Extending the Sectoral Coverage of an International Emission Trading Scheme

In a model inspired by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, non-cooperative countries allocate their emissions to internationally trading and non-trading sectors. Each country is better off with trading than without, and aggregate welfare is maximized with all sectors in the trading scheme. We analyze the effects of extending the sectoral coverage of the trading scheme in a two-country model with quadratic abatement costs. If only the original trading sector is asymmetric between countries, the welfare change is always positive and the same in both countries. If the original and additional trading sectors are asymmetric, one country might lose, but there is an aggregate welfare gain. If the original trading sector and the non-trading sector are asymmetric, both countries always gain.     

Strategic partitioning of emission allowances under the EU Emission Trading Scheme

The EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is breaking new ground in the experience with emission trading regimes across multiple jurisdictions. Since the EU ETS covers only some industries, it implies a hybrid emission control scheme where EU member states must apply complementary domestic emissions regulation for the non-trading sectors of their economies in order to comply with their national emission reduction targets. The EU ETS thus opens up for strategic partitioning of national emissions budgets by the member states between trading and non-trading sectors. In this paper we examine the potential effects of such strategic behavior on compliance cost and emissions prices. We show that concerns on efficiency losses from strategic partitioning are misplaced. In turn, our analysis implicitly indicates significant political economy forces behind EU climate policy, as both cost-effective and strategically motivated partitioning of national emission budgets are far off from the actual break-down between trading and non-trading sectors.     

论排污权交易

排污权交易是一种采用经济手段进行环境保护的手段,越来越多地受到了国际及国内社会的重视。本文对排污权交易进行了系统地介绍,论述了排污权交易的含义、性质、目的、特征,并在此基础上论述了排污权交易法律关系的构成。最后,对我国的排污权交易制度建立的障碍进行了分析,提出了构建我国排污权交易制度的若干设想。     

排污权交易的产权分析

本文运用产权理论对排污权交易进行分析和考察,认为排污权交易形成的根本动力是环境容量稀缺程度的提高、相对价格的上升导致了对更有效的污染治理技术的强烈需求。但技术创新需要产权制度的保护,只有对环境容量产权明晰,才能导致市场形成价格,从而诱发技术创新。而国家权利的介入是环境容量产权明晰的必要保障。     

Policy Diffusion of the Emission Trading Scheme in China:Progress and Prospects

Chinese national emissions trading scheme(ETS)of greenhouse gas(GHG)was scheduled to start simulation trading in the power sector in 2020.Now it is good timing ...     

排污权交易中的政府行为探析

排污权交易制度是基于市场的环境经济政策。中国排污权交易制度的发展实践始于20世纪80年代,主要是在部分省市以试点的形式进行。目前排污权交易在其基础、保障、运行等方面存在的问题,阻碍了其实践活动的开展。限制了其控污作用的发挥。而政府在这些方面发挥着不可替代的作用。明晰、规范并完善政府行为,才能为排污权交易的进行打牢基础,夯实保障,辅助运行,实现经济、环境协调发展。     

排污权用益物权性质的探讨

从法学的视角考察,排污权的性质是什么,学界存在着比较大的分歧。本文认为排污权具有作为权利的一般属性,是一种基于所有权或物权而衍生的权利。排污权虽然是用益物权,但是和其他的用益物权相比,排污权具有自身的特殊性,是一种新型的用益物权。     

Capital Malleability, Emission Leakage and the Cost of Partial Climate Policies: General Equilibrium Analysis of the European Union Emission Trading System

Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are the premier analytical platform for assessing the economic impacts of climate change mitigation. But these models tend to treat physical capital as “malleable”, capable of reallocation among sectors over the time-period for which equilibrium is solved. Because the extent to which capital adjustment costs might dampen reallocation is not well understood, there is concern that CGE assessments understate the true costs of greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction policies. This paper uses a multi-region, multi-sector CGE model to investigate cap-and-trade schemes, such as the European Union Emission Trading System which cover a subset of the economy, elucidating the effects of capital malleability on GHG abatement, the potential for emission leakage from abating to non-abating sectors, and the impacts on welfare. To simplify the complex interactions being simulated within the CGE model, that analysis is complemented with an analytical model. A partial climate policy results in negative internal carbon leakage, with emissions declining not only in capped sectors but also in non-regulated ones. This result is stronger when capital is intersectorally mobile. Interestingly, in partial climate policy settings capital malleability can amplify or attenuate welfare losses depending on the attributes of the economy.     

河北省实施排污权交易的实践与反思——基于河北省满城县经验的探讨

排污权交易作为环境控制政策的手段之一,已成为备受关注的环境经济政策。河北省满城县进行了排污权交易的试点探索,在实践中存在不少问题和困惑,诸如：排污权性质、排污总量的确定、交易价格等都需要进一步研究和探讨。     

我国排污权初始分配和交易的证券化设想

在总量控制的前提下实行排污权交易首先涉及排污权的初始分配问题,如何对排污权进行初始分配是阻碍排污权交易市场形成的主要障碍.现有的排污权初始分配模式复杂且欠缺合理性和可操作性,不利于形成成本较低的排污权交易市场.排污权证券化设想提出了"认购权证-许可确权-自由交易"的排污权初始分配和交易设计思路,简化了初始分配的手段,增加了排污权分配和交易的合理性和可操作性,同时为建立完善排污权交易市场留下了许多制度设计空间.     

