Coordinating development: Can income-based incentive schemes eliminate Pareto inferior equilibria?

Individuals' inability to coordinate investment may significantly constrain economic development. In this paper we study a simple investment game characterized by multiple equilibria and ask whether an income-based incentive scheme can uniquely implement the high-investment outcome. A general property of this game is the presence of a crossover-investment point at which an individual's incomes from investment and non-investment are equal. We show that arbitrarily small errors in the government's knowledge of this crossover point can prevent unique implementation of the high-investment outcome. We conclude that informational requirements are likely to severely limit a government's ability to use income-based incentive schemes as a coordination device.     

Taxation of firms with unknown mobility

We analyze optimal business tax policy when some firms are able to escape taxation by moving abroad. In contrast to the existing literature, we assume that the true number of mobile firms is ex ante unknown. While the government may learn from the firms' location responses to past tax rate changes, firms may anticipate this and adjust their choices accordingly. We find that incomplete information on mobility substantially affects the properties and the implications of equilibrium policy choices. First, the government may find it optimal to set a tax rate that triggers partial firm migration but full revelation of the true number of mobile firms. Second, we show that, if the firms' outside option is attractive (i.e., relocation cost and foreign tax rates are low), expected tax rates and expected firm migration are higher if the degree of mobility is unknown. Third, there is a positive value of learning, i.e., commitment on future tax rates cannot increase the government's expected revenue. However, if the government can commit to a rule‐based learning mechanism, i.e., credibly tie its future tax policy to present policy outcomes, it may obtain a Pareto improvement.     

The effect of capital gains taxation on small business transfers and start-ups

This paper studies the effect of capital gains taxation on small business transfers and business start-ups. We consider a model in which agents have different abilities to manage businesses and derive an agent's optimal choices as an owner or non-owner of a small business. Agents' optimal choices depend on their abilities. We also find that capital gains taxation has a negative effect on small business transfers but can encourage small business start-ups.     

Endogenous Move Structure and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment

In this paper, we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian's (1994) voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and also to the extent to which players care about payoff inequalities. We then report a laboratory experiment based on these extended games. We find that behavior is similar in the two extended games: subjects avoid the detrimental move order of Varian's model, where a person with a high value of the public good commits to a low contribution, and instead players tend to delay contributions. These results suggest that commitment opportunities may be less damaging to public good provision than previously thought.     

Environmental Policy in Developing Countries: A Dynamic Analysis

A dynamic model is constructed of the environmental policy formulation process in a stylized developing country (DC). The paper analyzes the employment and output effects of three pollution control policies. These policies embody different assumptions about the DC government's ability to commit to its announced course of action. The timepath of the government's policy variable is characterized. Optimality calls for an activist policy, irrespective of the length of time to which the government can commit to its announced policy. However, the effects of this activist policy depend fundamentally on the government's period of commitment.     

DOES DEFLATION IMPINGE ON A GOVERNMENT'S FISCAL STANDING?

This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model with money to investigate theoretically under what conditions deflation impinges on a government's fiscal standing. Focus is placed on an upper bound that is compatible with a no Ponzie game condition for the government and an equilibrium. A comparative dynamics analysis demonstrates that if a government's fiscal deficit is not so high, deflation has a negative impact on the upper bound, while if a government's fiscal deficit exceeds a critical level, deflation rather improves it. The critical level depends on a time stream of disposable real incomes and a preference parameter.     

Public investment criteria under optimal nonlinear income taxation without commitment

In this study, we highlight that the incredibility of the government's commitment to a certain tax policy is a determinant of production inefficiency. We show that if the government cannot commit to a certain tax policy and if the types of taxpayers are completely separated, then the production efficiency theorem could be violated in an optimal solution. In this case, an incremental unit of public or private capital affects taxpayers' labor supply through wage rates. In a situation where public capital is more (less) complementary to labor than private capital, public investment tightens (relaxes) the incentive compatibility constraint more than private investment.     

