Peer effects in corporate advertisement expenditure: Evidence from China

This study investigates whether industry peers affect focal firms’ advertising expenditure decisions and further explores the mechanisms and economic consequences of such effects. We find that peer firms have a significantly positive influence on the focal firm’s advertising expenditure. The results hold after a series of robustness tests. Additionally, the peer effects in advertising expenditure are more salient in industries with intense competition; and when economic policy uncertainty and demand uncertainty is higher. Interestingly, our results show that followers mimic the advertising expenditure of industry leaders, while leaders also react to followers’ advertising expenditure. We also find that the peer effects in advertising expenditure improve firms’ sales and market value. Our study contributes to a better understanding of peer effects on corporate decisions.     

Employee‐friendly practices,product market competition and firm value

In this paper, we examine whether employee‐friendly practices are associated with product market competition, and whether firm value is related to employee‐friendly practices and product market competition. Using a large sample of US firms, we find positive and significant associations between employee friendliness and product market competition, and between firm value and employee friendliness when product market competition is high, consistent with the value creation theory. Both positive relations hold when we account for corporate governance. In addition, using the list of Fortune's ‘100 Best Companies to Work For’ as an alternative measure of employee‐friendly policies, we find firms in more competitive industries are more likely to treat their workers favourably. Furthermore, we find that the market reaction is more positive when firms in more competitive industries are selected for the Fortune list.     

Product market advertising and new equity issues

We analyze the interaction between a firm's product market advertising and its corporate financing decisions. We consider a firm that faces asymmetric information in both the product and financial markets and that needs to raise external financing to fund its growth opportunity (new project). Any product market advertising undertaken by the firm is visible to the financial market as well. In equilibrium, the firm uses a combination of product market advertising, equity underpricing, and underfinancing (raising a smaller amount of external capital than the full information optimum) to convey its true product quality and the intrinsic value of its projects to consumers and investors. The following two predictions arise from our theoretical analysis for the relation between product market advertising and equity underpricing around new equity issues. First, firms choose a higher level of product market advertising when they are planning to issue new equity, compared with situations in which they have no immediate plans to do so. Second, product market advertising and equity underpricing are substitutes for a firm issuing new equity. We empirically test the above two predictions and find supporting evidence in the context of firms making initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings.     

The effects of advertising and solicitation on audit fees

Leading academic and professional accountants have suggested that the crisis in auditing over the past few years may have had its origin in deregulation which allowed firms to advertise their services and solicit new clients, encouraging accounting firms to become more commercial. In this paper, we look at this issue in New Zealand which has the unique distinction of having separated two key forms of deregulation, namely advertising and solicitation, by 6 years. This allows us to separately examine the effect of each form of market competition on audit fees. We find that advertising is associated with increases in fees, not decreases, which suggests that quality-based advertising took place, and not price-based advertising. In contrast, solicitation corresponded with a general decrease in average fees for clients of the Big 8. We interpret this result as indicating an increase in competition among accounting firms. Our results suggest that there may be a much more complex relationship among market competition, advertising and solicitation, and fees than the arguments used to originally justify deregulation.     

Product market competition,ultimate controlling structure and related party transactions

Previous studies have shown that product market competition has an important effect on corporate strategies and internal governance mechanisms. Using a sample of China’s listed firms from 2004 to 2009, we explore the relationship between product market competition and normal related party transactions and find a significant positive relationship. In addition, we investigate the substitutive effect of product market competition and the cash flow rights owned by ultimate controlling shareholders on the extent of normal related party transactions. In particular, our results suggest a positive relationship between the ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights and normal related party transactions that is strongest in noncompetitive industries and weakens as product market competition increases.     

Corporate Governance,Product Market Competition,and the Wealth Effect of R&D Spending Changes

This article examines whether corporate governance and product market competition interact to affect the profitability of corporate research and development (R&D) investments. Firms announcing R&D spending changes experience positive and significant wealth effects, and these effects are mainly driven by good‐governance firms. Investors appear to view announcements of R&D spending changes undertaken by firms with stronger shareholder rights as evidence of value creation. Moreover, the favorable wealth effects are stronger for good‐governance firms in noncompetitive industries than in competitive industries, supporting the argument that good governance substitutes for product market competition.     

EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE AND THE COST OF EQUITY FINANCING

We examine whether and how competitive pressure in the product market influences the cost of equity capital. Using a large panel of U.S. public firms, we find that intensification of product market competition results in lower equity financing costs. Our results are statistically significant and economically sizable. In line with the view of the disciplinary role of product market competition, we show that corporate governance, payout policy, and investment policy are channels through which competitive pressure influences the cost of equity capital.     

