How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives to Hedge Loans?

Before the credit crisis that started in mid-2007, it was generally believed by top regulators that credit derivatives make banks sounder. In this paper, we investigate the validity of this view. We examine the use of credit derivatives by US bank holding companies with assets in excess of one billion dollars from 1999 to 2005. Using the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Holding Company Database, we find that in 2005 the gross notional amount of credit derivatives held by banks exceeds the amount of loans on their books. Only 23 large banks out of 395 use credit derivatives and most of their derivatives positions are held for dealer activities rather than for hedging of loans. The net notional amount of credit derivatives used for hedging of loans in 2005 represents less than 2% of the total notional amount of credit derivatives held by banks and less than 2% of their loans. We conclude that the use of credit derivatives by banks to hedge loans is limited because of adverse selection and moral hazard problems and because of the inability of banks to use hedge accounting when hedging with credit derivatives. Our evidence raises important questions about the extent to which the use of credit derivatives makes banks sounder.

Do Hedge Funds Manipulate Stock Prices?

We provide evidence suggesting that some hedge funds manipulate stock prices on critical reporting dates. Stocks in the top quartile of hedge fund holdings exhibit abnormal returns of 0.30% on the last day of the quarter and a reversal of 0.25% on the following day. A significant part of the return is earned during the last minutes of trading. Analysis of intraday volume and order imbalance provides further evidence consistent with manipulation. These patterns are stronger for funds that have higher incentives to improve their ranking relative to their peers.     

Should Asset Managers Hedge Their “Fees at Risk”?

Although the recent financial crisis afflicted all asset managers, the problem of general market exposure was in some respects worse for the long-only funds that rely almost completely on asset-based fees than for the “absolute return” and other kinds of hedge funds that also receive performance-based fees. While the revenue generated by performance-based fees is expected to be volatile, asset-based fees tend to be viewed as an “annuity” stream that involves little or no earnings risk. But, especially in the case of long-only funds, large shortfalls in asset fees were caused by the combination of significant redemptions and sharp reductions in assets under management that accompanied the plunge in asset prices. In this article, the author attempts to quantify the expected effect of market fluctuations on the asset fees and profitability of long-only asset managers. Having done so, he then argues that traditional long-only asset managers—managers whose only reason for being is their ability to generate above-market returns (or “alpha”) on a fairly consistent basis—routinely retain too much beta risk in their primarily asset-based fee structures. The author offers two main reasons for long-only asset managers to hedge beta risk: (1) it would reduce the need for fund management firms to hold liquid capital to ensure solvency and fund important projects during market downturns; (2) it would provide the firm's current and prospective clients with a clearer signal of whether its managers are succeeding in the firm's mission of generating alpha, as well as the possibility of more equity-like and cost-effective incentive compensation systems for those managers.     

How Do Firm Characteristics Influence the Relationship between R&D and Firm Value?

This paper focuses on how a firm's characteristics affect the market valuation of its research and development (R&D) spending. We derive a valuation model based on the capital market arbitrage condition. Using the generalized method of moments and data from the Eurozone countries to estimate this model yields interesting results. Several firm characteristics (size, firm growth, and market share) positively affect the relationship between firm value and R&D spending, while others (free cash flow, dependence on external finance, labor intensity, and capital intensity) exert a negative effect. Therefore, we conclude that the effectiveness of R&D spending depends on firm characteristics.     

Can Companies Use Hedging Programs to Profit from the Market? Evidence from Gold Producers*

In this article, the authors summarize the findings of their recent study of the hedging activities of 92 North American gold mining companies during the period 1989‐1999. The aim of the study was to answer two questions: (1) Did such hedging activities increase corporate cash flows? (2) And if yes, were such increases the result of management's ability to anticipate price movements when adjusting their hedge ratios? Although the author's answer to the first question is “yes,” their answer to the second is “no.” More specifically, the authors concluded that:

• ? During the 1989‐1999 period, the gold derivatives market was characterized by a persistent positive risk premium— that is, a positive spread between the forward price and the realized future spot price—that caused short forward positions to generate positive cash flows. The gold mining companies that hedged their future gold production realized an average total cash flow gain of $11 million, or $24 per ounce of gold hedged, per year, as compared to average annual net income of only $3.5 million. Because of the positive risk premium, short derivatives positions did not generate significant losses even during those subperiods of the study when the gold price increased.
• ? There was considerable volatility in corporate hedge ratios during the period of the study, which is consistent with managers incorporating market views into their hedging programs and attempting to time the market by hedging selectively. But after attempting to distinguish between derivatives activities designed to hedge and those designed to profit from a view, the authors conclude that corporate efforts to time the market through selective hedging were largely if not completely futile. In fact, the companies' adjustments of hedge ratios appeared to consistently lag instead of leading the market.

     

Social Thinking about Collective Risk: How Do Risk‐related Practice and Personal Involvement Impact Its Social Representations?

