Venture capital investment and institutional factors: Evidence from China

This paper examines how venture capital (VC) investment and institutional factors affect the performance of VC-backed companies in China. Compared with non-VC-backed companies, we find that VC-backed companies slightly underperform in profitability but have considerably higher market value. Furthermore, VC investment does not help companies mitigate the negative impact of institutional factors on profitability; however, it conveys beneficial effects that help companies moderate the negative impact on market value. We also provide evidence that the impact of VC investment and institutional factors is more pronounced for non-state-owned companies, companies with poor corporate governance, and companies with higher research and development investment.     

The real effects of financial constraints: Evidence from a financial crisis

We survey 1,050 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in the U.S., Europe, and Asia to directly assess whether their firms are credit constrained during the global financial crisis of 2008. We study whether corporate spending plans differ conditional on this survey-based measure of financial constraint. Our evidence indicates that constrained firms planned deeper cuts in tech spending, employment, and capital spending. Constrained firms also burned through more cash, drew more heavily on lines of credit for fear banks would restrict access in the future, and sold more assets to fund their operations. We also find that the inability to borrow externally caused many firms to bypass attractive investment opportunities, with 86% of constrained U.S. CFOs saying their investment in attractive projects was restricted during the credit crisis of 2008. More than half of the respondents said they canceled or postponed their planned investments. Our results also hold in Europe and Asia, and in many cases are stronger in those economies. Our analysis adds to the portfolio of approaches and knowledge about the impact of credit constraints on real firm behavior.     

Impact of managerial ownership on investment and liquidity constraints: Evidence from Chinese listed companies

We examine the impact of managerial ownership on investment and financial constraints in the context of China. Using the system generalized method of moments estimation of an investment Euler equation, we find that investment decisions are related to managerial ownership in two ways. First, managerial ownership exerts a positive direct effect on corporate investment decisions by aligning management’s incentives with the interests of shareholders. Second, managerial ownership helps to reduce the degree of financial constraints faced by firms, suggesting that managerial ownership acts as a form of credible guarantee to lenders, signaling the quality of investment projects to the capital markets. Our findings suggest that recent policies enacted by the Chinese government, aimed at reforming ownership structure and encouraging managerial ownership in listed firms, help reduce agency costs and asymmetric information; thereby facilitating firms’ investment efficiency. Our findings will be of interest to scholars, practitioners, and policy makers interested in the financial impacts of management-compensation contracts.     

Leverage and investment under a state-owned bank lending environment: Evidence from China

This study examines the relations between leverage and investment in China's listed firms, where corporate debt is principally provided by state-owned banks. We obtain three major findings. First, there is a negative relation between leverage and investment. Second, the negative relation between leverage and investment is weaker in firms with low growth opportunities and poor operating performance than in firms with high growth opportunities and good operating performance. Third, the negative relation between leverage and investment is weaker in firms with a higher level of state shareholding than in firms with a lower level of state shareholding. Overall, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the state-owned banks in China impose fewer restrictions on the capital expenditures of low growth and poorly performing firms and also firms with greater state ownership. This creates an overinvestment bias in these firms.     

Firm internationalization and cost of equity: Evidence from China

This paper examines the relationship between firm internationalization and cost of equity. We find that firms with a higher degree of international operations have a significantly lower cost of equity, which is more pronounced for firms in provinces with a weak institutional environment or firms experiencing intense domestic competition. Our results are robust after adopting a firm fixed effect model, propensity score matching, difference-in-difference regressions and alternative measurements of key variables. Further, international operations help firms to break through their institutional constraints in the domestic market, which reduces the cost of equity and improves resource allocation efficiency in the capital market. Our paper enriches the literature on firm internationalization and the cost of equity from the perspective of emerging markets.     

Financial constraints and continental business groups: Evidence from German Konzerns

Using a unique large panel of German firms, we examine whether participation in business groups (Konzerns) reduces the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. The main finding is that the investment sensitivity is significantly reduced for small firms. On the other hand, we do not find clear evidence that medium-sized and large firms participating in Konzerns have different sensitivity compared to that of their stand-alone counterparts. We conclude that the German business model, which embodies key elements of the continental business model, seems to alleviate capital market imperfections for medium-sized and large firms and fails to do so for small firms.     

