我国出口补贴转变为技改补贴的有效性分析

文章探讨了本国企业与外国企业在以产量竞争的方式争夺出口市场的情况下,本国政府对本国企业技改投资进行补贴的理论依据。通过两次运用两阶段博弈,文章对由补贴政策、企业技改投资、产量和利润水平决定构成的三阶段博弈进行了因果关系的比较静态分析,认为在一般情况下,对本国企业技改投资补贴有利于本国企业在国际市场中产量、市场份额和利润的增加,也有利于本国社会总福利水平的增加,对外国企业产量、利润和社会福利则形成负面影响。这一政策可接替在未来实施中具有不确定性的出口补贴政策。     

Strategic Environmental Policy Under Incomplete Information

This paper introduces incomplete information into recent analyses of strategic environmental policy. It is shown how asymmetric information between planners and producers affects national incentives to impose strategic environmental standards on domestic industries in international oligopolistic competition. Relative to the full-information case, incomplete information is likely to mitigate allocative distortions originating from strategic behaviour. A countervailing effect, tending to raise distortion, is however revealed from the analysis. This effect is absent when governments intervene in free trade through direct production subsidies. The results suggest that incentives to capture foreign rents are less reduced due to private information, when environmental standards, rather than direct production subsidies, are the strategic instrument.     

农产品出口的影响因素分析及扩大出口的对策

各类调查数据和经验都表明,在我国各地区之间,年度农产品出口额的差异比较显著。当前,影响农产品出口的因素很多,总体来说可以分为内部因素和外部因素。本文通过翔实的数据,采用相关分析方法对影响农产品出口的内部因素进行了具体分析并得出了相应的结论,从而有针对性地提出了扩大农产品出口的对策。     

Privatization and the Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy

This article considers the interdependence between international financial markets, privatization, and strategic trade policies. We describe an economy where portfolio allocations are chosen by risk-averse agents who rationally forecast future trade policies. Assuming a government responsive to the policy preferences of voters, we show that ownership structure affects trade policy through the incentives for lobbying by private agents. Portfolios and trade policy are thus jointly determined in political-economic equilibrium. Privatization of state-owned industry exerts an important influence over the trade policies chosen by domestic and foreign governments by expanding the scope for individual diversification.     

从出口优先与内需扩大走向中性贸易政策——出口导向与内需扩展政策的价格、销量与福利效应分析

文章以中国出口导向型经济为原型,建立出口—消费补贴局部均衡模型,并以自由贸易为参照,分别探讨了出口补贴、消费补贴以及二者组合政策的价格、数量和国民福利效应,由此证明了从中性贸易政策、消费补贴政策、出口补贴与消费补贴组合政策到出口补贴政策的最优政策排序。文章提出如下的政策转型建议:(1)以创造就业和加速增长为目标,将单一出口补贴政策转向出口补贴和消费补贴组合政策;(2)以降低贸易摩擦、扩大内需为目标,将内外双重补贴政策转向单一消费补贴政策;(3)以建立和谐市场经济为目标,将非中性贸易政策转向以自由贸易为基础的中性贸易政策。     

出口退税与我国贸易出口增长——基于时间序列数据的协整分析和政策效应检验

2008年金融危机以来,我国连续七次调高出口退税率。论文以1985-2009年的年度和月度数据为基础,出口退税与贸易出口的协整分析表明二者存在长期均衡关系,脉冲响应分析表明出口退税的变动短期内对出口会形成明显的冲击,引起出口的短期波动。均值T检验结果表明,2004年1月-2008年10月的出口退税政策效果显著,但由于受金融危机冲击、外部需求减少、政策效应滞后等因素的影响,2008年11月-2009年4月的政策效果不显著。     

建立更加有效的出口鼓励政策机制

日益加速的经济全球化进程使各国在出口方面所面临的竞争越来越激烈,发展中国家面临的挑战尤其严峻。随着我国市场化改革的深入和对外开放的不断扩大,政府对出口贸易的鼓励政策得到不断的调整和优化,但仍有一些深层次的问题需要解决。为了保持我国出口贸易的持续增长,更加有效地参与国际分工、进一步拓展国民经济的成长空间,我们应当努力构建新型的出口鼓励政策机制,推动我国出口竞争优势模式的转换,实现从贸易大国到贸易强国的转变。     

