不同订货周期的零售商最优订货策略研究

企业联盟是企业间“合作-创新”的一种组织创新。企业加入联盟后能够获得新的竞争优势。但是,和其他组织形式相比,企业联盟并不具有绝对的优势。在不同的条件之下,企业会选择最适合它的行动方式。为了保证企业联盟能够顺利组建并运行,各成员在参加联盟后所获得的收益要超过它因参加联盟所发生的费用。     

COST‐SAVING PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGIES AND STRATEGIC DELEGATION*

This work analyses a managerial delegation model in which firms choose between two production technologies: a low marginal cost technology and a high marginal cost technology. For the former to be adopted more investment is needed than for the later. By giving managers of firms an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue, we find that Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt the cost‐saving technology than the strict profit maximisation case. However, the results may be reversed under Cournot competition. If the degree of product substitutability is sufficiently low (high), the incentive to adopt the cost‐saving technology is larger under strict profit maximisation (strategic delegation).     

Compensation measures for alliance formation: A real options analysis

This paper presents a real options model of alliance formation between two firms for entry into a new market. We analyze how different compensation measures affect the alliance timing and option values. Generally, when profit structures of the two firms before and after an alliance are different, their individually optimal alliance timings do not coincide. Therefore, achieving an agreement on a common alliance timing becomes an important issue. To promote alliance formation, we examine two feasible compensation measures provided by one firm to the other: share adjustment (flow compensation) and subsidy (lump-sum compensation). We find that subsidy induces an earlier alliance, although share adjustment is Pareto optimal in terms of the joint option value.     

Joint Ventures versus Contractual Agreements: An Empirical Investigation

In this paper, we empirically investigate the determinants of the governance form of strategic alliances. We use a database with 1,344 worldwide alliances in several industrial sectors. In contrast with previous empirical studies, we find that alliances undertaking R&D activities are more likely to use loose forms of organization (contractual agreements) than more hierarchical ones (joint ventures), and this result is even stronger when the alliance takes place in technologically sophisticated sectors. Moreover, we show that alliances between rival firms tend also to be organized with forms closer to arm’s length transactions. When the scope of an alliance is multidimensional or the alliance is an international one, however, firms prefer more hierarchical organizations such as joint ventures. This paper was partially written while the first author was visiting the University of the Basque Country. We would like to thank Reinhilde Veugelers and the project FWO spillovers 6.0131.98 at the Katholieke Universiteit of Leuven for the use of the K.U. database. Financial support from projects Progetto Giovani Ricercatori – 1999 Universitá di Udine, SEJ 2004-02172/ECON, 9/UPV 00035.321-13560/2001, UPV 00038.321-13503/2001 is gratefully acknowledged. We are also indebted to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.     

治理机制何时有助于联盟成功——基于不确定性视角的研究

基于交易成本理论和关系交换理论，采用比较研究法，探讨契约治理与关系治理对联盟成功的差异化影响并识别边界条件。运用410家联盟企业调研数据进行实证研究，结果表明关系治理比契约治理更有助于企业实现联盟成功，且这种影响效应随着联盟情境不同而发生改变。当联盟外部环境不确定性程度加深时，企业会更加依赖于关系治理而非契约治理实现联盟成功；当联盟伙伴行为不确定性程度加深时，企业选择契约治理比依赖关系治理更容易实现联盟成功。研究结论可为联盟企业在不同情境条件下选择恰当治理机制并实现联盟成功提供理论指导。     

MRO线上销售联盟及收益分配问题研究

以制造企业、网络平台和中间商作为工业品线上销售模式的构成主体,对其不同组合形成的三类销售联盟：单方联盟、两方联盟和三方联盟进行分析描述。运用Shapley值法及考虑实际收益权重的改进方法计算MRO线上销售联盟的收益分配问题。研究结果表明,三方联盟的附加收益大于等于任意两方联盟附加收益之和的一半,即可保证三方联盟中各方收益都达到最大值;任意两方联盟的附加收益增加都会使得第三方成员的边际收益减少。且基于实际责任、风险、成本及损失权益四个综合因素的变权计算方法,可使得线上销售联盟成员之间的收益分配更加公平合理,更加有利于工业品领域线上销售发展。     

企业社会责任标准国际化背景下企业进入策略研究*

本文通过构建博弈模型，对企业社会责任（CSR）标准国际化背景下企业进入策略进行研究。本文发现，企业最优进入策略受到进入成本影响，当进入成本较低时所有企业都适合选择进入高CSR标准市场，当进入成本较高时所有企业都不适合选择进入，当成本介于两者之间时适合部分企业选择进入。在对社会福利的分析中还发现，当进入是企业最优策略时，无论是部分进入还是全部进入，企业承担更高的社会责任能同时提升企业利润和社会福利水平。     