财务困境企业资本投资行为的实证研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

以2003～2005年因连续两年亏损被ST的79家公司为对象,从投资对现金流敏感度的变化和投资战略的调整两方面对财务困境企业的资本投资行为进行理论分析和实证检验.结果表明,陷入困境后的企业因更严重的信息不对称和代理问题而遭受更严重的融资约束;与缩减投资规模相比,财务困境企业扩大投资规模更有利于其走出困境.     

Dividend taxes and investment efficiency: Evidence from the 2003 U.S. personal taxation reform

We examine the effect of a large dividend tax cut on corporate investment efficiency by exploiting the 2003 personal taxation reform in the U.S. as a quasi-natural experiment. Using a difference-in-differences approach based on the probability that a firm’s marginal investor was an individual investor, we show that the 2003 dividend tax cut significantly improved the investment efficiency of U.S. listed firms. However, we find no evidence that the dividend tax cut increased the level of investment of U.S. listed firms. Further, we show that the tax cut increased investment efficiency by mitigating agency problems associated with the excessive free cash flows of overinvesting firms and by relaxing the financial constraints of underinvesting firms.     

The effect of large investors on asset quality: Evidence from subprime mortgage securities

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the GSEs), the dominant investors in subprime mortgage-backed securities before the 2008 crisis, substantively affected collateral composition in this market. Mortgages included in securities designed for the GSEs performed better than those backing other securities in the same deals, holding observable risk constant. Consistent with the transmission of private information, these effects are concentrated in low-documentation loans and for issuers that were highly dependent on the GSEs and were corporate affiliates of the mortgage originators. Additional analysis of yield spreads shows that these performance differences were not reflected in prices.     

我国“走出去”企业的最优融资模式选择——基于信息经济学的视角

我国“走出去”企业具有显著的债权融资偏好,过度“杠杆化”运营累积了极高的信用风险。本文建立信息经济学理论模型,分析了企业拥有关于项目风险的私有信息时,能够最大化企业期望利润的均衡债务水平以及能够最大化社会福利的社会最优债务水平,并以此探讨企业过度债务依赖行为的微观机理。研究发现,项目风险越大,或东道国风险越大,或者税率较高,都会导致企业过度债务依赖现象越严重。本文的研究有助于针对“走出去”企业的过度“杠杆化”现象,为我国金融支持“一带一路”企业对外投资的政策体系提出建议。     

The networking function of investment banks: Evidence from private investments in public equity

We examine investment banks' networking function in capital markets, using a sample of Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs). We argue that investment banks develop relationships with investors through repeat dealings, and that investment banks' networks of relationship investors form the basis of their networking function. We find that investment banks, especially those with larger investor networks, help issuers attract investors. Correspondingly, an issuer that desires more investors is more likely to hire an investment bank than place the shares directly. We also find that issuers pay higher fees to hire investment banks with larger investor networks. Our empirical findings suggest that the networking function of investment banks is important in securities offerings.     

Climate change reporting and multinational companies: Insights from institutional theory and international business

Multinational companies (MNCs) have an important impact on climate change, but knowledge on the greenhouse gas (GHG) reporting practices of MNCs is limited. A theoretical framework is developed to provide an explanation of GHG emissions reporting by MNCs. The framework combines institutional theory with the notion of MNC typology from International Business and explains how institutional pressure acting on each typology of MNC influences standardization of reporting practices and GHG emissions data quality. Propositions are developed and empirically investigated using a case study. Global MNCs are predicted to have better quality GHG emissions reporting compared to multi-domestic or transnational MNCs.     

Employment protection and leverage adjustment speed: Evidence from China

Stricter employment protection may affect capital structure adjustment speed in two ways. First, it may increase the cost of capital and decrease the leverage adjustment speed. Second, it increases financing needs and capital adjustment speed. Using China's 2008 Labor Contract Law as a natural experiment and the PSM-DID methodology, we find that the latter effect dominates the former. Specifically, stricter employment protection increases leverage adjustment speed, and this effect is more pronounced for non-state-owned firms and firms with larger leverage deviations. Furthermore, transmission channel tests show that employment protection increases firms’ substitution of labor with capital, driving up investment and financing needs. Finally, the increased leverage adjustment speed induced by enhanced employment protection is beneficial to firm performance.     

