International Asset Trade,Capital Income Taxation,and Specialization Patterns

This paper constructs a small economy version of dynamic Heckscher‐Ohlin models with overlapping generations and analyzes effects of capital income taxation on the specialization pattern of the country. It is shown that once international asset trade is allowed, in the presence of international technological asymmetries, a small country eventually leads to perfect specialization in our overlapping generations model. It is also shown that the residence‐based tax has no effect on the specialization pattern while the source‐based tax has a negative effect on capital accumulation and thereby it can affect the specialization pattern of the small country.     

Income Distribution and Redistribution

Abstract:

It seems that some observable structural trends in recent decades such as globalization, skills-biased technological advances and level of unionization all over the world have been affected by income distribution, in addition to other economic variables. The latest trends in the 2000s exhibited a widening gap between the rich and the poor not only in some of the already high inequality countries, but also in traditionally low inequality countries. In order to mitigate inequality, many countries have followed redistribution policies (taxes and transfers). In this article, we will mainly focus on the effects of redistribution policies consisting of income taxes and social transfers on income inequality using the micro data in Turkey. Additionally, since financial crises have been becoming more important with increasing frequency of crises all over the world, we also search for the effects of crises on inequality and the degree of mitigation of redistributive policies, especially during the Global Recession.     

Redistribution with Unobservable Bequests: A Case for Taxing Capital Income

This paper addresses the question of the optimal taxation of labour and interest income in an overlapping generations model with two unobservable characteristics, ability and inheritance. We assume realistically that saving can only be taxed anonymously, whereas the tax on labour earnings can be individualized and made non-linear. In such a setting, we show that a withholding tax on interest income along with a non-linear tax on labour income is desirable. The role of interest income taxation is to indirectly tax inherited wealth.
JEL Classification D 63, H 2     

Homeownership,Mobility, And Local Income Redistribution

Regions are characterized by different homeownership rates. Homeowners and renters differ in their mobility costs, renters having lower mobility costs. This paper analyses how the presence of those different types of households affects income sorting and tax differences between local jurisdictions. To this aim, we analyze a model of local income redistribution with mobile (renter) and immobile (homeowner) households. Linear income taxes finance a lump sum transfer. Policies are determined endogenously through voting. In such a framework, if there are no or only few homeowners, no income‐sorting equilibrium exists. Above a certain threshold for the homeownership rate we find an inverted U‐shaped relationship between tax differences and homeownership rates, such that tax differences between jurisdictions are highest for intermediate homeownership rates.     

Simple Rules for the Optimal Taxation of International Capital Income

In this paper we reconcile and extend previous results on the collectively optimal taxation of international investment income. The “weighted average” rule of Horst (1980), for example, is shown to rest on unattractive assumptions on the set of instruments available, ruling out any need for distorting taxes. The principal contribution is to establish a new and strikingly simple weighted average rule — encompassing the other key result in this area — for the general case in which lump-sum taxes are unavailable, the ability to tax pure profits is perhaps restricted and distorting taxes on both domestic and border-crossing capital income are optimally deployed.     

A Note on the Taxation of International Capital Income Flows

Seemingly persuasive arguments can be made to suggest that income from foreign-owned capital should be taxed by a small open economy and that it should not be taxed I show that the case for taxing foreign capital income as part of an 'optimal' tax scheme rests on the assumption that tax rates on other forms of income are not set optimally. In particular, if economic profit is not fully taxed, a tax on foreign capital income is desirable. If all tax rates are set optimally, foreign capital income should not be taxed by the capital-importing country.     

Majority Voting over Publicly Provided Goods, Redistribution, and Income Taxation

Federal, state, and many local governments make decisions that involve taxation, redistribution, and provision of public goods. Positive models to study these issues encounter the well‐known problem that majority‐voting equilibrium (MVE) may fail to exist in such multidimensional models. In this paper, with reasonable restrictions on preferences, I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of an MVE in a model with linear income tax and government expenditure policies that affect individual labor/leisure choices. My majority‐voting result takes account of the possibility that low‐skill individuals will drop out of the labor force under some tax and expenditure configurations.     

信贷约束、再分配及不平等对增长的影响

当信贷对那些禀赋较少的当事人是完全可获取时,再分配对长期增长无影响.当信贷不可得时,再分配可以促进经济增长.富人与穷人之间的不平等程度越高,越容易刺激穷人掠夺富人的财富,并牺牲了总的投资与增长.恰当的再分配政策设计可以有利于禀赋少者并促进总的产出,并使社会朝着增长与和谐的方向努力.     