启动全国碳排放权交易市场的难点与对策研究

随着全球低碳经济转型的逐步推进,碳交易市场成为极具发展潜力的商品交易市场。作为全球最大的碳排放国,我国一直积极采取措施应对气候变化。2011年国家发改委批准北京、上海、重庆、天津等七个碳交易试点,为推动全国碳市场进行初步探索。2015年12月,我国在巴黎气候大会上明确表示将于2017年启动全国碳交易市场。通过对碳交易试点运行现状的分析,对全面推行碳交易过程中存在的难点及相关对策进行探讨,并对启动全国碳交易市场的前景做出展望。     

Assessing the performance of the UK Emissions Trading Scheme

The UK’s Climate Change Programme introduced an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) for greenhouse gases. Firms in over 40 industrial sectors which have negotiated “Climate Change Agreements” setting quantitative energy efficiency targets can use the ETS to trade over-and under-compliance with these targets. In parallel, a limited number of firms have become major participants in the ETS as a result of an auction of subsidies for additional abatement commitments. The paper describes the UK arrangements and assesses the economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness of the ETS, drawing on evidence of participants’ behaviour both in the incentive auction, and in subsequent trading.     

中国可再生能源温室气体减排交易的机遇与挑战

通过清洁发展机制(CDM)等全球温室气体减排交易对中国可再生能源的影响,结合自愿减排意识的增强、减排交易与可再生能源的相互关系、国际交易环境的变化和国内交易体系的兴起,分析了中国可再生能源行业面临的机遇和挑战。建议可再生能源行业率先开展与国内温室气体减排交易体系的融合,利用市场手段发掘其巨大的减排和增收双重效益。同时,也为未来各行业顺利融入全国性碳交易市场提供经验借鉴,为中国在未来国际碳减排交易市场的定价中争得话语权。     

影响排污权实施效果的关键因素分析

文章介绍了排污权交易的基本概念,分析了实施排污权交易的必要性,总结了我国现存排污权交易的不足,探析了排污交易系统的基本构架和工作程序,在此基础上指出排污初始权的分配是影响排污权交易实施效果的关键因素,并就此进行了分析和讨论,给出了对策建议.     

控制火电厂二氧化硫排放的有效途径——排污权交易

目前,我国工业二氧化硫排放量中有42%是火电厂排放的,因此高效控制火电厂的二氧化硫排放是提高空气质量的主要途径.美国利用排污权交易治理火电厂的二氧化硫排放取得了巨大的成功,不仅二氧化硫排放量大幅下降,而且排污权交易也被证明是成本最低的方法.借鉴美国的经验,可以为我国治理火电厂二氧化硫排放提供高效途径.     

广东碳排放权交易市场发展问题初探

国内外碳交易需求增加很快。广东碳市场的发展,有碳生产力居全国前列、碳减排技术创新能力强、泛珠区域合作密切等优势;也有减排约束不强,企业诚信不足,金融服务欠缺等制约因素,还有相关国际规则变化和交易所竞争的风险。可取的对策是：加强省内减排约束,逐步发展强制减排;发展碳交易市场的国内外合作;开发碳金融产品,加快减排技术创新;稳步设置交易机构,防止业务过度竞争;利用规则和技术条件,培养使用碳交易人才。     

Assessing the Impact of State Trading Enterprises

State Trading Enterprises (STEs) are periodically subject to intense scrutiny for their suspected negative impact on the international trade of agricultural goods. Sound empirical assessment of the impact of STEs is scant, in spite of the ongoing and intense debate over their impacts, especially in the context of reform at the WTO. In this paper we use the case of world wheat trade between 2212 country pairs over a 35 year span to assess STE impacts. Using a gravity model, we estimate a Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood fixed effects model of world wheat trade to assess the role of both the presence of STEs and STEs with monopoly power. Further addressing estimation challenges, we also estimate zero-inflated versions of Poisson and Negative Binomial Regression models. We find consistent support for the hypothesis that monopoly export STEs are associated with higher exports for their host country. Similarly, import STEs appear to inhibit wheat imports, suggesting a protectionist function.     

比利时行业减排目标与措施(2008-2012年)

为履行《京都议定书》和《欧盟责任分担协议》,比利时必须在2008—2012年完成与1990年相比减排7．5％的目标。2006年9月比利时政府向欧委会递交了《比利时2008—2012年二氧化碳（CO2）排放限额分配国家计划草案》;2008年2月向欧委会递交了《比利时2008—2012年温室气体排放（GHG）限额分配国家额度计划》。本文介绍了该计划的主要内容,其中包括比利时联邦和各大区政府所采取的政策,特别是行业减排的目标和措施,如：能源生产、能耗、建筑、交通、工业、农业、林业及垃圾等。     

当前排污权交易市场化机制的问题及对策研究

我国排污权管理存在法律法规不完善,政府与市场角色错位;全国性的排污权交易市场没有形成,交易制度不健全;市场化交易中排污主体和污染物指标覆盖有限;价格市场化信号弱,交易价格构成要素抽象等问题。文章通过对当前排污权交易存在的问题分析,提出了推动与新修订环保法配套法规的完善,发挥政府和市场的各自作用;建立全国性的排污权交易体系,完善市场化交易制度;实现污染物指标和排污主体梯度覆盖,建立目录清单制;强化总量管理,推动政府管理下市场化价格确定等具体对策。发挥市场化机制在节能减排、环境改善中的积极作用。     

运用排污权交易改善晋江市垃圾治理现状

如何建设节约型社会是时下舆论讨论的热点问题之一,正确处理好经济发展与环境保护也是建设和谐社会的核心命题之一。本文通过分析晋江市工业垃圾治理模式如何由靠牺牲环境为代价的粗放型模式—模式Ⅰ,向封闭的、可循环的集约型模式—模式Ⅱ转变,证明经济发展与环境保护是完全可以协调统一的;同时,通过分析模式Ⅱ的不足,进一步引入排污权交易理论,结合晋江市的实际情况,创造性地提出了具有实用性和通用性的垃圾治理方式——模式Ⅲ。