Do peer firms influence innovation?

Using a large sample of 4,545 US firms over the period 1968–2018, we find robust and significant positive peer effects on corporate innovation. Consistent with the need to keep ahead or abreast of rivals, we document an increase in peer firms’ influence with product market competition. Our further analyses show interesting leader–follower interactions with firms following or adopting innovation policies of counterparts perceived or likely to have superior information. This finding supports the information-based motives of mimicking. More importantly, we show that adopting peers’ innovation policies is associated with improvements in long-term innovation outputs and product market performance. Our results suggest that peer effects are a critical determinant of corporate innovation in addition to other factors examined so far in the literature.     

Advertising dynamics and competitive advantage

Can advertising lead to a sustainable competitive advantage? To answer this question, we propose a dynamic model of advertising competition where firms repeatedly advertise, compete in the product market, and make entry as well as exit decisions. Within this dynamic framework, we study two different models of advertising: in the first model, advertising influences the goodwill consumers extend toward a firm (“goodwill advertising”), whereas in the second model it influences the share of consumers who are aware of the firm (“awareness advertising”). We show that asymmetries may arise and persist under goodwill as well as awareness advertising. The basis for a strategic advantage, however, differs greatly in the two models of advertising. We show that tighter regulation or an outright ban of advertising may have anticompetitive effects and discuss how firms use advertising to deter and accommodate entry and induce exit in a dynamic setting.     

CORPORATE BONDS AND PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION

I examine the effect of product market competition on the yield spread of corporate bonds. I find that firms that face more competitive threats also face a higher cost of corporate bond debt. After controlling for common bond-level, firm-level, and macroeconomic variables, my results show that bondholders of firms that are subject to increased competition demand significantly higher credit spreads than holders of otherwise similar bonds. Furthermore, this effect is more pronounced for firms that have assets that are difficult to redeploy. Overall, my findings provide evidence that competitive threats are being reflected in corporate debt prices.     

Corporate transparency and firm value: Does market competition play an external governance role?

We investigate whether market competition affects the relationship between corporate transparency and firm value in the United States using a sample of 12,665 firm-year observations, representing 1,644 individual firms for the period 1996–2018. The results show that stronger transparency enhances firm value, and market competition has a significantly positive effect on that relationship. More importantly, we use hierarchical linear models further to explore the cross-level interaction impact of market competition, and we find evidence suggesting that the industry-level competition has a significant cross-level moderating effect. Additionally, consistent with the substitute perspective, we also find that the disciplinary power of competition on the relationship between transparency and value is more pronounced for firms with weak corporate governance. Overall, our evidence supports the “bright side” of the competition view and highlights the active external governance role that competition plays in the value promotion effect of corporate transparency at both the individual and the industry levels.     

慈善捐赠、广告营销与企业绩效—— 考虑行业竞争因素

基于消费者视角,利用2007~2012年我国沪深两市 A 股上市公司的数据,实证检验了在考虑行业竞争的条件下,慈善捐赠行为对广告营销活动与企业销售增长之间关系的影响机制。研究发现,广告营销投入、慈善捐赠水平和行业竞争程度之间的三项交互作用显著。这一结论表明,对于那些在激烈竞争行业环境中运营的企业来说,慈善捐赠水平高而非低时,广告营销投入对企业销售增长的正向影响更强,因此,与处于弱竞争行业的企业相比,处于强竞争行业的企业更应充分利用好慈善捐赠在改善传统营销方式市场效果方面的杠杆作用。     

The Voluntary Restructuring of Large Firms In Response to Performance Decline

Much of the research on corporate restructuring has examined the causes and aftermath of extreme changes in corporate governance such as takeovers and bankruptcy. In contrast, we study restructurings initiated in response to product market pressures by “normal” corporate governance mechanisms. Such “voluntary” restructurings, motivated by the discipline of the product market and internal corporate controls, will play a relatively more important role in the 1990s due to a weakening in the discipline of the takeover market. Our data suggest that the firms retrenched quickly and, on average, increased their focus. There is no evidence of abnormally high levels of forced turnover in top managers. There is, however, a significant and rapid cut of 5% in the labor force. Further, the cost of goods sold to sales and labor costs to sales ratios both decline rapidly, more than 5% in the first two years after the negative earnings. The firms cut research and development, increased investment, and also reduced their debt/asset level by over 8% in the first year after the negative earnings. We also document the reasons management and analysis reported for the negative earnings. Overwhelmingly the firms blame bad economic conditions and, to a lesser extent, foreign competition.     

