我国货币中性问题实证分析

运用合理预期下的货币中性假设模型对我国货币中性问题进行了实证分析,认为不论是预期的货币供给冲击,还是非预期的货币供给冲击,对产出的影响基本上都是显著的。因此,货币供给在推动我国的经济运行中起着关键性的作用,而且利用预期的货币政策调控经济运行得到了实证经验的支持。     

理性预期学派货币中性理论在中国的实证检验

利用中国1994年以来的经济数据,通过建立ARIMA模型和二阶段OLS模型对理性预期学派货币中性理论进行了检验。实证结果显示,短期内中国预期的货币供给冲击与非预期的货币供给冲击对产出都有显著影响,且非预期的货币供给冲击对产出影响更明显;但从长期看,预期货币与非预期货币对产出的正负效应相互抵消,中国货币政策表现为长期渐近中性。     

货币中性:理论及中国的实证研究

本文在针对国内外货币中性理论及实证研究进行评述的基础上,利用我国1990~2005这16年间实际产出和货币供给量的相关数据,运用单位根、协整和葛兰杰因果检验等方法进行分析,得出两点结论:第一,货币供给无论是在短期还是长期都是非中性的;第二,因为M2具有一定的内生性,所以我国目前以M2作为货币政策的中介目标是不合适的,应该将利率作为操作目标,而不是货币供给量。     

货币长期中性对经济增长的意义

本文强调货币中性与货币非中性两个概念都有重要的意义,前者指明了经济持续增长的根本动力不在货币而在技术与制度,后者则为短期内保持经济的平衡提供了政策工具。在分析货币供给与经济增长的关系时,实证研究应建立在理论与实际的基础上。我国经济的实际问题是生产效率增长乏力。解决的出路是技术的创新与制度的变革。     

The West African Economic and Monetary Union: Optimality Revisited

The debate has been reignited in recent months by both defenders and opponents of the CFA franc, about its benefits or the lack thereof. The objective of this paper is to join the conversation in an objective, and quantifiable way, by investigating the optimality of the currency area. A trivariate SVAR comprising world output, domestic output for each one of the eight countries that make up the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), and changes in their price levels, represented by their respective CPIs was estimated. Annual data ranging from 1980 to 2017 was obtained from the IMF 2017 World Outlook. I also investigated endogeneity within the Union, by dividing the data into two samples, one from 1980 to 1993, a period that predates the WAEMU, and one from 1994 to 2017. The results show more synchronization of business cycles during the second period than during the first. I examined the role of trade in the near perfect synchronization of business cycles in the WAEMU, and found it to be the driving force behind the symmetry.

     

Litigation with Symmetric Bargaining and Two-Sided Incomplete Information

We construct game-theoretic foundations for bargaining in theshadow of a trial. Plaintiff and defendant both have noisy signalsof a common-value trial judgment and make simultaneous offersto settle. If the offers cross, they settle on the average offer;otherwise, both litigants incur an additional cost and the judgmentis imposed at trial. We obtain an essentially unique Nash equilibriumand characterize its conditional trial probabilities and judgments.Some of the results are intuitive. For example, an increasein trial cost (or a decrease in the range of possible outcomes)reduces the probability of a trial. We obtain a precise nonlinearexpression for the relationship. Other results reverse findingsfrom previous literature. For example, trials are possible evenwhen the defendant's signal indicates a higher potential judgmentthan the plaintiff's signal, and when trial costs are low, middlingcases (rather than extreme cases) are more likely to settle.     

中国货币长期中性实证研究——基于F-S方法的估计

本文利用Fisher-Seater的货币长期中性检验模型对中国1997年第1季度-2009年第4季度的数据进行实证分析,发现样本期间内中国货币长期导数是发散的,表明货币在长期内是非中性的.基于这一结果我们认为,近年我国的货币政策在影响实际经济上是有效的.     

Individual Differences in EWA Learning with Partial Payoff Information

We extend experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning to games in which only the set of possible foregone payoffs from unchosen strategies are known, and estimate parameters separately for each player to study heterogeneity. We assume players estimate unknown foregone payoffs from a strategy, by substituting the last payoff actually received from that strategy, by clairvoyantly guessing the actual foregone payoff, or by averaging the set of possible foregone payoffs conditional on the actual outcomes. All three assumptions improve predictive accuracy of EWA. Individual parameter estimates suggest that players cluster into two separate subgroups (which differ from traditional reinforcement and belief learning).     