The study investigates the effects of personal involvement in a collective risk on the structure of its social representation, and how those effects depend on risk‐related experience. The paper reports an empirical study conducted within the structural approach to the Social Representations Theory. We tested the effects of risk‐related practice (earthquake experience) and of personal involvement in risk on the structure of its social representation. The results showed that the social representation was normative in nature, but became more practically oriented in the group who experienced earthquake. A normative representation is useful in judging risk's attributes; instead, a more functional, or a more practically oriented representation is expected to enable the use of more diversified risk‐related information especially for practical purposes (risk mitigation behaviour). Similarly, the social representation of participants who were highly involved in seismic risk was more structured and more practically oriented. However, this was true only if they possessed risk‐related experience, either through collective (risk culture) or live earthquake experience. Based on these results, a suggestion is made on how to increase the efficiency of prevention campaigns that aim at encouraging collective risk‐mitigation conduct.     

Do Large Blockholders Reduce Risk?

The conventional assumption in the asset pricing literature is that the identity of a company's owners is largely irrelevant, but studies of companies with “blockholders”—shareholders with large positions in a particular company—provide grounds for questioning this assumption. Unlike the well‐diversified investors of modern portfolio theory, blockholders have strong incentives to monitor corporate performance and, when necessary, to exert control over ineffective managements and boards. The findings of many studies support the idea that blockholders have a positive effect on rates of return. The authors of this article report the findings of their recent investigation of whether blockholders might also have a positive effect on shareholder value by reducing the risk of the companies in which their holdings are concentrated. After distinguishing between companies with individual as opposed to corporate blockholders, and those with one share, one vote as opposed to those with dual‐class shares, the authors find that ownership of large positions by individuals—but not corporations—was associated with lower systematic risk (when using both Fama‐French multiple factor and CAPM models). At the same time, they find that the firm‐specific risk of such companies was higher, but “biased” toward positive outcomes—that is, smaller downsides with larger upsides. What's more, this upward shift in performance and risk‐profile was achieved at least partly through increases in productivity as reflected in higher profit margins, profitability, profit per employee, and operating leverage, and lower costs of goods sold, SGA, and cash holdings. By contrast, in the case of blockholders in companies with dual‐class share structures, all of these positive associations with blockholders were either significantly weaker, or reversed. That is, whereas the presence of individual blockholders appears to increase productivity and value under a one share, one vote governance regime, blockholders in companies with dual‐class structures were associated with higher systematic risk and reduced productivity and value.     

Do Firms Use M&A Business to Pay for Analyst Coverage?

We find that acquirers in merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions are more likely to hire as advisors investment banks that provided analyst coverage for the acquirer prior to the transaction. We also find that compared to a matched control group of banks, the advisor banks are less likely to terminate and more likely to initiate analyst coverage of the acquirer after the transaction. Finally, the advisor banks that initiate coverage after the transaction collect higher fees. These findings suggest that firms value analyst coverage and use M&A advisor appointments and advisor fees to compensate for it.     

Do Poorly Governed Acquirers Transfer Wealth to Targets in Cross‐Border Acquisitions?

We use the number of antitakeover provisions (ATPs) as a proxy for corporate governance and examine its impact in US domestic and foreign acquisitions made by US acquirers. We find that the targets of poorly governed acquirers earn higher postannouncement premiums, despite controls for deal characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, and country‐level protections, suggesting that these acquirers overpay. Puzzlingly, in contrast with the domestic US findings of Masulis, Wang, and Xie, poorly governed acquirers in cross‐border deals experience higher announcement period returns. The relation between governance and target returns appears concave, but this nonlinearity disappears once differences in country‐level governance and deal characteristics are accounted for.     

Do Islamic Stock Returns Hedge Against Inflation? A Wavelet Approach

This article makes an initial attempt to study the hedging effectiveness of Islamic stock returns against inflation for different investment horizons. We applied the wavelet analysis to measure the cross-correlations between the time series as a function of time-scales using data ranging from 2007 to early 2015. The main results tend to indicate the following: First, that for investment horizons not exceeding 3 years, the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Emas Shariah Index constituent returns may potentially hedge against inflation. Additionally, the hedging ability of stock returns was absent from 2008 to 2009 following the global financial crisis. Finally, a buy-and-hold strategy exceeding 3 years may erode investments. The results are plausible and have strong policy implications.     

Is Family Control Relevant for Corporate Cash Holding Policy?

This empirical research examines the effect of family control on firms’ cash holding policy. Using a sample of Western European firms, we confirm the precautionary motive for holding cash as family‐controlled firms’ desire to perpetuate the family legacy for future generations motivates them to accumulate more cash than their non‐family counterparts. We also show that, given family‐controlled firms’ long‐term perspective, they focus on cash flow volatility rather than cash flow level. Finally, the relation between financing constraints and cash holdings is not homogeneous: financially constrained family‐controlled firms hold higher levels of cash than financially constrained non‐family firms. Overall, these results suggest that family firms’ cash holding policy is the result not of a specific financial outcome but rather on the strategic objectives of the firm.     

Do Peer Firms Affect Corporate Financial Policy?

