Shareholder litigation,management forecasts,and productive decisions during the initial public offerings

This paper develops a model to analyze the impact of shareholder litigation on managers’ voluntary disclosure strategies in equity offerings. The major findings are as follows. First, under different economic parameters, the entrepreneur has two possible equilibrium disclosure strategies: full and partial disclosure. Of particular interest is the latter equilibrium, in which shareholder litigation can give the entrepreneur incentives to partially disclose her private information. Second, production decisions might be distorted by the entrepreneur’s disclosure incentives. The full disclosure equilibrium is associated with underinvestment, while overinvestment exists in the partial disclosure equilibrium.     

EARNINGS NEWS AND MARKET RISK: IS THE MAGNITUDE OF THE POSTEARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT DRIFT UNDERESTIMATED?

Postearnings announcement drift is the tendency for cumulative abnormal returns to drift in the direction of earnings surprise after the earnings news is released. I show that a standard approach to measuring abnormal returns by using preannouncement estimates of market risk (betas) causes the magnitude of this phenomenon to be significantly underestimated. I find that stock beta tends to rise (fall) following the release of bad (good) earnings news. In addition, I find that by not taking into account postannouncement shifts in betas, prior studies are likely to have underestimated the magnitude of the drift. My results are robust to different model specifications, as well as to different earnings surprise measures.     

Order aggressiveness as a metric to assess the usefulness of accounting information

Motivated by the availability of high-frequency data on trading activity, this paper proposes the use of order aggressiveness as a metric to evaluate the usefulness of accounting information. I test, through an analysis of order aggressiveness, whether earnings announcements of firms listed on the Italian Stock Exchange limit order book have information content. I estimate an ordered probit relating order aggressiveness to unexpected earnings and to three market determinants of aggressiveness. Consistent with the theory on the choice between limit and market orders, I find that order aggressiveness increases with the absolute value of unexpected earnings. The results provide evidence on the extent to which the information contained in earnings is used by traders.     

Are corporate managers savvy about their stock price? Evidence from insider trading after earnings announcements

We find that insiders trade as if they exploit market underreaction to earnings news, buying (selling) after good (bad) earnings announcements when the price reaction to the announcement is low (high). We also find that insider trades attributable to public information about earnings and the price reaction generate abnormal returns. By demonstrating that managers spot market underreaction to earnings news, our results imply that managers are savvy about their company’s stock price.     

Disclosure Versus Recognition: Inferences from Subsequent Events

Standard setters explicitly state that disclosure should not substitute for recognition in financial reports. Consistent with this directive, prior research shows that investors find recognized values more pertinent than disclosed values. However, it remains unclear whether reporting items are recognized because they are more relevant for investing decisions, or whether requiring recognition itself prompts differing behavior on the part of firms and investors. Using the setting of subsequent events, I identify the differential effect of requiring disclosure versus recognition in a setting where the accounting treatment of an item is exogenously determined. For comparable events, I find a stronger initial market response for firms required to recognize relative to firms that must disclose, although the large magnitude of the identified effect calls into question whether this difference can be attributed to accounting treatments alone. In examining various reasons for the stronger market response to recognized values, I fail to find support for the hypothesis that this difference is due to differential reliability of disclosed and recognized values. I do find some evidence that investors underreact to disclosed events, consistent with investors incurring higher processing costs when using disclosed information.     

Robust anomalies? A close look at accrual‐based trading strategy returns

The last 40 years have seen an extensive literature documenting so‐called anomalies in major capital markets. Evidence of ‘abnormal’ returns associated with trading strategies based on readily observable phenomena such as accounting‐based data involves experimental design choices that can be expected to influence the results. We show how evidence of an accrual anomaly in Australia is sensitive to research design specifications such as the choice of proxy for total accruals; the definition of abnormal returns (i.e. the return generating model); the impact of data trimming as a response to exceptionally large returns; and the choice between value and equal weighting of returns. We show that research design choices do matter and help reconcile conflicting prior evidence of any accrual anomaly in Australia. More broadly, our results suggest the need for caution in drawing inferences from trading strategy tests which claim to identify anomalies.     

Stock performance and the mispricing of accruals

I investigate the relationship between contemporaneous stock-price performance and the persistence of accrued earnings, and its impact on the accrual anomaly. I find that, in a fiscal year, accrued earnings for stocks that have performed poorly are less persistent in predicting future earnings than accrued earnings for stocks that have performed moderately. I further find that a hedge-strategy based on accruals earns greater abnormal returns following bad-news years. The results are consistent with conservative accounting causing accrued earnings to be even less persistent in bad-news years and investors failing to efficiently price this differential in persistence.     

Do managers intentionally use repurchase tender offers to signal private information? Evidence from firm financial reporting behavior

Signaling is the most commonly cited explanation for stock repurchases in the academic literature. Yet, there is little evidence on whether managers intentionally use repurchases as signaling devices. Using a firm's financial reporting behavior to infer managerial intent, we find evidence suggesting that managers intentionally use fixed-price repurchase tender offers to signal undervaluation. In contrast, we find no evidence that managers use Dutch-auction tender offers to signal undervaluation. Instead, firms engaging in Dutch-auction repurchases act as if they are trying to deflate their earnings prior to the repurchases to further reduce the repurchasing price.     

