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1.
Existing theories of legislative delegation feature spatial models in which a principal chooses a single agent to whom to delegate authority. In the canonical model, the ally principle holds – the principal picks the ideologically closest agent. However, elected politicians typically decide whether to delegate not to an individual but to an institution, which consists of many individuals with differing preferences. To improve on existing work, we model delegation with bureaucratic hierarchy. Our results show that hierarchy is sufficient to undercut the ally principle. Indeed, capturing the logic of delegation and its results requires incorporating agency structure, especially the costs of an agency head controlling her subordinates resulting in incomplete control, as different structures are associated with different policy outcomes even when the same people constitute a bureaucracy. We also demonstrate that integrating hierarchy has important implications for a wide range of considerations, such as agency structural choice and the measurement of agency ideal points.  相似文献   

2.
现有关于授权与激励的文献侧重于考察"是否授权"的问题。本文研究不同授权结构之间激励效果的比较。沿袭Aghion and Tirole(1997),本文在"一个委托人-两个代理人"的框架下,区分了"平行授权"、"优先授权"和"次第授权"三种授权结构。我们发现,项目带给代理人的净私人收益越大、代理人之间异质性越强、代理人之间的正外部性越弱(或负外部性越强),次第授权和优先授权越可能好过平行授权;反之,则平行授权越可能占优。当项目必须完成的时间越紧急,平行授权或优先授权越可能好过次第授权;反之,则次第授权越可能占优。我们的发现从激励和授权角度对组织(比如,董事会、公司、议会、政府机构)内部授权结构的一些现象提供了一些解释。  相似文献   

3.
We investigate the endogenous choice of roles by managerial firms in the presence of unilateral externality. The choice over timing can be taken either by managers or by owners. It is shown that: (i) the choice of the timing by managers entails the same profit that owners would have achieved by specifying the timing in the delegation contract; and (ii) firms move simultaneously if the degree of unilateral externality is small, while sequentially if the degree of unilateral externality is large, with the firm generating unilateral externality as a follower; the owner of the follower firm delegates to restrict output, while his/her counterpart does not delegate it.  相似文献   

4.
A principal wants two sequential tasks to be performed by wealth-constrained agents. Suppose that there is an outcome externality; i.e., a first-stage success can make second-stage effort more or less effective. If the tasks are conflicting, the principal's profit-maximizing way to induce high efforts is to hire one agent to perform both tasks (so that the prospect to get a larger second-stage rent after a first-stage success motivates the agent to work hard in the first stage). In contrast, when there is an effort externality (i.e., first-stage effort reduces or increases the probability of a second-stage success), then the principal prefers to hire two agents whenever the tasks are conflicting.  相似文献   

5.
Authority and Communication in Organizations   总被引:10,自引:1,他引:9  
This paper studies delegation as an alternative to communication. We show that a principal prefers to delegate control to a better informed agent rather than to communicate with this agent as long as the incentive conflict is not too large relative to the principal's uncertainty about the environment. We further identify cases in which the principal optimally delegates control to an "intermediary", and show that keeping a veto–right typically reduces the expected utility of the principal unless the incentive conflict is extreme.  相似文献   

6.
A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents’ performance is measured on a cardinal scale, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best performing agent must beat the second best to receive the winner prize. We analyze a tournament with two risk averse agents. Under unlimited liability, the principal strictly benefits from a gap by partially insuring the agents and thereby reducing labor costs. If the agents are protected by limited liability, the principal sticks to the standard tournament.  相似文献   

7.
We discuss a principal–agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a noncompete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal, as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the agent. The principal prefers to impose such a clause if and only if the value created is sufficiently small relative to the agent's outside option. If the principal can use an option contract for retaining the agent, she will never prefer a strict noncompete agreement.  相似文献   