如何完善中国出口退税制度

出口退税作为中国一项基本经济政策,从客观上要求建立一个科学、规范、合理和稳定的退税机制,改革现行出口退税体制,加强出口退税管理成为当务之急。就此,提出了相关的建议：合理改革出口退税中央与地方的分担机制,出口退税改革与增值税转型协调进行,取消所有产品的出口产品的退税,提高出口退税制度的立法层次,稳定出口退税制度。     

挤压还是促进?——内需对制造业出口的影响研究

文章结合新古典和新贸易理论研究范式,考察了国内需求对制成品出口的影响。研究发现,制造业中大部分产业的国内需求对出口有显著的正影响,但对于不同行业来说,出口的影响因素有很大差异,超过半数的产业内需对出口的影响已经超过劳动力禀赋的影响,并且贸易自由化会放大内需对出口的影响。我国未来出口将以产业内贸易为主,要更有针对性地采取政策措施以使扩大内需与稳定出口相辅相成,这样才能更大程度地获取贸易收益。     

价格竞争还是质量竞争--中国出口产品竞争力的实证研究

中国出口产品普遍被认为“价廉质次”,然而这并不能充分解释中国出口贸易长期增长的实质。对中国2001年加入WTO以来出口产品竞争力的实证研究表明：一方面,中国出口产品的相对单位价格呈现持续下降的趋势,这说明低价竞争是中国出口产品的一个主要特征;另一方面,中国出口产品质量在逐年上升,其中高技术出口产品的质量竞争力较为明显,这说明中国出口产品并未陷入低质量产品的陷阱。在新时期进一步深化对外贸易转型中,把握中国出口产品竞争力特征对我国对外贸易政策制定有重要意义。     

The Political Economy of Clientelism*

In this paper, we argue that the political‐commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form, particularly employment in the public sector. A job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents (such as in situations with moral hazard), and employment is optimal ex post. Moreover, a job is selective and reversible, and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician. We show that the need to make offers of employment incentive‐compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods. We also show that such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality and low productivity. Inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high, when inequality is high, and when money matters less than ideology in politics.     

Strategic Policy and Environmental Quality: Helping the Domestic Industry to Provide Credible Information

This paper shows that a country can improve an industry's competitiveness by requiring domestic firms to produce at the environmental standards at which they claim to produce or otherwise impose a penalty on those firms found cheating. Competitiveness will improve because this regulation will help the domestic industry to provide credible information about the environmental quality of its production. The credible information will differentiate domestic products from other products on the world market, and in this way increase consumers' willingness to pay for domestic products. Even if the government has no preferences for environmental quality, it has incentives to regulate its cheaters in order to help the domestic industry to provide credible information and thereby improve competitiveness.     

Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments

This paper investigates the impact of political lobbying on the choice of environmental policy instruments. It is argued that the prevalence of pollution emission standards over more efficient policy instruments may result from rent seeking behaviour. The model further predicts that when an emission standard is used to control pollution, rival political parties have an incentive to set the same standard. There is therefore a convergence of policies. Moreover, it is shown that emission taxes are more likely to be supported and proposed by political parties which represent environmental interest groups. This feature appears to accord with the observed support for environmental taxes by Green parties in Europe, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere.     

A Political Economy of Youth Policy in Tunisia

This paper seeks to add to debates over the contribution that a political economy approach can make to understanding the current condition of youth, specifically narrowing the focus to youth policy. The paper suggests an approach which locates youth not as a class in itself, but as being at the epicentre of the growing labour precariat. Youth policy, formulated and disseminated through the structures and hierarchies of global neo-liberal capital via the positive development approach, constructs narratives of youth as a social category which subordinate it to the changing needs of the labour market and disrupt the emergence of broad-based resistance or class consciousness. In Ben Ali’s Tunisia, youth policy had the added task of servicing the authoritarian reproduction of the regime, creating tensions and contradictions between the objectives of the various global and local structures and hierarchies of power at play.     

