Taxes,risk taking,and financial stability

After the global financial crisis, the use of taxes to enhance financial stability received new attention. This paper analyzes the corrective role of taxes in banking and compares two instruments, namely, an allowance for corporate equity (ACE), which mitigates the debt bias in corporate taxation, and a Pigovian tax on bank debt (bank levy). We emphasize financial stability gains driven by lower bank asset risk and develop a principal-agent model, in which risk taking depends on the bank's capital structure and, by extension, on the tax treatment of debt and equity. We find that (i) the ACE unambiguously reduces risk taking, (ii) bank levies reduce risk taking if they are independent of bank performance but may be counterproductive otherwise, and (iii) taxes are especially effective if regulatory capital requirements are constrained to low levels.     

迪拜债务危机:原因、影响及启示

2009年11月25日,迪拜政府宣布将重组旗下最大的主权投资公司迪拜世界,延迟6个月偿还其即将到期的约600亿美元债务。此事引起全球金融市场对迪拜未来偿还能力的担忧,多国股市出现下跌。迪拜债务危机的爆发主要是迪拜的发展模式出现问题,导致在金融危机冲击下房地产价格大幅度下跌。欧洲银行业在此次危机中风险敞口最大。此次事件会使新兴市场资金流向和美元汇率短期受到影响,但对世界经济的长期影响有限。迪拜危机对中国影响较小,但其所暴露的问题值得我们关注。     

The Perverse Effect of Debt Tax Benefits on Firm Investment Decisions

In this paper we question the idea that the deduction of debt interest is always an effective policy instrument to spur firm investment. We analyse the investment decision in presence of a borrowing constraint on the amount of debt that the firm can raise. We show that if the debt interest rate is decreasing in the firm's capital accumulation and another financial resource more expensive than debt is available (at least for levels of debt lower than the upper bound), then the deduction of the debt interest from taxes on capital income may reduce firm investment. This theoretical result is relevant for economic policy decisions when financial intermediaries are not willing to finance beyond a certain threshold but firms have access to other sources of finance.     

Mispricing of Risk in Sovereign Bond Markets with Asymmetric Information

The likelihood that a government will repay its sovereign debt depends both on the amount of debt it issues and on the government's future ability to repay. Whilst the former is publicly observable, the government may have more information about the latter than investors. This paper shows that this asymmetric information problem impairs the market's ability to differentiate economies according to their fiscal sustainability, and can lead to a disconnect between bond prices and default risk. The model can help rationalise the behaviour of Eurozone bond prices prior to the recent European sovereign debt crisis.     

Odious Debt in an Imperfect World

The odious debt problem refers to a government's ability to borrow for elite consumption while the general population repays. Although an intuitive response is to ban lending to such regimes, this paper shows that if a government faces endogenous replacement risk, then an international odious debt doctrine which (i) decreases the country's debt ceiling; (ii) decreases the likelihood that the citizens must repay the debt; or (iii) increases the government's cost of borrowing for a given default risk can all decrease citizens' welfare. These findings suggest that, even when a regime is clearly odious, allowing it to borrow up to a point may be preferable to a complete lending ban.     

Interactions of the firm's real and financial decisions

This paper provides an integrated approach to the theory of the firm. Under technological uncertainty, corporate taxes, risky debt and risk neutrality it is shown that the firm's investment production and financing decisions are made simultaneously. It is demonstrated that the relationship between optimal capital (or labour) and debt is not strictly negative as in Dotan and Ravid (1982) nor strictly positive as in Hite (1977). The direction of this relationship depends on the characteristics of debt and the characteristics of the firm's production function. Given the simultaneity of the real and financial decisions, it is shown that an interior optimum exists for the firm's value as a function of debt.     