Information friction and investor home bias: A perspective on the effect of global IFRS adoption on the extent of equity home bias

This paper provides a perspective on the effect of IFRS adoption on the tendency of investors to under-invest in foreign equities. We consider explanations for the equity home bias described in prior research and discuss research relevant to the informational consequences of global adoption of IFRS. Specifically, we evaluate whether IFRS adoption reduces information processing costs or decreases investor uncertainty about either the quality of financial reporting or the distribution of future cash flows. We predict that the effect of any reduction in information processing costs from the adoption of IFRS is likely to be small relative to the effects of other determinants of home bias such as the strength of investor protection mechanisms in foreign countries, behavioral biases toward familiar equities, and informational advantages related to geographical proximity. We argue that the quality of the information that investors have (or perceive they have) decreases with distance, conclude that global IFRS adoption is unlikely to affect home bias, and propose avenues for future research.     

Macro to micro: Country exposures,firm fundamentals and stock returns

We outline a systematic approach to incorporate macroeconomic information into firm level forecasting from the perspective of an equity investor. Using a global sample of 198,315 firm-years over the 1998–2010 time period, we find that combining firm level exposures to countries (via geographic segment data) with forecasts of country level performance, is able to generate superior forecasts for firm fundamentals. This result is particularly evident for purely domestic firms. We further find that this forecasting benefit is associated with future excess stock returns. These relations are stronger after periods of higher dispersion in expected country level performance.     

Legal Institutions,Ownership Concentration,and Stock Repurchases Around the World: Signal Mimicking?

One of the central puzzles of signaling theory is how to assess signal quality, in particular the potential for signal mimicking. Our study provides evidence of signal mimicking in the context of stock repurchases. Employing an ex-ante proxy for the likelihood of mimicking stock repurchases and data on open market stock repurchases from 30 countries, we find that long-term operating and market performance following stock repurchases improve less for suspected mimicking firms. This finding contradicts the conventional characterization that managers use stock repurchases to signal undervaluation and enhanced future performance. We find that mimicking firms have smaller capital investments, need greater external financing, buy back fewer shares, and issue more new shares (and/or resell more treasury shares) in the year of the repurchase. Our analysis further shows that mimicking is more likely in countries with weak investor protections and in firms with higher ownership concentration. Further, mimicking associated with concentrated ownership is mitigated in countries with stronger investor protections and by the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Altogether, our findings provide evidence of signal mimicking in stock repurchases in international data that is influenced by market, ownership, legal, and financial reporting characteristics of countries.     

Economic consequences of SFAS 142 goodwill write‐offs

This paper examines the economic consequences of goodwill write‐offs under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 (SFAS 142). Although write‐off firms have performed poorly, it is evident that deteriorating economic performance explains only a small proportion of write‐offs. After controlling for endogeneity of write‐off choice, I fail to find evidence that investors and analysts fixate on SFAS 142 goodwill write‐offs. I also provide evidence that write‐off firms pay higher audit fees, suggesting that auditors charge higher fees in response to extra audit effort. These results are consistent with the principles of market efficiency, analyst‐forecast rationality and efficient audit pricing.     

Is the market valuation of banks’ loan loss provision conditional on auditor reputation?

We examine how auditor reputation conditions the market valuation of banks’ loan loss provision (LLP). The inherent uncertainty associated with and discretion permitted in estimating the LLP contributes to information asymmetry. The auditor’s certification and monitoring roles influence firm value by mitigating this information asymmetry. We examine two aspects of auditor reputation, auditor type (Big 5 vs. non-Big 5) and auditor expertise, in the banking industry. We find a significant, positive association between the discretionary component of LLP and stock return for banks audited by the Big 5 auditors. Further analysis indicates that auditor expertise within banking and not auditor type drives this significant, positive association. Overall, our results are consistent with auditor expertise in the banking industry mitigating information asymmetry between bank managers and investors and enhancing the information conveyed by discretionary loan loss provision.     

Impact of FDICIA internal controls on bank risk taking

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 was designed, among other things, to introduce risk-based deposit insurance, increase capital requirements, and improve banks’ internal controls. Of particular interest in this study are the requirements for annual audit and reporting of management’s and auditor’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control for banks with $500 million or more in total assets (raised to $1 billion in 2005). We study the impact of these requirements on banks’ risk-taking behavior prior to the recent financial crisis and the consequent implications for bank failure and financial trouble during the crisis period. Using a sample of 1138 banks, we provide evidence that banks required to comply with the FDICIA internal control requirements have lower risk taking in the pre-crisis period. Specifically, the volatility of net interest margin, the volatility of earnings, and Z score show less risk-taking behavior. Furthermore, these banks are less likely to experience failure and financial trouble during the crisis period.