食品安全监管的横向和纵向配置--食品安全监管的国际比较与启示

本文从行政监管和社会管制的角度研究了食品安全监管权的横向和纵向配置，系统地比较分析了发达国家食品安全监管体制的特点、经验和教训及近年来的改革趋势；并在分析我国现行食品安全监管体制存在问题的基础上，提出食品安全监管系统性改革的建议。     

在现有的行政管理体制下谋求——监管体制的改革与创新

如果从1993～1994年度算起，大规模的监管制度建设在中国只有短短十几年的历史。应该认识到，在中国监管制度作为行政体制内应对市场经济的发展而产生的一种变革，本就是一件超越现有制度禀赋的壮举，对其背后的制度进行考察和分析十分必要。     

行政事业单位会计监管对策

<正>加强行政事业单位会计监管,目的在于有效扼制财政资金运行秩序混乱、浪费、贪污和会计信息失真现象的发生。要达到高效监管的目的,就需要完善监管体制。本文从完善我国行政事业单位会计监管体制出发,提出对策与建议。     

建筑工程合同的行政监管

章论述了建筑工程合同行政管的必要性，通过合同行政监管主体和客体的分析，探讨合同行政监管的手段与方法。     

浅谈建设工程合同的行政监管

由于建设工程投资额巨大，直接关系到国计民生，合同的不良履行会直接危及国家和人民的生命、财产安全。一旦出现问题。后果严重，难以弥补。因此，必须加大建设工程合同的行政监管力度。建设工程合同行政监管的主体是工商行政管理部门和其他行政主管部门；行政监管的客体是建设工程合同双方当事人的合同行为；行政监管的内容是对利用合同危害国家利益、社会利益的违法行为进行监督管理。即对合同的不法性进行行政监管；行政监管的方法主要包括事前审查、事中监督和事后验收。     

电力监管尚待全面深化

实施电力监管，目的在于改革政府对电力行业的管建体制。由原来依靠政府行政管理转化为主要依据法律法规实施专业化的行业监管．最终形成政府宏观调控、监管机构独立监管、企业自主经营、中介机构自律服务的电力管理新体制。[编者按]     

电力监管稽查的困境及现实选择

电力监管稽查队伍自组建以来，在维护电力市场秩序和电力用户合法权益方面发挥了积极作用，但目前还面临着许多困难，作用的发挥与实际需要还有一定的差距。因此，在电力监管体制、机制及监管法律法规建设短期内难有大的突破情况下，监管机构必须立足现实，在现有制度框架内创造性地开展工作，最大限度地发挥电力监管稽查的作用。     

我国电力监管机构刍议

本文试从确立我国现代电力行业监管理念谈起,论及电力体制改革的必要性以及电力监管机构设置等四个方面的问题。一、从国外几种不同的电力监管方式来看,发展中国家的情况较贴近我国国情,面临的主要难度都是没有现成的法律框架和现成的模式,以及缺少电力和法律方面的复合型人才。二、我国长期以来对于电力行业,始终沿用传统的政府管理方式即政企合一的行政管理方式,从未建立过对电力行业的“监管体制”。所谓现代电力行业监管方式,应是在市场经济条件下,依靠法律、法规去规范电力市场竞争,同时对合法的电力企业经营者给予法律上的保护。三、我国采取政监分离的电力监管机构的设置,既避免了纯政府的监管方式———即不会出现新的政府垄断行为,又可以体现以法律、法规方式由高规格国家事业机构实施行业监管的理念。所设置的电力监管机构,一是强调垂直管理体系,减少监管和执法中的障碍。二是监管的重点或主要对象是电网及调度机构。这有利于在厂网分开之后,有效地促进发电企业公平竞争。本文提出把电力市场监管放在电力监管的首要位置以及高度重视电力执法的观点,并从五个方面论及电力监管机构的内部设置。四、本文建议国家电力监管机构要按照程序简便、高效、透明的原则,合理确定并分级划分监管职能,并提出     

中国石油价格监管体制应如何应对"入世"

“入世”要求我国政府转变行政理念、管理方式和管理手段，成为服务型、有限、有效的政府。对应到石油价格监管、迫切需要尽快建立和完善符合WTO运行规则的、符合中国国情的新型石油价格监管体制和运行机制。新型石油价格监管体制在监管的内容方面，应以宏观调控为主，制定石油市场价格运行规则，并通过反暴利、反垄断等法律法规，保护市场经营主体和消费者的合法权益；在监管手段方面，应减少行政命令，依靠法律手段和必要的经济手段，确保监管的公开、公正、透明和连续性；在监管结果方面，对在监管过程中出现的超越权限、违规等行为，应有法规给予纠正和补救，以减少不必要的损失。为了能够实现新型石油价格监管体制的建立，还必须进行一些配套改革，其中包括构建符合WTO运行规则、符合中国国情的新型石油流通体系。     

