Cooperation by way of support in a rent seeking contest for a public good

This paper analyzes the efforts made to influence a decision that can have two outcomes. First, the agents on the same side designate an agent to play the contest for them. The inactive agents can then decide to support this active agent, i.e. pay a percentage of his effort. It is optimal to designate either the agent with the lowest stake (who will receive support from everyone else) or the agent with the highest stake (who will not receive support) as the active agent. We find that the side with the higher aggregate stake may have the lower success probability.     

The allocation of entrepreneurial efforts in a rent-seeking society: Evidence from China

This paper considers four types of entrepreneurial efforts: productive activities, aggressive rent seeking, defense against rent extraction, and leisure. It examines how entrepreneurs allocate efforts when facing dual-dealing relationships with politicians in a rent-seeking society: entrepreneurs not only pursue additional benefits through rent seeking, but also try to avoid extortions by politicians. Using unique city-level and firm-level data across China, we demonstrate that Chinese entrepreneurs survive in a twisted world: ordinary entrepreneurs would desire better institutional environment, but if institutional improvement is not available, they would prefer political connections which are often preoccupied by special interest groups and/or large-sized firms.     

The social cost of rent seeking in Europe

Direct measurement of the social cost of rent seeking is impeded by non-observable and non-reported activities. We use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to compute the social cost of rent seeking in Europe. Our estimate is based on competition among interest groups for privileges provided by governments, including income transfers, subsidies, and preferential tax treatment. The model, which is calibrated to the euro area as a whole and also to individual euro member countries for 1980–2003, performs well vis-à-vis the data. We find that significant proportions of GDP are extracted as rents available to be sought by rent seekers.     

Optimal contest design: volume and timing of rent seeking in contests

This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of rent-seeking contests in terms of the amount and the timing of effort they elicit from the participants. The optimal contest structure—the one that maximizes the discounted sum of efforts—is found to hinge on the degree of impatience of the contest organizers, the more patient of whom prefer longer contests consisting of pairwise matches among the contestants. Heterogeneity of the contestants' quality also turns out to play an important role in the comparison.     

Evidence and explanation for the Tariff-lobbying paradox: endogenous Tariffs fall as protectionist lobbying rises

Recent empirical evidence suggests that U.S. protectionist lobbying expenditures rose while U.S. trade barrier fell. We find that the same result holds in our panel data sample from 28 countries between 1995 and 2011. We find two economic drivers cause the paradox between increasing protectionist lobbying and decreasing trade barrier. First, trade barriers decline as country capital-labour ratio endowments rise because of the rising political and economic power of capital that lobbies for free-trade. Second, factor intensities in production become more similar as factor-intensity convergence. This flattens the production possibility curve between exportable and import-competing production so that changes increased magnification in both factor rewards. In our panel, the magnification parameters are twice as high for capital as for labour (8.6 vs. 5.1). And, the elasticity of the capital return with respect to country capital-labour factor endowment ratios (.59) is nearly twice those of labour (.22). Increased magnification causes thus labour’s increased lobbying for protection to be more than offset by increased capital lobbying against protection. In short, while an increasing labour lobbies for protection as countries advance, combined tariff and non-tariff protection (OTRI) decline significantly as advanced countries get richer. This explains the tariff-protectionist-lobbying paradox.     

股权再融资、盈余管理与大股东的寻租行为

我国上市公司处于大股东的超强控制状态,大股东与中小股东之间存在严重的信息不对称,导致大股东在股权再融资过程中表现出强烈的盈余管理动机.本文研究了我国资本市场参与者的行为与盈余管理之间的关系,并分析了对资本配置效率的影响效应.大股东通过操纵报告盈余来改变会计盈余的时间分布和误导投资者,从而攫取更多的隐性收益,造成资本市场配置效率的降低.研究结果表明:(1)大股东通过盈余管理在股权再融资过程中可以获得中小股东无法得到的隐性收益;(2)大股东的收益随着盈余管理程度的增加而提升,中小股东的财富随着盈余管理程度的增加而降低;(3)盈余管理程度的增加将降低上市公司的资本配置效率和企业价值.因此,大股东通过盈余管理实现了对小股东财富的掠夺效应,造成了上市公司资本配置效率、公司价值、声誉和后续融资能力的下降.     

Rent Control and Prices of Owner-occupied Housing

We examine the relation between rent control and prices of owner-occupied housing in the presence of different qualities of housing. While a rent ceiling and the price of condominiums are substitutes if housing is undifferentiated, it is shown that this is not necessarily the case when housing differs in quality. A complete dismantling of rent control may in fact increasethe price of condominiums.
JEL Classification D45; D49; R21     

基于West模型的房地产泡沫的实证研究--以北京、上海、深圳为例

本文简要回顾了关于房地产泡沫的研究框架,在West模型的基础上,运用房地产合理价格是租金资本化的原理,对北京、上海和深圳的房地产市场是否存在泡沫作了实证检验.结果表明:北京住宅市场、上海住宅市场以及深圳写字楼市场在样本期内的检验结果拒绝原假设,即市场存在着泡沫现象;北京写字楼市场、上海写字楼市场和深圳住宅市场检验结果为接受原假设,即不能判断市场存在泡沫现象.本文提出了一些政策建议.     

