Entry and Component Pricing in Regulated Markets

This paper discusses work on computable models of entry into regulated markets. Cournot, Stackelberg and Fringe entry are considered for the case where the incumbent operator‘s profitability is regulated and component pricing influences the desirability of entry. The simulation results illustrate that welfare optimal component pricing can be highly sensitive to model specification (behavioural assumptions about agents, the nature of competition, the extent of product differentiation etc.) and that no welfare ranking of simple component pricing rules (such as marginal cost, average cost, opportunity cost or efficient component price) exists. In addition, the welfare desirability of entry is seen to be sensitive to the choice of welfare benchmark for comparison     

Income Distribution in Network Markets

We enquiry about the effects of first and second order stochastic dominance shifts of the distribution of the consumers’ willingness to pay, within the standard model of a market with network externalities and hump-shaped demand curve. This issue is analyzed in the polar cases of perfect competition and monopoly. We find that, while under perfect competition both types of distributional changes result in higher output, provided marginal costs are low enough, in the monopoly case the final outcome depends on the way income distribution and the network externality interact in determining market demand elasticity.     

Price-Increasing Competition on Two-Sided Markets with Homogeneous Platforms

We make a case for price-increasing competition on “competitive bottleneck” two-sided markets. We argue that demand interrelation might be sufficient to cause either no observable price effect of competition or price-increasing competition. Under price equality, total demand on both market sides in the duopoly market exceeds total demand in the monopoly market. Furthermore, even though there is no observable price effect, there is still a competitive effect that becomes manifest in total duopoly equilibrium profits being strictly smaller than monopoly profits. The relationship of total welfare is ambiguous in subsidization cases, while without subsidization, welfare is strictly greater in duopoly.     

Bank competition in Russia: An examination at different levels of aggregation

We analyze bank competition in Russia at different levels of aggregation. First, we compute a country-level measure of competition and compare it to that for similar-sized economies. Second, we contrast competition across different groups of banks in Russia. Third, we analyze bank competition across Russian regions. We find that banks in Russia are less competitive than those in Brazil, but more so than those in China and India. Large and state-owned banks exert more market power than others. Finally, competition is stronger in regions where there is less bank concentration, greater presence of banks, and greater financial and/or economic development.     

The impact of parallel imports on investments in cost-reducing research and development

We develop a two-country model of endogenous investment in process innovation by a manufacturer facing competition from parallel imports (PI). We find that the distortions associated with PI inhibit innovation. However, the difference between the manufacturer's expected profits under successful and failed innovation is U-shaped in the cost of engaging in PI. Thus, the reduction in R&D investment depends on both legality of PI and transport costs. The reduction in innovation could harm global welfare, depending on whether the manufacturer was deterring PI with a high wholesale price. If so, banning such trade would raise expected welfare.     

Generic Competition in the US Pharmaceutical Industry

We develop a simultaneous equations estimation framework to understand the interactions among generic entry, prices, and market shares. We base our estimates on a panel data sample of 40 brand‐name drugs that first experienced generic competition during the period July 1992–January 1998. We find that generic share and price are simultaneously determined, while the number of generic entrants is a key determinant of generic market share and the generic‐to‐brand price ratio. In addition, we find generic competition to be particularly intense for blockbuster drugs, which experience significantly more generic entrants, price erosion, and generic penetration than other drugs.     

Competition,agency and productivity

This article tests a set of hypotheses relating to agency and Schumpeterian views on how competition affects performance. A survey data set of Australian workplaces is used, with the change in labour productivity as the dependent variable. The results show strong support for the idea that intense competition raises productivity growth in managerial workplaces, but not in non‐managerial workplaces (i.e. where the principal owner also works). Testing the agency theories in more detail, we find no evidence that the number of competitors, the price elasticity of demand or a proxy for bankruptcy (pre‐tax losses) are the mechanisms behind the process. For non‐managerial workplaces the results indicate support for the idea that greater demand uncertainty reduces productivity growth. In contrast, for managerial workplaces, greater demand uncertainty tends to raise productivity growth.     

