Pre‐commitment to an Exclusive Contract under Partial Regulation

This article examines the welfare implications of an incumbent’s pre‐commitment to an exclusive contract in a partially regulated environment. It shows that the contract offered to customers in a competitive market makes the first‐best allocation infeasible in the partially regulated environment. However, the contract can have a welfare‐enhancing property through the exclusion of inefficient entry or cream skimming in the competitive market, especially when the regulated price ceiling is low and the incumbent’s technology is characterized by a large proportion of common cost in total cost.     

Deregulating and privatizing statutory monopolies

Considering an homogeneous goods Cournot framework with cost asymmetries between the regulated incumbent and the unregulated entrant, this paper investigates the welfare effects of market liberalization and privatization. The positive efficiency effects of market liberalization depends on reallocation of the production between firms and on the extent of the “output distortion” due to the existence of imperfect information. More competition in a previously statutory monopoly reduces the cost of imperfect information. In terms of social welfare, we derive conditions on the desirability of entry and show that privatization is complementary to deregulation, i.e. privatization makes entry more desirable.     

Is Cost-of-Service Regulation Worth the Cost?

Cost-of-service regulation that reduces prices will also reduce incentives to control cost. Increased output counteracts this trend when there are economies of scale. We derive closed-form approximations for the maximum cost increase that leaves a positive welfare gain when regulation reduces price by some percentage. To be useful to regulators, these approximations depend only on demand elasticity and the ratio of fixed to total cost. For low demand elasticities typical of regulated industries, price must fall by half to outweigh cost increases of as little as 2%. Cost-of-service regulation appears to reduce welfare unless economies of scale are strong. These conclusions may be reversed if regulators favor consumers, but only a slight bias in favor of the firm exacerbates them. Regulatory methods that preserve incentives to be efficient by divorcing price from cost become more appealing.     

Competition in the Canadian Personal Finance Sector

This paper employs cross-section continuous time series data to examine competition in the Canadian personal finance sector for the period 1987–90. Using a generalised linear pricing model, firm entry is found to be significant in the setting of deposit and mortgage rates, suggesting the presence an incontestable market structure consistent with Cournot oligopoly. There is also evidence of price-making behaviour and relative bargainlripoff products. For three of the four products studied, a ‘fifth column’ consisting of the 12 major banks and trust companies best explain pricing in these markets     

Monopoly Prices versus Ramsey-Boiteux Prices: Are they “Similar”, and: Does it Matter?

Ramsey-Boiteux prices and monopoly prices are frequently regarded as being similar. This might suggest that sometimes monopoly pricing is close to the Ramsey-Boiteux second best and welfare superior to imperfectly regulated prices. This paper tries to specify what is meant by “being similar”. Both sets of prices are similar in a theoretical sense but differ not only with respect to price levels but can even lead to different price orders. The paper discusses the impact of competition and stresses the difference between market and residual demand, which are important for the Ramsey-Boiteux and the monopoly problem, respectively. JEL classification  L33, L50, L94     

Differential pricing, parallel trade, and the incentive to invest

I consider the case for imposing uniform pricing on a monopolist in a setting where markets can be segmented according to differences in marginal costs and/or consumer demand. I also analyze the ex ante impact on incentives to invest in R&D. I show how two opposite trade-offs arise. When differential pricing is demand-based, uniform pricing has good ex-post welfare properties but leads to lower investment ex ante. Conversely, when differential pricing is cost-based, uniform pricing has bad ex-post welfare properties but leads to higher investment ex ante.     

A股市场新股的因素定价模型实证研究

现代股权定价理论对A股初始定价时存在缺陷,采用主成份回归法,确定影响A股初始定价的主因子,在此基础上建立初始定价模型。根据模型,影响A股初始定价的因素从高到低分别为:成本因子、投资偏好因子、市况因子、业绩成长性因子,实证结果与传统股票定价理论并不吻合。     

人工智能时代个性化定价行为的反垄断规制--从大数据杀熟展开

人工智能时代,数据规模显著扩张,算法能力持续优化。科技实力雄厚、市场力量强大的经营者凭借大数据与算法工具的紧密结合,收集和分析能够反映消费者特征和行为的相关信息,以无限接近消费者购买能力和支付意愿上限的方式对消费者实施个性化定价。个性化定价行为涉及对条件相同的交易相对人在交易价格上实施差别化待遇,可能构成反垄断法所禁止的价格歧视行为。但与以往反垄断实施重点关注的排他性价格歧视不同,个性化定价突出表现为直接针对终端消费者实施的剥削性价格歧视,且在具体情形下呈现出不同的限制竞争效果,引发消费者选择能力与选择范围的双重限制。鉴于此,个性化定价行为的反垄断规制需要准确识别涉案行为,综合判断竞争效果,慎重选择福利标准。对于同时降低消费者剩余和社会总福利的个性化定价行为,可认定其具有限制竞争效果且不具备正当理由,从而构成违法价格歧视;对于降低消费者剩余却提高社会总福利的个性化定价行为,如果选择消费者福利标准则可认定其构成违法价格歧视,如果选择社会总福利标准则可认定其具备正当理由;对于同时提高消费者剩余与社会总福利的个性化定价行为,因涉及消费者之间的剩余转移,对其竞争效果的评价仍待反垄断实施予以明确。     

