Effects of Works Councils on Firm‐Provided Further Training in Germany

Unions are an important indicator of various measures of firm performance in Anglo‐Saxon countries. The same is true for the German analogue of the workplace union, the works council. Using German establishment data, I examine the impact of works councils on further training. I employ pooled logit and count‐data models to analyse the further training activity and intensity of German firms. Because the treatment variable may suffer from endogeneity, I also adopt linear and nonlinear instrumental variable techniques. The analysis reveals a positive impact of works councils on firm‐provided training and provides slightly weaker evidence for firm‐size differentials in workplace representation. I conclude that enhanced management–employee relations foster the training efforts of firms.     

The Microeconomic Impacts of Employee Representatives: Evidence from Membership Thresholds

Employee representatives in firms are a potentially key but not yet studied source of the impact of unions and works councils. Their actions can shape multiple drivers of firm performance, including collective bargaining, strikes, and training. This article examines the impact of union representative mandates by exploiting legal membership thresholds present in many countries. In the case of Portugal, which we examine here, while firms employing up to forty‐nine union members are required to have one union representative; this increases to two (three) union reps for firms with fifty to ninety‐nine (100–199) union members. Drawing on matched employer–employee data on the unionized sector and regression discontinuity methods, we find that a one percentage point increase in the legal union representative/members ratio leads to an increase in firm performance of at least 7 percent. This result generally holds across multiple dimensions of firm performance and appears to be driven by increased training. However, we find no effects of union representatives on firm‐level wages, given the predominance of sectoral collective bargaining.     

The relationship between works councils and firms’ further training provision in times of technological change

Participating in further training is strategically important for employees to ensure their employability. Particularly for employees in low-skilled jobs, works councils — firm-level organizations that represent employees — constitute an important employee advocacy instrument in European countries, such as France and Germany. With comprehensive co-determination rights, works councils can influence firms’ hiring policies, job design and career paths (e.g. promotions). Using German firm-level data, we empirically investigate the influence of works councils on firms’ training provision for employees in firms below and above the industry level of technology. The results show that works councils have a positive effect on the percentage of employees in general, and of employees in low-skilled jobs in particular, participating in training, but only for firms below the industry level of technology. These results show the importance of works councils in supporting training in such firms and enhancing the employment prospects of employees in low-skilled jobs. In contrast, firms above the industry level of technology invest in training with or without a works council, indicating that the training interests of employers and employees are aligned.     

On the Determinants of Mandatory Works Councils in Germany

German works councils are often thought of as operating in all firms that exceed the basic size threshold (of five permanent employees) established under law. Drawing on a new large-scale, representative German data set, we report that only one-fifth of firms in our sample have works councils even if such firms do account for almost three-fourths of employment. The principal factors behind works council presence emerge as fairly conventional: firm size, firm age, branch plant status, the gender composition of the work force, and certain working arrangements. There are also signs of a close relation between workplace union density and council presence. However, some controversial causal links suggested in an earlier econometric literature receive little support.     

Works Councils and Unionization: Lessons from South Korea

This study analyzes the impact of effective works councils and unions in large South Korean firms. Following a brief review of economic theory on works councils and the institutional environment of Korean industrial relations, we describe the unique data set used to analyze Korean firm-level labor relations and economic performance. The results of the multivariate analysis show that both effective works councils and unions enhance employee voice on several key personnel practices. In addition, the estimates show that unionization increases wages and reduces turnover, but effective works councils are associated with higher levels of employee satisfaction and somewhat higher productivity. These estimates are consistent with theoretical models that find that carefully designed works councils can enhance employee voice and may increase productivity.     

The Institutional Context of an ‘Empirical Law’: The Wage Curve under Different Regimes of Collective Bargaining

The wage curve postulates that the wage level is a decreasing function of the regional unemployment rate. In testing this hypothesis, most studies have not taken into account that differences in the institutional framework may have an impact on the existence (or the slope) of a wage curve. Using a large‐scale linked employer–employee dataset for Western Germany, this article provides a first direct test of the relevance of different bargaining regimes (and of works councils) for the existence of a wage curve. In pooled regressions for the period 1998 to 2006, as well as in worker‐level or plant‐level fixed‐effects estimations, we obtain evidence for a wage curve for plants with a collective bargaining agreement at firm level. The point estimates for this group of plants are close to the ?0.1 elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment postulated by Blanchflower and Oswald. In this regime, we also find that works councils dampen the adjustment of wages to the regional unemployment situation. In the other regimes of plants that either do not make use of collective contracts or apply sectoral agreements, we do not find a wage curve.     