8.
In a principal-agent model with moral hazard, a signal about the principal?s technology — the stochastic mapping from the agent?s action to the outcome — is observed before the contract is offered. The signal is either uninformative (null information), informative and observed only by the principal (private information), or also observed by the agent (public information). We show that, from an ex ante standpoint (before the signal is observed): (i) the agent prefers private to both null and public information; (ii) the principal sometimes prefers null to both private and public information; and (iii) when the principal prefers public to null information, she prefers public to private information, whereas the agent prefers private to public information. In this last situation, we also show that (iv) for any separating equilibrium with private information, there exists a contract with public information that both strictly prefer.  相似文献   

9.
In a laboratory experiment, we investigate behavior in a principal-agent situation with moral hazard. We evaluate the predictive success of two theories. One is the standard agency theory, which assumes that the agent will accept any contract offer that satisfies his participation constraint, typically requiring zero expected utility. The other is the “fair-offer” theory suggested by Keser and Willinger [2000. Principals’ principles when agents’ actions are hidden. International Journal of Industrial Organization 18 (1), 163-185], which requires that the principal provide full insurance against losses to the agent and leave him a share of at most 50% of the generated surplus. The treatment variable of our experiment is the cost of effort. As effort costs increase, expected net surplus of a contract decreases. We observe that fair-offer theory generally predicts observed contract offers better than standard agency theory. However, the predictive success of the fair-offer theory decreases, while the one of standard agency theory increases with decreasing expected net surplus.  相似文献   

10.
We revisit job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities from a different perspective, extending Schmitz (2013a). When two sequential tasks need to be performed by wealth-constrained agents, the principal can hire only one agent or two different agents. When there exists an outcome externality in terms of the fixed cost and such an externality is not too large, if the two tasks are conflicting (resp. synergistic), then it is optimal for the principal to hire two different agents (resp. only one agent). When there exists an outcome externality regarding the marginal cost, the opposite result holds.  相似文献   

11.
This article demonstrates for the first time that owners will delegate the location decision under delivered pricing using a relative performance contract rather than a market share contract. It goes on to evaluate the welfare consequences of this demonstration. With linear production costs and simultaneous location, both incentive contracts reduce welfare, but the chosen relative performance contract reduces it by less. Yet, with linear costs and sequential location, the chosen relative performance contract reduces welfare by more. Finally, with enough convexity in production costs, welfare can be improved by the chosen relative performance contracts.  相似文献   

12.
ABSTRACT ** :  We investigate a bureaucratic principal responsible for the procurement of goods and services from private agents. The bureaucrat is evaluated on output and controlled by a limited budget. The agents maximize profit, have private information about variable production costs, and have positive outside options which are lost upon acceptance of a procurement contract. The setting is relevant for, e.g. governmental agencies. We show how this setup makes probabilistic rationing and overproduction for low-cost agents a useful tool for the bureaucrat.  相似文献   

13.
Extended Games Played by Managerial Firms   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
The issue of timing is addressed in a game between managerial firms. The choice over timing can be taken either by managers or by entrepreneurs. It is shown that (i) delegation drastically modifies the owners' preferences concerning the distribution of roles, as compared with the setting where firms act as pure profit-maximizers; and (ii) the ability of moving first in the market game entails that, at least observationally, the owner of the leading firm prefers not to delegate. I show that the choice of the timing by managers entails the same profit that owners would achieve by specifying the timing in the delegation contract.
JEL Classification Numbers: D43, L13.  相似文献   

14.
We introduce asymmetric information about consumers’ transportation costs (i.e., the degree of product differentiation) in the model of Hotelling. When transportation costs are high, both firms have lower profits with asymmetric information than with perfect information. Contrarily, if transportation costs are low, both firms may prefer the asymmetric information scenario (the informed firm always prefers the informational advantage, while the uninformed firm may or may not prefer to remain uninformed). Information exchange is ex‐ante advantageous for both firms, but ex‐post damaging if transportation costs turn out to be low. If the information is unverifiable, the informed firm does not represent a reliable source of information, since it always prefers to announce that transportation costs are high and there is no contract that induces truthful revelation.  相似文献   

