美国住房金融体系及其经验借鉴——兼谈美国次贷危机

本文系统地介绍了美国住房金融体系的发展历史和现状特点,重点分析了公共住房政策在美国住房金融体系中的体现,以及次级抵押贷款危机的原因和应对措施,总结了美国住房金融体系的经验和教训,为我国进一步深化金融体制改革、完善住房金融市场建设,提供了可资借鉴的经验。     

Termination of distressed residential mortgages: An empirical analysis

A sample of 209 distressed mortgages is used to analyze the terminations of distressed mortgages. An option-based model is compared to a traditional default model. Results show that the traditional model is statistically superior. However, the model's ability to identify a default is similar to that of the simpler option-based model. Alternative measures of borrower's equity are compared. Measuring borrower's equity using total debt more accurately explains default than using either the mortgage balance or the mortgage value.     

Wimp or tough guy: Sequential default risk and signaling with mortgages

When analyzing what to do with a currently defaulted loan, the lender must consider the impact of his foreclosure versus workout decision on the expected payoff of subsequent loans as well as on the payoff of the current loan. This is because borrowers with future loan payoff dates can observe the lender's actions and update prior information regarding the lender's toughness or wimpiness when dealing with defaulted loans. In this paper we consider the strategic interaction between a lender and multiple borrowers, where borrowers have distinct, sequentially maturing mortgage loans and where the lender has private information regarding the magnitude of his foreclosure costs. We find that a variety of strategic outcomes can occur that explain the co-existence of workout and foreclosure in the mortgage marketplace. In general, the lender's workout/foreclosure response depends on the cost of bluffing (e.g., foreclosing when workout is cheaper) versus the value of reducing expected defaults and workout concession losses on future loans (e.g., imperfect foreclosure cost information leads future borrowers to payoff the mortgage when default would have been optimal under perfect information). Given recently revised expectations regarding the depth of the real estate recession, our results may explain the move by many lenders away from granting workout concessions and toward taking a harder line when dealing with defaulting borrowers.     

Delinquency and Default in Arms: The Effects of Protected Equity and Loss Aversion

This paper extends the extant literature in understanding the effects of equity and debt on delinquency and default by focusing on a variant of borrower equity where part of equity is “protected”. The CPF scheme in Singapore stipulates that the refund of borrower’s retirement funds utilized for property purchase prior to September 2002 takes priority over loan obligations. A decision to utilize CPF for property purchase actually increases ex post delinquency and default risk as it effectively reduces cash equity commitment. In particular, any erosion in house value that places protected equity at risk translates into potential wealth reduction or financial liability for the borrower. While loss aversion is evident for non-distressed sellers, the effect of equity losses for distressed borrowers is not as clear. Our research suggests that averting losses in committed equity may be a secondary consideration for borrower subject to income shocks, recognizing that delinquency and default are precursors to foreclosure. Interestingly, we find that the borrowers are strongly averse to incurring protected equity-induced wealth loss or financial liability. This study suggests that the first-lien “anomaly” associated with CPF refund may reduce delinquency and default risks for mortgage backed securities.

金融危机背景下基金家族绩效与风险关系研究——基于面板数据模型的实证分析

以中国基金市场32家基金管理公司旗下的103只开放式偏股型基金作为样本,选择恰当的面板数据模型形式,分别建立金融危机之前、危机期间和危机之后三个时期基金家族绩效与风险关系模型,以剖析不同经济形势下两者之间的关系。结果表明,金融危机之前和危机期间基金家族绩效与风险显著负相关,而危机之后两者关系不显著,在金融危机期间和危机之后基金业绩效状况持续恶化,危机之后基金业整体风险水平降低;金融危机后,为弥补金融危机中造成的损失,各基金家族倾向于采取\"打造明星基金\"的投资策略以充分利用有限资源、提升家族整体绩效。     

The “Rent-To-Own” mortgage and prepayment risk

The most important risk factor in the mortgage and mortgage-backed security market has been prepayment risk. Various innovations have arisen to deal with it but none hedge it fully. The Rent-To-Own (RTO) mortgage discussed here is a mortgage instrument that reduces or even reverses prepayment risk. It does so by creating an incentive structure within the framework of the mortgage contract that penalizes prepayment when interest rates are low and rewards it when interest rates are high. This is the opposite of standard mortgages. The RTO incentive structure is based on a unique buyout feature. Borrowers who want to buy out the financial interest of the lender may do so whenever they want, but the buyout price is a negative function of the market interest rates prevailing currently, that is, at the time of the buyout. Hence the lower these rates, the higher the buyout price. Other advantages of the RTO mortgage are also described.     

The ins and outs of mortgage debt during the housing boom and bust

From 1999 to 2013, U.S. mortgage debt doubled before contracting sharply. I estimate mortgage inflows and outflows that shed light on the sources of volatility. During the boom, inflows from real estate investors tripled, far outpacing other segments such as first-time homebuyers. During the bust, a collapse in inflows keyed the debt decline, while an expansion of outflows due to defaults played a more minor role. Inflow declines partly reflect a dramatic falloff in first-time homebuying, especially for low credit score individuals. Further analysis helps support the notion that the differential decline by credit score reflects markedly tightened credit supply.     

Housing,mortgage bailout guarantees and the macro economy

What are the macroeconomic and distributional effects of government bailout guarantees for Government Sponsored Enterprises (e.g., Fannie Mae)? A model with heterogeneous, infinitely lived households and competitive housing and mortgage markets is constructed to evaluate this question. Households can default on their mortgages via foreclosure. The bailout guarantee is a tax-financed mortgage interest rate subsidy. Eliminating this subsidy leads to a large decline in mortgage origination and increases aggregate welfare by 0.5% in consumption equivalent variation, but has little effect on foreclosure rates and housing investment. The interest rate subsidy is a regressive policy: it hurts low-income and low-asset households.     

Government intervention in the housing market: Who wins,who loses?

Many U.S. government policies aim to encourage homeownership. We use a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents to consider the effects of temporary homebuyer tax credits and the asymmetric tax treatment of owner-occupied and rental housing on prices, quantities, allocations, and welfare. The model suggests that homebuyer tax credits temporarily raise house prices and transaction volumes, but have negative effects on welfare. Removing the asymmetric tax treatment of owner-occupied and rental housing can generate welfare gains for a majority of agents across steady states, but welfare impacts are substantially more varied along the transitions between steady states.     

A Comparison of Unexplained Racial Disparities in Bank-Level and Market-Level Models of Mortgage Lending

Statistical models of mortgage lending have been used by both academics and regulators to assess the importance of racial discrimination in lending decisions. Models estimated by bank regulators are specified at a bank level, allowing regulators to focus on possible disparate treatment discrimination against minorities. In contrast, the academic literature has tended to estimate models combining data across many banks. We argue that the market-level approach uses a mis-specified model whose estimates do not clearly measure any well-defined concept of discrimination. Using data from eight banks, we find important differences between bank-level and market-level models, with market-level models producing larger estimated racial effects than bank-level models.     

Can interest rates really control house prices? Effectiveness and implications for macroprudential policy

This paper investigates how changes in the central bank policy and retail mortgage rates affected real housing prices in New Zealand during the period 1999–2009. We find that real interest rates are significantly and positively related to real housing prices, indicating that increases in the policy rate may not be effective in depressing real housing prices. By testing interest rates, we also find some evidence of housing price bubbles. Our findings suggest that the central bank could have limited housing price bubbles if it had started to intervene in the housing market prior to 2003. Our results set international exemplars for using policy rates or macroprudential tools to cool the housing market, where the extent of policy rate adjustments is limited by internal or external economic factors.