Human capital and learning as a source of sustainable competitive advantage

This paper seeks to identify the sources of wide and persistent variations in learning performance in the semiconductor manufacturing industry. In the resource‐based view of the firm, human capital is frequently assumed to contribute to competitive advantage due to its inimitability based on its intangible, firm‐specific, and socially complex nature. Consistent with this view, we find that investments in firm‐specific human capital have a significant impact on learning and firm performance. More specifically, human capital selection (education requirements and screening), development through training, and deployment significantly improve learning by doing, which in turn improves performance. However, we find that acquiring human capital with prior industry experience from external sources significantly reduces learning performance. We also find that firms with high turnover significantly underperform their rivals, revealing the time‐compression diseconomies that protect firm‐specific human capital from imitation. These results provide new empirical evidence of the inimitability of human capital. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Poaching and Firm‐Sponsored Training

A series of seminal papers argues that poaching hampers company‐sponsored general training. Empirically, however, the existence and extent of poaching remain open questions. We provide a novel empirical strategy to identify poaching. We find that only few apprenticeship training firms in Germany are ‘poaching victims’ or ‘poaching raiders’. Victims are more likely to be in a temporary downturn and raiders are more likely to be growing. Victims hardly change their training strategy after poaching and poaching seems be a transitory event. This is an important result for countries that intend to introduce apprenticeship‐type training and need to convince firms to participate in training.     

How dynamics,management, and governance of resource deployments influence firm‐level performance

To help understand how firms develop and maintain dynamic capabilities, we examine the effects of the dynamics, management, and governance of R & D and marketing resource deployments on firm‐level economic performance. In a sample of technology‐based entrepreneurial firms, we find that a history of increased investments in marketing is an enduring source of competitive advantage. We also find that managers' firm‐specific experience positively moderates the relationship between R & D deployment intensity and economic returns. In addition, institutional ownership boosts economic returns from marketing deployments by subjecting these deployments to increased scrutiny and by sending positive signals to the market about the firm. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Works Councils and Separations: Voice,Monopoly, and Insurance Effects

Using a large linked employer–employee data set for Germany, we find that the existence of a works council is associated with a lower separation rate to employment, in particular for workers with low tenure. While works council monopoly effects show up in all specifications, clear voice effects are only visible for low tenured workers. Works councils also reduce separations to nonemployment, and this impact is more pronounced for men. Insurance effects only show up for workers with tenure of more than 2 years. Our results indicate that works councils to some extent represent the interests of a specific clientele.     

The effect of CEO pay deviations on CEO withdrawal,firm size,and firm profits

We build upon previous work on the effects of deviations in CEO pay from labor markets to assess how overcompensation or undercompensation affects subsequent voluntary CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profitability, taking into account the moderating effect of firm ownership structure. We find that CEO underpayment is related to changes in firm size and CEO withdrawal, and that the relationship between CEO underpayment and CEO withdrawal is stronger in owner‐controlled firms. We also show that when CEOs are overpaid, there is higher firm profitability; a relationship that is weaker among manager‐controlled firms. We then discuss the implications that these findings have for future research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Married to the firm? A large‐scale investigation of the social context of ownership

Research summary : Using a large sample of private firms across Europe, we examine how the social context of owners affects firm strategy and performance. Drawing on embeddedness theory and the institutional logics perspective, we argue that embeddedness in a family, in particular the nuclear family, can strengthen identification and commitment to the firm, but can also induce owners to behave more conservatively. Consistent with this argument, we find that family‐owned firms have higher profit margins, returns on assets, and survival rates compared to single‐owner or unrelated‐owners' firms, but also invest and grow more slowly, hold greater reserves of cash, and rely less on external debt. These differences are most pronounced when the two largest shareholders are married. Our results highlight the key role of marital ties in explaining differences in behavior and performance among firms. Managerial summary : Despite the prevalence of the married‐couple ownership structure in firms, little research has been dedicated to understanding how these firms are managed and perform. We examine the behavior and performance of firms owned by married couples in a large panel of closely held Western European firms. We find that married‐owner family firms are managed more conservatively relative to firms with unrelated owners and even to other family‐owned firms. In particular, married‐owner family firms invest and grow more slowly and rely less on external finance. However, they also exhibit greater performance stability and higher profitability. Our findings suggest that social relationships among owners have a large impact on firm strategy and performance, and highlight some potential trade‐offs to performance when married couples control firms. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Wage Cyclicality Under Different Regimes of Industrial Relations

We analyze the effect of collective wage agreements and of works councils on the cyclicality of real wages. Using employer–employee data for western Germany (1995–2004), we find that wage adjustments to positive and negative shocks are generally not symmetric. Wage growth increases in all industrial relations regimes when unemployment is falling, but this inverse relationship is weaker when unemployment is rising. Moreover, in plants with individual‐level bargaining, wages do not adjust at all to rising unemployment. Works councils increase wage growth only in firms covered by sectoral agreements, but they do not affect the cyclicality of wages.     