Modeling Guarantees,Over-Indebtedness and Financial Crises in an Open Economy

This work develops a simple framework to analyse how financial intermediaries’ balance sheet problems combined with financial guarantees make an economy more vulnerable to financial crises. A ‘double default’ problem – that is, the default of financial intermediaries on their debt repayments and of the government on its guarantees to bailout intermediaries’ losses – is modelled in this study. The possibility of multiple equilibria, including a crisis equilibrium where the government is not able or willing to honor its guarantees towards the domestic financial sector, arises from the interplay of all the above elements: financial intermediaries’ level of indebtedness, government implicit guarantees and high-risk creditors’ lending. This work also produces predictions concerning the vulnerability to a financial crisis: multiple equilibria are possible only in certain ranges of the fundamentals.     

The impact of government debt on the long-run natural real interest rate – a quantitative evaluation

Persistently low natural real interest rates are a problem for monetary policy and financial stability. I analyse to what extent a permanent increase in government debt that is financed by higher taxes could raise the long-run natural real interest rate. As a measurement tool, I use an incomplete markets model with capital and government bonds. Increasing the public debt/GDP ratio by one percentage point raises the real interest rate by between 0.4 and 1.5 basis points, depending on the degree of inequality generated by the model and the tax instrument used to balance the government’s budget constraint. I also show that the interest rate effect of a change in public debt/GDP predicted by the model is significantly smaller than its empirical counterpart for the US, due to the fact that the model understates the empirical fraction of households that are constrained in their consumption decision.     

War finance and the baby boom

In this paper, I extend the Barro–Becker model of endogenous fertility to incorporate specific fiscal policies and use it to study the effects of the fiscal policy changes following WWII on fertility in the United States. The US government went through large changes in fiscal policy after the beginning of WWII. The marginal income tax rate for an average American jumped from 4% on average before 1940 to approximately 25% during the war and stayed around 20% afterwards. The government debt–GDP ratio jumped from approximately 30% on average before WWII to 108% in 1946 and then dropped gradually in the following two decades to about 30% again at the end of 1960s. I find that the dramatic increase in the marginal income tax rate was an important cause of the postwar baby boom in the US because it lowered the after-tax wage and thus the opportunity cost of child-rearing. I also find that the differential change in taxes by income was an important reason why the baby boom was more pronounced among richer households (as documented by Jones and Tertilt, 2008). Furthermore, I argue that the government's debt policy may also matter for understanding fertility choices because government debt implies a tax burden on children in the future and thus affects their utility, which is a key determinant of current fertility choice in the Barro–Becker model. The results of a computational experiment show that the US government's postwar debt policy also contributed to the baby boom, but its quantitative importance is relatively small.     

The crisis,Fed, Quants and stochastic optimal control

The Dodd–Frank (D–F) Financial Reform Bill authorizes the Federal Reserve to monitor the financial services marketplace to identify potential threats to the stability of the US financial system. Alan Greenspan's retrospective indicates what he has learned from the crisis. He argues that the crisis, the housing price bubble, was unpredictable and unavoidable. Greenspan now focuses on desirable capital requirements, or leverage, for banks and financial intermediaries. I explain why the Fed's and Greenspan's views stem from a lack of the appropriate tools of analysis of what is an excessive debt or leverage. The Quants who devised the highly leveraged financial derivatives ignored systemic risk.My theme is that the application of stochastic optimal control (SOC) is an effective approach to implement what the D–F bill is authorizing. I explain: first, what is the optimal capital requirement/leverage that balances expected return against risk. Second, what is a theoretically derived early warning signal of a crisis. Third, I derive an excess debt ratio, equal to the difference between the actual and optimal ratios. The probability of a debt crisis is directly related to the excess debt ratio. The excess debt ratio starting from 2004–05 indicated that a crisis was most likely. The Fed should use this SOC analysis in implementing the Dodd–Frank bill.     

