A note on optimal capital stock and financing constraints

There is a robust literature on the relationship between financing constraints and real investment. Little has been said on the relationship between financing constraints and capital stock in the long run. This note focuses on this last issue. To keep the model tractable, we assume that the firm employs a single input, and this input is used as collateral. We get three main results. Firstly, we show that the optimal capital stock chosen by a firm is affected by financing constraints even when they are slack at the current time. Secondly, we show that the net present value of the potentially constrained firm is always smaller than the one of the never constrained firm. Finally, we find that in the presence of latent financing constraints the firm does not limit itself to reducing its investment when the upper limit is reached. What it actually does is to lower its long run optimal capital stock, amplifying the effects of constraints in the long run.     

Financial constraints on investments: A three-pillar approach

Recent theoretical analyses demonstrate how informational asymmetries between financiers and investors may generate credit rationing and positive cost differentials between external and internal financing sources. The traditional empirical approach used to test for the presence of financing constraints at firm level is based on two pillars: a priori identification of relatively more financially constrained firms and econometric estimation of an investment demand function. This approach has been seriously questioned due to several methodological problems. This paper intends to amend it by adding a third pillar: the informational content of direct revelation through qualitative data. The paper estimates a reduced form investment equation following the Euler equation approach, and combines a priori information and direct qualitative information to consistently estimate for each firm the probability of being financially constrained. Our main finding is that when financially constrained firms are properly identified, the neoclassical model is rejected only for unconstrained firms. This indirectly rescues the validity of the Euler equation approach. Moreover, financially constrained firms show a positive correlation between investment and lagged cash flow.     

Credit constraints and productivity of SMEs: Evidence from Canada

To what extent firms are constrained by external credit is usually unobserved in commonly used firm-level data. We use a survey of financing among Canadian small and medium-sized enterprises to measure the likelihood of a firm being constrained by credit. We find that firm size, current debt-to-asset ratio and cash flow are robust indicators of being financially constrained, while long-term debt to asset ratio is not a significant indicator of credit constraints. We then estimate the firm-level total factor productivity, taking into account the measured credit constraints. Omitting credit constraints leads to an upward bias of productivity estimates, by 4 percent. In addition, we find no strong evidence that suggests credit constraints lead to slower productivity growth. Finally, we confirm that both investment and employment growth are negatively affected by the measured credit constraints.     

Liquidity Constraints and Investment in Transition Economies

We use Bulgarian firm-level data to investigate the impact of liquidity constraints on investment performance. Internal funds are an important determinant of investment in most industrialized countries. We test whether internal funds are important for firm investment during the current transition process in Bulgaria. We use a simple accelerator model of investment to test whether liquidity constraints are relevant in the case of Bulgaria. Our estimations are based on data for the period 1993–95, prior to the Bulgarian financial crisis in 1996–97. It turns out that Bulgarian firms are liquidity constrained, and that firms' size and financial structure help to distinguish between firms that are more and less liquidity constrained. In our view, liquidity constraints can be given a different interpretation in the case of transition economies as compared to Western economies. A more in depth analysis of the data reveals that liquidity constraints, and consequently the access to external funds for Bulgarian firm investment, are to be seen against the background of soft-budget constraints and the failure of the financial system to enforce an efficient allocation of funds. In our view, the lack of liquidity constraints may actually be seen as a sign of financial weakness in the case of Bulgaria.     

Financial Constraints and Investment Decisions

In what follows we show that liquidity constraints can affect a firm's investment even when the constraints are not currently effective. This happens when, at any given time, the firm believes that internal finance is likely to become a constraint in the future. In these circumstances, the value of the firm becomes a non‐monotonic functional form of the fundamental. Thus, in a dynamic setting, the potential barrier to internal liquidity expansion exerts a global effect on the firm's investment policy, lowering its desired investment profile (Classification JEL: E22, E51 ).     

Credit Constraints,Technology Choice and Exports: A Firm‐level Study for Latin American Countries

In this paper, constraints on technology choice and credit access are introduced into a firm‐level trade model in a dynamic setting in order to explain factors that limit benefits to a firm from trade liberalization. Theoretical analysis shows that firms face credit constraints depending on their initial productivity and the cost of credit. As a result, credit‐constrained firms may not be able to cross the minimum productivity threshold needed to enter and compete in a foreign market. Empirical analysis using firm‐level panel data for six Latin American countries confirms that financial constraints negatively influence firms' export and investment decisions.     

Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management

Summary This paper considers a problem in which an agent is hired to manage a capital investment and subsequently receives private information regarding the productivity of the capital investment. The capital manager must decide whether to invest capital supplied by the firm (the principal), or to divert these investment funds to perquisite consumption. If the manager decides to invest, the manager must then select the level of operating efficiency (productivity) of the capital investment, this latter choice being unobservable and constrained by the (maximal) productivity of the investment. In this setting we demonstrate that the optimal employment contract, from the perspective of the firm hiring the manager, is the contract whichminimizes the dependence of the manager's compensation on firm output. This contract pays the manager a fixed wage whenever output from the investment exceeds the wage and provides the manager with all of the projects rents whenever output falls below this level. Thus, we provide a setting in which fixed wage contracts are the optimal incentive contract even when agents are risk neutral and contracts can be costlessly written on future output.We would like to thank the participants in the Princeton Economics and Finance Workshop and the Ohio State University Finance Workshop for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The second author gratefully acknowledges the research support of the Georgia State College of Business Administration Research Council.     

The effect of cash flow on investment: an empirical test of the balance sheet theory

Using a large data set on investments and accounting information for private firms, we put the balance sheet theory to test. We find that firm cash flow has a positive impact on investment and that the effect is enhanced for firms which are more likely to be financially constrained. We also find that the investment-cash flow sensitivity is significantly larger and more persistent during the first half of our sample period, which includes a severe banking crisis and recession. Our results suggest that financial constraints matter more in periods characterized by adverse economic conditions.     

The Perverse Effect of Debt Tax Benefits on Firm Investment Decisions

In this paper we question the idea that the deduction of debt interest is always an effective policy instrument to spur firm investment. We analyse the investment decision in presence of a borrowing constraint on the amount of debt that the firm can raise. We show that if the debt interest rate is decreasing in the firm's capital accumulation and another financial resource more expensive than debt is available (at least for levels of debt lower than the upper bound), then the deduction of the debt interest from taxes on capital income may reduce firm investment. This theoretical result is relevant for economic policy decisions when financial intermediaries are not willing to finance beyond a certain threshold but firms have access to other sources of finance.     

FAMILY FIRMS,BANK RELATIONSHIPS,AND FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS: A COMPREHENSIVE SCORE CARD

We examine the effect of financial constraints on firm investment and cash flow. We combine data from the Spanish Mercantile Registry and the Bank of Spain Credit Registry to classify firms according to whether they are family‐owned, not family‐owned, or belong to a family‐linked network of firms and according to their number of banking relations (with none, one, or several banks). Our empirical strategy is structural, based on a dynamic model solved numerically to generate the joint distribution of firm capital (size), investment, and cash flow, both in cross sections and in panel data. We consider three alternative financial settings: saving only, borrowing and lending, and moral hazard constrained state‐contingent credit. We estimate each setting via maximum likelihood and compare across these financial regimes. Based on the estimated financial regime, we show that family firms, especially those belonging to networks based on ownership, are associated with a more flexible market or contract environment and are less financially constrained than nonfamily firms. This result survives stratifications of family and nonfamily firms by bank status, region, industry, and time period. Family firms are better able to allocate funds and smooth investment across states of the world and over time, arguably done informally or using the cash flow generated at the level of the network. We also validate our structural approach by demonstrating that it performs well in traditional categories, by stratifying firms by size and age, and find that smaller and younger firms are more constrained than larger and older firms.     

Financial systems,financing constraints and investment: empirical analysis of OECD countries

This paper investigates the influence of cash flow on corporate investment in 11 OECD countries. We find that the sensitivity of investment levels to internally available funds differs significantly across countries, and is lower in countries with predominantly close bank–firm relationships than in countries with predominantly arm's-length bank–firm relationships. At the same time, we find no relationship of the levels of financial constraints to indicators of overall financial development. Our results are consistent with the view that information and incentive problems in the capital market have important effects on corporate investment, and that close bank–firm relationships can reduce these problems and thus improve the access of firms to external finance.     

SME credit constraints in Asia’s rising economic star: fresh empirical evidence from Vietnam

This study provides a fresh look at the SME sector’s economic backbone vis-à-vis credit constraint dichotomy in Vietnam—Asia’s rising economic star. The study uses data from the Survey of Manufacturing SMEs in Vietnam from 2005 to 2013 and adopts a two-step Heckman modelling strategy to single out firms with formal financing needs that are credit constrained. Results show that several characteristics—including firm size, investment, financial assets, leverage, equity, registration, gender of owner, age, and education—significantly affect the likelihood of either credit constraints or demand. The main results do not change even when the issue of endogeneity is dealt with. Particularly, we provide evidence that unobserved factors that increase the probability of debt demand also increase the probability of being constrained. Policy implications are discussed.     