Subsidies for FDI: Implications from a model with heterogeneous firms

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of subsidies to attract multinational corporations when firms are heterogeneous in their productivity levels. I show that the use of a small subsidy raises welfare in the FDI host country, with the consumption gains from attracting more multinationals exceeding the direct cost of funding the subsidy program through a tax on labor income. This welfare gain stems from a selection effect, whereby the subsidy induces only the most productive exporters to switch to servicing the host's market via FDI. I further show that for the same total subsidy bill, a subsidy to variable costs delivers a larger welfare gain than a subsidy to the fixed cost of conducting FDI, since a variable cost subsidy also raises the inefficiently low output levels stemming from each firm's markup pricing power.     

Unequal Pricing in the Information Economy: Implications for Consumer Welfare

This article presents an economic analysis of information good pricing and consumer welfare, and discusses the implications of price discrimination in the information economy. It argues that network externalities, coupled with information asymmetry, enable a dominant marketer to price unequally, extracting late adopters surplus to compensate for the loss from early adopters. In the short term, the minority early adopters benefit by paying less, but in the long term, the majority late adopters suffer by paying more. Considering that late adopters are likely to be at a disadvantage in resources, this discriminatory pricing amounts to the poor subsidizing the rich. Based on this analysis, implications for consumer welfare are discussed.     

Riding the Wave: Exclusionary Practices in Markets for Microprocessors Used in IBM–Compatible Personal Computers

This paper examines exclusionary practices allegedly used by Intel to maintain its dominant position in sales of microprocessors for IBM–compatible personal computers (PCs), focusing primarily on the preferential allocation of scarce product among customers. The paper considers the period 1991–93, which encompasses the transition from the 386 to the 486 microprocessor generation and the entry of several competitors. We test for two conditions that are necessary for exclusionary practices to be successful. First, using the market definition approach that is common to antitrust analyses in the US, we demonstrate that, at the upstream microprocessor level, Intel had monopoly power in a distinct market for high–end microprocessors. In particular, pricing data show that the effects of entry were localized at the low end of Intel‘s product line. Secondly, we identify four conditions that are sufficient for exclusionary practices to be successful, and show that the downstream PC manufacturing stage has these characteristics. Finally, we consider potential explanations for preferential allocation that are based on efficiencies, and outline a methodology for calculating the effect of exclusionary practices on the prices received by two of Intel‘s competitors     

中国演出产品定价机制及完善对策探究

在文化消费多样化和移动互联网技术兴起的发展趋势下,中国演艺市场面临着高成本、低回报的经营困境,作为新兴产业的演艺行业,不管是运行秩序还是行业规则方面,都有需要完善的地方。以演出产品定价为主要研究视角,提出了演出产品定价存在机制不完善、价格水平整体偏高、炒票现象严重等问题,并从建立演出产品价格管理体系、实行差异化定价策略、科学管理演艺市场3个方面提出了建议。笔者将鲍莫尔的病态成本理论作为演艺产品差异化定价的理论依据,菲利普·莱斯利的百老汇价格歧视作为将科学管理手段应用于演出产品价格管理的例证,对演艺产品定价机制及完善对策进行了初步探究。     

Pricing and Cost Recovery for Internet Services: Practical Review,Classification, and Application of Relevant Models

Suitable pricing models for Internet services represent one of the main prerequisites for a successfully running implementation of a charging and accounting system. This paper introduces general aspects influencing the choice of a pricing model in practical situations and presents a survey as well as a classification of relevant and advanced approaches to be found in the scientific literature. First performance results on charging extensions within the Internet are presented, which are completed by a set of market price simulations for dynamic pricing models within the same implementation environment. Based on cost model investigations some detailed insights into price and cost issues from an Internet Service Provider's (ISP) point of view are given. Moreover, current challenges as well as problems are discussed in a practical context as investigated in the Swiss National Science Foundation project Charging and Accounting Technology for the Internet (CATI).     

