贸易摩擦、宏观经济波动与经济开放程度的选择

本文构建一个包含关税冲击以及外汇风险溢价的两国开放经济DSGE模型,创新地揭示了关税冲击造成实际汇率波动的“直接效应”与“间接效应”,刻画了关税变动、贸易条件与实际汇率之间的动态关系与作用机制。我们深入分析了不同经济开放程度下贸易摩擦造成的宏观经济波动以及经济福利损失。模拟结果表明,在一定贸易开放程度下,外国加收关税一方面会导致本国贸易条件恶化,引发出口及产出下降;另一方面会导致本国汇率贬值,引发出口及产出增长。关税冲击发生后短期中汇率贬值效应占优,本国产出会出现小幅上升,随后贸易条件恶化效应逐步显现,产出持续下降。福利分析结果表明,本国适度提升贸易开放度,虽然经济福利损失会小幅上升,但福利损失增加幅度小于外国,会在贸易摩擦竞争中形成相对优势;如果本国过度提高贸易开放度,则会导致本国福利损失大幅增加,并且大于外国福利损失增幅,会在贸易摩擦竞争中形成相对劣势。因此,应适度逐步有序地提升贸易开放度。此外,本国适度推进资本账户开放的政策能够改善贸易条件,促进本国经济增长。     

贸易摩擦、宏观经济波动与经济开放程度的选择

本文构建一个包含关税冲击以及外汇风险溢价的两国开放经济DSGE模型,创新地揭示了关税冲击造成实际汇率波动的“直接效应”与“间接效应”,刻画了关税变动、贸易条件与实际汇率之间的动态关系与作用机制。我们深入分析了不同经济开放程度下贸易摩擦造成的宏观经济波动以及经济福利损失。模拟结果表明,在一定贸易开放程度下,外国加收关税一方面会导致本国贸易条件恶化,引发出口及产出下降;另一方面会导致本国汇率贬值,引发出口及产出增长。关税冲击发生后短期中汇率贬值效应占优,本国产出会出现小幅上升,随后贸易条件恶化效应逐步显现,产出持续下降。福利分析结果表明,本国适度提升贸易开放度,虽然经济福利损失会小幅上升,但福利损失增加幅度小于外国,会在贸易摩擦竞争中形成相对优势;如果本国过度提高贸易开放度,则会导致本国福利损失大幅增加,并且大于外国福利损失增幅,会在贸易摩擦竞争中形成相对劣势。因此,应适度逐步有序地提升贸易开放度。此外,本国适度推进资本账户开放的政策能够改善贸易条件,促进本国经济增长。     

加征关税如何影响美国贸易逆差及全球福利——基于美元本位下两国动态一般均衡框架的分析

本文构建了一个包含美元本位特征的两国模型,在此基础上分析了美国加征关税及引发的贸易摩擦对美国贸易逆差和全球福利的影响,并详细探讨了相关传导机制。在基准模型设定下,美国单方面加征20%关税会使得美国贸易逆差占GDP比重小幅缩小约0.40个百分点,美国长期稳态GDP下降约2.50%,其他国家GDP下降约1.10%,美国居民福利上升约0.60%,其他国家居民福利下降约1.20%。美国单方面加征关税在抑制全球贸易和生产的同时,会通过更加不公平的国际贸易恶化全球福利分配。当其他国家采取报复性措施时,其他国家自身福利并不会进一步恶化,但美国福利会大幅下滑,同时美国贸易逆差相对规模变化不大。贸易摩擦博弈的“囚徒困境”特征在一定程度上能够解释贸易战的发生。削弱美元本位地位能促进国际贸易公平性的提升,进而能减弱贸易摩擦带来的负面影响、提升全球福利水平,并能有效缩窄美国贸易逆差。     

