THE IMPACT OF MARKET MAKER CONCENTRATION ON ADVERSE‐SELECTION COSTS FOR NASDAQ STOCKS

We examine the impact of market maker concentration on adverse‐selection costs for NASDAQ stocks and find that more market makers results in lower costs. Furthermore, this reduction in adverse selection exceeds the overall reduction in spreads that is attributable to market maker competition. We hypothesize that order flow internalization is increasing in market makers and allows for greater information production, and is an explanation for our findings. Our results provide an explanation for the puzzle documented by previous work that finds that adverse‐selection costs for NASDAQ tend to be lower than for the New York Stock Exchange, whereas spreads tend to be higher.     

On the Stability of the Cross‐Section of Expected Stock Returns in the Cross‐Section: Understanding the Curious Role of Share Turnover

In this paper, we shed further light on cross‐sectional predictors of stock return performance. Specifically, we explore whether the cross‐section of expected stock returns is robust within stock groups sorted by past monthly return. We find that the book/market and momentum effects are remarkably robust to sorting on past returns. However, share turnover is negatively related to future returns for stocks with abnormally low stock price performance in the recent past, but postively related to returns for well‐performing stocks. This casts doubt on the use of turnover as a liquidity proxy, but is consistent with turnover being a proxy for momentum trading which pushes prices in the direction of past price movements. Our results are robust to both NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq stocks, and also robust to stratifying the sample by time period.     

Distinguishing Between Rationales for Short‐Horizon Predictability of Stock Returns

In this paper, we shed light on short‐horizon return reversals. We show theoretically that a risk‐based rationale for reversals implies a relation between returns and past order flow, whereas a reversion in beliefs of biased agents does not do so. The empirical results indicate that returns are more strongly related to own‐return lags than to lagged order imbalances. Thus, the evidence suggests that monthly reversals are not completely captured by inventory effects and may be driven, in part, by belief reversion. We do find that returns are cross‐sectionally related to lagged imbalance innovations at horizons longer than a month.     

Dumb money: Mutual fund flows and the cross-section of stock returns

We use mutual fund flows as a measure of individual investor sentiment for different stocks, and find that high sentiment predicts low future returns. Fund flows are dumb money–by reallocating across different mutual funds, retail investors reduce their wealth in the long run. This dumb money effect is related to the value effect: high sentiment stocks tend to be growth stocks. High sentiment also is associated with high corporate issuance, interpretable as companies increasing the supply of shares in response to investor demand.     

A comparison among various dimensions of illiquidity effect: A case study of Finland

We study different dimensions of the illiquidity effect on asset returns in the Finnish market. The market illiquidity is measured as unexpected rises and falls in average monthly zero returns across all stocks. We find that for the returns on the specific class of assets, a flight to the liquidity effect is the most important systematic risk among all dimensions of the illiquidity effect. In other words, higher returns for illiquid assets in good times compensate for a pronounced drop in those returns in bad times and vice versa. Furthermore, only one illiquidity-related factor has a similar pricing capacity as Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model and Carhart's (1997) four-factor model in the context of this study.     

Optimal Number of Stock Holdings in Mutual Fund Portfolios Based on Market Performance

Among the decisions that most mutual fund portfolio managers make is the number of stocks to hold. We posit that there is an optimal number of stocks for each mutual fund, reflecting the trade‐off between diversification benefits versus transactions and monitoring costs. We find a significant quadratic relation between number of stock holdings and risk‐adjusted returns for U.S. equity mutual fund portfolios during 1992–2000. Moreover, we find that changes in the number of stocks held over time are more highly correlated with mutual fund flows than with funds' investment returns.     

Do Low‐Priced Stocks Drive Long‐Term Contrarian Performance on the London Stock Exchange?

We investigate whether low‐priced stocks drive long‐term contrarian performance on the U.K. market. We find that contrarian performance at low, middle, and high price levels is positive. On the Fama‐French risk adjusted basis, we find both low‐priced and middle‐priced losers have significantly positive returns. When we adjust returns by market and liquidity risk, only middle‐priced losers maintain their positive returns. Our results reveal that low‐priced stocks are not fully responsible for contrarian performance. Our empirical evidence is generally consistent with the overreaction hypothesis and behavioral models of value investing.     