Asymmetric Information and the Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy

Abstract. This paper analyses the consequences of asymmetric information in credit markets for the monetary transmission mechanism. It shows that asymmetric information can not only reinforce but can also weaken or overcompensate the effects of the standard interest rate channel. Crucial is that informational problems lead to an external finance premium that can be positive or negative for marginal entrepreneurs. Tight money may lead to an increase in the absolute value of this premium, implying that there is a credit channel of monetary policy, but its working direction is ambiguous.     

Optimality of workfare with heterogeneous preferences

With the standard non-linear income taxation framework with heterogeneity of preferences, in this paper the optimality of workfare as a screening tool is examined. It is assumed that workfare does not serve as a human capital investment, participation is mandatory, and administrative costs are negligible. Imposing alternative cardinalizations on individuals utilities allows for the possibility that the government optimally redistributes income to or from high disutility of labour individuals. Under either case, it is never optimal to impose workfare on these individuals. It is also shown that non-productive workfare can be an efficient policy tool, in contrast to the results found in Besley and Coate (1995), Brett (1998), and Beaudry and Blackorby (1997). JEL Classification: H21, H23
Optimalité du workfare en présence de préférences hétérogènes. L'auteur examine l'timalité du workfare en tant qu'instrument de tamisage à l'aide du cadre conceptuel traditionnel d'imposition non-linéaire des revenus en présence de préférences hétérogènes. On postule que le workfare n'est pas un processus d'investissement en capital humain, que la participatioun est obligatoire, et que les coûts d'administration sont négligeables. Quand on postule aussi des utilités cardinales différentes pour les individus, il devient possible pour le gouvernement de redistribuer optimalement les revenus en faveur ou au détriment des individus pour qui le travail a une très grande désutilité. Dans l'un et l'autre cas, on montre que le workfare n'est jamais une politique optimale. On montre aussi que le workfare dans des activités non-productives peut être un instrument de politique publique efficient, contrairement a ce qu'affirment Besley et Coate (1995), Brett (1998) et Beaudry et Blackorby (1997).     

On Corporate Tax Asymmetries and Neutrality

This article discusses the effects of corporate tax asymmetries under investment irreversibility. We introduce a tax scheme where the tax base is given by the firm's return net of a rate of relief. When the firm's return is less than the imputation rate, however, no tax refunds are allowed. Unlike symmetric tax systems, the scheme proposed is neutral with respect not only to income uncertainty but also to policy uncertainty.     

Biased Technical Change and Parallel Neutrality

The Luenberger productivity indicator has many attractive features to evaluate productivity, technical and efficiency changes. Paralleling Färe et al. (1997), this paper shows that the technical change indicator can be expressed as the sum of a magnitude indicator and a bias indicator that is the sum of two bias indicators input and output oriented respectively. Using a recent concept of ``parallel neutrality'' introduced by Briec et al. (2006), some conditions under which each bias indicator makes no contribution to productivity change are established. Among the key contributions of this paper is a new linear programming model involving a graph translation homotheticity property.     

资产价格传递货币政策前瞻性信息

处于转轨经济体中,我国的经济结构必然处于不断的变迁中,各种经济指标传递的经济信息也不断地随之变动。CPI作为通货膨胀的测度指标,是货币政策的重要参考变量。然而随着国民经济的不断发展和金融深化,金融资产在国民财富中的比重不断上升,资产价格的信息含量越来越大,资产价格变动影响了未来的CPI。为了实现物价稳定,经济持续快速发展,我国的货币政策应该兼顾CPI和资产价格。     

Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

If A is a set of social alternatives, a social choice rule (SCR) assigns a subset of A to each potential profile of individuals' preferences over A , where the subset is interpreted as the set of welfare optima. A game form (or mechanism) implements the social choice rule if, for any potential profile of preferences, (i) any welfare optimum can arise as a Nash equilibrium of the game form (implying, in particular, that a Nash equilibrium exists) and, (ii) all Nash equilibria are welfare optimal. The main result of this paper establishes that any SCR that satisfies two properties—monotonicity and no veto power—can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals. The proof is constructive.     

