Environmental Protection and Trade Liberalization in a Small Open Dual Economy

The author investigates the conditions under which environmental protection and trade liberalization might improve urban unemployment and welfare in a small open Harris–Todaro model with polluting urban manufacturing. While a tariff reduction decreases manufacturing employment, a rise in the pollution tax rate may increase it when a dirty input is complementary to capital. Environmental protection and trade liberalization are consistent in reducing the level of urban unemployment because they lower it under the same condition. They are consistent in increasing GDP if a rise in the pollution tax rate decreases manufacturing employment. Otherwise, trade liberalization will mitigate a decrease in GDP because of environmental protection if the degree of urbanization is low and if rural technology exhibits weak diminishing returns to labor. This GDP effect plays a central role in welfare improvement.     

Strategic Environmental Policy under Free Trade with Transboundary Pollution

We analyze the effects of trade liberalization on environmental policies in a strategic setting when there is transboundary pollution. Trade liberalization can result in a race to the bottom in environmental taxes, which makes both countries worse off. This is not due to the terms of trade motive, but rather the incentive, in a strategic setting, to reduce the incidence of transboundary pollution. With command and control policies (emission quotas), countries are unable to influence foreign emissions by strategic choice of domestic policy; hence, there is no race to the bottom. However, with internationally tradable quotas, unless pollution is a pure global public bad, there is a race to the bottom in environmental policy. Under free trade, internationally nontradable quotas result in the lowest pollution level and strictly welfare‐dominate taxes. The ordering of internationally tradable quotas and pollution taxes depends, among other things, on the degree of international pollution spillovers.     

A dynamic analysis of the Korea–Japan free trade area: simulations with the G‐cubed Asia–Pacific model

This paper explores the effects of the proposed free trade agreement between Japan and Korea. Our experiments are based on a new dynamic simulation model, called the Asia‐Pacific G‐cubed Model, which incorporates the rational expectations and intertemporal optimizing behaviour of agents. The simulations show that both Korea and Japan benefit from the bilateral FTA although other countries lose. The output gains from the FTA are estimated to be larger when trade liberalization is undertaken by a tariff reduction that is more gradually phased‐in than rapid.

JEL Classification: F15     

Trade liberalization in environmental goods

Trade negotiations have started to pay attention to liberalization in environmental goods (EGs), whose production may require dirty intermediate goods. We construct a two-country trade model to explore the effects of trade liberalization in EGs on the local pollution, the global environment and welfare in the presence of such an environmental conundrum. We find that countries do not necessarily benefit from trade liberalization in EGs in the absence of an environmental policy. With the assistance of an upstream pollution tax, trade liberalization in EGs improves each country's welfare. This result holds independent of whether the upstream market is competitive or not, or whether we have upstream trade across countries. For asymmetric countries, trade liberalization in EGs improves the world welfare and the welfare for the country if it has a smaller demand for EGs; or experiences less damage from the production of dirty inputs; or values environment improvement more.     

Some aspects on regional integration,comparative advantage and consumer's diversity

This article describes one simple Cournot oligopoly model with linear inverse demand and international linkage, and tries to analyse how the degree of competitiveness, the diversity in comparative advantage, consumer preference and market volume are closely interrelated with each other in the course of free trade areas (FTA) liberalization. The influence of income/substitution effects to firm's profit maximization is also examined. My analysis shows some basic results and implications regarding the tariff-setting strategies and the incentive for endogenous internal liberalization, as well as the role of FTA formation on a stream to world-wide liberalization.     

