The role of auditing in the fight against corruption

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how various types of auditing may contribute to fight corruption. While previous literature has primarily addressed auditing's ability to prevent corruption, this paper systematically explores auditing's potential to detect corruption. It argues that financial auditing has excluded corruption from the definition of fraud and instead classified it as ‘non-compliance with laws and regulations’. The main arguments for this exclusion is that corruption leaves no material errors in financial statements and no evidence for the auditor to follow. The paper refutes this, arguing that commercial and political corruption creates misstatements in the financial statements of the corruption giver's organization as well as the corruption receiver's organization. Thus, if auditing is to gain a more prominent role in the fight against corruption, auditing standards must include corruption in the definition of fraud, private and public sector auditors need to cooperate and exchange information, auditing techniques to detect corruption should be employed, and the auditing profession must embrace effective preventive measures such as anti-corruption certifications.     

The dilemma of government intervention in a firm's financing: Evidence from China

This paper discovers the dilemma of government intervention in a firm's financing. With evidence from China, we document that government intervention causally promotes a firm's financial access but impedes the positive change of financial access (i.e., micro-financial development). Considering that our instrumental variable (IV) may be imperfectly exogenous, we apply the plausible exogeneity theory to verify that our IV estimates are robust to the relaxation of exclusion restriction. We further use mediation estimates to show that the corruption is the by-product of government intervention in financing and that the corruption due to government intervention constrains micro-financial development. Therefore, we discover that the corruption is the crux of the government-intervention dilemma.     

董事会报告可读性、制度环境与分析师预测——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

依据2007-2016年中国上市公司数据,考量上市公司董事会报告可读性、制度环境对证券分析师盈利预测表现的影响。结果发现：董事会报告可读性越好,分析师预测越准确,分析师预测的分歧度也越小;考虑宏观制度环境的影响,上市公司所处地区的制度环境越好,分析师盈利预测的准确度越高,分歧度越小,受到董事会报告可读性的影响越少。鉴此,应完善公司非财务信息披露和外部制度环境,从而提高分析师预测准确性,促进资源有效配置。     

Corporate profitability and the global persistence of corruption

We examine the persistence of corporate corruption for a sample of privately-held firms from 12 Central and Eastern European countries from 2001 to 2015. Using publicly available information and stochastic frontier analysis, we create a proxy for corporate corruption based on a firm's internal inefficiency. We find that corruption enhances a firm's profitability. A channel analysis further reveals that inflating staff costs is the most common approach by which firms divert funds to finance corruption. In spite of corruption's negative effects on a country's economy, we conclude that it persists because of its ability to improve corporate profitability. We refer to this effect as the Corporate Advantage Hypothesis.     

对金融监管腐败的制度约束与博弈分析

如何积极有效地防范金融监管腐败是当前一个重大课题。本文分析了金融监管腐败形成的必要条件，探讨了防范金融监管腐败的制度约束办法，并建立一个博弈模型，讨论了金融监管反腐各个因素之间的关系。结果表明，要有效防范金融监管腐败，反腐机构要在查办和惩罚两个方面加大力度，强化金融监管部门业务经费的透明度管理，重点打击中小案件，既要事前重成慑，也要事后抓惩治，降低腐败的期望效益。     

The Main Determinants of the Use of the Cost Accounting System in Portuguese Local Government

Abstract: This paper explores the main determinants of the use of the cost accounting system (CAS) in Portuguese local government (PLG). Regression analysis is used to study the fit of a model of accounting changes in PLG, focused on cost accounting systems oriented to activities and outputs. Based on survey data gathered from PLG, we have found that the use of information in decision‐making and external reporting is still a mirage. We obtain evidence about the influence of the internal organizational context (especially the lack of support and difficulties in the CAS implementation) in the use for internal purposes, while the institutional environment (like external pressures to implement the CAS) appears to be more deterministic of the external use. Results strengthen the function of external reporting to legitimate the organization's activities to external stakeholders. On the other hand, some control variables (like political competition, usefulness and experience) also evidence some explanatory power in the model. Some mixed results were found that appeal to further research in the future. Our empirical results contribute to understand the importance of interconnecting the contingency and institutional approaches to gain a clear picture of cost accounting changes in the public sector.     

Sais work against corruption in Scandinavian,South-European and African countries: An institutional analysis

International pressures on Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) to fight corruption are increasing. Nevertheless, SAIs lack a clear mandate and may appear ineffective in their anticorruption work. Using an institutional approach, this paper compares the cases of seven SAIs from Scandinavian, South-European and African countries to better understand how these institutions perceive their role in fighting corruption. Our article demonstrates that the way SAIs organize their work cannot simply be explained by the countries' level of corruption. Rather, efforts to fight corruption reflect the ways in which coercive, mimetic and normative pressures interact with institutional logics to guide the SAIs' work. We conclude that the influence of INTOSAI still appears to be limited, and it needs increased institutional recognition if it is to be effective in harmonizing SAIs' work worldwide to fight corruption.     