Personnel Decisions,Wage Profiles and Investment in Firms

An investment model where firms mitigate adverse hold‐up effects using hiring and personnel policies is theoretically investigated and empirically scrutinized. While no evidence for the prediction of differing worker characteristics, other than gender, across firms is found, demand (firm) side factors are evident in the hiring process. Evidence on other personnel policies is consistent with theory, which predicts firms with high‐investment expenditures resist unions, utilize more temporary and shift‐time workers and conduct more multitask training. Wages in high‐investment firms are higher, more sensitive to unemployment and experience variables that exhibit greater effects than in low‐investment firms.     

Owner‐Managers and the Failure of Newly Adopted Works Councils

Using representative data from the IAB Establishment Panel, we show that the managerial environment has a strong influence on the introduction and survival of works councils. Employees in owner‐managed establishments are less likely to introduce a works council. Moreover, in case of an introduction, the new works council is less likely to survive if the establishment is owner‐managed. The pattern of results even holds in situations that involve positive economic effects of works councils. This suggests that owner‐managers oppose works councils not primarily for economic reasons. Our findings are rather consistent with the hypothesis that owner‐managers oppose co‐determination because it reduces the utility they gain from being the ultimate bosses within the establishment.     

Human capital matters: Market valuation of firm investments in training and the role of complementary assets

Research summary: This article empirically examines the economic value to firms of investing in the training of their employees and firm‐level factors that influence how much the firms benefit. Event study methodology is used to obtain a measure of the economic impact of information regarding a firm's human capital management investments and policies. Subsequent regression analyses are then used to test hypotheses regarding possible complementary relationships between firm‐level factors and human capital investments. Results provide robust support for the proposition that effective investments in human capital and training matter, and that these human capital investments are more impactful when combined with complementary assets of R&D, physical capital, and advertising investments . Managerial summary: Do firm investments in training and the development of employee human capital matter with regard to financial performance? We find that, yes, these investments do matter. Our results show that managers who view employee human capital as an asset to be invested in and developed can expect to outperform those who view it as a cost to be minimized. In addition, we find that these human capital investments will be of even greater economic value to firms when they have made complementary investments in R&D, physical capital, and advertising . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is performance driven by industry‐or firm‐specific factors? A new look at the evidence

In this study we revisit the question of whether firms' performance is driven primarily by industry or firm factors, extending past studies in two major ways. Firstly, in a departure from past research, we use value‐based measures of performance (economic profit or residual income and market‐to‐book value) instead of accounting ratios (such as return on assets). We also use a new data set and a different statistical approach for testing the significance of the independent effects. Secondly, we examine whether the findings of past research can be generalized across all firms in an industry or whether they apply to a particular class of firms within the same industry. We find that a significant proportion of the absolute estimates of the variance of firm factors is due to the presence of a few exceptional firms in any given industry. In other words, only for a few dominant value creators (leaders) and destroyers (losers) do firm‐specific assets seem to matter significantly more than industry factors. For most other firms, i.e., for those that are not notable leaders or losers in their industry, however, the industry effect turns out to be more important for performance than firm‐specific factors. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Subnational institutional contingencies and executive pay dispersion

This paper investigates the impact of subnational institutional contingencies on executive pay dispersion structure and the relationship between pay dispersion and firm performance. Using executive compensation data on Chinese listed firms between 2000 and 2011, we find that executive pay dispersion is significantly lower in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while is significantly higher in cross-listed firms and to a smaller degree in firms located in developed regions. There is also evidence that executive pay dispersion is smaller during the voluntary compensation disclosure period. After controlling for endogeneity of pay determination, we find that executive pay dispersion is positively associated with firm performance. In addition, the positive link between executive pay dispersion and firm performance is stronger in non-SOEs than in SOEs, and stronger in firms located in more developed regions than those not. Our findings are also robust to alternative measures of pay dispersion and firm performance.     

The Dynamic Effects of Works Councils on Labour Productivity: First Evidence from Panel Data

We estimate dynamic effects of works councils on labour productivity using newly available information from West German establishment panel data. Conditioning on plant fixed effects and control variables, we find negative productivity effects during the first five years after council introduction but a steady and substantial increase in the councils’ productivity effect thereafter. Our findings support a causal interpretation for the positive correlation between council existence and plant productivity that has been frequently reported in previous studies.     

Corporate divestitures and family control

This paper investigates the relationship between divestitures and firm value in family firms. Using hand‐collected data on a sample of over 30,000 firm‐year observations, we find that family firms are less likely than non‐family firms to undertake divestitures, especially when these companies are managed by family rather than non‐family‐CEOs. However, we then establish that the divestitures undertaken by family firms, predominantly those run by family‐CEOs, are associated with higher post‐divestiture performance than their non‐family counterparts. These findings indicate that family firms may fail to fully exploit available economic opportunities, potentially because they pursue multiple objectives beyond the maximization of shareholder value. These results also elucidate how the characteristics of corporate owners and managers can influence the value that firms derive from their corporate strategies. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.