We show that peer firms play an important role in determining corporate capital structures and financial policies. In large part, firms' financing decisions are responses to the financing decisions and, to a lesser extent, the characteristics of peer firms. These peer effects are more important for capital structure determination than most previously identified determinants. Furthermore, smaller, less successful firms are highly sensitive to their larger, more successful peers, but not vice versa. We also quantify the externalities generated by peer effects, which can amplify the impact of changes in exogenous determinants on leverage by over 70%.     

Do Hot Hands Exist among Hedge Fund Managers? An Empirical Evaluation

In measuring performance persistence, we use hedge fund style benchmarks. This allows us to identify managers with valuable skills, and also to control for option-like features inherent in returns from hedge fund strategies. We take into account the possibility that reported asset values may be based on stale prices. We develop a statistical model that relates a hedge fund's performance to its decision to liquidate or close in order to infer the performance of a hedge fund that left the database. Although we find significant performance persistence among superior funds, we find little evidence of persistence among inferior funds.     

Do Hedge Fund Managers Misreport Returns? Evidence from the Pooled Distribution

We find a significant discontinuity in the pooled distribution of monthly hedge fund returns: The number of small gains far exceeds the number of small losses. The discontinuity is present in live and defunct funds, and funds of all ages, suggesting that it is not caused by database biases. The discontinuity is absent in the 3 months culminating in an audit, suggesting it is not attributable to skillful loss avoidance. The discontinuity disappears when using bimonthly returns, indicating a reversal in fund performance following small gains. This result suggests that the discontinuity is caused at least in part by temporarily overstated returns.     

Do Corporate Governance Motives Drive Hedge Fund and Private Equity Fund Activities?

We document empirical evidence that both hedge fund (HF) and private equity fund (PE) investments are driven by corporate governance improvements, but address different types of agency conflicts. Whereas HFs focus on firms without a controlling shareholder, in particular family shareholders, PEs invest in firms with low managerial ownership. Both appear to address free cash flow problems differently. Aiming at increasing dividends, HFs tend to use commitment devices that can be implemented over a short horizon. PEs are inclined to longer‐term strategies: they target firms that are particularly well suited for leverage increases because of low expected financial distress costs.     

Do Firms Decouple Corporate Governance Policy and Practice?

We test whether Thai listed firms with higher levels of good governance policy adoption are less likely to violate listing rules and laws designed to protect shareholders. Our results suggest that firms on average implement, substantively as opposed to symbolically, recommended governance policies, as violations occur less frequently among firms with higher governance policy adoption scores. However, we also find evidence of symbolic governance among a small group of ‘talk‐only’ firms that issue statements about governance while lagging in the adoption of policies related to shareholder rights and the board of directors.     

Do Foreign Investors Encourage Value-Enhancing Corporate Risk Taking?

This paper examines whether foreign investors in Korea affect incentives for firms to take risks in corporate investment. The short-term focus of foreign investors encourages managers to engage in conservative investment behavior. On the other hand, foreign investors encourage managers to focus on long-term value rather than short-term returns as active participants in corporate governance. These competing views are examined by testing for the association between foreign ownership and variations in corporate cash flow, a proxy for the risk of chosen investments. Furthermore, we examine whether risk taking is positively associated with firm growth, which is a primary concern in debates regarding the myopic behaviors of foreign investors. The results show that firms with high foreign ownership are less likely to avoid risk taking—and that risk taking is, in turn, positively associated with firm growth, implying that foreign investors perform a monitoring function in encouraging value-enhancing risk taking.     

Do Managers Use Meeting Analyst Forecasts to Signal Private Information? Evidence from Patent Citations

This study examines whether firms manage earnings to meet analyst forecasts to signal superior future performance. Prior research finds that firms use earnings management to just meet analyst forecasts and that these firms have a positive association with future performance (Bartov et al., 2002). There are two potential explanations for the positive association – signaling and attaining benefits that allow for better future performance (i.e., the real benefits explanation). Prior studies cannot provide evidence of signaling because they do not control for the real benefits explanation. Our research design enables us to control for the real benefits explanation because we can identify potential signaling firms within the sample of firms that just meet analyst forecasts. We use a unique database from the National Bureau of Economic Research to construct a proxy for the manager's belief about future firm value due to patents. We find that firms with more patent citations are more likely to just meet the analyst forecast and manage earnings to achieve this goal. We also find firms that just meet analyst forecasts with more patent citations have significantly better performance than firms with fewer patent citations, which is consistent with signaling and not the real benefits explanation.     

Do Personal Taxes Destroy Tax Shields? A Critique to Miller’s (1977) Proposal

We discuss the relevance of personal taxes on tax shields. Interest and taxes are the basis for defining an optimal capital structure. When personal taxes are greater than or equal to TS, an optimal capital structure does not exist.

We suggest that the approach proposed by Miller (1977) might understate the effect of personal taxes in the net TS and/or its associated net value. We consider the irrelevance of personal taxes on interest received by debtholders on the value of TS earned by the firm on interest paid. We conclude that Miller’s approach might be wrong and has some inconsistencies.