The quality of street cash flow from operations

We provide empirical evidence on the quality of street cash flow from operations (CFO) as an alternative financial performance summary measure. We focus our investigation on the quality of the items analysts exclude in their determination of street CFO. Based on a sample of 8,518 firm-year observations over the 1993–2008 period, we find that the street CFO number is generally higher than the GAAP CFO number, indicating that analysts typically make CFO-increasing exclusions. Our inspection of hand-collected analyst reports reveals that, while some analysts make sophisticated exclusions of transitory cash items, many others ignore working capital and other accruals when adjusting forecasted earnings to arrive at their street CFO forecasts. We find that street CFO exclusions are negatively associated with future operating earnings, suggesting that these exclusions are not fully transitory or unimportant in forecasting future performance. Our results also indicate that street CFO exclusions are less transitory than the implicit accrual component of analysts’ street earnings exclusions. These results suggest that the average quality of analysts’ street CFO exclusions is quite low and that it is even lower than the quality of their implied accrual exclusions. Moreover, we find that investors perceive analysts’ CFO exclusions to be of such low quality to render street CFO measures less informative than GAAP CFO figures. Finally, we find that analyst conflicts of interest and (to some extent) the greater inherent volatility of firms’ CFO series contribute to the low-quality nature of analysts’ street CFO exclusions.     

Analyst cash flow forecasts and pricing of accruals

This paper investigates how analyst cash flow forecasts affect investors' valuation of accounting accruals. We find that the strength of the accrual anomaly documented in Sloan (1996) is weaker for firms with analyst cash flow forecasts, after controlling for idiosyncratic risk, transaction costs and firm characteristics associated with the issuance of cash flow forecasts. We further show that this reduction in mispricing of accounting accruals is at least partially attributed to the improved ability of investors to price earnings manipulations imbedded in accruals. We investigate several non-mutually exclusive alternative explanations for this improvement in investors' ability and demonstrate that the increased investor attention and the improved accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts both contribute to the mitigation of the accrual anomaly.     

Has the value of cash increased over time?

We document a dramatic increase in the market valuation of cash holdings of US firms from 1988 to 2013. The value of one dollar of cash has increased by $0.019 per year during the period, indicating that shareholders place more value on cash in recent years. We also find that the increasing trend in cash value is driven mainly by increases in institutional shareholdings and accounting conservatism. We further decompose cash change into cash flows from operation (CFO) and cash flows from investing and financing activities, and find that CFO is a significant driver of the increasing trend in cash value.     

The impact of meeting or beating analysts' operating cash flow forecasts on a firm's cost of debt

Extant literature provides conflicting results with respect to the usefulness and accuracy of analysts' operating cash flow forecasts. Our study empirically examines the importance and influence of meeting or beating analysts' operating cash flow forecasts on a firm's cost of debt. Results indicate that firms meeting/beating analysts' cash flow forecasts have higher initial bond ratings as well as lower initial bond yields. Additionally, based upon an analysis of rating changes, firms meeting or beating cash flow forecasts have a higher probability of receiving a debt rating upgrade and a lower probability of a ratings downgrade compared to firms missing cash flow forecasts. A direct comparison of the importance of meeting/beating cash flow versus earnings benchmarks indicates that debt market participants appear to incrementally value both types of forecasts, and contrary to selected equity market findings, neither forecast subsumes the other for debt market participants.     

CFOs and CEOs: Who have the most influence on earnings management?

This study examines the association between chief financial officer (CFO) equity incentives and earnings management. Chief executive officer (CEO) equity incentives have been shown to be associated with accruals management and the likelihood of beating analyst forecasts (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Cheng and Warfield, 2005). Because CFOs’ primary responsibility is financial reporting, CFO equity incentives should play a stronger role than those of the CEO in earnings management. We find that the magnitude of accruals and the likelihood of beating analyst forecasts are more sensitive to CFO equity incentives than to those of the CEO. Our evidence supports the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) new disclosure requirement on CFO compensation.     