加征关税如何影响美国贸易逆差及全球福利——基于美元本位下两国动态一般均衡框架的分析

本文构建了一个包含美元本位特征的两国模型,在此基础上分析了美国加征关税及引发的贸易摩擦对美国贸易逆差和全球福利的影响,并详细探讨了相关传导机制。在基准模型设定下,美国单方面加征20%关税会使得美国贸易逆差占GDP比重小幅缩小约0.40个百分点,美国长期稳态GDP下降约2.50%,其他国家GDP下降约1.10%,美国居民福利上升约0.60%,其他国家居民福利下降约1.20%。美国单方面加征关税在抑制全球贸易和生产的同时,会通过更加不公平的国际贸易恶化全球福利分配。当其他国家采取报复性措施时,其他国家自身福利并不会进一步恶化,但美国福利会大幅下滑,同时美国贸易逆差相对规模变化不大。贸易摩擦博弈的“囚徒困境”特征在一定程度上能够解释贸易战的发生。削弱美元本位地位能促进国际贸易公平性的提升,进而能减弱贸易摩擦带来的负面影响、提升全球福利水平,并能有效缩窄美国贸易逆差。     

Trade costs and multimarket collusion

Contrary to conventional wisdom, this article argues that trade liberalization may facilitate collusion and reduce welfare. With the help of a duopoly model in which firms interact repeatedly in multiple markets, we first show that, if trade costs (i.e., tariffs/transport costs) and discount factors are not too high, efficient cartel agreements necessitate the cross‐hauling of goods, as that entails lower deviation incentives. In this setting, we then demonstrate that reciprocal trade liberalization always raises total output when trade costs are within a range whose lower bound exceeds a threshold level, but may reduce total output (and thus be pro‐collusive) when trade costs are below that threshold level.     

Trade Reform in the Partially Liberalized Economy of Turkey

Recent reforms in trade policy in Turkey have produced a foreigntrade regime that exhibits very little antiexport bias on average.A quantitative, multisectoral general equilibrium model of theTurkish economy shows that piecemeal trade policy reform, basedon first-best rationales that are appropriate for highly distortedeconomies, would not now be appropriate. Further tariff reductionsmust be coordinated with export subsidy reductions to attainsignificant welfare benefits. The dispersion of distortions,especially export subsidies, is more important than their level.A policy of harmonizing tariffs to the common external tariffof the European Community has virtually no effect on welfare.     

Economic Growth or Environmental Sustainability? Drivers of Pollution in the Yangtze River Delta Urban Agglomeration in China

In this article we examine the effects of foreign trade, economic growth, and inter-city strategic interaction on pollution in the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) Urban Agglomeration in China. We find that when the effects of many factors are controlled for, foreign trade is positively related to pollution intensity in the YRD cities. Our results also support the Environmental Kuznets Curve by showing that when per capita income grows larger, pollution intensity first rises and then falls. We also find that ceteris paribus, a higher level of city human capital intensity is associated with a lower level of city pollution intensity. In addition, our results show that there exists inter-city strategic interaction among the governments of the YRD cities in determining their effort levels with respect to environmental protection.     

Trade and domestic tax reforms in the presence of a public good and different neutrality conditions

This paper develops a perfectly competitive general-equilibrium model of a small open economy with production of private traded goods and of a public good which is financed by revenues from trade and domestic taxes. Within this framework we consider the effects on public good provision and on welfare of the following tax reforms: (i) a producer-price-neutral reduction in export taxes and a corresponding increase in production taxes, (ii) a consumer-price-neutral reduction in tariffs and a corresponding increase in consumption taxes, and (iii) a partial tax-revenue-neutral reform in trade and domestic taxes.     

The Costs of Restrictive Trade Policies in the Presence of Factor Tax Distortions

This paper uses a numerical general equilibrium model to examine the quantitative importance of pre-existing factor tax distortions for the welfare effects of tariffs and import quotas. The presence of pre-existing taxes can greatly raise the costs of these policies, possibly by over several hundred percent. For a tariff much of this extra cost can be offset if tariff revenues are used to reduce distortionary taxes. Hence there can be a large cost discrepancy between tariffs and quotas. The optimal tariff for a country with market power in trade can be reduced to zero, unless revenues finance cuts in distortionary taxes.     

Capital accumulation and international trade

Capital accumulation is introduced into a version of Eaton–Kortum model of international trade, imposing period by period balanced trade. The effects of tariff changes on world steady states and transition dynamics are studied. A calibrated version of the model is used to assess the short- and long-run gains from a world-wide elimination of trade tariffs. The determinants and importance of convergence in world-wide capital as well as convergence on the relative capitals and incomes are analyzed. Positive and normative comparisons with an analogous static model are conducted, as well as comparisons steady state welfare comparisons vs full dynamic gains.     