Political economy of taxation,debt ceilings,and growth

This study presents voting on policies, including labor and capital income taxes and public debt, in an overlapping-generations model with physical and human capital accumulation, and analyzes the effects of a debt ceiling on a government's policy formation and its impact on growth and welfare. The results show that the debt ceiling induces the government to shift the tax burdens from the older to younger generations, but stimulates physical capital accumulation and may increase public education expenditure, resulting in a higher growth rate. Alternatively, the debt ceiling is measured from the viewpoint of a benevolent planner and lowering the debt ceiling (i.e., tightening fiscal discipline) makes it possible for the government to approach the planner's allocation in an aging society.     

Public debt dynamics with tax revenue constraints

We develop a dynamic model of public debt under the assumption that it is problematic for governments to implement fast increases of tax revenues, as new taxes require costly infrastructure and expertise that can be built only over time. In this environment, the standard condition requiring economic growth greater than interest costs is not sufficient to guarantee financial stability. Debt might become unstable if the gap between these two indicators falls below a given threshold. Our empirical analysis based on historical public finance data for the US provides strong support for the model. This study conveys a cautionary warning, because the debt of relatively safe borrowers may suddenly become unstable for instance because of a substantial deceleration in the growth of nominal income. These issues can be particularly relevant for those countries that do not have a modern and efficient tax collection system.     

Introduction: globalisation,governance and development

In 1887 Henry Carter Adams produced a study demonstrating that the ownership of government bonds was heavily concentrated in the hands of a ‘bondholding class’ that lent to and, in Adams's view, controlled the government like dominant shareholders control a corporation. The interests of this bondholding class clashed with the interests of the masses, whose burdensome taxes financed the interest payments on government bonds. Since the late nineteenth century there has been plenty of debate about the ownership of the public debt. But the empirical evidence offered to support the various arguments has been scant. As a result, political economists have few answers to questions first raised by Adams over century ago: how has the pattern of public debt ownership changed? Can we still speak of a powerful ‘bondholding class’? Does public debt redistribute income from taxpayers to public creditors? This article develops a new framework to address these questions. Anchored within a ‘capital as power’ approach, the research indicates a staggering pattern of concentration in the ownership of US public debt in the hands of the top one per cent of US households over the past three decades. Accordingly, the bondholding class is still alive and well in contemporary US capitalism.     

Output‐based rebating of carbon taxes in a neighbour's backyard: Competitiveness,leakage and welfare

We investigate how, in an open economy, carbon taxes combined with output‐based rebating (OBR) perform in interaction with the carbon policies of a large neighbouring trading partner. Analytical results suggest that, whether the purpose of the OBR policy is to compensate firms for carbon tax burdens or to maximize welfare (accounting for global emission reductions), the OBR rate should be positive in policy‐relevant cases. Numerical simulations for Canada, with the US as the neighbouring trading partner, indicate that the impact of US policies on the OBR rate will depend crucially on the purpose of the Canadian OBR policies. If, for a given US carbon policy, Canada's aim is to restore the competitiveness of domestic emission‐intensive and trade‐exposed (EITE) firms to the same level as before the introduction of its own carbon taxation, we find that the necessary domestic OBR rates will be insensitive to the foreign carbon policies. However, if not only the Canadian carbon tax but also an equally high US tax is introduced, compensatory Canadian OBR rates will be up to 50% lower, depending on the sector and on US OBR policy. If the policy objective is to increase economy‐wide allocative efficiency (welfare) of Canadian policies by accounting for carbon leakage, the US policies will have only a minor downward pressure on desirable OBR rates in Canada. Practical choices of OBR rates hardly affect overall domestic economic performance; thus, output‐based rebating qualifies as an instrument for compensating EITE industries without a large sacrifice in terms of economy‐wide allocative efficiency.     

