控制权收益与企业融资方式选择——基于Myers-Majluf模型的分析框架

将控制权收益引入Myers-Majluf模型中,本文建立了一个企业融资方式选择模型。模型预测,由于控股股东和外部投资者的利益冲突,选择股权融资的上市公司存在过度投资行为,而选择负债融资的企业一般不存在过度投资行为;进一步的研究表明,控股股东的控制权收益加剧了企业股权融资偏好和过度投资行为。     

治理环境、终极股东控制与公司并购绩效

文章以2007—2009年我国非金融上市公司扩张性并购事件为研究对象,对治理环境、终极股东控制与公司并购绩效的关系进行了实证研究。结果发现,终极股东的两权分离度及政府控制性质与公司并购绩效负相关;治理环境的改善在提高公司并购绩效的同时,还能抑制两权分离对公司并购绩效带来的负面影响;终极控制股东的政府控制属性会弱化治理环境的这种治理效应。     

大股东所有权、控制权与公司治理绩效的灰色关联分析——基于三一重工的案例研究

以中国"股权分置改革第一股"——三一重工为研究对象,采用案例研究的方法,对三一重工的公司治理绩效和控制性大股东的所有权、控制权以及两权分离度进行灰色关联度分析。实证研究结果表明:三一重工的最终控制大股东所持有的的所有权(现金流量权)在一定程度上抑制了其进行"隧道挖掘"的行为,起到了利益汇聚的激励效应,并且随着其所有权比例的上升,公司治理绩效随之提高。同时,三一重工的最终控制大股东虽然通过采用金字塔控股结构分离所有权与控制权,用较少的所有权掌握大部分的控制权,但是两权分离并没有降低上市公司的治理绩效,即两权分离并未产生隧道挖掘的防御效应。但是激励效应和防御效应均不显著。     

The Effects of Idealized Advertising Imagery on Social Comparisons,Psychological and Emotional Outcomes,and Consumer Vulnerability: A Conceptual Model

This article integrates marketing and social psychology theories and findings into a conceptual model that describes the conditions for which idealized advertising images induce positive (or negative) consumer outcomes. Extending Bessenoff's moderated mediation model, the authors propose that: (1) effect of social comparison on the relationship between exposure to idealized advertising images and psychological/emotional outcomes will be moderated by internalization of ideals and self-discrepancy; (2) effect of psychological/emotional outcomes on the relationship between social comparison and consumer vulnerability will be moderated by attainability of ideals; and (3) product claims should moderate the relationship between psychological and emotional outcomes and consumer vulnerability.     

企业价值、盈利性与成长:中国上市公司控制类型的比较研究

本文以我国上市公司为例,对不同控制类型下企业价值、盈利性与成长进行了比较研究,试图发现控制类型对企业所追求的目标是否产生影响。研究结果表明,在不同的控制类型下,企业价值、盈利性与成长存在一定的差异。与国外业主控制型相似的法人控股的企业注重企业价值和成长性,而与经理控制型相似的国有绝对控股企业相对更加重视盈利性,这可能是不同的控制主体持股的目标不同所导致的。     

Private Benefits of Managerial Control,Government Ownership,and Acquirer Returns: Evidence from the Chinese State‐Controlled Listed Companies

This article examines how government ownership affects the relationship between private benefits of managerial control, measured as excessive overhead expenses, and profitability of acquirers. A total of 246 merger and acquisition (M&A) events from Chinese state‐controlled listed companies (CSCLCs) between 2001 and 2006 constitutes the analytical sample. Under a low level of government shareholding, private benefits of managerial control positively correlated with acquirer announcement returns. However, there was no relationship between private benefits of managerial control and acquirer announcement returns under a high level of government shareholding. The implications of these findings for scholarship and practice are discussed. Copyright © 2011 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.