Multiproduct two part tariffs

Two part pricing by a multiproduct monopoly and a differentiated oligopoly are examined and compared. Two part pricing policies are seen to depend on whether products are complements or substitutes and on whether or not the market is segmented. A principle result is that although competition tends to lower unit prices, there is no corresponding tendency for competition to reduce entry fees. The unit pricing rule is related to the Ramsey pricing rule. Oligopoly equilibrium unit prices equal marginal cost when there is one consumer type.     

Regulatory bias in the price structure of local telephone service

This article combines a discrete choice model of demand for residential local telephone access and an optimal price regulation model to estimate the welfare weights that state regulators implicitly place on consumers with different incomes and locations. I find no evidence of a bias towards rural consumers on average, but the relative weight on low income consumers in a geographic area can vary as a function of the proportions of rural and poor population and the political characteristics of the regulator. I also measure the welfare consequences of deviating from total consumer surplus maximization and disconnecting prices from costs.     

Opportunism and menus of two-part tariffs

We show that a menu of two-part tariffs can solve the opportunism problem identified by McAfee and Schwartz (1994) [McAfee, R.P., Schwartz, M., 1994. Opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting: nondiscrimination, exclusivity, and uniformity. American Economic Review, 84 210–230] in vertical games with sequential contracting, provided the sunk costs incurred by the first firm to invest are not too large. If the seller were to engage in opportunism with a second firm in an attempt to shift rents from the first firm, the first firm could mitigate the dissipation of its rents by choosing from its menu of contract options the tariff with the higher marginal price and lower fixed fee. The prospect of the first firm's choosing the ‘wrong’ two-part tariff in the event of opportunism is, in some environments, sufficient to make opportunism unprofitable for the seller.     

The effect of ownership on telephone penetration

It is well known that telephone penetration (the number of telephones per 100 population) is strongly related to national income. This report examines whether telephone penetration is significantly influenced by type of ownership (ie whether the telephone system is owned and operated by a private company or a government organization) and by postal responsibility (ie whether the telephone system is run by the same organization which runs the postal system). Economic theory and evidence from other industries suggest that private ownership increases output, and one might guess that postal responsibility would tend to restrict telephone penetration - but are these hypotheses correct and are the effects significant? The author concludes that telephone penetration is significantly more responsive to per capita GDP and to population density in private systems than in government-owned systems. Joint responsibility for postal systems has no significant effect on telephone penetration.     

The role of the telephone in economic development

The author investigates the telephone's role as a contributory agent in economic development. Cross-sectional time series data for 60 nations over 13 years were used to determine how the telephone might make its contribution to economic development. Path analysis and cross-lagged correlation techniques indicate that the telephone does contribute to economic development. This contribution appears to come from the telephone's support of the organization of economic activity.     

Group purchasing, nonlinear tariffs, and oligopoly

Loyalty discounts are nonlinear tariffs that condition rebates or marginal prices on meeting aggregate purchase or market share targets. These discounts are widespread, and are often the impetus for consumers to form buying groups, or group purchase organizations (GPOs). This paper models the competitive effects of the introduction of a GPO into a market within which the preferences of the GPO's members are horizontally differentiated. While nonlinear tariffs are an effective way for a monopolist to extract consumer surplus, when two suppliers compete using such schedules, the results are far more competitive in comparison to simple Bertrand–Nash competition with linear tariffs. This result holds when the product of each of the suppliers is attractive to a substantial portion of consumers. In our model, the nonlinear schedule puts all customers “in play” to a degree that contrasts sharply with the competition at the margin characteristic of constant per unit prices. Moreover, competing in nonlinear tariffs removes allocative inefficiency that can result from single price competition.     

The effect of subscriber line charges on residential telephone bills

This paper evaluates the way in which subscriber line charges (SLCs) have affected telephone company residential customers, comparing residential telephone bills before and after the $2.60 SLC began. Customer bills are analyses using the net bill reduction method and the consumer welfare method. Bills of low-income area and senior citizen customers are studied using a similar technique. The cumulative bill savings accruing to customers whose bills have been lowered for outweigh the small increases experienced by those whose bills are higher. Since the SLC programme began, interstate long-distance usage by low-income area customers has grown, on average, to nearly the same levels as usage for all residential customers.     