外资风险资本、关系网络与国际创业企业制度学习

外资风险资本对创业企业的注资行为,引发了国际商务学者及创业学者的广泛关注。除资金优势外,如何利用外资风险资本嵌入的广泛国际市场关系网络资源,促进中小型创业企业国际化发展,成为该研究的重要议题。基于关系网络的企业国际化理论和制度同构理论,以制度学习为切入点,通过文献梳理,系统探究了外资风险资本与国际创业企业制度学习同构效应之间的作用机理。在此基础上,提出相应理论假设,构建概念模型,并对未来研究提出了相关建议。     

中国吸引外资竞争力国际比较研究

本文在对中国与主要竞争国家吸引外资潜力、投资硬环境、投资软环境进行比较分析的基础上,集中回答了“中国在今后一段时间内能否吸纳更多的外资”和“中国在今后应该如何进一步完善投资环境”等问题。     

A Positive Theory of Income Redistribution

This article examines how redistribution of human capital expenditure can come about voluntarily. A model is developed in which, in the absence of redistribution, human capital expenditure is financed through tax revenue collected locally. However, circumstances are shown under which transfers of human capital expenditure across neighborhoods can take place voluntarily, even in the absence of interfamily altruism. These transfers can eliminate absolute inequality and reduce relative inequality. In addition, the effect on aggregate income of such human capital funding transfers across neighborhoods is evaluated. Empirical evidence supporting the model's implications for the impact of redistribution of human capital expenditure on the persistence of income inequality is presented     

关于内外资企业所得税法合并问题的探讨

本文在分析目前我国内外资企业所得税法并存的问题基础上,对两法合并后应遵循的原则、纳税义务人、税率、税基及税收优惠的确定等问题进行了探讨。     

International Labor Mobility,Redistribution, and Domestic Political Liberalization

Do international labor flows influence the prospects for democratization both in the countries that export their excess workers and in the countries that import them? This paper argues that emigration should have a positive effect on political liberalization in net source countries because it decreases the amount of redistribution that would occur in a more democratic regime. Conversely, immigration should have a negative effect on political liberalization in net destination countries through the same causal channel: by increasing the amount of redistribution that would occur in a more democratic regime. South Korea and Singapore are considered as illustrative examples, and the paper provides statistical evidence to support the hypothesis that emigration (immigration) has been positively (negatively) related to future political liberalization.     

Consumer Heterogeneity,Free Trade,and the Welfare Impact of Income Redistribution

Demographic differences, like young and elderly, and healthy and disabled, are summarized as consumers' heterogeneity in expenditure shares, and introduced into an otherwise standard Heckscher–Ohlin model, together with income distribution in this paper. We prove that free trade may hurt consumers who spend more on the exporting good if the volume of trade is small, while redistributing more income to consumers who spend more on the exporting good may make everyone in the country better off. By contrast, redistributing more income to consumers who spend more on the importing good may make everyone in the country worse off.     

Redistribution Policies under Capital Market Imperfection

We establish the existence and stability of the long‐run wealth distribution in a credit constrained economy by applying the monotonicity condition developed by H. Hopenhayn and E. Prescott. There should emerge an egalitarian society in which all families experience upward and downward mobility, although a society of persistent inequality may occur in which rich entrepreneurs and poor lenders remain immobile between classes. The speed of transition from the latter to the former is shown to depend on the design of redistribution policies. Simulation results show that this occurs more rapidly when the government favours relatively rich lenders. JEL Classification Numbers: D31, G33, O12.     

Foreign Investment,Technology Transfer and Foreign Capital Impact Function

This paper analyzes the optimal capital accumulation of a small open economy by incorporating the impact of technology transfer that accompanies foriegn ivestment. Assuming that technology transfer depends on the extent of foreign ownership, it is shown that, whenever there is technology transfer through foreìgn participation, the optimal rule suggests that a host country maintain some foreign capital in the steady state. The concept of the foreign capital impact function is introduced to capture possible negative effects in addition to the positive effects of foreign investment. The impact of foreign investment is shown to involve an externality, calling for government intervention for a social optimum. [110]     

On the Political Economy of Income Redistribution and Crime

This article analyzes a general equilibrium model in which agents choose to specialize in either legitimate or criminal activities. Expenditures on police to apprehend criminals, as well as income redistribution, are determined endogenously through majority voting. We investigate how crime, redistribution, and police expenditures depend on characteristics of the underlying distribution of income-earning abilities and on the apprehension technology. Our model accounts for the positive correlation between inequality and crime, the positive correlation between expenditures on police and redistribution, and the lack of correlation between crime and redistribution observed in U.S. data.     

Human Capital, Study Effort, and Persistent Income Inequality

The paper shows that if an individual's cost of human capital accumulation depends on his parents' human capital and there exists a "raw labor" sector of production, individuals with low parental human capital may devote little effort in study and become unskilled workers. Further, if an individual exerts little effort in study, the human capital he accumulated may be even less than his parents'. Consequently, his children will have even lower parental human capital than him and they will therefore also become unskilled. Thus, the model shows that even when education is free, income inequality can persist across generations.