股权再融资、盈余管理与大股东的寻租行为

我国上市公司处于大股东的超强控制状态,大股东与中小股东之间存在严重的信息不对称,导致大股东在股权再融资过程中表现出强烈的盈余管理动机.本文研究了我国资本市场参与者的行为与盈余管理之间的关系,并分析了对资本配置效率的影响效应.大股东通过操纵报告盈余来改变会计盈余的时间分布和误导投资者,从而攫取更多的隐性收益,造成资本市场配置效率的降低.研究结果表明:(1)大股东通过盈余管理在股权再融资过程中可以获得中小股东无法得到的隐性收益;(2)大股东的收益随着盈余管理程度的增加而提升,中小股东的财富随着盈余管理程度的增加而降低;(3)盈余管理程度的增加将降低上市公司的资本配置效率和企业价值.因此,大股东通过盈余管理实现了对小股东财富的掠夺效应,造成了上市公司资本配置效率、公司价值、声誉和后续融资能力的下降.     

Cooperation by way of support in a rent seeking contest for a public good

This paper analyzes the efforts made to influence a decision that can have two outcomes. First, the agents on the same side designate an agent to play the contest for them. The inactive agents can then decide to support this active agent, i.e. pay a percentage of his effort. It is optimal to designate either the agent with the lowest stake (who will receive support from everyone else) or the agent with the highest stake (who will not receive support) as the active agent. We find that the side with the higher aggregate stake may have the lower success probability.     

Rent Seeking with Efforts and Bids

We introduce bids in a rent-seeking contest. Players compete for a prize. Apart from exerting lobbying efforts, they also submit a bid which is payable only if they win the prize. We show that our model has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, in which each active player submits the same bid, while the sum of all efforts equals that bid. In equilibrium there is underdissipation of rent.     

Rent Control and Prices of Owner-occupied Housing

We examine the relation between rent control and prices of owner-occupied housing in the presence of different qualities of housing. While a rent ceiling and the price of condominiums are substitutes if housing is undifferentiated, it is shown that this is not necessarily the case when housing differs in quality. A complete dismantling of rent control may in fact increasethe price of condominiums.
JEL Classification D45; D49; R21     

要素市场扭曲对企业家寻租及创新的影响

Baumol认为企业家行为模式受到所在制度环境的影响,良好的制度环境会促进企业家从事增加社会福利的生产性活动,比如创新;而制度环境不佳会导致企业家从事攫取社会利益的非生产性活动,比如寻租。Baumol的企业家才能配置理论在中国具体情境中,是否有其适用性？以我国2009-2014年省级层面面板数据,利用各省份人均土地出让面积作为地区要素市场扭曲的工具变量,在有效控制内生性可能导致的模型估计偏误后,实证考察了要素市场扭曲对企业家寻租活动的作用效应。研究发现,转轨时期我国地区要素市场扭曲程度越深,企业家寻租活动就越多。进一步通过系数检验以及Bootstrap方法考察企业家寻租活动在地区要素市场扭曲和企业创新强度之间的中介效应,证实了“要素市场扭曲→企业家寻租活动增多→企业创新强度减弱”传导机制的存在,可为深化中国要素市场机制改革提供理论和实证支持。     

Regional Impact of the German Rent Brake

New rental contracts have risen dramatically in many German places in recent years due to strong influxes and sluggish construction activity. The rent brake should put a stop to this development so that housing in prospering cities remains affordable for people on normal and low incomes. Although initial successes were attested to the rent brake, empirical findings are increasing, according to which the rent brake is not having the desired effect. This also applies to the findings determined here: the results of a difference‐in‐difference estimation show that the rent brake has reduced rents on offer in Hamburg, Berlin and Munich by up to 5%, while no effects are observed in Cologne and Düsseldorf. Nevertheless, the effects are lagging behind the expected effects almost everywhere. The results illustrate once again an implementation deficit and show that no general statements on the effectiveness of the rent brake are currently permissible. However, the rent brake is certainly having a price effect in some regions, even if not to the intended extent.     