Returns and option activity over the option-expiration week for S&P 100 stocks

For S&P 100 stocks, we find that the weekly returns over option-expiration (OE) weeks (a month’s third-Friday week) tend to be high, relative to: (1) the third-Friday weekly returns of other stocks with less option activity, (2) the own stock’s other weekly returns, (3) the risk, based on asset-pricing alphas. For these same stocks, a month’s fourth-Friday weekly returns underperform modestly. We suggest the following two avenues are likely partial contributors towards understanding these return patterns: (1) delta-hedge rebalancing by option market makers, with a reduction in short-stock hedge positions over the OE week, and (2) declining risk perceptions over the OE week, as measured by option-derived implied volatilities. Our findings suggest option activity can induce reliable patterns in the weekly returns of option-active large-cap stocks.     

Order Flow and Expected Option Returns

I show that the inventory risk faced by market‐makers has a first‐order effect on option prices. I introduce a simple approach that decomposes the price impact of trades into inventory risk and asymmetric information components. While both components are large for option trades, the inventory risk component is larger. Using the full panel of daily option returns, I find that option order imbalances attributable to inventory risk have five times larger impact on option prices than previously thought. Finally, I find that past order imbalances have greater predictive power than any other commonly used predictor of option returns.     

Stock return volatility,operating performance and stock returns: International evidence on drivers of the ‘low volatility’ anomaly

This study highlights the link between stock return volatility, operating performance, and stock returns. Prior studies suggest that there is a ‘low volatility’ anomaly, where firms with a low stock return volatility out-perform firms with a high stock return volatility. This paper confirms that low volatility stocks earn higher returns than high volatility stocks in emerging markets and developed markets outside of North America. We also show that low volatility stocks have higher operating returns and this might explain why low volatility stocks earn higher stock returns. These results provide a partial explanation for the ‘low volatility effect’ that is independent from the existence of market anomalies or per se inefficiencies that might otherwise drive a low volatility effect. We emphasize the importance of controlling for stock return volatility when analyzing operating performance and stock performance.     

ROBUSTNESS OF THE HEADQUARTERS‐CITY EFFECT ON STOCK RETURNS

Recent studies report that U.S. firms headquartered near each other experience positive comovement in their stock returns, a finding suggestive of local biases in equity trading activity. We investigate the robustness of these findings and find that including additional pricing factors in models for monthly stock returns materially reduces the magnitude of the headquarters‐city effect in stock returns. Additionally, we find that an implicit null hypothesis of zero local return comovement is inappropriate as there is positive comovement between a stock's return and returns on portfolios of stocks from nonheadquarters cities, on average. Nevertheless, results benchmarked against estimates based on resampling methods indicate a significant and robust headquarters‐city effect in stock returns.     

Extreme downside risk and expected stock returns

We propose a measure for extreme downside risk (EDR) to investigate whether bearing such a risk is rewarded by higher expected stock returns. By constructing an EDR proxy with the left tail index in the classical generalized extreme value distribution, we document a significantly positive EDR premium in cross-section of stock returns even after controlling for market, size, value, momentum, and liquidity effects. The EDR premium is more prominent among glamor stocks and when high market returns are expected. High-EDR stocks are generally characterized by high idiosyncratic risk, large downside beta, lower coskewness and cokurtosis, and high bankruptcy risk. The EDR premium persists after these characteristics are controlled for. Although Value at Risk (VaR) plays a significant role in explaining the EDR premium, it cannot completely subsume the EDR effect.     