Fiscal Policy Reforms in a Global Economy

Two countries are populated by workers and capitalists. Their governments collect taxes to finance productive expenditure and income redistribution. The share of income redistributed defines the size of the welfare state. Although both groups benefit from an abolition of the welfare state in the long run, the optimal fiscal policy in autarky can be characterized by maintaining a large welfare state since transfer cuts would induce transitional losses. Starting in such a position of policy inertia free trade and capital mobility is introduced. Fiscal policy competition leads to a reduction of tax rates and a relative increase of productive expenditure. If both countries coordinate their fiscal policy the reduction of taxes and income transfers is less pronounced. Quantitative effects of increasing globalization are assessed in a calibrated model for an average Europe G-4 country and the United States.     

Does better information about foreign shocks improve monetary policy?

This paper examines whether better information about foreign shocks leads to welfare-improving monetary policy using a stylised two-country New Keynesian general equilibrium model. We demonstrate that when terms of trade externality exist and national central banks have the incentives to shift terms of trade in their own favour, the equilibrium under imperfect information may be welfare superior relative to an equilibrium with perfect information. In addition, the welfare gains or losses from information sharing between central banks are found to be small for empirically plausible range of parameters for risk aversion and elasticity of labour supply.     

Patent pools,vertical integration,and downstream competition

Patent pools are commonly used to license technologies to manufacturers. Whereas previous studies focused on manufacturers active in independent markets, we analyze pools licensing to competing manufacturers, allowing for multiple licensors and nonlinear tariffs. We find that the impact of pools on welfare depends on the industry structure: whereas they are procompetitive when no manufacturer is integrated with a licensor, the presence of vertically integrated manufacturers triggers a novel trade‐off between horizontal and vertical price coordination. Specifically, pools are anticompetitive if the share of integrated firms is large, procompetitive otherwise. We then formulate information‐free policies to screen anticompetitive pools.     

Economic Reform and Labor Unions: A General-Equilibrium Analysis Applied to Bangladesh and Indonesia

Noting the trend toward more independent trade unions in developingcountries, this article examines whether the presence of unionsstrengthens or weakens the benefits to be gained from economicpolicy reform. We show that the presence of "passive" unions—onesthat choose their wage-employment contract given the firm'scost-minimizing strategy—increases the welfare gains fromtrade liberalization, because trade reform lowers the wage premiumenjoyed by the unionized sector, reducing a distortion in thelabor market. These gains are amplified when the unions are"active", namely, when they negotiate a contract with the firmthat is off its labor demand curve. Such a contract resultsin featherbedding—paying workers more than their marginalproduct—and trade reform reduces the amount of featherbedding.The policy implication for Bangladesh—a country with strongtrade unions and a protected unionized sector—is thatthe benefits of further trade liberalization may be greaterthan otherwise predicted. In Indonesia, where both unionizationand import tariffs are low, allowing greater independence tounions may preserve flexibility and reward workers better thanthe current minimum-wage policy.     

International tax competition with endogenous sequencing

This paper examines endogenous timing in an international tax competition model. Unlike existing studies, governments are assumed to decide not only tax rates but also whether they are set early or late. The Nash equilibrium provides four conclusions for alternative double tax allowances. First, tax deductions cause simultaneous tax competition, whereas tax credits yield sequential tax competition. Second, any double taxation relief would generate capital trade. Third, a credit system could maximize one country’s economic welfare but would lower another country’s economic welfare more than a deduction regime. Fourth, a home country’s government would choose credit regimes under a maximax rule, but select deduction methods under minimax and maximin rules, while all double tax allowances are indifferent to a host country. The findings resolve the question raised by Bond and Samuelson (Economic Journal 99:1099–1111, 1989) of why governments choose tax credits when tax deductions are clearly better. Namely, this paper shows that one country is better off but another is worse off with credits rather than deductions. Accordingly, we cannot clearly specify whether governments choose credit systems or deduction regimes. The possible double tax allowances employed by the governments depend on their own decision criterion.     