The determinants and valuation effects of classification choice on the statement of cash flows

In this paper we exploit the choice allowed by International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) regarding the presentation of interest payments on the cash flow statement to answer two related questions: First, whether the classification choice is explained by firm reporting incentives and second, whether it is value relevant. Using a UK sample, we find that firms reporting losses, with a greater proportion of their debt stemming from public sources, with CFO-based covenants and greater increases in leverage in the year of adoption are less likely to report interest payments in cash flows from operating activities (CFOA). Results also suggest that the incentive to meet or beat analyst CFO forecasts decreases, but strong corporate governance increases the probability of including interest payments in CFOA. Based on the assumption that the decision not to classify interest payments in CFOA captures lower disclosure quality or poor future expected performance, we posit that these firms should also exhibit lower valuations. Results obtained after correcting for self-selection bias confirm this assertion. We conclude that managers’ decision not to classify interest payments in CFOA is consistent with the opportunistic use of the choice allowed by IFRS.     

To beat or not to beat? The importance of analysts’ cash flow forecasts

We investigate the implications of firms’ benchmark-beating patterns with respect to analysts’ quarterly cash flow forecasts for firms’ current capital market valuation and their future performance. We hypothesize that nonnegative earnings surprises are more likely to be supported by real operating performance and signal higher earnings quality if they are achieved via higher than expected cash flows or lower than expected accruals. We show that firms beating analyst earnings forecasts have larger positive capital market reactions and larger earnings response coefficients if they beat analyst cash flow forecasts or report lower than expected accruals. We also demonstrate that these firms’ superior future performance may provide an economic justification for their more favorable market response. Our findings suggest that firms’ ability to beat analyst cash flow forecasts is informative regarding the quality of their earnings surprises.     

The Unintended Consequences of High Expectations and Pressure on New CEOs

We provide empirical tests of a general version of targeting theory that greater scrutiny could lead to executive abuses. Our results show that new CEOs under higher expectations or pressure are more likely to report meeting analyst forecasts; however, this apparent superior performance dissipates after excluding firms having characteristics synonymous with earnings manipulation. We find evidence that new CEOs under greater pressure are considerably more likely to engage in manipulation while the link between expectations and manipulation is much weaker. The results are strongest for new CEOs whose firms report meeting forecasts and do not “walk down” earnings estimates.     

Effective board monitoring over earnings reports and forecasts: Evidence from CFO outside director appointments

Prior evidence that firms adjust their board structure following accounting restatements suggests that firms expect the board to effectively monitor the firm’s financial accounting system. However, little is known about signals firms use to identify monitoring weaknesses or the types of individuals firms appoint to improve the quality of monitoring. We expand on Ghannam, Bujega, Matolcsy, and Spiropolous (2019)’s evidence that firms appoint directors with accounting experience after financial fraud by investigating whether firms that file restatements or issue highly inaccurate earnings forecasts appoint individuals with CFO experience (i.e., a subset of accounting experts) to their audit committee. We find that firms are more likely to appoint an outside director with CFO experience to the audit committee when they have recently restated earnings and when they have higher prior management forecast error. We also find that the appointment of a CFO outside director to the audit committee is followed by a lower likelihood of restatement and more accurate management forecast. Together, our results suggest that firms respond to accounting failures by appointing outside directors with CFO experience. Thus, we provide insight into the signals firms use to identify weaknesses in the monitoring of the accounting function and the types of expertise firms value in addressing those weaknesses.     

Cash flow disaggregation and the prediction of future earnings

We examine the incremental information content of the components of cash flows from operations (CFO). Specifically the research question examined in this paper is whether models incorporating components of CFO to predict future earnings provide lower prediction errors than models incorporating simply net CFO. We use Australian data in this setting as all companies were required to provide information using the direct method during the sample period. We find that the cash flow components model is superior to an aggregate cash flow model in terms of explanatory power and predictive ability for future earnings; and that disclosure of non‐core (core) cash flows components is (not) useful in both respects. Our results are of relevance to investors and analysts in estimating earnings forecasts, managers of firms in regulators’ domains where choice is provided with respect to the disclosure of CFO and also to regulators’ deliberations on disclosure requirements and recommendations.     

