under certain circumstances, the punishment for default need not be a lifetime without loans.     

The elusive costs of sovereign defaults

The evidence supporting the presence of output losses associated with sovereign defaults is based on annual observations and suffers from measurement and identification problems. This paper examines the impact of default on growth using quarterly data and finds that output contractions precede defaults and that output starts growing after the quarter in which the default took place. This indicates that default episodes mark the beginning of the economic recovery and that the negative effects of a default on output are likely to be driven by the anticipation of default, independently of whether or not the country ultimately decides to validate it.     

Political participation and entrepreneurial initial public offerings in China

This paper examines the economic consequences of political participation by entrepreneurs in China. Using unique data on political participation and initial public offerings by entrepreneurial firms, we find that firms controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics exhibit superior post-IPO performance. We also find that firms characterized by political participation are subject to less underpricing. Furthermore, the superior performance is concentrated among firms that operate in an environment characterized by rich rent-seeking opportunities instead of abundant business opportunities, suggesting that political participation is facilitating rent seeking rather than serving simply as a proxy for political recognition for entrepreneurship.     

Advancing Loss Given Default Prediction Models: How the Quiet Have Quickened

We describe LossCalc™ version 2.0: the Moody's KMV model to predict loss given default (LGD), the equivalent of (1  −  recovery rate). LossCalc is a statistical model that applies multiple predictive factors at different information levels: collateral, instrument, firm, industry, country and the macroeconomy to predict LGD. We find that distance‐to‐default measures (from the Moody's KMV structural model of default likelihood) compiled at both the industry and firm levels are predictive of LGD. We find that recovery rates worldwide are predictable within a common statistical framework, which suggests that the estimation of economic firm value (which is then available to allocate to claimants according to each country's bankruptcy laws) is a dominant step in LGD determination. LossCalc is built on a global dataset of 3,026 recovery observations for loans, bonds and preferred stock from 1981 to 2004. This dataset includes 1,424 defaults of both public and private firms – both rated and unrated instruments – in all industries. We demonstrate out‐of‐sample and out‐of‐time LGD model validation. The model significantly improves on the use of historical recovery averages to predict LGD .     

Political freedom and the response to economic incentives: labor migration in Africa, 1972-1987

This study examines the thesis that political institutions and the freedoms and civil rights generated by these institutions affect migration decisions. The hypothesis is based on one stated by Adam Smith in 1776, that economic conditions that reflect greater political freedoms and civil liberties harbor higher levels of resource mobility in response to economic incentives. Pooled cross-sectional and time-series analysis is based on data from the World Bank for 32 African countries during 1972-87. Findings support the hypothesis that migration rate is more affected by the expected returns ratio to labor in countries where civil liberties are greater than in nations with fewer civil liberties. The implication, from the inclusion of institutional factors in the model, is that civil liberties have an indirect impact on the rate of labor migration out of agriculture in Africa. The impact is a mix of economic incentives and civil liberties. In the political rights model, the most free countries had the largest migration elasticity. The findings on political rights impacts support findings by Friedman and McMillan that civil liberties are a more important determinant of economic growth than political rights. Further testing for measurement error confirmed that the data were flawed, but not so greatly that the basic findings were overturned. The migration out of African agriculture was found to be sensitive to the effect of price signals, which were conditioned by the degree of political rights and civil liberties. Policy makers are urged to consider both changes in pricing and institutions.     

Determinants of corporate default risk in China: The role of financial constraints

Corporate default risk can affect financial stability and the macroeconomy. However, the determinants of corporate default risk in China are not well defined in the literature. We address this issue by using a rich credit event dataset of 981 Chinese listed firms over the period 1998–2013 and study the factors that affect default risk. We demonstrate that leverage, liquidity, firm size are the key firm-specific factors in determining default risk in China, along with macroeconomic factors like interest rate and stock return. Moreover, ‘Too big to fail’ only applies to non-SOEs, as default risk of SOEs is not affected by the firm size. We further find that high liquidity fails to reduce firms default risk, because small-sized firms which are financially constrained have limited cash to prevent financial distress, whereas large firms with greater cash holdings are able to mitigate their default risk as they are unconstrained.     