Neutrality in arrow and other impossibility theorems

Summary. Although not assumed explicitly, we show that neutrality plays an important role in Arrow and other impossibility theorems. Applying it to pivotal voters we produce direct proofs of classical impossibility theorems, including Arrow's, as well as extend some of these theorems. We further explore the role of neutrality showing that it is equivalent to Pareto or reverse Pareto, and to effective dictatorship for non-null social welfare functions satisfying the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives. It is also equivalent to Wilson's Citizens' Sovereignty--which is related to the intuition that symmetry over alternatives makes social preference depend only on citizens' preferences. We show that some of these results are more fundamental than others in that they extend both to infinite societies and to considerably smaller domains of preferences. Finally, as an application of Arrow's theorem, we provide a simple proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.Received: 13 April 2000, Revised: 6 December 2002, JEL Classification Numbers: D71, C70.I thank Salvador Barberá, Luis Corchón, Cesar Martinelli, Eric Maskin, Tomas Sjöström, Ricard Torres, José Pedro Ubeda, and an anonymous referee for feedback. The proofs of Arrow's theorem and two Wilson's theorems come from a note I wrote in 1987 at Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona (Ubeda [16]). In 1996 Geanakoplos [7] wrote a proof of Arrow's theorem similar but not identical to mine. All work in this paper is independent of his.     

Monetary Policy with Uncertain Parameters

This paper shows that—in contrast to the received wisdom—uncertainty about the parameters in a dynamic macroeconomic model may lead to more aggressive monetary policy. In particular, when there is uncertainty about the persistence of inflation, it may be optimal for the central bank to respond to shocks more aggressively in order to reduce uncertainty about the future development of inflation. Uncertainty about other parameters, on the other hand, dampens the policy response.
JEL classification : E 43; E 52     

The False Consensus Effect Disappears if Representative Information and Monetary Incentives Are Given

We present an experiment on the false consensus effect. Unlike previous experiments, we provide monetary incentives for revealing the actual estimation of others' behavior. In each session and round, sixteen subjects make a choice between two options simultaneously. Then they estimate the choices of a randomly selected subgroup. For half of the rounds we provide information about other subjects' choices. There we find no false consensus effect. At an aggregate level, subjects significantly underweight rather than overweight their choices. When we do not provide information, the presence of a false consensus effect cannot be detected.     

对称信息情况下开发可再生资源的激励问题研究

本文用委托一代理理论研究了对称信息情况下政府管理可再生资源开发活动的激励问题。通过对立并分析资源可持续开发的数学模型表明,政府实施生态平衡管理有助于降低开发人对可生资源的开发努力,在政府及开发人都是风险中性的条件下,激励合同不仅依赖于所观察到的产出,而且依赖于生物种群的内禀增长率。     

Optimality and Natural Selection in Markets

We ask if natural selection in markets favors profit-maximizing firms and, if so, is there a difference between the predictions of models which assume all firms are profit maximizers and the predictions of models which explicitly take account of population dynamics in the market. We show that market selection favors profit maximizing firms, but we also show that the long-run behavior of evolutionary market models is nonetheless not consistent with equilibrium models based on the profit-maximization hypothesis. Dynamic equilibrium paths with market selection are not Pareto optimal, nor even asymptotically optimal. The discrepancy arises because the dynamics created by firm evolution causes prices to vary over time and the resulting dynamical system need not have stable steady states.     

Monetary policy with heterogeneous agents and borrowing constraints

We show that the long-run neutrality of inflation on capital accumulation obtained in complete market models no longer holds when households face binding credit constraints. Borrowing-constrained households are not able to rebalance their financial portfolio when inflation varies, and thus adjust their money holdings differently compared to unconstrained households. This heterogeneity leads to a new precautionary savings motive, which implies that inflation increases capital accumulation. We quantify the importance of this new channel in an incomplete market model where the traditional redistributive effects of inflation are also introduced. We show that this model provides a quantitative rationale for the observed hump-shaped relationship between inflation and capital accumulation.