The Korean financial crisis and the soft budget constraint

A panel of Korean firms is used to test for the soft budget constraint (SBC) in bank lending before and after the 1997–1998 financial crisis. SBC is present if a firm can borrow from its bank despite being in financial distress, which we define by a low Altman's z-score. We find that prior to 1997 financially distressed firms were able to borrow while after the crisis their ability to borrow declined substantially. We also demonstrate that SBC was a significant factor in the firms’ propensity to default during the crisis.     

Investment decisions and the soft budget constraint

This paper investigates the investment behaviour of a large panel of Hungarian firms in the period 1989–99, in order to assess the impact of institutional and regulatory changes on the efficiency of credit allocation. We find that the role of financial factors for investment decisions has changed significantly after the introduction of major financial reforms, and that firms were affected differently depending on their ownership type. Reforms have hardened the budget constraint of private domestic firms, particularly small ones, and reduced informational problems for foreign‐owned firms. State‐owned firms remained subject to a soft budget constraint. In particular, small state firms became more sensitive to financial conditions, whereas large state firms were unaffected and kept operating under a soft budget constraint.     

Soft budget constraints and the property rights theory of ownership

Modeling the government make-or-buy decision, Hart and colleagues [Hart, O., Shleifer, S. and Vishny, R.W., 1997, The proper scope of government: Theory and an application to prisons, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 1127–1161] assume government providers are exogenously more replaceable than private providers. Instead, we posit government managers' soft incentives arise endogenously from their lack of control rights, because of rationally softer budget constraints.     

Shark hunting: On the vulnerability of resources with heterogeneous species

This paper examines the unprecedented decimation of sharks. In accordance with the biological characteristics and the economic environment of sharks, we extend the Brander-Taylor model of renewable resources and trade to a resource with a continuum of species which are heterogeneous with respect to their growth rate. The model implies that heterogeneity increases the vulnerability of a resource as relatively abundant species make harvesting economically viable even though slow-growing species are driven to extinction. The empirical analysis assesses the fate of sharks in the light of the model and finds that the likelihood of extinction is, indeed, significantly greater for shark species which exhibit low intrinsic growth.     

Soft budget constraint theories: From centralization to the market

This paper surveys the theoretical literature on the effect of soft budget constraints on economies in transition from centralization to capitalism; it also reviews our understanding of soft budget constraints in general. It focuses on the conception of the soft budget constraint syndrome as a commitment problem. We show that the two features of soft budget constraints in centralized economies – ex post renegotiation of firms' financial plans and a close administrative relationship between firms and the centre – are intrinsically related. We examine a series of theories (based on the commitment-problem approach) that explain shortage, lack of innovation in centralized economies, devolution, and banking reform in transition economies. Moreover, we argue that soft budget constraints also have an influence on major issues in economics, such as the determination of the boundaries and capital structure of a firm. Finally, we show that soft budget constraints theory sheds light on financial crises and economic growth.     

Trade liberalization,forward‐looking firms,and welfare

We set up an oligopolistic model with two exporting firms selling to a third market to investigate the welfare implications of trade liberalization when the exporting firms are forward‐looking. The results show that with cost asymmetry trade liberalization encourages the exporting firms to engage in tacit collusion, which may not only be detrimental to the domestic welfare, but also to the consumer surplus of the importing country. Moreover, we find that tacit collusion is less sustainable if the government of the importing country imposes a lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient exporting firm. If a nonforward‐looking or a forward‐looking cost‐efficient domestic firm exists in the importing country, then trade liberalization also encourages tacit collusion.     

Determinants and consequences of soft budget constraintsAn empirical analysis using enterprise‐level data in transition countries1

This paper presents empirical work grounded in the soft budget constraint (SBC) literature. A loan is soft when a bank cannot commit the enterprise to hold to a fixed initial budget and/or the timing of repayment. Using data collected by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), 2002) in 26 transition economies, we analyze the determinants of managers’ expectations of having a soft loan. In particular, we find that managers’ expectations are lower when the initial financing requires collateral, and higher for larger firms and when firms had recently experienced financial distress. We also provide evidence that managers’ expectations influence their price responsiveness.     