高管海外经历与企业全要素生产率

依据2007-2016年沪深A股上市公司数据,考察高管海外经历对企业全要素生产率的影响。结果发现：高管海外经历正向影响企业全要素生产率。从内部制度环境角度来看,企业内部控制质量越高、薪酬制度越完善,高管海外经历对企业全要素生产率的影响越显著;从外部制度环境角度来看,高管海外经历对企业全要素生产率的影响在政府监管较好、存在机构投资者持股以及市场化程度较高地区的企业中更显著。     

Corruption and valuation of multinational corporations

This paper examines the relationship between U.S. MNCs' valuation and corruption in countries where the MNCs' foreign subsidiaries are located. We uncover that country-level corruption has a multi-dimensional impact on MNCs' valuation. We find that the impact of intangibles is less pronounced for MNCs operating primarily in corrupt countries, consistent with the view that the lack of property rights protection and information asymmetry problems are more prevalent in corrupt environments. We also find that the expansion of a MNC network dominated by corrupt countries negatively affects MNCs' valuation, suggesting that investors may recognize it as an additional risk. However, more importantly, we find that geographic diversification in corrupt countries significantly increases firm value if the MNC has high levels of intangibles such as technological know-how and marketing expertise. Assuming that transactions costs in corrupt countries are higher, our findings are consistent with the notion that the advantages from internalizing the cross-border transfer of intangibles are greater in the presence of corruption. Our findings remain unchanged when we account for endogeneity at the country-and firm-level, when we use alternative corruption measures, and when we re-estimate models by omitting MNCs with operations in locations with big “negative” shocks during the sample period. Moreover, we show that firms with expertise in dealing with corruption enjoy greater benefits from internalization.     

机构投资者担心企业应用衍生品进行投机吗-来自中国上市公司的证据

以2007-2011年应用过衍生品的中国上市公司为样本,检验机构投资者持股与企业应用衍生品及其投机行为的关系,研究发现:机构投资者担心企业应用衍生品尤其是应用衍生品的投机行为会损害其自身的利益,并且这种担心超出了机构投资者通过积极的监督来保障自身利益的意愿,因此,机构投资者倾向于减少对那些应用衍生品公司的投资,大多维持在一个较低的水平.此外,证据还表明:在我国上市公司中,机构投资者的投资并不普遍,份量也较轻;衍生品在我国上市公司中的应用亦不普遍并且应用的程度很低,大多数应用衍生品的公司是为了套保,但一旦投机则非常严重;机构投资者较为看重应用衍生品公司的成长性,而反感其业绩与盈余管理行为.     

Corruption and stock market development: Developing vs. developed economies

This paper looks at the impact of corruption on stock market development, emphasizing the difference between developing and developed economies and the role corruption may play in preventing firms from listing. Guided by a theoretical model that explains why corruption’s impact on stock market development may differ, we use a sample of 87 economies worldwide over the period 1995–2017 to test for that difference. For the full sample we find no evidence that corruption has a significant effect on stock market development, but this changes when we split the sample into two groups: high-income and low-income countries. For the subsample of poorer (developing) countries, the corruption-stock market development relationship remains insignificant or weak. For the subsample of high-income (developed) countries, however, we find a significant relationship between lower levels of corruption and stock market capitalization as a share of gross domestic product. Our results further indicate that higher levels of income and investment reduce the impact of that relationship. Our results are robust to alternative estimation specifications and confirm the importance of macroeconomic fundamentals (i.e., income, investment, domestic credit, and macroeconomic stability) for the development of stock markets. In particular, those fundamentals seem more important for developing economies before reduced corruption will have as much (if any) of an impact.     

Can government intervention be both a curse and a blessing? Evidence from China's finance sector

Earlier work views government intervention as a “grabbing hand,” whereas more recent studies report that it acts as a “helping hand.” Can government intervention be both a curse and a blessing? This paper investigates this issue by investigating the impact of government intervention on firm financing and financial corruption in China, using the 2005 World Bank Investment Climate survey data. To do so, we first use instrumental variable estimations to confirm that government intervention promotes financial access and encourage corruption. Next, we adopt a mediator model to document that government intervention promotes firms' access to finance through informal payment. The mediation effect is significant for split samples that capture different type of political and economic climate. The policy implications of the findings are discussed.     

Corporate Culture and Greed — The Case of the Australian Wheat Board

Between 1999 and 2002, the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) was involved in an elaborate bribery, or ‘kickback’, scheme involving the illicit payment of A$300 million to the Iraq government for supposed ‘transportation fees’ that were funnelled to the Saddam Hussein regime. This was clearly in breach of the United Nations trade sanctions and was apparently perpetrated by the AWB to secure continued sales with the lucrative Iraqi market. This paper aims to gain further insight into how a corporate culture can lead to greed, corruption and deception. Specifically, this study aims to add to the literature by analysing, using Schein's (1997, 2004) theoretical framework, a case on the development of a corrupt corporate culture. Content analysis of official investigative reports and other published documents is used to determine the extent to which the AWB's corporate culture and leadership may have influenced the behaviour of senior managers. The findings indicate that the culture within the AWB fostered an environment in which senior managers placed sales and profits above the sanctions clearly enunciated by the United Nations.     