我国跨境油气管道管输费制定模式

从中亚、中哈和中俄陆上油气管道的管输费制定模式上可以看出,管输费的制定并没有统一的模式,但都符合成本回收和投资回报的基本原则;管输费的制定应充分考虑管道所在国政府的相关管理规定,并按照其管输费制定模式对国际通用的财务内部收益率（IRR）方法进行调整。在对外合作项目的商务交流活动中,谈判需要一定的灵活性,不宜一味坚持国内适用的财务内部收益率法的管输费制定模式。建议国内相关部门和单位,参照已经运行的跨境管道的管输费制定模式,对今后海外管道项目的经济评价和管输费制定公式进行调整与完善,以便更好地适应对外项目合作的需要。     

Privatization and telephone numbers

This report is the Rapporteur's personal impression of the presentations given at the World Privatization of Telecommunications Conference in Amsterdam, 23–24 June 1992. It includes some commentary of his own.     

The consumer loss of the minimum duration for mobile telephone calls

This article estimates price elasticities of demand for the duration of mobile telephone calls for Portugal, as well as the monetary loss per consumer of the existence of a minimum duration of calls. The demand for the duration of calls is estimated using a Tobit model for panel data with individual random effects. The elasticity of demand is found to be small and to vary across firms. At current prices, the average duration of calls ranges between 101 and 109 s, while the estimated average length of calls without minimum duration ranges between 63 and 66 s. Hence, the existence of a minimum duration for calls results in a monetary loss of 35–40% of the average invoice.     

Local competition for telephone services

A policy discussion and overview of the development and scope of local exchange competition in U.S. Telecommunications markets is presented. The primary focus is on access and cable competition. In the future, we will see policies which encourage cable to enter telephone services, telephone companies to develop a video dialtone, and transportation networks which allow interexchange carriers to bypass the access charges of the local network. Regulatory policy needs to manage these competitive changes so that there is parity between the various service providers.     

The importance of EU-15 borders for CEECs agri-food exports: The role of tariffs and non-tariff measures in the pre-accession period

This paper assesses the evolution of the EU-15 market access for the agri-food products, originating from CEECs. A gravity model technique has been used to assess the overall trade resistance (border effect), and to weight its various components such as tariff and non-tariff measures (sanitary and phytosanitary standards, other quality measures) in the pre-accession period (1999–2004). The findings reveal, despite the undertaken integration and trade liberalisation processes, a persisting and significant trade resistance for the CEECs’ agri-food exports to the EU market, even just prior their accession in 2004. Still present difficulties in market access at the time are partially explained by tariff and non-tariff measures, while a large part of border effect remains in the domain of other, presumably non-trade policy related factors (home bias, consumer preferences, etc.). These results indicate that despite the accession process (customs union and adoption of the EU standards), the trade integration of the enlarged EU market was not yet completed in 2004.     

The mixed blessing of a deregulatory endpoint for the public switched telephone network

Receiving authority to dismantle the wireline public switched telephone network (PSTN) will deliver a mixture of financial benefits and costs to incumbent carriers and also jeopardize longstanding legislative and regulatory goals seeking ubiquitous, affordable and fully interconnected networks. Even if incumbent carriers continue to provide basic telephone services via wireless facilities, they will benefit from substantial relaxation of common carriage duties, no longer having to serve as the carrier of last resort and having the opportunity to decide whether and where to provide service. On the other hand, incumbent carriers may have underestimated the substantial financial and marketplace advantages they also will likely lose in the deregulatory process. Legislators and policy makers also may have underestimated the impact of no longer having the ability to impose common carrier mandates that require carriers to interconnect so that end users have complete access to network services regardless of location.This paper will identify the potential problems resulting from prospective decisions by National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), such as the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to grant authority for telecommunications service providers to discontinue PSTN services. The paper also will consider whether in the absence of common carrier duties, private carriers providing telephone services, including Voice over the Internet Protocol (VoIP), voluntarily will agree to interconnect their networks. The paper will examine three recent carrier interconnection issues with an eye toward assessing whether a largely unregulated marketplace will create incentives for carriers to interconnect networks so that consumers will have ubiquitous access to PSTN replacement and other broadband services.The paper concludes that private carrier interconnection models and information service regulatory oversight may not solve all disputes, or promote universal service public policy goals. Recent Internet interconnection and television program carriage disputes involving major players such as Comcast, Level 3, Fox, Cablevision and Google point to the possibility of increasingly contentious negotiations that could result in balkanized telecommunications networks with at least temporary blockages to desired content and services by some consumers.     

