Strategic Second Sourcing by Multinationals*

Multinationals often serve foreign markets by exporting as well as by investing directly in foreign production facilities. We argue that if the multinational competes in an oligopolistic market characterized by strategic complements then there are strategic reasons to use two production facilities—committing to a second source allows the firm to keep average cost low while increasing its marginal cost. The increase in marginal cost softens product market competition resulting in higher profits. We argue that this theory also has implications for the “make or buy” literature in production management and the literature on second sourcing in industrial organization.     

Multinationals, Endogenous Growth, and Technological Spillovers: Theory and Evidence*

FDI has received surprisingly little attention in theoretical and empirical work on openness and growth. This paper presents a theoretical growth model where MNCs directly affect the endogenous growth rate via technological spillovers. This is novel since other endogenous growth models with MNCs, e.g. the Grossman–Helpman model, assume away the knowledge‐spillovers aspect of FDI. We also present econometric evidence (using industry‐level data from seven OECD nations) that broadly supports the model. Specifically, we find industry‐level scale effects and international knowledge spillovers that are unrelated to FDI, but we also find that bilateral spillovers are boosted by bilateral FDI.     

Optimal Tariff Policy on Imports from Multinationals*

Using partial equilibrium analysis, it is shown that for small countries there is an optimal tariff on imports from a monopolistic multinational. There is also (under specified circumstances) a tariff at which the multinational finds subsidiary production more profitable than exports: the switchover tariff. The interaction between the optimal and switchover tariffs is analyzed from the small country's welfare standpoint. The conclusion is that there is not one, but a variety of possible optimal policies for the country: trade at the optimal tariff, with or without prohibition of subsidiary production, or tariff-protected subsidiary production.     

Foreign Acquisitions,Domestic Multinationals,and R&D

Our aim in this paper is to evaluate the causal effect of foreign acquisition on research and development (R&D) intensity in targeted domestic firms. We are able to distinguish domestic multinational enterprises (MNEs) and non‐MNEs, which allows us to investigate the fear that the change in ownership of domestic MNEs to foreign MNEs leads to a reduction in R&D activity in the country. Overall, our results give no support to the fears that foreign acquisition of domestic firms leads to a relocation of R&D activity in Swedish MNEs. Rather, in this paper, we find robust evidence that foreign acquisitions lead to increasing R&D intensity in acquired domestic MNEs and non‐MNEs.     

易逝性高新科技产品更新速度研究

通过分析易逝性高科技产品在其生命周期内的特征,并运用存量控制的方法,对同一市场上相互竞争的两家企业的策略进行分析和比较,解释了易逝性高科技产品更新换代加速的原因。     

Capital Flows, Vertical Multinationals, Wage Inequality, and Welfare

Wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor in the US and its trading partners, Mexico and Chile, has increased since 1980, while Taiwan's wage inequality has decreased since the mid‐1980s. The authors provide a new explanation for the latter, involving a rise in capital flows from Taiwan to less‐developed countries (LDCs) in the form of vertical multinationals (MNEs), and a corresponding rise in intermediate‐good exports from the MNEs to subsidiaries in LDCs. Moreover, national income in both countries definitely improves.     

Reciprocal Dumping with Product Differentiation*

This paper examines if international trade can reduce total welfare in an international oligopoly with differentiated goods. We show that intra‐industry trade, i.e. “reciprocal dumping,” can result in lower total surplus than autarky in a Cournot model for any degree of product differentiation. Moreover, trade can reduce welfare compared to autarky in a Bertrand model when the local markets are sufficiently competitive and products are sufficiently close substitutes. Otherwise it unambiguously increases welfare.     

Multinationals,R&D and Endogenous Productivity Asymmetries

We analyze the influence of endogenous productivity asymmetries between firms, in terms of competitiveness and size, on multinational activity. In the model, productivity depends on cost-reducing R&D (research and development). We show that when firms differ on commitment power in R&D, the R&D leader, independently of being a multinational or a domestic firm, tends to invest more in R&D than the R&D follower. Because of these productivity advantages, the R&D leader can more easily become multinational. Therefore, in addition to the proximity-concentration trade-off, we identify another FDI (foreign direct investment) determinant: technological competition.     

Tariffs,Quotas, and Forward Contracts under Asymmetric Information*

We consider optimal trade policy for a large country with private information. We show that the optimal tariff leads to a signaling equilibrium with higher tariffs and lower welfare than under complete information, whereas the optimal import quota replicates the complete information equilibrium and thus is superior to the tariff. We also show that, with the tariff, the country may be better off being uninformed. Finally, we show that if the importing nation cannot commit to its tariff, the use of futures contracts together with the dynamically consistent tariff leads to the same equilibrium as under complete information with commitment.     