Collusion in Spatially Separated Markets with Quantity Competition

This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be sustained. Gross and Holahan (Int Econ Rev 44:299–312, 2003) use a similar model with price setting firms, we compare their results with ours to analyze the impact of the mode of competition on sustainability of collusion. Further we analyze the impact of collusion on social welfare and find that collusion may be welfare enhancing.     

The dynamics of entry,exit and profitability: An error correction approach for the retail industry

We develop a two equation error correction model to investigate determinants of and dynamic interaction between changes in profits and number of firms in retailing. An explicit distinction is made between the effects of actual competition among incumbants, new firms competition and potential competition from firms outside the market. Effects of cost, demand and general income changes on profitability are investigated to gain insight in the role of retailing in the cost, demand and wage inflationary processes. The relative importance of profitability, growth and unemployment as determinants of net entry are studied. The model is tested using a panel data set of 36 Dutch shoptypes covering the 1977–1988 period.     

Exchange Rate Effects on Domestic Prices in Bulgaria and Poland: Progress in Making Markets?

The economic liberalization which has occurred in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) over the past 15 years generally has involved establishing domestic markets and privatizing state‐owned firms, both with the intention of integrating the CEE economies into the global economy and allowing the benefits of competition to be realized. We explore how well this has been accomplished in two countries, Poland and Bulgaria, and the domestic conditions that contribute to its accomplishment. The sensitivity of domestic markets to international shocks, as reflected in exchange rate effects on domestic prices, may be viewed as an indicator of how integrated a country’s markets are into the global economy, and a proxy for competition in those markets. In explaining variation in exchange‐rate pass‐through, we examine the impact of market structure, economic liberalization and infrastructure as factors contributing to the development of competitive markets. We find that although integration into global markets can significantly increase market competitiveness, domestic factors also play a significant role.     

Competition in Markets and Competition for Markets

This paper builds on a distinction that is sometimes made between competition in a market and competition for a market. Competition for a market refers to the struggle to create a new market, or to erect a new standard, and it is usually associated with the process of innovation that brings new displacing technologies to market. Competition in a market is the conventional view of competition, and concentrates on the actions of incumbents and imitative entrants in well-established markets. The paper reviews some of the issues that competition for markets raises for anti-trust policy makers, and then asks whether competition for a market is a perfect substitute for competition in a market.     

Are Unbundled and Self‐supplied Telecommunications Switching Substitutes? An Empirical Study

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires incumbent monopoly phone companies to lease elements of their networks to rivals. An important policy question is whether these unbundled elements are substitutes for entry modes that are more facilities‐based. In this article, we estimate demand curves for unbundled elements with the goal of assessing cross‐price effects between two of the more popular entry modes that differ in the mix of unbundled and self‐supplied inputs. As expected, we find downward sloping demand curves for unbundled elements. We also find own‐price elasticities in the elastic region of demand. What we do not find is evidence of substitution; we are able to reject the hypothesis of effective substitution between the two entry modes.     

An empirical assessment of the welfare effects of reciprocal dumping

Can two-way trade in similar products lead to lower welfare than if such trade was banned? Theory answers yes. To empirically investigate this proposition we examine Swedish imports of bottled water. Assuming one-shot (Bertrand and Cournot) competition, we can use the estimates from a structural model of demand to uncover marginal costs. We simulate the effect on consumer and producer surplus of banning imports. We do not find convincing evidence that banning imports would increase overall welfare. Given our choice of market this suggests we should not be overly concerned with the welfare effects of two-way trade in consumer goods that are close to homogenous.     

Efficient barriers to trade: A sequential trade model with heterogeneous agents

This paper studies the choice of tariffs and other type of consumption taxes and subsidies in a flexible price version of the Prescott [Prescott, Edward C., 1975. Efficiency of the Natural Rate. Journal of Political Economy 83, 1229-1236.] hotels model. It is shown that a country with unstable demand may benefit from a tariff on imports. More surprisingly, the exporting country may also benefit from the tariff. In general, I consider the problem of a world planner who chooses country specific consumption taxes and subsidies. I show that buyers in countries that tend to consume relatively more in the high demand state should be taxed and buyers in countries that tend to consume relatively more in the low demand state should be subsidized.     