Unionized labor market and licensing by a monopolist

We show that a monopolistic final goods producer may find it profitable to create competition by licensing its technology if the input market is imperfectly competitive. With a centralized union, we show that licensing by a monopolist is profitable under both uniform and discriminatory wage settings by the union. However, the incentive for licensing is higher under the former situation. We also show that licensing by the monopolist is profitable under both quantity and price competition, and the incentive for licensing is higher under price competition than under quantity competition. Our qualitative results hold even with decentralized unions.      

Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments: Comment

In this comment, I analyze Damania's political economy model (Environmental and Resource Economics 13: 415–433, 1999), correcting some flaws and clarifying some ambiguities. I arguethat the political parties are identical at the outset of the game. Onlyafter the parties have chosen the instrument (standards or taxation) and thestrictness of environmental policy do the environmentalists and thepolluting firms know which party to support in the election campaign. Inequilibrium, both parties choose the same platform, so that both have anequal probability of winning the election.     

出口退税政策对出口贸易的持续影响效应研究——来自异质性企业出口生存率的证据

出口退税作为一项贸易调控政策,在一国政府应对国际贸易的大幅波动中发挥着重要作用.文章以企业出口关系持续性作为研究切入点,结合高度细化的出口退税率数据,运用生存分析模型对出口退税政策的实施效果进行系统评估.研究表明:(1)总体而言,出口退税率的变动在短期和长期均对企业出口关系的稳定性产生了显著影响.(2)在短期内,出口退税政策的调整对企业出口持续性的影响不因其所在区域和行业特征的差异而存在显著不同,但在所有制属性层面,民营企业受到的影响程度最大.(3)在长期内,来自东部地区、民营以及低技术行业的企业不仅受政策变动的作用时效更长,而且受政策调整的影响效果也更明显;而来自西部地区、三资以及高技术行业的企业则对出口退税政策调整的反应敏感程度最低.因此,出口退税政策的实施需要结合出口信贷等政策加以综合运用,以保证经济的平稳运行.     

考虑港口收费管制的进出口贸易竞争研究

考虑港口的收费管制因素,建立了进出口贸易竞争模型。该模型由一个出口国和两个进口国组成,且各国都拥有一个港口,位于出口国的两家公司均向两个进口国销售商品,并在各个进口国展开市场竞争（古诺竞争或伯川德竞争）,各贸易国的港口根据其是否存在价格管制确定港口收费。针对进出口公司的每种竞争模式,得到了不同的港口收费管制组合下各贸易国的港口收费、港口利润和社会福利,并将竞争均衡结果进行了比较。研究发现： （1）在进出口公司古诺竞争模式下,若三个贸易国的港口都无收费管制（有收费管制）且进出口产品的差异较大 （小）时,各贸易国的社会福利和港口利润均更高; （2）在进出口公司伯川德竞争模式下,若进出口产品的差异较大 （小）,则出口国的港口利润主要取决于港口收费 （贸易量）,而进口国恰好相反; （3）当进出口产品的差异较大 （小）时,进出口公司在古诺 （伯川德）竞争模式下各贸易国的社会福利、港口利润以及港口使用费都更高。     

农村剩余劳动力转移的重要途径——国际劳务输出

我国农村剩余劳动力的转移问题越来越受到社会各界的关注。本文提出扩大国际劳务输出是转移农村剩余劳动力的重要途径。我国进行国际劳务输出具有较大的比较优势和发展空间。我国政府应加大国际劳务输出的管理力度,为促进我国农村剩余劳动力转移另辟新径。     

人民币汇率制度和出口退税政策的演变及政策评价

汇率制度和出口退税政策一直是开放经济体对外经济制度的重要组成部分,是有效调节出口贸易最重要的两种政策手段。中国的人民币汇率制度和出口退税政策经历了计划经济体制时期、经济转轨时期、社会主义市场经济体制初步确立时期、亚洲金融危机时期、全球经济危机时期六个发展阶段,其中1978—1993年人民币汇率的贬值对出口的促进作用较为明显,1994—2010年出口退税成为影响出口的重要因素。目前,随着人民币渐进升值,出口退税成为影响出口和产业结构调整的重要政策工具。