Agricultural trade liberalization,price changes,and environmental effects

Many analyses of agricultural trade liberalization have been undertaken but few have considered the effects on the environment. For the developed countries, reducing the degree of protection would result in less intensive production; therefore, environmental stress would be reduced. A reduction of trade barriers in industrial countries would result in higher world prices and in a somewhat lower world price variability. Assuming initially no policy changes for developing countries, the question is how the liberalization would affect the environment. Higher Prices in developing countries increase the level of production by intensifying production, particularly in the commercial sector, and by an area expansion. Both result in negative environmental effects. These could be partly offset by an increase in hired labor in the commercial sector, which might reduce pressure at the frontier and on marginal lands, as well as by the income effect. These off-setting effects may be small; however, the direction of the overall environmental effects cannot be determined unambiguously without empirical examination. At the global level, the beneficial economic effects of agricultural trade liberalization probably outweigh the expected negative environmental effects in developing countries, but this cannot be unambiguously established without valuation.     

Endogenous Free Trade Agreements and Foreign Lobbying

This paper assesses the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs) in the presence of lobbying by organized foreign interest groups. The assessment is based on a model in which external tariffs and the decision to form an FTA are endogenously determined. The findings demonstrate that, in the presence of an organized lobby group in a prospective partner country, an FTA may initiate an increase in the level of protection against imports from third countries and impede trade with non‐member countries. Further, this study finds that a foreign lobby may encourage the local government to enter a welfare‐reducing trade‐diverting FTA. Finally, this paper shows that an FTA increases the lobbying power of the organized lobby groups of the member countries, which can potentially obstruct the viability of welfare‐improving multilateral trade liberalization.     

Economic Determinants of Free Trade Agreements Revisited: Distinguishing Sources of Interdependence

One of the most notable international economic events since 1990 has been the enormous increase in the number of free trade agreements (FTAs). While Baier and Bergstrand were the first to show empirically the impact of a country‐pair's economic characteristics on the likelihood of the pair having an FTA, the literature has been extended to demonstrate the importance empirically of FTA “interdependence”—the effect of other FTAs on the probability of a pair having an FTA. In the context of the Baier–Bergstrand framework, this paper delves deeper into the sources of interdependence—an “own‐FTA” effect and a “cross‐FTA” effect. The authors argue that the own‐FTA effect (the impact on the net welfare gains of an FTA between two countries owing to either already having other FTAs) likely dwarfs the cross‐FTA effect (the impact on the net welfare gains of an FTA between the pair owing to other FTAs existing in the rest of the world, or ROW). Augmenting a parsimonious logit model with simple “multilateral FTA” and “ROW FTA” terms to differentiate the own and cross effects empirically, it is shown that the marginal impact on the probability of a country‐pair having an agreement of either country having one more FTA with a third country is 50 times that of one more FTA between another pair in ROW. The results suggest that “domino (own‐FTA) effects” have far exceeded “competitive liberalization (cross‐FTA) effects” in the proliferation of FTAs.     

Trade Liberalization and Environmental Taxation in Federal Systems

The literature on trade liberalization and environment has not yet considered federal structures. In this paper, we show how the design of environmental policy in a federal system has implications for the effects of trade reform. Trade liberalization leads to a decline in pollution taxes, regardless of whether pollution taxes are set at the federal (centralized) or local (decentralized) level, and it increases social welfare. The effect under a decentralized system is smaller than if these taxes are set by the federal government, and pollution emissions therefore decline in this case. Moreover, majority bias interacts with trade liberalization if federal taxes are used.     

Unity versus Collaboration: Construction of China's Belt and Road Free Trade Agreement 2.0 Network

In the context of the United States prioritizing bilateral as well as trilateral trade agreements and China's regional economic integration strategy based on the Belt and Road (B&R) Initiative, the B&R free trade agreement (FTA) and the US–European–Japanese FTA (UEJFTA) have become the two regional economic integration processes with the greatest potential impact on the world economic landscape. The present paper examines the game situation as well as the economic effects of China's B&R‐FTA 2.0 network against the United States' UEJFTA to study the optimization of China's B&R FTA system. By constructing a four‐country extended game model under a two‐part expansion, we find that an increase in members will promote the welfare of each country when there is a single regional trade agreement; the potential member countries tend to choose larger organizations for higher economic benefits when there are several regional trade agreements. Our quantitative simulation shows that promoting the construction of the FTA 2.0 network based on the B&R can significantly alleviate the impact of FTA entered into by the United States with its major trading partners.     

Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Feasibility of Multilateral Free Trade

We studied how the pursuit of bilateral free‐trade agreements (FTAs) affects the likelihood of achieving multilateral free trade. We derive and compare the stable Nash equilibria of two games of trade liberalization: in the FTA game, each country can either form an FTA with one of its trading partners or both of them or none of them, whereas in the (restricted) No FTA game, purely bilateral FTAs are not permitted. The major result is that there exist circumstances under which the freedom to pursue (discriminatory) bilateral FTAs is necessary for achieving multilateral free trade.     

The political economy of preferential trade arrangements: The case of Japan

ABSTRACT

Support for open trade regimes varies. We analyze Japanese survey data on individuals' preferences for TPP, unilateral import liberalization, and East Asian economic integration, and compare factors influencing policy preferences. First, despite the massive negative campaigns against TPP, 42.8% of individuals support Japan’s participation in TPP, vs. 21.1% against. Second, economic factors do matter for an individual in determining his/her policy preference over TPP. Third, noneconomic factors such as gender, age, access to accurate information, and attachment to hometown also feature as determinants. Fourth, although preferences over TPP and other policy options are positively correlated, some factors decrease TPP support but do not undermine support for two other less-politicized policy options: lack of access to accurate information and some industry and regional TPP-specific factors. Criticism impacts negatively on FTA policy preferences. Finally, we discuss economic policy implications for relationships between China, Japan, and Korea.

Abbreviations: FTA: Free trade agreement; JA: Japan agricultural cooperative; TPP: Trans-Pacific partnership agreement.     

Trade Liberalization and Environmental Regulation on International Transportation

Incorporating pollution emissions from international transportation into a model of strategic trade and environmental policies, we investigate the effect of trade liberalization and environmental regulation on national welfare and the environment. Our model includes imperfectly competitive markets for international transportation and final products. We find that trade liberalization may reduce each country's welfare unless some level of environmental regulation on international transportation is in place. When international trade is liberalized initially, a mutual increase in the common emission tax rates may improve each country's welfare. However, when international trade is highly protected initially, imposing an emission tax may reduce welfare.     

Gender Effects of Trade Openness in Sub-Saharan Africa

ABSTRACT

More than thirty years into the modern era of globalization, scholars are now in a position to evaluate the distributive effects of the policy shifts that have led to greater economic integration. One region of the world for which little robust empirical evidence exists on gendered employment effects is Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). To identify whether there is an impact of economic and trade structure on women's relative access to work, this contribution empirically explores these issues for thirty-eight SSA countries, and for two subgroups. Panel data for the period 1991–2010 is examined using fixed effects, random effects and two-stage least-squares estimation techniques. Findings suggest that trade liberalization has gendered employment effects, with the direction depending on the structure of the economy. However, the more robust finding is that a country's infrastructure has played a determining role in gendered labor market outcomes in SSA since the early 1990s.     

Trade Liberalization with Heterogeneous Firms

This paper examines the various aspects of trade liberalization with heterogeneous firms using the Melitz (2003 ) model. We find a number of novel results and effects including a Stolper–Samuelson‐like result and several results related to the volume of trade, which are empirically testable. We also analyze what might be called an anti‐variety effect as the result of trade liberalization. We show that this effect is most pronounced for small countries. This resonates with the often voiced criticism from antiglobalists that globalization leads the world to become more homogeneous by eliminating local specialties. Nevertheless, we find that trade liberalization always leads to welfare gains in the model.     

Is bioenergy trade good for the environment?

We analyze the impacts of bioenergy trade on greenhouse gas emissions using a two-good, three-factor model. Bioenergy is an agricultural good used as a substitute for fossil fuels in industry. Governments tax domestic pollution without international coordination. We assume that northern countries have higher labor productivity than southern ones and that agriculture is less pollution intensive than industry (after taxation). We show that whereas southern countries impose a lower tax rate than northern ones, they do not necessary have a competitive advantage in industry, and that compared to autarky, trade liberalization either increases or decreases worldwide emissions depending on regional comparative advantages.     