The cost of telephone service: An international comparison of rates in major countries

An exhaustive analysis of all 1979 telephone calls in the US Bell System determines market baskets of telephone services consumed by residential subscribers and by business subscribers. Individual calls are classified according to duration, distance, hour and day of week, and type of service. The annual cost of purchasing these market baskets is evaluated using the complete rate structures of nine countries. Telephone service is least expensive in the US and only slightly higher in Canada. Costs in Sweden, the UK and Italy are moderately higher than the USA. The highest rates are found in Japan, the FRG, France and Australia.     

The effect of the Telefonica–BellSouth merger on the Argentine cellular telephone market

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effects of the merger between Telefonica and BellSouth, which took place in December 2004, in the Argentine cellular telephone market. In this market the merger under analysis is horizontal. The evaluation is carried out by performing a demand estimation, using the PCAIDS model, and a marginal cost estimation, using supply prices and the elasticities inferred from the previously estimated demands. With those results, a merger simulation is run under different hypotheses related to possible marginal cost reductions. The merger is found to be able to lower supply prices for relatively small marginal cost reductions. This is basically due to the fact that the individual firms’ demands are highly elastic, and that the cross elasticity between the brands affected by the merger is relatively small.     

Forecasting business needs in the telephone market

The last decade has seen substantial changes in the environment in which U.S. telephone companies operate. As regulated monopolies, telephone companies are experiencing effective competition in several areas of their operations. Additionally the consumerist movement has made regulatory agencies more aware of the requirements of the numerous markets served by the utilities. With “good” telephone service available at reasonable cost throughout the United States, users and telephone companies are more aware of secondary product attributes such as style (decorator sets) and auxiliary features (the ability to place one caller on hold and answer another call). These changes reflect the evolution of the marketing function within the telephone companies and the increasing use of marketing research for product line expansion and sales forecasting. What has caused this shifting perspective on the function of marketing? How have the utilities responded? The following discussion deals with these questions as well as the ways in which marketing research has aided the telephone company in forecasting sales to business customers.     

New technology and Hong Kong telephone workers

Most studies of technological change in telecommunications have researched incremental shifts within the analogue switching paradigm. This paper takes the case of the shift to digital switching in Hong Kong's public telephone network. It focuses upon how this change was managed and the consequential changes in labour relations.     

Fruit and vegetable access to EU markets: Dissecting tariffs faced by Mediterranean countries

This paper analyzes the access of Eastern and Southern Mediterranean countries to the EU fruit and vegetables market and provides a measure of the level of preferences from which they benefit. To take into account the complexity of EU protection in the F&V sector, in particular the seasonality of protection and the Entry Price System, we conducted our analysis at a very disaggregated level (eight digits of the nomenclature, monthly data). We showed that, on average, Mediterranean countries do have significant preferences compared to other countries exporting to the EU. However, the magnitude of the preferences differs among countries; Morocco has the highest preference, while Syria and Israel have the lowest. We simulated a multilateral reduction in the MFN tariffs (as planned in the Doha Round) and showed that this would reduce the heterogeneity within the zone by more strongly eroding the preferences of the most advantaged countries. The classification of Entry Price products as sensitive products would either benefit or have no effect on most Mediterranean countries.     

Total factor productivity measures for Hong Kong telephone

Since the early 1960s, the Hong Kong Telephone Company (HKTC)—the dominant firm in Hong Kong's local telephone market—has undergone several regulatory reforms. The company has been subject to price control, rate-of-return regulation and price-cap regulation. This paper estimates the total factor productivity (TFP) growth of HKTC. The empirical results show that the estimated TFP growth of HKTC was 2.31–3.56% per year between 1964 and 1998. TFP growth varied substantially under different regulatory regimes, and the importance of the scale effect relative to the technological effect diminished over time.