15.
We address the questions of the patterns and the efficiency of public intervention in a dynamic game model between public agencies in charge of a non-local externality. We give two examples: pollution spreading between water basins (negative externality), and non-uniform contributions from the elite and from the mass to a cultural background (positive externality). We define two extreme cases, depending on whether or not the receiving end of the externality balances the transmitting end. When both balance, the reactivity of the agency structure is strong and the need for redistribution between them is weak. When they do not balance, the externality is more markedly non-local and redistribution is required to balance the fiscal burden (or product) from pigouvian instruments among all beneficiaries. We show that, with a static rule of redistribution that allows them to compute transfers between them as a function of their own strategies, the decentralized agencies' reactivity is somewhat slowed, but they still react faster and more efficiently than a static central agency.  相似文献   

16.
We investigate the effects of contract renegotiation in multi-agentsituations where risk-averse agents negotiate a contract offer to theprincipal after the agents observe a common, unverifiable perfect signalabout their actions. We show that renegotiation with multiple agentsreduces the cost of implementing any implementable action profile downto the first-best level, even though the principal cannot observe theagents' actions. Moreover, it is sufficient for the principal to use a"simple" initial contract, in the sense that it consists of nomore than a single sharing scheme for each agent and the total payments tothe agents are the same regardless of the realised state. An importantimplication is that decentralization, in the sense of delegated negotiationand proposals from the agents, can be as effective as centralized schemesthat utilize revelation mechanisms in unrestricted ways.  相似文献   

17.
Abstract. We consider optimal contracts when a principal has two sources to detect bad projects. The first one is an information technology without agency costs (ITP), whereas the second one is the expertise of an agent subject to moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability (ITA). First, we show that the principal does not necessarily benefit from access to additional information and thereby may prefer to ignore it. Second, we discuss different timings of information release, i.e., a disclosure contract offered to the agent after the principal announced the result of ITP , and a concealment contract where the agent exerts effort before ITP is checked. We find that concealment is superior whenever the quality of ITP is sufficiently low. Then, ITP is almost worthless under a disclosure contract, while it can still be exploited to reduce the agent's information rent under concealment. If the quality of ITP improves, disclosure can be superior as it allows to adjust the agent's effort to the updated expected quality of the project. However, even for a highly informative ITP , concealment can be superior as it mitigates the adverse selection problem.  相似文献   

18.
This paper examines the relationship between the Samuelson rule for efficient provision of stock externality and unilateral transfers for equalization of mitigation costs among the agents. Using a generic model of stock externality provisions, we proved that the revised Samuelson rule that allows transfers is a necessary and sufficient condition for efficient provision of stock externalities. In addition, selection of social welfare weights of the agents plays a key role in directions and magnitudes of the transfers. We discuss the implications of the revised Samuelson rule in economic modeling of climate change, an empirical case of stock externality, through numerical simulations in the RICE model.  相似文献   

19.
20.
沿袭Tirole(1986)的委托人一中间人一代理人科层结构,本文研究了当委托人不能直接管理代理人时的最优序贯授权问题。在该授权博弈中,委托人通过审慎设计中间人职权范围,影响其对代理入的授权行为,从而激励代理人更有效地提供和使用信息。我们发现,当下属之间利益偏差方向一致时,即中间人较委托入更愿意扩大代理人权限时,采用文献中常关注的“区间授权”(Holm—strom,1977)形式,委托人可以实现其直接向代理人授权时的最优结果。但是,如果下属间利益偏差方向相反,即中间人希望减小代理人权限时,“区间授权”将不再是最优。为了更好地影响控制中间人向代理人的次第授权行为,在最优序贯授权方案中委托人将移除部分中间选项。移除选项数目的多少取决于中间人的利益偏差程度。同授权与激励方面的文献不同,本文表明,即使在信息结构给定的条件下,移除中间项将作为科层中的控制工具,成为最优授权方案的一个特征。本文的发现从激励和授权角度对现行的一些法规执行实践中的“一刀切”政策(比如,“醉驾入刑”、大学招生录取等)提供了一些解释。  相似文献   

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