A macroeconometric analysis of the effects of taxation on financing and real investment in equipment in Canada

This paper analyses the impact of taxation on corporate financing and corporate investment in machinery and equipment in Canada. A coherent macroeconometric model of the firm's real and financial decision process is theoretically developed and empirically tested on Canadian data. Estimates of the impact of taxation in general and of the 1987 Canadian government's White Paper in particular, are analysed. The estimates suggest that income taxation has a negative but relatively small impact on equipment investment in Canada, and that models that ignore the link between the real and financial decisions overestimate the impact of taxation on real investment. With respect to tax reform, the White Paper reduces the incentive to save and invest in equity capital, and is expected to decrease real capital investment in the long run.     

When redistribution makes personalized pricing of externalities useless

We consider a standard optimal taxation framework in which consumers' preferences are separable in consumption and labor and identical over consumption, but are affected by consumption externalities. For every nonlinear, income-dependent pricing of goods there is a linear pricing scheme, combined with an adjusted income tax schedule, that leaves all consumers equally well-off and weakly increases the government's budget. The result depends on whether a linear pricing scheme exists that keeps the aggregate amount of consumption at its initial level observed under nonlinear pricing. We provide sufficient conditions for the assumption to hold. If adjusting the income tax rate is not available, personalized prices for an externality can enhance social welfare if they are redistributive, that is, favor consumers with a larger marginal social value of income.     

Optimum Taxation of Each Year's Income

In this paper, a two‐type, two‐period model of optimum income taxation is investigated. I assume full commitment and that current income determines the agents' tax burden in each period. It is shown that such a tax system does not allow one to implement the optimal long‐term tax contract and that it implies positive marginal tax rates at the upper end of the income distribution.     

For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment

The Kreps–Wilson–Milgrom–Roberts framework is one of the most renowned ways of modeling reputation-building. Once the number of repetitions of the game is considered as a choice variable, such a framework can fruitfully be employed to study the optimal length of the commitment to a relationship. We analyze a model where a principal plays with an agent a finitely repeated trust game, characterize the optimal length of the relationship between principal and agent when the principal’s preferences on the agent’s type stochastically change over time and show that a commitment to a stable relationship may be optimal (even) in very unstable environments.      

Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring

In a repeated game with imperfect public information, the set of equilibria depends on the way that the distribution of public signals varies with the players' actions. Recent research has focused on the case of “frequent monitoring,” where the time interval between periods becomes small. Here we study a simple example of a commitment game with a long-run and short-run player in order to examine different specifications of how the signal distribution depends upon period length. We give a simple criterion for the existence of efficient equilibrium, and show that the efficiency of the equilibria that can be supported depends in an important way on the effect of the player's actions on the variance of the signals, and whether extreme values of the signals are “bad news” of “cheating” behavior, or “good news” of “cooperative” behavior.     

STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY WITH INTERNATIONALLY OWNED FIRMS*

The consequences of international firm ownership for strategic trade policy are examined both in a general and in a simple linear model of an international duopoly with two governments using production subsidies as policy instruments. At first sight, the case for strategic trade policy seems to be weakened, because international ownership reduces a government's incentive for rent-shifting. Closer inspection shows, however, that there are ownership structures leading to optimal policies which induce the duopolists to behave more collusively. This tends to resolve the conflict between national and international rationality in a policy game with retaliation and makes strategic trade policy look more attractive.     

Foreign direct investment,tax competition and social expenditure

The aim of this paper is to make a first step towards studying the role of social expenditure and its interaction with corporate taxation in determining the destination of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. Using panel data for 18 OECD countries and measuring the extent of social welfare policies by the (public social expenditure)/GDP ratio, we find strong support for the conjecture that redistributive social welfare state policies are valued by multinationals as, for instance, they may signal a government's commitment to social stability.     

The political economy of income comparisons and economic growth

The literature on income inequality has provided various explanations as to how income inequality can affect growth, with the emphasis on ideas such as investments in human capital, issues of occupational choice, or the redistributive policies of governments. Inequality not only has a direct effect on the distribution of consumption in an economy, but it also has a powerful effect on people's subjective sense of well being. This paper takes a novel approach by focusing on the way in which a government's choice of economic policy can be influenced by how individuals perceive themselves relative to other individuals, both within the country and in foreign countries. The chosen policy affects economic growth, with the assumption being that policies that promote growth also tend to result in more switching of individuals between income groups. We show that the government's optimal policy depends on the importance of both inside country and outside country income comparisons, the fraction of national income earned by the different income groups, the potential magnitude of economic growth, the probability of switching between income groups in the presence of growth, and the relative importance of the various income groups. The model predicts that a greater degree of inside country income comparison is bad for growth whereas more outside country comparison is good for growth.     