Industrial Location and Spatial Inequality: Theory and Evidence from India

The authors argue that spatial inequality of industry location is a primary cause of spatial income inequality in developing nations. Their study focuses on understanding the process of spatial industrial variation: identifying the spatial factors that have cost implications for firms, and the factors that influence the location decisions of new industrial units. The analysis has two parts. First the authors examine the contribution of economic geography factors to the cost structure of firms in eight industry sectors and show that local industrial diversity is the one factor with significant and substantial cost‐reducing effects. They then show that new private sector industrial investments in India are biased toward existing industrial and coastal districts, whereas state industrial investments (in deep decline after structural reforms) are far less biased toward such districts. The authors conclude that structural reforms lead to increased spatial inequality in industrialization, and therefore, income.     

The Role of Firms' Collaborative Agreements in the Information Technology Industry Transformation

While most articles on firm partnerships focus on the firm, the alliance or networks, we investigate the role of collaborative agreements during industrial transformation phases. Observation of a single industry, the Information Technology (IT) industry, shows that the growth of collaborative agreements formed by industry leaders in the early 1990s can be interpreted as an attempt to absorb a major industry shock characterized by vertical disintegration and the emergence of 'divided technical leadership'. Such firms have adopted collaborative agreements to maintain their leadership by controlling new entrants in the new industry segments that have resulted from the disintegration. Partnerships became a strategic component of the new 'divided technical leadership' market structure that emerged from the competitive crash of the early 1990s.     

产业技术创新联盟中企业联盟能力的构建——一个多层面互动的模型

在新的竞争环境下,产业技术创新联盟成为了企业实施技术创新战略的主要形式,而对创新联盟以及创新联盟网络的管理能力也因此成为了企业竞争优势的关键来源。文章超越了现有大多数联盟能力研究所采取的单一分析层面的做法,着重探索了影响产业技术创新联盟中企业联盟能力的组织和个体两个层面的多因素互动机制。在案例研究的基础上,建立了一个联盟能力的多维动态框架,包括组织维度的战略和结构以及个体维度的能力等因素,分别从战略锚定、支持结构和联盟思维等方面阐述了企业联盟能力构建的途径和方法,强调组织层面的因素与个体层面的因素之间的互动是创新联盟中企业联盟能力构建的关键,联盟能力是企业组织层面的战略-结构因素与个体层面的认知结构和能力因素交互作用的函数,从而为企业构建联盟能力以更好地从技术创新联盟中获益提供了一定的指导和借鉴。     

INTER-MARKET COMPETITION THROUGH BUNDLING IN THE PRESENCE OF COST ADVANTAGE

This paper presents a model of inter-market competition through bundling wherein each firm has a cost advantage in a different market and competes against fringe firms. Without cost saving through bundling, there is no equilibrium in which the bundled good is provided. However, with cost saving through bundling, there exist equilibria in which one firm provides bundling and the other does not. In this case, bundling can be used as a device for entry deterrence. Finally, we illustrate that bundling can reduce social welfare by discouraging the efficient entrant from entering the market.     

中国四类地区工业用地供给研究*——来自新经济地理学的解释

本文基于工业用地供给模型,修改了多样性偏好假定,并将中国按照工业发展程度分成四类地区,分析四类地区政府在GDP考核目标下的工业用地供给策略。通过求解纳什均衡的近似解析解,笔者发现,处于工业发展初级阶段的地区,倾向于多供给土地,形成小规模企业;反之亦然。同时本文证明了在同样的劳动力规模下,交易成本高、同质性竞争激烈、技术水平低下的地区会供给更多的工业用地。这为提升工业用地使用效率指明了方向。     

基于管理协同的产业技术创新战略联盟稳定性研究

近年产业技术创新战略联盟发展迅速,但普遍存在稳定性不高、效率低下等诸多问题。因此,提高联盟稳定性、改进联盟绩效是当前亟需解决的问题。基于管理协同理论,从资源协同、目标协同、知识协同、关系协同、创新协同视角,以成员信任度为调节变量,对产业技术创新战略联盟稳定性进行分析。研究结果发现,联盟成员资源协同、目标协同、知识协同对联盟稳定性存在正向影响,关系协同、创新协同对联盟稳定性存在负向影响。基于此,提出促进联盟稳定性的对策建议。     

Credit constraints in Italian industrial districts

Italy is characterized by strong differences both in the productive and in the financial structure. Small and medium firms tend to concentrate in the so called ‘Marshallian industrial district’, whose productive system has been thoroughly studied but whose financial features are partially overlooked. This paper aims at investigating how the location of a firm in an industrial district affects its ability to resort to external finance, mostly bank loans. The econometric analysis on a panel of 1700 firms over the 1989–1995 period shows that firms located inside industrial districts have an advantage in terms of financial relations with the banking system: both the cost of credit and the probability to face financial constraints are lower. Nevertheless, the cyclical pattern of this advantage is not in favour of district firms: following the tightening of monetary policy, increases in interest rates on bank loans are proportionally higher for firms inside the district; furthermore, also the advantage consisting in an easier access to credit market disappears after the 1992–1993 recession.     