Geopolitical risk and corporate payout policy

In this study, we examine the effects of geopolitical risk on corporate payout policy. Exploiting a news-based index of geopolitical risk, we find that firms adopt a more conservative payout policy by reducing share repurchases in response to greater geopolitical risk, whereas the effects of geopolitical risk on cash dividends are insignificant. Further analysis suggests that cash flow uncertainty and financial distress risk are two potential channels through which geopolitical risk affects corporate payout policy. We also show that the effects of geopolitical risk on share repurchase are more pronounced for firms with greater exposure to product market competition and those facing higher threats of financial distress. Overall, our study emphasizes the implications of geopolitical risk for corporate payout choice.     

Local product market competition and bank loans

We investigate the influences of local product market competition on the cost of private debt. Our evidence suggests that the cost of bank loans is significantly higher for firms headquartered in states with greater local product market competition measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for resident industries. To establish causality, we examine the recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and firm relocations to identify exogenous shocks to local product market competition. We find that the cost of bank loans is lower for firms facing less intense local product market competition after the adoption of IDD and higher for firms relocated to states with more competitive product markets. The results imply that banks value the characteristics of a firm's local product market when approving loan contracts.     

Product market threats and tax avoidance

In this paper, we find that product market threats increase firms’ tax avoidance. This association is especially observed for firms that pursue tax avoidance more than their optimal target level (i.e., actively tax-avoiding firms). In addition, among these firms with active tax avoidance practices, firms with weaker corporate governance structure, lower financial flexibility, and greater predation risk are more likely to experience the positive relationship between product market threats and tax avoidance. Further evidence suggests that higher levels of tax avoidance driven by product market threats do not come with higher levels of tax uncertainty and rather positively affect firms’ profitability. This result highlights the decoupling relationship between tax avoidance and tax uncertainty.     

CEO Incentives and Corporate Innovation

Using scaled wealth‐performance sensitivity as my measure of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentives, and utilizing cross‐sectional variations in industry innovativeness, product market competition and firms’ degree of exposure to the market for corporate control for identification purposes, I find that higher long‐term incentives that stem from CEO holdings of unvested options are associated with greater subsequent corporate innovation in innovative industries, competitive product markets, and firms more exposed to the threat of hostile takeovers, that is, exactly where incentivizing innovation is a matter of necessity. I address the endogeneity concerns with systems of simultaneous equations estimated using three‐stage least squares. A possible channel for the observed relation between unvested options‐based incentives and subsequent corporate innovation is that these incentives encourage managers to undertake riskier projects to achieve long‐term economic benefits.     

Competitive pressure and firm investment efficiency: Evidence from corporate employment decisions

This study examines the link between product market competition and labour investment efficiency. We find that competitive pressure distorts the efficiency of corporate employment decisions by creating an underinvestment problem. This finding withstands a battery of robustness checks and remains unchanged after accounting for endogeneity concerns. Additional analysis shows that the relationship between product market competition and labour investment efficiency is stronger for firms facing higher competitive threats, greater financial constraints, higher information asymmetry and higher labour adjustment costs. Our results suggest that as competition increases bankruptcy risk, it leads managers to underinvest in labour to avoid incurring labour-related costs.     

Stock market reactions to US Consumer Product Safety Commission enforcement actions

This study examines stock market reaction to violations of product safety regulations and firm product responsibilities in the post-enforcement period. Our event study results show that market reaction was negative to failures by firms to report product defects in a timely way. Our results also show that the stock market reaction varies depending on the type of violations, and whether there are single or multiple violations. Firms spend more on research and development and advertising in the post-enforcement period, in addition to investing in their compliance programmes which have a significant positive impact on product responsibility stewardship. Our empirical results show that the stock market reacts negatively to recall volume and refund remediation strategy. The stock market reaction is negative to social media communication about product recalls initiated by manufacturers. However, this negative effect appears to be counteracted by the positive corporate social responsibility (CSR) reputation effect of the manufacturers. Our findings imply that US manufacturing firms dealing with product recalls must be sensitive to how consumers and investors interpret the communication.     

The effect of market competition on corporate cash holdings: An analysis of corporate innovation and financial constraint

This study investigates the impact of market competition on corporate cash holdings. Specifically, we focus on the corporate innovation and financial constraint channels. Based on a sample of the Chinese stock market from 1998 to 2019, our empirical results show that cash holdings are negatively impacted by market competition, corporate innovation partially mediates this effect, and financial constraint exhibits full mediation. Moreover, the mediating effect of corporate innovation is moderated by financial constraints. Furthermore, the impact of market competition reveals an increasing trend as cash holdings increase with quantile regression. In addition, this impact is mitigated for state-owned enterprises, and firms with larger total assets are impacted to a lesser degree.