Transactions technology and the time consistency of optimal policy

In a perfect foresight, continuous time model of the macro economy. Turnovsky and Brock (1980) have demonstrated that the government's choice of an optimal policy will be time inconsistent only if it is bound by a k% rule regarding the growth of nominal monetary balances. This result is shown to be invalid when bonds bear a liquidity yield. Under such circumstances, it is shown that all optimal policies are time inconsistent. The conclusion is that the liquidity properties of the government's financing instruments play an important role in determining the consistency properties of its optimal policies.     

The political economy of tariff protection in China: evidence from the WTO accession

We analyze China's tariff rates at WTO accession using a political economy approach. A model drawing on Branstetter and Feenstra ( 2002 ) is used to derive an optimal tariff rate for each industry. The model predicts that a government would set a high tariff rate if an industry is of large state‐owned enterprise (SOE) share, multinational share, or small foreign import share. From the model we reveal the Chinese government's preference towards different interest groups under the binding tariff constraint from the WTO commitments. The estimated structural parameters imply that the political weights on both the SOE profits and consumer income diminish with the economic opening. More important, the government still favours SOEs over consumer income. Our findings are consistent with the special features of China's economy.     

Profits in the UK economy: some Kaleckian models ∗

Official statistics on profits in the UK economy during the 1980s show a substantial increase in the share of profits in GDP after 1981. However, these figures are based on companies' own returns which have been distorted by changes in accounting practices and taxation, privatization and the arbitrary allocation of profits by multinational companies. Kalecki's theory of profits provides a way of systematically determining gross profits in national income. However, the use of this method is complicated by the absence of data on the distribution of savings and consumption between wages and profits, and Kalecki's own estimates of the equation appear to be flawed in their statistical methodology.

A number of ways of overcoming the distributional problem are explored in this paper, using data from the sectoral capital accounts of the UK during the 1980s. The methodology suggested by Asimakopulos to estimate Canadian profits turns out to be the weakest on theoretical and statistical grounds. All estimates are highly correlated with the officially reported profit series. However, in real terms (defined in Keynes' wage units as a proportion of implied wage income), they all show a profits cycle in which real profits in the second half of the 1980s are lower than they were at the end of the 1970s. The conclusion that there was no upward trend in the profits cycle suggests that the UK government's supply-side policies, designed to make the economy more profitable, did not achieve this purpose during the 1980s.

This article is an investigation of what happened to profits in the UK using Kaleckian models of how profits are determined to supplement the rather unreliable data that is provided by the government's Central Statistical Office. In the course of the investigation, a number of different models derived from Kalecki's fundalmental profits equations are presented. Two of them turn out to have a high correlation with the official published data, but contrary to that information suggest that there has been no upward trend in profits.     

Optimal Factor Income Taxation in the Presence of Unemployment

According to conventional wisdom internationally mobile capital should not be taxed or should be taxed at a lower rate than labour. An important underlying assumption behind this view is that there are no market imperfections, in particular that labour markets clear competitively. At least for Europe, which has been suffering from high unemployment for a long time, this assumption does not seem appropriate. This paper studies the optimal factor taxation in the presence of unemployment which results from the union-firm wage bargaining both with optimal and restricted profit taxation when capital is internationally mobile and labour immobile. In setting tax rates the government is assumed to behave as a Stackelberg leader towards the private sector playing a Nash game. The main conclusion is that in the presence of unemployment, the conventional wisdom turns on its head; capital should generally be taxed at a higher rate than labour.     

Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion

This paper studies a game of persuasion. A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to take an action by presenting evidence. Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) showed that when the listener's decision is binary, neither randomization nor commitment have any value for the listener, and commented that the binary nature of the decision was important for the commitment result. In this paper, I show that concavity is the critical assumption for both results: no value to commitment and no value to randomization. Specifically, the key assumption is that the listener's utility function is a concave transformation of the speaker's utility function. This assumption holds vacuously in the binary model. The result that concavity implies credibility allows us to dispense with the assumption that the listener's decision is binary and significantly broadens the scope of the model.