Multinationals,cross‐border acquisitions and wage dispersion

Abstract We examine the impact of cross‐border acquisitions on intra‐firm wage dispersion using a detailed Swedish linked employer‐employee data set including data on all firms and about 50% of the Swedish labour force with information on job‐tasks and education. Foreign acquisitions of domestic multinationals and local firms increase wage dispersion but so do also other types of cross‐border acquisitions. Hence, it is the acquisition itself rather than foreign ownership that increases wage dispersion. The positive wage effect is concentrated to CEOs and other managers, whereas other groups are either negatively affected or not affected at all.     

Product Safety Provision and Consumers' Information

Economic mechanisms related to the provision of product safety are explored, with particular attention paid to the structure of consumers' information. The case of perfect information, of experience goods (for which consumers detect product safety after consumption) and of credence goods (where consumers cannot link a disease to a particular product consumed in the past) are explored. Imperfect competition is assumed in the supply sector. In the case of both perfect information and experience goods, market equilibrium is characterised by a less-than-socially optimal provision of safety, when the safety effort is costly. With credence goods, imperfect information leads to the absence of safety effort and to a market closure. Different types of public regulation aiming at increasing consumer protection and circumventing market failures are explored. Particular attention is paid to minimum safety standards, labels and liability enforcement. The relative efficiency of these instruments depends on the information structure. In the cases of perfect information and experience goods, a minimum safety standard can be an efficient instrument. Regulation is necessary but not sufficient to avoid market failure in the case of credence goods.     

Multinationals, Technology Upgrading, and Wages in Urban and Rural Indonesia

The author examines whether foreign direct investment has an effect on regional disparities in a developing country. For this purpose, the author compares the magnitude of productivity and wage spillovers derived from foreign presence to local firms in different locations. Using plant-level panel data for Indonesian manufacturing in 1990–95, the study finds supporting evidence for the hypothesis that the effects of foreign presence on the level and growth of productivity and wages in locally owned plants are greater in regions where multinational corporation affiliates tend to have a higher concentration as compared to other regions in the same province. The findings indicate that spillovers occur locally and diffuse to neighboring regions in part, and thus that the concentration of foreign direct investment in a certain region imparts a greater positive externality on one hand, and negatively affects regional disparities on the other.     

Volume Quotas with Heterogeneous Product Categories*

Volume quotas on imports are an important part of assistance packages afforded a number of major industries in Australia. Generally, quota is allocated to importers free of charge, although recently a proportion of quota for some product groups has been sold by tender. In this paper we compare the effects of volume quotas applied to heterogeneous product groups when allocated free of charge, by full tender sale and by a combination offender sale and free allocation. The analysis is undertaken for both competitive markets and in the case where importers have some market power.     

Product Market Reform and Innovation in the EU*

European Union countries have implemented widespread reforms to product markets to stimulate competition, innovation, and economic growth. We provide empirical evidence that the reforms carried out under the EU Single Market Programme (SMP) were associated with increased product market competition, as measured by a reduction in average profitability, and with a subsequent increase in innovation intensity and productivity growth for manufacturing sectors. Our analysis exploits exogenous variation in the expected impact of the SMP across countries and industries to identify the effects of reforms on average profitability, and the effects of profitability on innovation and productivity growth.     

Taxes and Decision Rights in Multinationals

We examine how a multinational's choice to centralize or decentralize its decision structure is affected by country tax differentials. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in multinational enterprises (MNEs)—here, as a strategic precommitment device and a tax manipulation instrument—we show that centralization is more profitable when tax differentials are large. When tax differentials are small, decentralization can be performed in two different ways each providing the highest profits in a particular range of the tax differential. Hence, the paper emphasizes the organizational flexibility that MNEs have in pursuing tax optimization.     

Information Technology and the World Economy*

This paper addresses the impact of investment in information technology (IT) on the recent resurgence of world economic growth. We describe the growth of the world economy, seven regions and 14 major economies during the period 1989–2003. We allocate the growth of world output between input growth and productivity and find, surprisingly, that input growth greatly predominates! The contributions of IT investment have increased in all regions, but especially in industrialized economies and Developing Asia. Differences in per capita output are explained by differences in per capita input, rather than by variations in productivity.