Skill‐biased heterogeneous firms,trade liberalization and the skill premium

We propose a theory that rising globalization and rising wage inequality are related because trade liberalization raises the demand facing highly competitive skill‐intensive firms. In our model, only the lowest‐cost firms participate in the global economy exactly along the lines of Melitz ( 2003 ). In addition to differing in their productivity, firms differ in their skill intensity. We model skill‐biased technology as a correlation between skill intensity and technological acumen, and we estimate this correlation to be large using firm‐level data from Chile in 1995. A fall in trade costs leads to both greater trade volumes and an increase in the relative demand for skill, as the lowest‐cost/most‐skilled firms expand to serve the export market while less skill‐intensive non‐exporters retrench in the face of increased import competition. This mechanism works regardless of factor endowment differences, so we provide an explanation for why globalization and wage inequality move together in both skill‐abundant and skill‐scarce countries. In our model countries are net exporters of the services of their abundant factor, but there are no Stolper‐Samuelson effects because import competition affects all domestic firms equally.     

Strategic tariffs, tariff jumping, and heterogeneous firms

The majority of research to date investigating strategic tariffs in the presence of multinationals finds a knife-edge result where, in equilibrium, all foreign firms are either multinationals or exporters. Utilizing a model of heterogeneous firms, we find equilibria in which both pure exporters and multinationals coexist. We utilize this model to study the case of endogenously chosen tariffs. As is standard, Nash equilibrium tariffs are higher than the socially optimal tariffs. Unlike existing models with homogeneous firms, we find that non-cooperative tariffs promote the existence of low-productivity firms relative to the socially optimal tariffs. This highlights a new source of inefficiency from tariff competition not found in models of homogeneous firms. In addition, we find that in many cases the Nash equilibrium tariff when FDI is a potential firm structure is lower than when it is not. As a result, FDI improves welfare by mitigating tariff competition.     

Regulation, market structure and service trade liberalization

In this paper, we develop a theoretical method to quantify the importance of regulation and market structure on the success of service trade liberalization. For this purpose, we incorporate a single imperfectly competitive service sector that can take on various market structures into a standard computational general equilibrium model. We apply our framework to analyze the impact of partial telecom liberalization in Tunisia. We show that if the regulatory environment guarantees competition, Tunisia's welfare can improve up to 0.65%. If a cartel is formed between the domestic incumbent and foreign entrant, however, Tunisia's welfare can drop up to 0.25%. Our results thus call for Tunisia among other developing countries to step up its pro-competitive regulatory reforms while liberalizing its telecom sector.     

Trade between symmetric countries,heterogeneous firms,and the skill premium

Abstract This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization between symmetric countries on the skill premium. I introduce skilled and unskilled labour in a model of trade with heterogeneous firms à la Melitz (2003) and assume a production technology such that more productive firms are more skill intensive. I show that the effects of trade liberalization on wage inequality crucially depend on the type of trade costs considered and on their initial size. While fixed costs of trade have a potentially non‐monotonic effect on the skill premium, a drop in variable trade costs unambiguously and substantially raises wage inequality.     

Trade and the Euro: effects on bystanders

This article investigates trade effects of the euro focusing on the impact on bystanders. We use data for Swedish firms and examine the impact on exporting firms’ intensive and extensive margins of trade. Our result shows an overall increase in Swedish firms’ exports to the euro area after the introduction of the single currency, indicating that the euro has decreased trade costs also for outsiders. In addition, we find important heterogeneity in the sample, suggesting that it is the large majority of small firms that has increased trade flows with the Eurozone the most.     

企业、银行和政府三方还贷博弈研究

预算软约束已成为国有企业改革的阻碍因素,并影响经济转型期的政企、银企关系,而政府对于债务的软预算约束是企业信贷违约的原因之一,根据企业还贷过程中相关利益者的相互博弈,建立一个企业、银行、政府之间三方博弈模型来分析它们之间的行为及其目标差异对企业信贷违约的影响。模型分析表明：政府出于政治和经济利益的考虑,通过补贴银行和企业来实施对企业还贷的软预算约束,而银行在衡量了政府补贴和清算得失之后有可能对企业再贷款。解决预算软约束和企业信贷违约的关键在于＂政府、银行、企业＂之间的关系处理,企业完全按市场化运作,建立科学的法人治理结构,让政府从企业中逐步退出,硬化企业的预算约束环境,从而降低企业的信贷违约的概率。     