Non-GAAP earnings disclosures around regulation G – The case of “implicit non-GAAP reporting”

We identify a phenomenon related to non-GAAP earnings disclosure and examine its prevalence around Regulation G (RegG). Specifically, we analyze to what extent firms only disclose adjustments to GAAP earnings instead of entire adjusted earnings figures thereby not providing the ideal non-GAAP to GAAP reconciliation promoted by RegG. We refer to this reporting behavior as “implicit non-GAAP reporting” and ask three different questions: How is “implicit non-GAAP reporting” related with the adoption of RegG? What type of firm reports implicit non-GAAP measures? What are the motives for “implicit non-GAAP reporting” post-RegG? Our analyses yield three key findings. First, the frequency of “implicit non-GAAP reporting” spikes after the regulatory intervention but to a lesser degree also existed before. Second, during the post-RegG time period, the prevalence of “implicit non-GAAP reporting” is much higher among firms who only started to report non-GAAP earnings after RegG was enacted (starters) than among those, which continued to disclose non-GAAP earnings across the regulatory intervention (continuers). Third, we show that only for starters, “implicit non-GAAP reporting” is associated with motives of beating analyst earnings forecasts as well as experiencing GAAP losses. Our study provides important insights for regulators, firms and academics into "implicit non-GAAP reporting" by examining properties and determinants of implicit vs. explicit non-GAAP earnings for different types of firms around RegG.     

Media coverage,board structure and CEO compensation: Evidence from Taiwan

This paper investigates the relationship between CEO cash compensation and media coverage of firms, analyst forecasts and board structure using data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange. We find that, other things being equal, CEO cash compensation is much higher for firms with greater media coverage, firms with more positive news, firms with more analyst forecasts, and firms with larger institutional holdings. There is little evidence that board size and board independence affect CEO cash compensation, and CEO duality is negatively associated with CEO cash compensation     

CDS trading and analyst optimism

This paper investigates whether and how the initiation of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) trading affects analyst forecast optimism. First, we document that the initiation of CDS trading curbs analyst forecasts optimism. Second, we find that the dampening effect of CDS on analyst optimism is stronger for firms with negative news and for firms with poorer financial performance or higher leverage, supporting a “correction effect” of CDS on non-strategic optimism. Moreover, we find that CDS also has a “disciplining effect” on strategic optimism that arises from incentives to cultivate relation with management or to please institutional investors. Overall, our evidence shows that the CDS market not only provides important information for analysts, but also alters analysts’ reporting incentives and enhances their objectivity. Additional analysis shows that this effect has disappeared after the Dodd-Frank Act.     

Employee protection shocks and corporate cash holdings

We examine the relation between employee protection legislation and corporate cash holdings. Our rationale rests on the notion that higher labor adjustment costs increase a firm's operating leverage making firms to adjust their liquidity management by increasing precautionary savings. Consistent with this, we show that the staggered passage of legal exceptions to the “at-will” employment doctrine in various U.S. states led to an average increase in cash holdings by 7.2%. Cash increases are higher when unionization rates and industry concentration are lower, and when industry discharge rates and volatility is higher. Consistent with the financial flexibility argument of tighter employment protection increasing corporate cash needs, the value of cash increases after the passage of pro-labor regulations. Moreover, we find that the increase in the value of cash is especially pronounced for financially constrained firms.     

Analysts' Cash Flow Forecasts,Audit Effort,and Audit Opinions on Internal Control

We examine the economic impact of analysts’ cash flow forecasts by looking at how external auditors respond to financial analysts’ issuance of cash flow forecasts. Using a differences‐in‐differences approach, we find that financial analysts’ initiation of cash flow forecasts leads to reduced auditor fees and audit report lags. Moreover, after cash flow forecast initiation, firms report fewer Section 404(b) internal control weakness disclosures. These findings suggest that cash flow forecasts constrain earnings manipulation and improve management accounting behavior, thereby reducing inherent and control risk and strengthening firms’ internal control over financial reporting.     