区域一体化、环境污染与社会福利

如何在区域协调发展中实现减排和社会福利的双增进已成为中国绿色高质量发展所面临的重大现实问题。本文在空间经济模型框架下探讨了区域一体化的环境和社会福利效应。基于1995-2016年中国30个省级行政区的数据,运用动态空间面板杜宾模型和广义空间二阶段最小二乘模型验证了区域一体化对环境污染和社会福利的影响。研究发现:(1)区域一体化对不同类型污染物的影响存在差异,区域一体化显著抑制了本地性污染物排放,但同时促进了全域性污染物的排放。(2)区域一体化与社会福利间呈现倒“U”形关系。在临界水平内,区域一体化有利于增进社会福利。(3)区域一体化对环境污染和社会福利的影响存在地区交互影响,即邻近地区的区域一体化促进了本地工业粉尘的排放,同时抑制了本地二氧化碳的排放,邻近地区的区域一体化有利于增进本地的社会福利。(4)区域一体化对环境污染和社会福利的影响存在显著的空间边界。本研究认为应对不同类型的污染物制定差异化环境政策,通过强化空间管理以充分利用区域一体化促进地区协同减排和增进社会福利的双重红利。     

区域一体化、环境污染与社会福利

如何在区域协调发展中实现减排和社会福利的双增进已成为中国绿色高质量发展所面临的重大现实问题。本文在空间经济模型框架下探讨了区域一体化的环境和社会福利效应。基于1995-2016年中国30个省级行政区的数据,运用动态空间面板杜宾模型和广义空间二阶段最小二乘模型验证了区域一体化对环境污染和社会福利的影响。研究发现:(1)区域一体化对不同类型污染物的影响存在差异,区域一体化显著抑制了本地性污染物排放,但同时促进了全域性污染物的排放。(2)区域一体化与社会福利间呈现倒“U”形关系。在临界水平内,区域一体化有利于增进社会福利。(3)区域一体化对环境污染和社会福利的影响存在地区交互影响,即邻近地区的区域一体化促进了本地工业粉尘的排放,同时抑制了本地二氧化碳的排放,邻近地区的区域一体化有利于增进本地的社会福利。(4)区域一体化对环境污染和社会福利的影响存在显著的空间边界。本研究认为应对不同类型的污染物制定差异化环境政策,通过强化空间管理以充分利用区域一体化促进地区协同减排和增进社会福利的双重红利。     

Regional Integration as Diplomacy

Regional integration agreements are examples of second-bestpolicies and have an ambiguous impact on welfare. This articlebuilds a model in which regional integration agreements unambiguouslyraise welfare by correcting for externalities. It assumes thattrade between neighboring countries raises trust between themand reduces the likelihood of conflict. The optimum interventionin that case is a subsidy on imports from the neighbor. Thearticle shows that an equivalent solution is for the neighboringcountries to tax imports from the rest of the world—thatis, to form a regional integration agreement—togetherwith some domestic taxes. The article shows that (1) the optimum tariffs on imports fromthe rest of the world are likely to decline over time; (2) deepintegration implies lower optimum external tariffs if it isexogenous; (3) optimum external tariffs are higher before deepintegration and lower thereafter if deep integration is endogenous;and (4) enlargement of bloc size (in terms of symmetric countries)has an ambiguous impact on external tariffs but raises welfare,and some form of domino effect exists.     

Examples of unit tax superiority for a price-discriminating monopolist

This paper compares the welfare effects of per-unit and ad valorem taxes in four pervasive price discrimination schemes: quantity discounts, two-part tariffs, bundling, and package size price discrimination. The paper shows by example that per-unit taxes may welfare dominate ad valorem tariffs in a market with a monopoly that maximizes profits by engaging in second-degree price discrimination.     

Overlapping tax revenue,soft budget,and rent seeking

This paper investigates how the soft-budget constraint with grants from the central government to local governments tends to internalize the vertical externality of local public investment by stimulating local expenditure when both the central and local governments impose taxes on the same economic activities financed by public investment. The model incorporates the local governments’ rent-seeking activities in a multi-government setting. The soft-budget constraint is welfare deteriorating because it stimulates rent-seeking activities, although a soft-budget game may attain the first-best level of public investment.