Political Economy of Industrial Development in Vietnam’s Telecommunications Industry: A Rent Management Analysis

This article contributes to the current debate in economics on the uses and benefits of rents and rent seeking. On the one hand, public choice and neoliberal scholars highlight the redistributive and damaging aspects of rent seeking, thus rendering the policy suggestion to completely eradicate rents and rent seeking in an economy. On the other hand, institutional and development economists point out the inherent theoretical inconsistencies shown in the earlier models, and suggest that certain types of rent and rent seeking could be growth-enhancing. Using the Developmental Rent Management Analysis, this article assesses the industrial development of the telecommunications industry in Vietnam using two case studies. Qualitative research points out a number of rent management factors contributing both to the industry’s failure before the early 2000s and its subsequent success thereafter. The successful development of the telecommunications industry was fundamentally based on (i) favorable political support for rent creation, (ii) an effective structure of rent allocation and implementation, and (iii) credible incentives and pressures that encouraged local firms’ industrial upgrading. The Vietnamese experience suggests that rents can be developmental, conceivably side-by-side with rent seeking, cronyism and corruption.     

粮食价格预警模型与风险防范机制研究

随着我国粮食购销市场化的加速推进,影响粮食安全的各种不确定因素增多.笔者在对粮食价格运行状态的类型进行界定的基础上,构建了粮食价格预警的控制论模型,分析了粮食价格调控系统的构成.这一系统包括模型系统和专家系统两部分.模型系统又包括信息采集系统、信息分析与推断系统、风险识别系统、信息输出与警报系统、预控对策系统等.笔者还设计了三种粮食价格定量调控模型,并对构建粮食价格风险防范机制提出了建议.     

基于Copula函数特征筛选的电力物资供应商投标价格预测

分析电力物资供应商投标价格特征是招标企业估计投标价格并制定合理采购策略的基础.传统的Spearmen秩相关系数特征筛选方法只单纯考虑了特征的数值排列顺序,不能挖掘特征变量与目标的内在关联关系,会导致预测效果差.本文在电力企业招标价格预测建模中引入Copula函数,通过特征变量与目标变量的联合概率分布来分析变量间的相依关系.首先确定特征变量与目标变量的边缘分布,进行Copula参数估计,选取合适的Copula函数并计算相关系数来筛选供应商投标价格的特征,并以多种预测方法进行预测来验证引入Copula函数后预测精度是否提升.结果表明,引入Copula函数进行特征筛选后,预测精度更高、效果更好.     

Bidding in hierarchies

This paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single-stage contests. A condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single-stage contest, and when the single-stage contest is more likely to award the prize to the contestant who values it most highly. The outcome depends on inter- and intra-group heterogeneity, and is not driven by free-rider incentives.     

建筑施工企业定额在企业运行中的作用及制定原则和方法

施工企业要生存壮大,就现在的建设市场形势,有一套切合企业本身实际情况的企业定额是十分重要的。企业定额要体现本企业在某方面的技术优势。企业定额的所有单价都实行动态管理。企业定额各单项的平均造价要比社会平均价低。企业定额要具有先进性、合理性。企业定额的运用可以提高企业效益,有助于规范市场,提高市场占有率,易适应工程量清单计价。     

Economic Benefits of Dolphins in the United States Eastern Tropical Pacific Purse-Seine Tuna Industry

This paper provides a profit-maximizing modelwith vessel-level dolphin mortality limits forpurse seiners harvesting tunas in the easterntropical Pacific Ocean. The model analyticallyderives the shadow price (estimated economicvalue) for dolphin mortality, the fishing-fleetsize, and the annual tuna harvest as functionsof a few key fishing parameters. The model alsoprovides a statistical method to determine theaccuracy of all needed parameter estimates. Thepaper then applies the model to the year 1996and the period from 1985 to 1987. The shadowprice measures the economic value to the UStuna fleet of dolphins lost in the harvestingof tuna. This value is essential whenattempting to evaluate the economic benefitsand costs to society of any action designed toreduce the mortality of dolphins in theharvesting of tuna in the eastern tropicalPacific Ocean.     

碳排放配额政策的环境效应和贸易效应研究

基于不完全市场竞争理论,构建了两个对称国家碳排放配额政策选择与企业碳减排选择的两阶段博弈模型,运用逆向求解法求得了均衡解,并通过进一步分析碳排放许可证政策、碳排放配额许可交易政策和许可交易碳排放权合作政策的福利效应,得出了两国政府碳排放配额政策选择的激励相容条件和参与约束条件,确定了全局稳定均衡最优解及其条件;此外,还分析了两国政府碳排放许可证政策、碳排放配额许可交易政策和许可交易碳排放权合作政策的环境效应和贸易效应。结果表明：从福利效应来看,许可交易碳排放权合作政策是全局稳定最优解,可以资源的有效配置,实现Pareto改进;从环境效应来看,许可交易碳排放权合作政策也是严格占优的,有助于减少各国和全球净污染排放量;从贸易效应来看,碳排放配额许可交易政策好于许可交易碳排放权合作政策。因此,北-北型对称国家会优先选择许可交易碳排放权合作政策,南一南型对称国家在一定时期内仍然会优先选择碳排放配额许可交易政策,南-南或北-北型对称国家之间容易实现碳排放政策合作,实现全球环境合作还有待时日。     

The value of rents and the likelihood of conflicts

This paper extends the prey–predator model of Grossman and Kim (J Political Econ 103:1275–1288, 1995) to analyze the relation between the value of a contested rent and the emergence of conflict. We show that an increase in the value of the rent makes a conflict equilibrium more likely. We also analyze the case where the valuation of the rent is different for the two players. We find, for example, that a conflict equilibrium may occur even though the predator has an important disadvantage in warfare. That is when his valuation of the rent is sufficiently high compared to that of the prey.