公司多元化折价:寻租与投资偏差

相对于业务集中的企业来说,多元化公司往往出现市场价值贬损,尽管造成这一现象的原因多种多样,但部门经理寻租引致公司经理配置资源出现偏差,则是产生公司多元化折价的重要根源之一.文章基于这一思想,通过建立模型进行了深入分析,得出多元化公司往往出现折价并给出了影响折价的一些重要因素.     

Constitutional Design for a Rent Seeking Society: The Voting Rule Choice Revisited

Buchanan and Tullock's original trade-off model of constitutional design is used to analyze how constitutional design affects post-constitutional rent seeking, and, in turn, how the anticipation of post-constitution rent seeking should lead to modification of constitutional design — specifically with respect to imposing and maintaining effective (composite) supermajority decision rules.     

The allocation of entrepreneurial efforts in a rent-seeking society: Evidence from China

This paper considers four types of entrepreneurial efforts: productive activities, aggressive rent seeking, defense against rent extraction, and leisure. It examines how entrepreneurs allocate efforts when facing dual-dealing relationships with politicians in a rent-seeking society: entrepreneurs not only pursue additional benefits through rent seeking, but also try to avoid extortions by politicians. Using unique city-level and firm-level data across China, we demonstrate that Chinese entrepreneurs survive in a twisted world: ordinary entrepreneurs would desire better institutional environment, but if institutional improvement is not available, they would prefer political connections which are often preoccupied by special interest groups and/or large-sized firms.     

Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments

This paper investigates the impact of political lobbying on the choice of environmental policy instruments. It is argued that the prevalence of pollution emission standards over more efficient policy instruments may result from rent seeking behaviour. The model further predicts that when an emission standard is used to control pollution, rival political parties have an incentive to set the same standard. There is therefore a convergence of policies. Moreover, it is shown that emission taxes are more likely to be supported and proposed by political parties which represent environmental interest groups. This feature appears to accord with the observed support for environmental taxes by Green parties in Europe, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere.     

Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments: Comment

In this comment, I analyze Damania's political economy model (Environmental and Resource Economics 13: 415–433, 1999), correcting some flaws and clarifying some ambiguities. I arguethat the political parties are identical at the outset of the game. Onlyafter the parties have chosen the instrument (standards or taxation) and thestrictness of environmental policy do the environmentalists and thepolluting firms know which party to support in the election campaign. Inequilibrium, both parties choose the same platform, so that both have anequal probability of winning the election.     

国有企业外部人控制：—个寻租视角

国有企业的公共物品性导致国有企业蜕变为一个多重寻租网络。政府作为国有企业的外部控制人,借助政企不分、个人权力的无约束和责任体系弱化、多层委托与多重代理等体制性弊病的掩饰,与国有企业代理人合谋寻租,国有企业的"内部人控制"应运而生。可以说,国有企业若不存在"外部人控制","内部人控制"几乎不可能产生;国有企业若存在"外部人控制","内部人控制"便几乎一定会产生。"外部人控制"产生的必要前提是国有企业泛化为公共物品,而国有企业泛化为公共物品,必须具备以下条件:包括存在可供寻租的租金、存在制度性的寻租通道、存在租金和信息的传递系统。国有企业外部人控制具有极大的危害,主要表现为降低企业家的生产性努力水平和使得企业家行为寻租化。解决问题的关键在于进行产权改革,使产权得到清晰界定并得到有效保护,同时不会出现事后寻租的现象。     

The social cost of rent seeking in Europe

Direct measurement of the social cost of rent seeking is impeded by non-observable and non-reported activities. We use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to compute the social cost of rent seeking in Europe. Our estimate is based on competition among interest groups for privileges provided by governments, including income transfers, subsidies, and preferential tax treatment. The model, which is calibrated to the euro area as a whole and also to individual euro member countries for 1980–2003, performs well vis-à-vis the data. We find that significant proportions of GDP are extracted as rents available to be sought by rent seekers.     