Government auditing and corruption control: Evidence from China’s provincial panel data

Since its foundation, China’s government auditing system has played a very important role in maintaining financial and economic order and improving government accountability and transparency. Though a great deal of research has discussed the role of government auditing in discovering and deterring corruption, there is little empirical evidence on whether government auditing actually helps to reduce corruption. Using China’s provincial panel data from 1999 to 2008, this paper empirically examines the role of government auditing in China’s corruption control initiatives. Our findings indicate that the number of irregularities detected in government auditing is positively related to the corruption level in that province, which means the more severe the corruption is in a province, the more irregularities in government accounts are found by local audit institutions. Also, post-audit rectification effort is negatively related to the corruption level in that province, indicating that greater rectification effort is associated with less corruption. This paper provides empirical evidence on how government auditing can contribute to curbing corruption, which is also helpful for understanding the role of China’s local audit institutions in government governance and can enrich the literature on both government auditing and corruption control.     

政府清廉、财政政策与经济增长

减速治理背景下,政府官员廉洁程度与财政政策有效性之间的动态关系引起社会广泛关注。基于赋予转移概率以时变特征的MS-TVTP模型,研究发现：中国腐败治理取得阶段性成果,但并未呈现持续性改善趋势;政府廉洁状况的改善有助于财政政策有效性的提高,也有利于经济扩张区间的相对延长,最终促进经济增长,但由于中国尚处于腐败较为严重区间且改善程度有限,导致这一促进作用并不十分突出;此外,信贷政策对经济增长的促进作用已十分有限。     

水信息披露、机构投资者与股价同步性

基于2010-2016年中国A股高水敏感行业的322家上市公司数据,实证检验水信息披露对股价同步性的影响,以及机构投资者的调节效应。研究表明：水信息披露对股价同步性的影响呈倒U型,且在民营企业样本中尤其显著。在国有企业样本中,机构投资者的加入能促使水信息披露更好地融入股价;在民营企业样本中,只有在高水信息披露水平下,机构投资者才能更好地发挥调节作用。     

民营企业股权激励计划与研发投入关系分析

以2008~2011年民营上市公司为样本,使用3SLS回归分析以及DID模型,从外部环境以及内部环境两个方面分析了我国民营企业股权激励计划对于企业研发投入的影响。实证研究发现,民营企业实施股权激励能够促进企业的研发投入,而高科技行业的民营企业实施股权激励能够加强这种正向影响;对于股权激励具体方案的分析表明,激励计划的有效期与研发投入有弱相关关系,行权条件当中非财务指标的使用对于企业研发投入有正向影响,但是相对绩效指标的使用则对于研发投入有抑制作用。     

Political corruption and mergers and acquisitions

This research examines the relation between political corruption and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that local corruption increases firm acquisitiveness but decreases firm targetiveness. The levels of corruption in acquirer areas relate positively to the bid premiums and negatively to the likelihood of deal completion. Corruption motivates acquiring firms to use excess cash for payment, which mitigates the negative effect of corruption on acquirer shareholder value. The evidence indicates that acquisitions help acquiring firms convert cash into hard-to-extract assets and relocate assets from the high to low corruption areas, thereby shielding their liquid assets from expropriation by local officials.     

Institutional Monitoring: Evidence from the F‐Score

The extant literature shows that institutional investors engage in corporate governance to enhance a firm's long‐term value. Measuring firm performance using the F‐Score, we examine the persistent monitoring role of institutional investors and identify the financial aspects of a firm that institutional monitoring improves. We find strong evidence that long‐term institutions with large shareholdings consistently improve a firm's F‐Score and that such activity occurs primarily through the enhancement of the firm's operating efficiency. Other institutions reduce a firm's F‐Score. Moreover, we find evidence that, while monitoring institutions improve a firm's financial health, transient (followed by non‐transient) institutions trade on this information.     

Corruption and competition for resources

An increasing share of world FDI is carried out by multinationals from developing countries. These investors may have objectives and constraints that differ from their developed country counterparts. In this paper we focus on differences in attitudes to corruption, and how these may shape the competition for the right to extract resources in a developing country context. We show how differences in the investors’ level of technology and differences in the host country government’s trade-off between bribes and taxes determine who wins the competition for the resource and the winning price. One finding is that competition from a bribe-willing investor may induce a bribe-averse investor to enter into corruption. Surprisingly, however, we also find that competition with a bribe-willing investor may induce the bribe-averse investor to increase its tax payments.