浅析注册金计师行政监管与行业自律的协调

2002年底，财政部党组决定，收回原委托中注协行使的注册会计师行业行政监管职能，并将注册会计师行业行政监督检查和处罚职能交由财政部监督检查局行使。注册会计师行业行政监督职能划转工作顺利．目前已基本形成了财政部门对注册会计师行业的行政监管体系。本文仅从通过分析世界各国注册会计师行业监管模式和内容及结合我国注册会计师行业现状．对如何处理行政监管和行业自律的关系做一些探讨。     

Commitment to Competition: An Assessment of Antitrust Agency Budgets since 1970

In these remarks to the Industrial Organization Society, I discuss the adequacy of antitrust enforcement resources in the U.S. Relevant resources are measured by the competition budgets of the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission. Since 1970 these have been influenced by the overall economy, its changing structure, and politics, but they have not kept up with the pace of mergers or other measures of the need for antitrust. Thus at present, the resources devoted to antitrust fall well short of what is required for continued vigilance over our growing and changing economy.     

Vertical restraints in the Australian Trade Practices Act

Vertical restraints are singled out for detailed legislative treatment in the AustralianTrade Practices Act. Resale price maintenance and third-line forcing (tying another firm's products) are illegal per se while price discrimination and non-price vertical restraints (apart from third-line forcing) are subject to a competition test. Most vertical restraints may be either authorised by the Trade Practices Commission or given statutory exemption from the Act under a notification procedure unique to vertical restraints. The ability to seek an authorisation or to notify the Commission about a vertical practice has meant that the economic issues in this area have been dealt with mainly in administrative processes outside the courts. While issues of economic efficiency have been important, the main objective of the Commission has been to benefit consumers by promoting competition as a process. This paper briefly overviews what is probably the most complex area of antitrust in Australia yet, which has received negligible academic comment.     

我国废物犯罪立法初探

随着我国经济的发展,环境问题越来越严重,尤其是废物处理问题,成为我们所面临的一个迫切需要解决的问题。对废物处理中的一般的违法行为,可以追究行为人的民事责任、行政责任,对于那些严重的违法行为即废物犯罪问题则应由刑法加以规制。我国刑法规定了废物犯罪．但是仍然存在不足,难以有效地惩治和预防废物犯罪,在刑事立法方面,对废物犯罪需要加以完善。     

Antitrust and Vertical Integration in “New Economy” Industries with Application to Broadband Access

Whether the firms that supply Internet hardware and software should face restrictions on the use of their property is an important and controversial policy issue. Advocates of “net neutrality”—including President Obama and the current FCC majority—believe that owners of broadband distribution systems (hardware used to distribute Internet and video services) and producers of certain “must-have” video content should be subject to prophylactic regulation that transcends present-day antitrust law enforcement. In the economic terms that are used in debates on competition policy, the concern is with vertical integration that may give firms both the opportunity (through denial of access or price discrimination) and incentive (increased profit) to restrict competition. This paper’s central point is that virtually every production process in the economy is vertically integrated, and economics predicts changes in the extent of vertical integration—that is, changes in the boundaries of the firm—in response to changes in relative prices, technology, or institutions. Both vertical integration and changes in the extent of vertical integration are benign characteristics of efficient, dynamic, competitive markets. While there is no shortage of theoretical models in which vertical integration may be harmful, most such models have restrictive assumptions and ambiguous welfare predictions—even when market power is assumed to be present. Empirical evidence that vertical integration or vertical restraints are harmful is weak, compared to evidence that vertical integration is beneficial—again, even in cases where market power appears to be present. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that prophylactic regulation is not necessary, and may well reduce welfare. Sound policy is to wait for ex post evidence of harm to justify interventions in specific cases. Net neutrality, recently enacted by the FCC but subject to judicial review, is an unfortunate idea.     