Optimal contest design: volume and timing of rent seeking in contests

This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of rent-seeking contests in terms of the amount and the timing of effort they elicit from the participants. The optimal contest structure—the one that maximizes the discounted sum of efforts—is found to hinge on the degree of impatience of the contest organizers, the more patient of whom prefer longer contests consisting of pairwise matches among the contestants. Heterogeneity of the contestants' quality also turns out to play an important role in the comparison.     

Rent Seeking Behavior in Transition Countries: The Case of Romania

This paper points out, in the changing institutional setting of transition in Romania, Some relevant factors influencing economic actors to behave in a way that pushes them to devote resources to unproductive goals, rather than to embark on activities that add economic and social value. The theoretical insights offered in the literature of rent seeking are applied to the issues of transition. A mathematical model of a rent seeking economy is presented, analyzing the influence of interest groups activity on the overall income of the economy. Some examples of rent seeking behavior that severely hamper the economic efficiency are illustrated for the case of Romania. The conclusion is that, in appreciating the progress in transition, the reduction in rent seeking is an important factor to be taken into consideration.     

变革中的就业环境与中国大学生就业

本文总结了国内外有关大学生就业问题的研究文献 ,通过问卷调查、统计分析、深度访谈等研究方法 ,从就业制度的演变、大学生劳动力市场的供求变动、个人就业意愿和行为、用人单位对大学生就业的期望和国外有关大学生就业的政策和措施等方面 ,对我国当前大学生就业困难的问题进行了分析和探讨。文章认为 ,目前大学生就业确有困难的表现。不过 ,由于初次就业率统计指标设计的局限 ,客观上也夸大了这种困难的程度。文章对缓解劳动力市场上大学生就业困难 ,特别是降低结构性失业和摩擦性失业 ,提出了一些政策建议。     

A Social-Psychological Perspective on Herding in Stock Markets

A social-psychological perspective conceives of herding in stock markets as informative social influence resulting from heuristic or systematic information processing. In three laboratory experiments employing undergraduates we apply this perspective to investigate factors that prevent herd influence that would lead to inaccurate predictions of stock prices. In Experiment 1, we show that an economic reward for making the same predictions as the herd increases the influence of a majority but not the influence of a minority, and that an individual economic reward for making accurate predictions reduces the influence of the majority. In Experiment 2, we show a reduced influence of a majority herd's inaccurate predictions when requiring assessments of the accuracy of the majority herd´s predictions as compared to requiring judgments of their consistency. Experiment 3 shows that a lower volatility of stock prices reduces the influence of a majority herd´s inaccurate predictions.     

On the Effects of Suggested Prices in Gasoline Markets

There is a widespread suspicion that suggested prices act as a focal point for individual firms when setting their prices. Oil companies announce suggested prices for gasoline stations in the Dutch retail market. We show that, compared to the gasoline spot market price, suggested prices contain additional information that explains retail price changes. We conclude that suggested prices have a horizontal coordinating effect in the sense that retail prices react to information that suggested prices contain and that is unrelated to firms’ costs (i.e., the information that firms use under normal competitive conditions).     

基于马克思地租理论的中国城市房价形成研究

本文运用马克思地租理论分析中国城市房地产经济现象,得到结论:城市房地产价格由生产过程中凝结的抽象劳动和地租资本化的加总决定;房地产价格可转化为成本价格、平均利润、城市地租的购买价格三个部分,其中城市级差地租决定了房价趋势的形成;同时在城市的不断发展和扩张中,级差地租受单个城市规模的限制给城市房价设定了一个运行区间。可见稳定房价需拉平城市房地产区位差异并对土地价值增值部分进行收入再分配。