扩大内需与中国制造业出口结构优化:基于“母市场效应”理论的研究

中国过往低价竞争的畸形出口遇到了阻碍,因而应扩大内需,但中国经济的增长还应是内外并举的,内需拉动增长和出口拉动增长并不矛盾,出口拉动经济增长的政策并未过时,中国的就业等压力也不允许出口大幅被替代,我们要的是在内需的扩大中寻找中国制造业出口的新优势,同时优化出口结构,而不是排挤或替代出口。本文利用"母市场效应"理论,通过对中国制造业各部门对外贸易"母市场效应"存在性的检验,从理论上和实证上证明了扩大内需政策会导致中国制造业出口结构优化。     

The effects of a “no-haggle” channel on marketing strategies

As sellers increasingly turn to multi-channel retailing, the opportunity to implement different pricing policies has grown. With the advent of the internet, many traditionally bargained products such as automobiles, jewelry, watches, appliances and furniture are now being offered online at a fixed pre-determined price. We explore the strategy of simultaneously offering two pricing formats (fixed and bargained) via two different channels (online and brick and mortar) and find that in a market where there are two types of consumers—those with a high cost of haggling and others with a lower cost—a dual-pricing strategy is optimal only when there are enough high haggling-cost consumers, but not too many, and when the haggling costs between the two types of consumers are sufficiently different. We also find that it is optimal for the seller to specify a higher-than-cost minimum acceptable price as the price floor of bargaining. By doing so, the seller increases the bargained price by complementing the salesperson's bargaining ability, and also softens the internal competition between the two channels. Finally, we find that, surprisingly, the dual-pricing strategy may serve fewer customers while still being more profitable than a single price structure. The implications for consumer surplus are also explored.     

Employment Flexibility,Dual Labour Markets,Growth, and Distribution

Many policymakers and economists have argued in favour of greater labour market flexibility as a part of structural adjustment reforms that are expected to improve economic performance. Existing post‐Keynesian‐Kaleckian (PKK) models are unable to address these issues because they assume away long‐term labour by allowing employment to be short term and adjusting freely with output. This paper introduces long‐term labour into PKK models. We develop a model that provides alternative ways of modelling labour market flexibility and suggest that when aggregate demand issues are important, an increase in employment flexibility is likely to have adverse growth and distributional impacts.     

Testing Gibrat’s Law for Small, Young and Innovating Firms

This article analyses whether small, young, and innovating firms have experienced a greater employment growth than other Spanish firms over the period 1990–2000. The study draws upon a sample of 1272 manufacturing firms in which only 967 of the firms survived for the entire ten year period. The analyses test Gibrat’s law, both by least squares and by utilizing the procedure proposed by Heckman in which a probit survival equation is first estimated to correct for sample selection bias. Two estimators correcting for selection bias are utilized: one that incorporates the inverse Mill’s ratio and the other that employs maximum likelihood methods. All the results reject Gibrat’s law and support the proposition that small firms have grown larger. Additionally, the results show that old firms grow less than young ones, and innovating activity – both process and product – is a strong positive factor in the firm’s survival and its employment growth.     

Price Differences in Consumer Goods in Retail Markets

Abstract

This study analyses the effects that competition causes on the dispersion of prices in the mass market products. Therefore, a model is proposed that integrates the vertical, spatial and market environment factors that make up the competitive structure of the retail trade distribution sector. The results obtained, after processing a database of more than 19,000 records, indicate that various indicators of these three levels of competition exercise a decisive influence on determining the final prices of the analysed products. Likewise, the research allows verifying that there are significant differences in the effect caused by the analysed factors on the dispersion of prices, thereby depending on the considered product category (packaged goods versus fresh food).     

Market Preemption and Entry Deterrence: Evidence from the Golf Course Industry

The population in a given geographical area has to be large enough before the area can support the entry of a golf course. The required amount of population will be higher if costs are higher, or if the underlying demand to golf by residents is lower, or if there is more preexisting competition from incumbent golf courses. If incumbent golf courses undertake entry‐deterring strategies, either explicitly or implicitly, the required population will be higher still. If population is expected to grow quickly, then the amount of population required by the entry date could be lower. These effects are measured and analyzed in this empirical study of the entry of 104 golf courses in the greater San Francisco Bay Area between 1893 and 2001.