Is ‘benchmark beating’ by Australian firms evidence of earnings management?

We investigate the extent to which Australian firms that report small profits and/or small increases in earnings (i.e. benchmark beaters) have done so by the upward manipulation of these earnings. Although evidence of an unusually large number of firms managing to just beat such earnings benchmarks has been interpreted as evidence of earnings management, this approach fails to identify those firms that are the manipulators from those where unbiased earnings fall naturally into the benchmark beating group. Our results suggest that caution is required in interpreting benchmark beating as an indicator of the extent of earnings management. Using several methods for estimating the unexpected accrual component of earnings, we show that although benchmark beaters have larger positive unexpected accruals than other firms, a similar result holds when firms with small losses or earnings declines (i.e. ‘just miss’ firms) are compared with other firms. Moreover, there is no statistically significant difference between unexpected accruals for the benchmark beating and just miss groups. At a minimum, we reject the joint hypothesis that unexpected accruals capture earnings management and that an unusual kink around zero in the distribution of earnings levels or earnings changes is caused by earnings management.     

An Empirical Investigation of the Effect of CFO Power on Disclosure Quality

We examine the association between chief financial officer (CFO) power and disclosure quality, measured using financial statement disaggregation disclosure and analyst forecast disclosure. Empirically, we validate that CFO power, measured by multiple dimensions, is positively associated with firms’ disclosure quality. We also find that this positive association between CFO power and disclosure quality is stronger when firms exhibit higher governance monitoring and accounting quality. Further analysis shows that our main results hold across multiple disclosure quality tests. Our findings are robust to addressing endogeneity issues using two-stage least squares, Heckman selection bias, and propensity score matching analyses. The results highlight the importance of CFO power for the accounting reporting process and decision-making.     

企业集团财务管控与上市公司现金持有水平研究

与现有基于上市公司单个企业的研究不同,本文以股改后2006—2009年沪深股市3958个A股上市公司为样本,考察了企业集团财务管控对上市公司现金持有水平的影响。实证发现集团控股上市公司现金持有水平较高,国有集团控股的更高。集团财务管控方式显著影响上市公司现金持有水平,集团选派CFO使之显著降低,拥有财务公司的集团选派CFO使之降幅更大,高达30%。财务公司对现金持有水平影响不显著,但按CFO选派、ERP、产权性质分组后发现,当集团选派CFO或上市公司有ERP财务系统或民营控股时,财务公司显著降低上市公司现金持有水平。上市公司ERP财务信息系统能够提升公司现金管理水平,提高其现金持有水平,而集团选派的CFO可能会通过财务公司和ERP配置现金,降低其控股上市公司现金持有水平。     

Consistency in meeting or beating earnings expectations and management earnings forecasts

This paper provides evidence that firms that have consistently met or beaten analysts’ earnings expectations (MBE) provide more frequent “bad news” management forecasts than firms with no established string of MBE, particularly when existing analyst forecasts are optimistic. This suggests that firms with a consistent MBE record are more likely to guide analysts’ expectations downward to avoid breaking the consistency. Subsequent analyst forecast revisions following bad news management forecasts issued by these firms are dampened, implying that analysts suspect that these forecasts may be opportunistic. The relation between management forecasts and MBE consistency is stronger after Regulation FD.     

Does Regulation FD work? Evidence from analysts' reliance on public disclosure

We examine how Regulation FD changed analysts' reliance on firms' public disclosure. Regulation FD is associated with a stronger analyst response to earnings announcements, management forecasts and conference calls—that is, analysts respond to these events more quickly, more frequently and with larger forecast revisions after FD. Further, following public disclosure, the decline in analyst forecast dispersion and forecast error accelerates after FD. We find no such changes either for foreign ADR firms or around several confounding events. Overall, Regulation FD levels the playing field between the analysts and individual investors, thereby promoting “fair game” property of the market.