Free Trade Agreements and the Prospects for Regional Integration in East Asia

Trade policy in East Asia has switched from non-discriminatory unilateral liberalization, reinforced by General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) commitments, to discriminatory free trade agreements (FTA). The paper surveys the FTA activity of the major regional players: China, the ASEAN countries, Japan, and South Korea. It concludes that emerging FTAs are weak and partial. A hub-and-spoke pattern of dirty FTAs will not drive regional economic integration or further integration with the global economy. Rather, it could be a force of regional economic disintegration – especially if the multilateral trading system weakens further. At the same time, FTA activity is distracting attention from the WTO, and, more fundamentally, from unilateral liberalization and domestic structural reforms. Hence, East Asian trade policies need to be rebalanced, with better-quality FTAs and more focus on the WTO. However, more important than the WTO and FTAs is a fresh spurt of unilateral liberalization and structural reform outside trade negotiations.     

Are free trade agreements good for the environment? A panel data analysis

This study empirically examines the relationship between free trade agreements (FTAs) and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. For this purpose, we use three different FTAs: the Southern Common Market, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement. These FTAs are between developing, both developing and developed, and only developed countries, respectively. Panel unit root, panel cointegration, and fully modified ordinary least squares estimations are employed to examine the long‐run relationship between GHG emissions and trade liberalization. The results indicate that the environmental effects of FTAs depend on the different agreement types. When FTAs are between only developed or developing countries, overall there is no environmental damage, and these types of FTAs can be beneficial for the environmental quality in the long run. However, when developing and developed countries are in a trade agreement, overall environmental quality decreases due to increased GHG emissions.     

Analyzing the effects of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership on FDI in a CGE framework with firm heterogeneity

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a free trade agreement (FTA) that is currently under negotiation among China and 15 other Asian countries. It is one of several potential mega-regional FTAs in the Asia-Pacific region. In this paper we investigate the potential effect of RCEP on foreign direct investment (FDI) with a focus on China using an innovative computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The model is built on the theory of firm heterogeneity extended to FDI. The framework is able to capture FDI increases along both the intensive and extensive margins. Liberalization under RCEP is simulated as impacting on FDI both directly through FDI liberalization and indirectly through trade liberalization. Our simulation results suggest that RCEP would encourage significant increases in FDI to China through both these pathways. While competition from imports drives out the least productive foreign owned firms, export expansion of firms using FDI will lead to an overall increase in foreign investment. In addition, the facilitation of trade in intermediate goods tends to promote vertical FDI. The direct FDI effect from investment liberalization will evidently promote FDI from partners. Projected economic gains to China from RCEP are in the range of US$103–214 billion, or 1.1–2.2% of GDP.     

How deep is your love? A quantitative spatial analysis of the transatlantic trade partnership

This paper explores the quantitative effects of trade liberalization envisioned in a transatlantic trade and investment partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union. We use a quantitative trade model that, in contrast to other works, features consumptive and productive uses of land and we allow for labor mobility and a spatial equilibrium. Our calibration draws mainly on the world input–output database (WIOD). The eventual outcome of the negotiations is uncertain. Tariffs in E.U.–U.S. trade are already very low, however, so that an agreement will have a major impact only by eliminating nontariff barriers. These are extremely hard to quantify. We address these uncertainties by considering a corridor of trade‐liberalization paths and by providing numerous robustness checks. Even with ambitious liberalization, real income gains within a TTIP are in the range of up to 0.46 percent for most countries. The effect on outside countries is typically negative, yet even smaller. Taking land into account scales down the welfare effects strongly. Interestingly, we find that all German counties derive unambiguous welfare gains even though the model allows for negative terms‐of‐trade effects. Our analysis also implies that in order to arrive at the same welfare gains as under a TTIP, a multilateral liberalization would have to be much more ambitious for the U.S. than for the E.U.