Do price-earnings ratios explain investment decisions better than Tobin’s q? Evidence from German firm-level data

This article tests the additional information content of price-earnings ratios, with respect to Tobin’s q, in explaining firms’ investment behaviour. While Tobin’s q describes the expected future earnings related to those projected by the book value, the price-earnings ratio compares future growth of earnings based on the projection of current earnings. In other words, a high price-earnings ratio might indicate that investors are willing to rely on future earnings growth, even though current earnings are low. By using an unbalanced panel of about 500 listed firms from Germany over the period 1987–2007, we find that including the price-earnings ratio in the investment equation does not change the explanatory power of Tobin’s q. Most notably, the price-earnings ratio exerts a positive and significant impact on investment. These results are robust to the inclusion of a measure of the firm’s internal funds and of fixed effects and also to the use of different estimators.     

Testing for the effects of credit crunch on agriculture investment in the EU

There are several research papers focusing on the detrimental effects of the credit crunch on the economic performance. A sector of the economy where the implications of the credit crunch have not been thoroughly studied is the agriculture. This is surprising given the importance of agriculture for the European economy. We focus on agriculture in fourteen European Union (EU) Member States in the aftermath of the credit crunch. To this end, we employ the micro-econometric data set of Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) of EU at NUTS 2 level. From a methodological point of view, we model agriculture investment based on a flexible panel Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model that provides impulse response functions (IRFs) and variance decompositions (VDCs). The empirical estimates indicate that agriculture investment has been constrained by negative shocks in interest paid and total liabilities. Unless those financial constraints are eased, agriculture investment in EU would remain rather sluggish at best.     

The effects of irreversibility on the timing and intensity of lumpy investment

This paper examines how changes in irreversibility of investment affect the timing and intensity of lumpy investment. We develop a continuous-time model wherein a firm is endowed with a perpetual option to invest in a project at any time by incurring a partially reversible investment cost at that instant. The amount of the investment cost is directly related to the intensity of investment that is endogenously chosen by the firm at the instant when the investment option is exercised. We show that higher irreversibility of investment induces the firm to raise its optimal investment trigger, thereby deferring the undertaking of the project. Furthermore, we show that changes in irreversibility of investment have no impact on the firm's optimal investment intensity due to two opposing effects that exactly offset each other. Finally, we show that higher irreversibility of investment reduces the value of the investment option and, therefore, makes the firm less valuable.     

Complementarity between product and process innovation in a monopoly setting

In this article we study complementarity between market-enhancing product innovation and cost-reducing process innovation in a monopoly setting. First, we consider the possibility for a firm to alternatively invest only along one of the two directions and compare the incentives of process vs. product innovation. Then, we allow the firm to invest simultaneously in both activities, showing that both investment levels and profit are higher than in the case of individual investment. Thus, product and process innovations are complementary, and the firm always prefers the simultaneous adoption of both activities.     

The impact of financial constraints on firm survival and growth

We propose a new approach for identifying and measuring the degree of financial constraint faced by firms and use it to investigate the effect of financial constraints on firm survival and development. Using panel data on French manufacturing firms over the 1996–2004 period, we find that (1) financial constraints significantly increase the probability of exiting the market, (2) access to external financial resources has a positive effect on the growth of firms in terms of sales, capital stock and employment, (3) financial constraints are positively related with productivity growth in the short-run. We interpret this last result as the sign that constrained firms need to cut costs in order to generate the resources they cannot raise on financial markets.     

Domestic Labor Markets and Foreign Direct Investment*

We study how the labor market and industry uncertainty affect the investment decisions of multinational enterprises (MNEs). In an uncertain business climate, MNEs must take account of the future in deciding where to locate a branch plant. When wages are endogenously determined, both the opportunity cost of labor and redundancy payments influence the MNE’s decision. When countries compete for foreign investment, different national characteristics determine the winners in different industries. Differences in risk may draw MNEs to different locations. Firm‐specific bargaining always offers an advantage, as the mix of current and future pay fully reflects the firm’s risk profile.     

Climate Policy with Tied Hands: Optimal Resource Taxation Under Implementation Lags

In this paper we present a Stackelberg differential game to study the dynamic interaction between a polluting firm and a regulator who sets pollution limits overtime. At each time, the firm settles emissions taking into account the fine for non-compliance with the pollution limit, and balances current costs of investments in a capital stock which allows for future emission reductions. We derive two main results. First, we show that the optimal pollution limit decreases as the capital stock increases, while both emissions and the level of non-compliance decrease. Second, we find that offering fine discounts in exchange for firm’s capital investment is socially desirable. We numerically obtain the optimal value of such discount, which crucially depends on the severity of the fine. In the limiting scenario with a very large severity of the fine, the optimal discount implies that no penalties are levied, since the firm shows adequate adaptation progress through capital investment.