The impact of institutions on financial development: Evidence from East Asian countries

This paper examines the impact of institutions on regional financial development using a panel data model of 11 East Asian countries during 1996–2017. It divides the institutional factors into six economic factors and six legal‐political factors. The analysis demonstrates that the legal‐political institutional factors have a stronger impact on financial development than the economic institutional factors in East Asia. Improvement in institutional quality such as fiscal freedom, business freedom, control of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law can promote financial development. Improvements of these institutional factors facilitate the ability of enterprises to allocate resources and improve the strength of business operations, thereby reducing transaction costs and making the financial operating environment fairer and more efficient. With the improvement of institutional factors, financial development will have more opportunities to develop better. Institutional impacts are more pronounced in the financial development in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Myanmar than in the other countries such as China, Japan, Korea and Singapore.     

Default and liquidity regimes in the bond market during the 2002–2012 period

Using a real‐time random regime shift technique, we identify and discuss two different regimes in the dynamics of credit spreads during 2002–2012: a liquidity regime and a default regime. Both regimes contribute to the patterns observed in credit spreads. The liquidity regime seems to explain the predictive power of credit risk on the 2007–2009 NBER recession, whereas the default regime drives the persistence of credit spreads over the same recession. Our results complement the recent dynamic structural models as well as monetary and credit supply effects models by empirically supporting two important patterns in credit spreads: the persistence and the predictive ability toward economic downturns.     

Global banking and international business cycles

This paper incorporates a global bank into a two-country business cycle model. The bank collects deposits from households and makes loans to entrepreneurs, in both countries. It has to finance a fraction of loans using equity. We investigate how such a bank capital requirement affects the international transmission of productivity and loan default shocks. Three findings emerge. First, the bank's capital requirement has little effect on the international transmission of productivity shocks. Second, the contribution of loan default shocks to business cycle fluctuations is negligible under normal economic conditions. Third, an exceptionally large loan loss originating in one country induces a sizeable and simultaneous decline in economic activity in both countries. This is particularly noteworthy, as the 2007–09 global financial crisis was characterized by large credit losses in the US and a simultaneous sharp output reduction in the US and the Euro Area. Our results thus suggest that global banks may have played an important role in the international transmission of the crisis.     

The Interaction of Financial Fragility and the Business Cycle in Determining Banks’ Loan Losses: An Investigation of the Italian Case

The Basel II capital accord and the recent crises have fostered the debate over the financial stability of the aggregate banking sector. Because loan losses are an important factor for banking stability, this paper aims to gauge the impact of real and financial fragility on default losses of Italian banks. To this end the ratio of non‐performing loans to total loans is regressed on the business cycle and indebtedness. In addition, to capture the joint effect of real and financial fragility, the analysis considers an interaction term, which to our knowledge has never been applied before to Italian default data. Based on the interaction model, results show that the actual impact of financial fragility on default losses depends not only on the business cycle phase but also on the firm's size, whereby in adverse economic conditions, small firms are more significantly affected by financial fragility.     

Political instability: Effects on financial development, roots in the severity of economic inequality

We here bring forward strong evidence that political instability impedes financial development, with its variation a primary determinant of differences in financial development around the world. As such, it needs to be added to the short list of major determinants of financial development. First, structural conditions first postulated by Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) as generating long-term inequality are shown here to have strong empirical support as exogenous determinants of political instability. Second, that exogenously-determined political instability in turn holds back financial development, even when we control for factors prominent in the last decade’s cross-country studies of financial development. The findings indicate that inequality-perpetuating conditions that result in political instability and weak democracy are fundamental roadblocks for international organizations like the World Bank that seek to promote financial development. The evidence here includes country fixed effect regressions and an instrumental model inspired by Engerman and Sokoloff’s (2002) work, which to our knowledge has not yet been used in finance and which is consistent with current tests as valid instruments. Four conventional measures of national political instability – Alesina and Perotti’s (1996) well-known index of instability, a subsequent index derived from Banks’ (2005) work, and two indices of managerial perceptions of nation-by-nation political instability – persistently predict a wide range of national financial development outcomes. Political instability’s significance is time consistent in cross-sectional regressions back to the 1960s, the period when the key data becomes available, robust in both country fixed effects and instrumental variable regressions, and consistent across multiple measures of instability and of financial development. Overall, the results indicate the existence of an important channel running from structural inequality to political instability, principally in nondemocratic settings, and then to financial backwardness. The robust significance of that channel extends existing work demonstrating the importance of political economy explanations for financial development and financial backwardness. It should help to better understand which policies will work for financial development, because political instability has causes, cures, and effects quite distinct from those of many of the key institutions most studied in the past decade as explaining financial backwardness.