客户效应与上市公司债务融资能力——来自我国供应链客户关系的证据

本文用2007～2012年所有A股上市公司披露的前五大客户数据,检验了客户资源是否影响企业的贷款能力。结果发现,客户集中度越高的公司银行贷款的规模越大、期限也越长;当优质客户(上市公司和国有企业)的比例越高时,这种现象越明显;但以上关系只在遭受“信贷歧视”的民营企业中成立。上述结果表明,大客户(尤其是优质客户)能够以自身声誉为企业提供收入保障和实力认证,在银行看来对企业价值判断的正向作用大于其潜在的经营风险和利益侵占带来的负向作用,进而供应链资源能够帮助银行进行信贷决策判断,缓解民营企业融资约束。     

Government intervention and investment efficiency: Evidence from China

The extant corporate investment literature has documented that information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors prevent firms from making optimal investment decisions. In this study, we investigate whether government intervention, as another form of friction, distorts firms' investment behavior and leads to investment inefficiency. Using Chinese data, we test this by measuring government intervention at two different levels. First, we compare investment efficiency between SOEs and non-SOEs. We find that the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities is significantly weaker for SOEs. Second, we measure government intervention by whether a firm is politically connected through the employment of top executives with a government background. We find that political connections significantly reduce investment efficiency in SOEs. However, we do not find such evidence in non-SOEs. Taken together, our findings suggest that government intervention in SOEs through majority state ownership or the appointment of connected managers distorts investment behavior and harms investment efficiency.     

金融发展、汇率变动与中国省区制造业出口

本文使用中国省区细分行业的数据和一系列反映金融发展的指标,检验了金融发展对于中国省区制造业出口的影响,同时观测了汇率变动对于各省区行业出口绩效的影响。在控制了各省区要素禀赋以及基础设施条件后发现,在金融发展水平高的省份,高融资依赖性的行业具有较高的出口份额。此外,金融发展有利于融资依赖性行业抵御外部汇率冲击带来的负面影响,扩大市场份额。在选取工具变量以及采取IVTobit模型克服模型的内生性后,结果依然稳健。     

Fixed investment or financial assets investment: Evidence from political uncertainty in China

Using a comprehensive dataset of listed firms and detailed turnover data on top provincial leaders in China, we explore how political uncertainty affects a firm's portfolio choice. During political turnover, a firm decreases its fixed investment and increases its financial asset investment, but the promotional effect of political turnover on the financial asset investment of politically dependent enterprises (PDEs) is not obvious. We explain this finding through the mediating effect of stock price informativeness and degree of political dependence. Our results suggest that non-PDEs rely on market information to make investment decisions, whereas PDEs are also affected by political resource information.     

Mandatory CSR disclosure,monitoring and investment efficiency: evidence from China

This study investigates the effect of mandatory corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure on firms’ investment efficiency in China. Using the CSR regulation that mandates a group of listed firms to disclose stand‐alone CSR reports after 2008 as a natural experiment, we find that firms subject to the mandatory CSR regulation have decreased investment inefficiency subsequent to the mandate, especially in cases of overinvestment. This effect is more pronounced for firms with a control‐ownership wedge, state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), and firms having lower institutional ownership. Further analyses find that the reduction of overinvestment is much more significant in industries with high pollution and that the reduction in investment is not due to the CSR spending siphoning off capital used in other projects. We argue that mandatory corporate social responsibility disclosure improves monitoring over firms in China, especially when firms are characterised as having severe agency problems.     

Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: Evidence from the Chinese listed companies

Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders. However, multiple large shareholders may collude, thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the company. This paper uses a sample of companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges between 2008 and 2017 to investigate the relationship between multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment (CEPI). We find that multiple large shareholders will significantly reduce CEPI. Specifically, external supervision and a company’s ownership structure affect the relationship between multiple large shareholders and CEPI. In addition, after participating in SOEs, non-state-owned shareholders will significantly improve CEPI of SOEs.     

Common ownership and executive pay-for-performance sensitivity: Evidence from China

This study focuses on the impact of common ownership on executive pay-for-performance sensitivity using a sample of A-share listed firms in China from 2008 to 2020. We find common ownership significantly improves executive pay-for-performance sensitivity and plays a monitoring and governance role. Meanwhile, the impact of common ownership on executive pay-for-performance sensitivity is more significant in non-state-owned firms (non-SOEs) and when a firm faces a highly competitive product market. The mechanism tests indicate that common ownership affects executive pay-for-performance sensitivity through the information and governance mechanisms. Further analyses show that the portion of compensation explained by common ownership significantly enhances future firm performance. Overall, our findings validate the positive role of common ownership in corporate governance.