Fiscal Rules,Interest Payments on Debt,and the Irrelevance of the Taylor Principle

We show that in New Keynesian models with non‐neutral government debt, the Taylor principle ceases to be relevant for equilibrium determinacy if the government follows a fiscal rule of levying taxes in proportion to its interest payments on existing debt. This is in contrast with previous studies, which typically have assumed that taxes respond to the level of debt, and have found either a confirmation or reversal of the Taylor principle depending on the feedback from debt to taxes. We find, instead, that the equilibrium effect of the interest rate on debt is crucial for determinacy. If, as in our model, taxes are raised in response to debt interest payments, the range of indeterminacy monotonically decreases with the fiscal feedback parameter. When interest payments are completely tax‐financed, indeterminacy is ruled out without any restrictions on monetary policy.     

我国政府性债务与金融体系安全的阈值效应--基于2001-2012年数据的实证研究

我国政府性债务无序扩张对金融体系安全产生何种影响是研究的热点问题。文章构建了包括宏观经济内部安全、宏观经济外部安全、金融市场运行安全3个模块,共计15个指标的金融体系安全指数,并引用2001-2012年的数据进行测度,进而采用数据模拟的方法建立政府性债务和金融体系安全指数的非线性模型。结果发现,我国政府性债务与金融体系安全之间存在阈值效应,时间节点在2010年,阈值为64.6960万亿元,自此以后,金融体系安全指数随政府性债务规模扩大呈现超线性上升趋势,我国政府性债务已经成为威胁金融体系安全的重大隐患,亟需建立有效的约束框架维护金融体系安全。     

China's Growing Government Debt in a Computable Overlapping Generations Model

This paper simulates the effects of China's growing government debt in a computable equilibrium model of overlapping generations. Our model assumes that the government increases debt to finance its spending in the short run, and then increases taxes or cuts spending to keep the debt–GDP ratio constant. The spending‐driven government debt increases public capital and output in the short run, but decreases private investment, total capital stock, output, and net exports in the long run, and makes the future generations worse off. Among various means of debt control, a decrease in government spending seems to be the least harmful to private investment, capital stock, and output while an increase in capital taxation is most detrimental.     

The financial fragility and the crisis of the Greek government sector

The purpose of this paper is to develop Minskyan financial fragility indices for the government sector and to examine the financial structure of the Greek government before and after the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in 2009. We provide empirical evidence that clearly shows the growing financial fragility of the Greek public sector in the 2000s. We also assess the effectiveness of the implemented bailout adjustment programmes in Greece and claim that the conducted austerity measures and fiscal consolidation have not significantly improved the financial posture of the Greek government sector. We argue that the implementation of fiscal and wage austerity in an economy that lacks structural competitiveness produces prolonged recession and unemployment with adverse feedback effects on the financial fragility of the government.     

Fiscal rules in a monetary economy: Implications for growth and welfare

This study considers two fiscal rules, a debt rule that controls the debt‐to‐gross domestic product (GDP) ratio, and an expenditure rule that controls the expenditure‐to‐GDP ratio, in a monetary growth model with financial intermediation. Tightening of fiscal rules promotes economic growth and thus, benefits future generations. However, there could be two equilibria of the nominal interest rates, and the welfare effects of the rules on the current generation are different between the two equilibria. In particular, the effects of a decreased debt‐to‐GDP ratio depend on its initial ratio; a high (low)‐ratio country has no incentive (an incentive) to reduce the ratio further from the viewpoint of the current generation's welfare. This result provides an explanation for difficulties with fiscal reform in countries with already high debt‐to‐GDP ratios.     

Does local and Euro area sentiment matter for sovereign debt markets? Evidence from a bailout country

Does sentiment impact the sovereign debt markets? This article investigates whether lagged domestic and Euro area irrational sentiment (optimism or pessimism unwarranted by fundamentals) predicts future sovereign bond spreads, in Portugal, between January 2000 and December 2013. We find that domestic and Euro area sentiment negatively forecasts total return spreads and that this effect is stronger during the bailout period. Also, we find that the business sentiment is even most noticed. Therefore, Portuguese sovereign debt market is prone to the influence of investors’ sentiment.