结构洞度对联盟网络中企业创新绩效的影响研究

对于结构洞是否可以真正促进企业创新网络中的成员提高创新绩效,不同学者持有不同观点。在国内外相关研究文献的基础上,发现企业在联盟网络中所处的结构洞位置与局部网位置都将对企业的创新性产生影响,从而提出结构洞度概念。结合社会网络分析法与负二项回归方法,以社会网络理论为基础,以中国家用视听设备制造业企业联盟网络为研究对象,研究了企业在战略联盟网络中网络位置的结构洞度对企业创新绩效的影响。研究结果表明,企业所处联盟网络的结构洞度的确可以对企业的创新绩效产生显著促进作用,这将为企业在选择联盟伙伴时提供重要的参考依据。     

A Theory of International Strategic Alliance

As an alternative to exporting, a firm can enter a foreign market by forging a strategic alliance with its foreign counterpart. The alliance eliminates transportation costs and duplications in product distribution networks. At the same time, strategic alliance lessens competition between the firms so that it leads to smaller outputs and higher prices. The degree of lessening of competition depends on the firms’ ability to commit to output levels. In the case where the firms can credibly commit to output levels, the alliance effectively becomes a cartel, restoring prices to the monopoly level. On the other hand, if such commitment is not credible or not possible, prices will be lower than the monopoly level but will still be higher than that if firms had exported to each other's market directly. The welfare effects of the strategic alliance are in general ambiguous.     

Horizontal Mergers Under Asymmetric Information About Synergies

This paper analyses a situation in which there are three quantity‐setting firms, two of which are considering whether or not to merge. When these two firms have private information about the potential cost‐saving synergies of the merger, they may have an incentive to overstate them. This is because if they succeed in making the non‐merging rival firm believe that the synergies are high, the rival firm reduces output and the merger becomes more profitable. Under some conditions, anticipating that the rival will form such a belief, low‐synergy firms that would never merge under complete information will mimic high‐synergy firms by merging. Such pooling behaviour by the merging firms can have a negative impact on social welfare.     

Temporary hires and innovative investments

The flexicurity approach claims a positive effect of flexible labour on firm performance, also through an increased ability to innovate. Critics consider it a deregulation of the labour market, decreasing investment in human capital and innovation. We contribute to this broad debate providing an estimate of the relationships linking innovative investment, substitution investment, permanent hires and temporary hires. In particular, we aim at affirming or denying that innovative investments are accompanied by a specific kind of workforce, being it stable or flexible. In doing so, we contribute to bridge the gap among two quite separate strands of literature, as existing literature usually analyses capital and labour separately. Estimating a nonlinear recursive equation system we highlight a significant increase in the likelihood of hiring on a permanent base when the firm innovates; this holds till 2008. Afterward, during the crisis, innovating firms are more likely to hire using temporary contracts instead, a possible signal of a cost saving strategy adopted in a loose labour market by firms still able to innovate. Furthermore, both permanent and temporary hires never depend on increases in labour costs; however, substitution investment increases when labour cost increases, maybe in an attempt to increase labour productivity through a more efficient capital equipment.     

COALITION FORMATION WITH LEARNING FROM PREDECESSORS: A CASE OF DYNAMIC POSITIVE EXTERNALITY

We consider a simple multi‐period model where the entry cost varies with respect to the number of firms that have entered previously. In the non‐cooperative outcome, there is clustered entry among the firms in the last period; hence, the full potential of learning is not expropriated. When firms are allowed to form coalitions, the non‐cooperative outcome is dominated; thus, there is a gain in efficiency. We also find that full efficiency is obtained when a grand coalition is formed. The implications of policies on coalitions as well as on individual firms are also discussed.     

Learning in strategic technology alliances

In this paper we examine the influence of strategic technology alliances on organisational learning. From an empirical perspective we examine the pre- and post-alliance knowledge bases of allying firms. We find that the pre-alliance knowledge base overlap of the allying firms has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the degree of learning taking place in the alliance. Alliances established for the purpose of learning also show a significantly greater increase in knowledge base overlap for the allying firms than for non-learning alliance or non-allying firms. This shows the particular importance of learning alliances as a vehicle for organisational learning and competence development. Contrary to what we expected we found that weak ties are more important than strong ties in organisational learning within strategic alliances.