欧美和中国对技术性贸易壁垒的研究综述

鉴于技术性贸易壁垒对世界经济和国际贸易的重要影响,各国学者都对技术性贸易壁垒问题进行了大量研究,并取得了丰硕的成果,这为相关国家和地区的政策制定提供了很好的决策参考。欧美发达国家是技术性贸易壁垒的发祥地,也最早从事技术性贸易壁垒研究。早在19世纪60年代,欧共体就意识到技术性贸易壁垒对国际贸易的限制作用,并于1969年制定了《消除商品贸易中技术性壁垒的一般性纲领》,第一次提出了在国际贸易中制定技术性贸易壁垒的贸易规则。美国随之向GATT建议拟定关于技术性贸易壁垒的协议。我国虽然遭遇技术性贸易壁垒的案例早已有之,但…     

Trade liberalization and the inter-industry wage premia: the missingf role of productivity

The literature concerning the effect of tariffs on the inter-industry wage premium has not addressed the role of total factor productivity (TFP) in determining both the wage premium and tariffs. This omission not only overlooks an important determinant of wage premium but also invalidates the use of the pre-reform tariff level as an instrument for the change in tariffs. Based on an analysis of Colombian data, I find that including TFP in the estimated model of the effects of tariffs on the wage premium leads to a 41% decrease in the effect of tariffs on the inter-industry wage premium relative to the model that omits TFP. More specifically, a 10 percentage point decrease in tariffs reduces the wage premium by 1.01%, whereas a 10% increase in TFP raise wage premium by 1.6%. This finding suggests the importance of using policies that boost productivity to offset the effect of tariffs on the wage premium.     

Trade Structure and Trade liberalization: The emerging pattern between the EU and Transition Economies

The purpose of this study is to find empirical evidence for the assumption that trade liberalization unlocks the potential of the Transition Economies (TEs) to achieve technological upgrading, productivity progress and catching-up (in terms of income). The study examines the trade structure now emerging between the European Union (EU) and the TEs in the light of two sets of differently liberalized trade items identified by the European Agreements. The aim is to determine whether trade liberalization has helped to supersede the structures – reflected mainly in the low quality of products – inherited by the TEs from the command economy. The empirical results are interpreted in the light of the Flam-Helpman quality-cycle model. We find evidence of an ongoing division of labor between high quality products (EU) and low quality products (TEs) according to a cycle. The first stage comprises the already well established dominance of quality advantage products by EU countries producing and exporting high-quality products, which crowd out the TEs' production of similar products. The second stage is the exploitation of cost-advantages by TEs in less liberalized trade, and there they appear to achieve better results. All these results may be taken as support for an active government in TEs.     

International Trade, Bargaining and Efficiency: The Holdup Problem

In the presence of product market imperfections and holdup, we identify allocative and productive efficiency gains resulting from international trade. Under a bilateral monopoly in a closed economy, inefficiencies arise in both input and output markets. Trade in final goods has a procompetitive effect in the product market. This in turn triggers an increase in output, which raises incentives for the upstream firm to invest and helps reduce the hold-up problem.
JEL classification: F 12; F 13; F 15     

Factor Heterogeneity,Factor Market Imperfection and Trade

This paper develops a tractable model of examining how factor heterogeneity and imperfect factor market interact for determining a pattern of trade. Institution plays a crucial role for the interaction. In my work, firm productivity is defined as a composition of factor productivity and technology. Thus, input selection should affect the pattern of Melitz’s intra-industry allocation due to the incurring transaction cost. For a simple model, I assume two factors (labor and capital) and two sectors, which are relatively less institution-dependent and relatively more institution-dependent. When the economy is open, effect of the transaction cost on income distribution is more drastic for an institutionally underdeveloped country. Depending on institutional quality, the economic openness reallocates resource across countries through job creation or job destruction. The job turnovers redistribute income between heterogeneous labors within countries. The income redistribution is catalyzed by international mobility of capital. As a result, income disparity is widened between the institutionally developed country and the institutionally underdeveloped country. This paper can contribute to the literature of institution and international trade.