Market Power in China: Manifestations, Effects and Legislation

This paper presents a picture of market power in China – its current situation, manifestations, causes, damaging effects and related economic laws and regulations. China is in a transition from a planned economy to a socialist market economy. Market power in China is reflected largely in administrative monopolies inherited from the old system, as well as in economic monopolies created by the new system. Administrative monopolies are worse than economic monopolies in terms of the distortion of transaction behavior and the preclusion of market competition. They have become a pressing issue facing China in its economic and social development. China has been developing a legislative framework on market competition, but this framework currently appears weak and powerless in the face of the administrative monopolies. However, the introduction of an anti-monopoly law will undoubtedly be helpful in enhancing the market competition mechanism.     

An Empirical Study of the Relationships among Co-location, Integration, Performance, and Satisfaction

Co-locate or perish. In this era of cross-functional integration, are these the only choices for the departments that participate in the new product development (NPD) process? Bringing together different departments certainly seems like a good idea. After all, breaking down the walls between functions improves the quality of the inputs to NPD and thus increases the likelihood of success. On the other hand, a firm would be ill-advised to implement co-location simply because it seems like a good idea. Such a complex undertaking requires careful consideration of the costs, the benefits, and the effects of co-location. Noting the need for more in-depth knowledge in this area, Kenneth Kahn and Edward McDonough present the results of a study that explores several issues regarding co-location and its relationship to interdepartmental integration, performance, and satisfaction. For example, does co-location relate directly to improved performance and satisfaction in working with personnel from other departments? Or does co-location play a moderating role, fostering improved interdepartmental collaboration and interaction, which in turn increase performance and satisfaction? And finally, do the effects of co-location depend on which departments are involved? For example, do the benefits of co-locating marketing and R&D exceed those of co-locating manufacturing and R&D? The 514 survey respondents work as department managers in member companies of the Electronic Industries Association. The study includes an even distribution of responses from managers of marketing, manufacturing, and R&D departments. Most respondents have firsthand knowledge of the effects of colocation; 68% of the marketing managers report that they are co-located with manufacturing, and 80% of the marketing managers are co-located with R&D. R&D and manufacturing managers fall between those levels, with roughly 75% indicating that they are co-located with the other departments. While generally supporting the premise that co-location is helpful for integrating departments, the survey results indicate that co-location has department-specific effects. For example, the findings indicate that co-location facilities collaboration between R&D and marketing, but not between manufacturing and the other departments. The findings do not point to a direct relationship between co-location and performance. On the other hand, the results suggest direct links between collaboration and both performance and satisfaction.     

Vertical Restraints,the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Sylvania</Emphasis> Case,and China’s Antitrust Enforcement

We briefly review the relevant economic theories and legal treatment of vertical restraints, and especially focus on the 1977 landmark case of Sylvania and its possible influence on China’s antitrust enforcement on vertical restraints. China’s competition policy, and particularly its antimonopoly law, does not explicitly instruct with respect to the enforcement approach (per se versus rule of reason) toward vertical restraints. But from an overview of China’s recent antitrust cases, we find that there is a division in the approaches taken by public versus private enforcement: Even though the administrative enforcement is more inclined to the application of per se prohibitions (or the application of the EU-style prohibition-plus-exemption approach), it seems that a rule of reason is the (increasingly) prevailing approach that is taken by the courts.     

市场经济发展与企业标准化改革

市场经济与计划经济体制下的企业标准化目标不同,随着市场经济的发展完善,必须对企业标准化进行深入改革,企业标准化改革要重视转变企业领导和企业标准化人员的思想观念,建立和完善包括内在运行机制和外部约束机制在内的企业标准化管理运行机制.     

论国有资产管理体系的建立与完善

国有资产管理体系的建立，是中国经济体制改革贯彻渐变稳定逐步转轨的方法论、完善市场经济体制的创举。其目的是寻找新型的公有制形态与市场经济相对接的桥梁。如何从战略高度上对国有资产管理体系的建立有一个全新的认识，作者提出必须走出四个误区。如何建立在公有制为主体的市场经济条件下政府管理经济的新模式，作者提出必须从简单的政企分离转变到政资分离和资企合一。最后，作者提出了在实践中贯彻好这一战略构思要处理好的八个问题。     

A Tiger Without Teeth? Regulation of Administrative Monopoly Under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law

We identify in this paper the sources and types of administrative monopoly and the possible harms that administrative monopoly causes to the Chinese economy in its current institutional environment. We review the arguments for and against the inclusion of provisions on administrative monopoly in the ambit of the Anti-Monopoly Law and explain the weaknesses of such provisions. After analyzing the clauses against administrative monopoly in some countries?? antitrust laws and two recent litigation cases on administrative monopoly in China, we detail the challenges in practicing anti-administrative monopoly law and provide a number of suggestions as to how the law and its enforcement can be improved.