Empirical investigation of channel reactions to brand introductions

We investigate how incumbent manufacturers and retailers alter their pricing behavior in response to new product introduction. In performing our analysis, we need to be cognizant of the fact that the observed price changes can be due to entry-induced changes in a) demand conditions or b) costs or, on the other hand, to the competitive behavior of c) manufacturers and/or d) the retailer. In order to separate these four changes, we posit that manufacturer and retailer pricing is an outcome of maximizing a combination of shares and profits. This enhanced objective function allows us to measure competitive conduct benchmarked as less or more competitive than under the Bertrand-Nash framework. Our empirical analysis is based on the toothpaste category for the time period January 1993–February 1995. During this period, there were three brand introductions in two rounds of entry. Using the estimates from the demand and the supply model, we compute the changes in the retail and wholesale prices that are attributable to changes in demand conditions, manufacturer and retailer competitive conduct, and cost changes. These results support our conjecture that inferring the change in conduct solely based on a change in observed prices is likely to be erroneous. For the first new brand entry, we find that the brand introduction did not significantly increase competition between manufacturers. As a result, the balance of channel power between the manufacturers and the retailers remained unaltered. Both retailer and manufacturer profit margins increased after the first entry. However, subsequent to the second entry, retailer share of channel profits increased at the expense of the manufacturers; manufacturers even saw a decline in their absolute profit margins. We believe that this research will provide insight for manufacturers and retailers regarding how the various channel participants are likely to react to new product introduction. Furthermore, policymakers interested in understanding competitive reactions to new product introduction should find this research useful.     

Inflation inertia and credible disinflation

We develop a model of optimizing forward-looking staggered price setting where even fully credible disinflations display a delayed and gradual inflation response and significant output losses. There is a welfare trade-off between these output losses and the gains from smaller inflationary distortions. For reasonable parameter values disinflation improves welfare, and more so if it is phased in gradually. The pricing assumption of our model yields dynamics that are similar to models of sticky information, but its state space is much simpler, thereby allowing for the application of standard linearization methods.     

Can Mergers to Monopoly,Price Fixing,and Market‐Division Agreements Raise Welfare?

Naked market division, price fixing agreements and mergers which result in dominant positions have long been opposed by the courts and the government because of the high likelihood that they will result in a reduction in output and an increase in price. We show that the opposite may be true if the market is characterized by marketing spillovers. When marketing investment is required to educate consumers about the general capabilities or qualities of a product, marketing efforts by one producer will benefit rival producers. A theoretical model of these types of markets shows that marketing spillovers can forestall entry altogether or force incumbent firms to engage in ‘limit marketing’ that leaves the market underserved from a welfare‐maximizing perspective. Under these circumstances, market output and social welfare are potentially raised not only through horizontal agreements among competitors, but also through cost‐raising strategies and commitments to predatory behavior by incumbent firms.     

论市场因素对保险产品定价的影响

基于精算技术的保费厘定实际上是用一种成本定价方法,未考虑市场因素对价格的影响。即单个投保人之间对保险产品价格变化的容忍程度、价格空间的大小变化对顾客需求的影响以及不同组群的潜在投保人的需求差别。分析市场因素对保险产品定价的影响,保险产品差别定价的策略是保险业产品定价之良策。而保险业只有精算技术与市场分析结合起来才能挖掘保险产品深层次的潜力。     

Design and evaluation of road pricing: state-of-the-art and methodological advances

This article provides an in-depth review of the state-of-the-art and describes methodological advances in the design and evaluation of road network pricing schemes. A number of paradigm shifts from the two polar cases of the marginal social cost pricing of road traffic congestion and revenue-maximizing road toll pricing are analyzed, as induced by the need to address realistic design complexities and constraints. The crucial role of the joint consideration of pricing strategies with optimal capacity provision and several network management measures is manifested and an integrated evaluation framework is suggested to incorporate a wide range of road pricing impacts into the scheme design process.     

Selling to strategic customers with cost uncertainty

Production cost can be influenced by previous sales in an uncertain way. In reality, production cost may decrease in the number of initial buyers due to the learning effect, or increase in the number of initial buyers due to the quality-improving pressure from negative comments of unhappy users. Taking this uncertainty into account, this paper studies the optimal intertemporal pricing strategies of a firm when selling to strategic customers in two periods where production cost in the second period randomly changes with the number of buyers in the first period. Our results suggest how firms should adjust their optimal pricing strategies under different market circumstances.     

A cost-plus trap: Pricing heuristics and demand identification

Cost plus pricing is a common pricing heuristic. We investigate whether a firm, following cost plus pricing in a simple environment, will eventually have enough information about demand conditions to switch to an optimization-based pricing approach. We find that with unsophisticated statistical approaches this is unlikely, and even with a Bayesian decision theoretic approach there can be what we call a cost plus trap.