Microstructure and reverse stock splits

In this paper we show that, similar to NYSE/AMEX stocks, NASDAQ stocks exhibit significant ex date returns for reverse stock splits. Although the 10-day cumulative return after the ex date is close to –10%, this does not violate market efficiency, because the average bid-ask spread for the reverse split stock is at least double this return. We also document that these large negative returns are mostly due to a drop in the ask price while bid prices barely change at all. Furthermore, the ex date returns are negatively related to trading volume.These results suggest that there is abnormal selling and a significant buildup of market makers' inventories near the ex date. To reduce the inventory buildup, market makers lower ask prices to induce buying by investors, resulting in the observed negative returns. Lowering bid prices, an alternative strategy for reducing inventories, is not attractive to market makers due to competitive factors and the reduction of commissions associated with a smaller number of transactions. Notably, selling investors have no incentives to sell their stocks early to avoid the observed negative ex date return, since this return is largely an ask price phenomenon and does not represent realized returns to sellers.     

Stock Volatility during the Recent Financial Crisis

This paper uses monthly returns from 1802 to 2010, daily returns from 1885 to 2010, and intraday returns from 1982 to 2010 in the USA to show how stock volatility has changed over time. It also uses various measures of volatility implied by option prices to infer what the market was expecting to happen in the months following the financial crisis in late 2008. This episode was associated with historically high levels of stock market volatility, particularly among financial sector stocks, but the market did not expect volatility to remain high for long and it did not. This is in sharp contrast to the prolonged periods of high volatility during the Great Depression. Similar analysis of stock volatility in the United Kingdom and Japan reinforces the notion that the volatility seen in the 2008 crisis was relatively short‐lived. While there is a link between stock volatility and real economic activity, such as unemployment rates, it can be misleading.     

Measuring investor sentiment with mutual fund flows

We investigate a proxy for monthly shifts between bond funds and equity funds in the USA: aggregate net exchanges of equity funds. This measure (which is negatively related to changes in VIX) is positively contemporaneously correlated with aggregate stock market excess returns: One standard deviation of net exchanges is related to 1.95% of market excess return. Our main new finding is that 85% (all) of the contemporaneous relation is reversed within four (ten) months. The effect is stronger in smaller stocks and in growth stocks. These findings support the notion of “noise” in aggregate market prices induced by investor sentiment.     

Intraday Variation in the Bid-Ask Spread: Evidence after the Market Reform

In this article we show that intraday variation in spreads for Nasdaq‐listed stocks has converged to intraday variation in spreads for NYSE‐listed stocks after the implementation of the new order‐handling rules. We attribute this convergence to the Limit Order Display Rule, which requires that limit orders be displayed in Nasdaq best bid and offer when they are better than quotes posted by market makers. Our findings suggest that the different patterns of intraday spreads between NYSE and Nasdaq stocks reported in prior studies can largely be attributed to the different treatment of limit orders between the NYSE and Nasdaq before the market reform.     

THE EFFECT OF THE TRADING SYSTEM ON IPO UNDERPRICING: EVIDENCE FROM THE 1997 ORDER‐HANDLING RULES

We use a natural experiment resulting from the 1997 Securities and Exchange Commission rule mandating a change in the order‐handling rules (OHR) for all NASDAQ stocks to test whether secondary market structure affects initial public offering (IPO) underpricing. We find that the increase in liquidity that the OHR represent led to a decrease in underpricing for cold NASDAQ IPOs, suggesting that when liquidity is lowest, changes in market liquidity display a negative relation to initial returns.     

Order flow, bid-ask spread and trading density in foreign exchange markets

This paper examines the implications of market microstructure for foreign exchange markets. We argue that the usual order flow model needs to be recast in broader terms to incorporate the transaction costs of liquidity and the limitation of price discovery through order flows that involve low trading density currencies. Using a daily data set, we find that order flows are inadequate when it comes to explaining the changes in the low trading density currencies. Alternatively, within the high trading density, both order flows and bid-ask spreads significantly affect the foreign exchange rate returns. Our findings suggest that the order flow model is better at incorporating these microstructure effects except for some currencies with a very high level of trading density.     

Is Gold a Hedge or a Safe Haven? An Analysis of Stocks,Bonds and Gold

Is gold a hedge, defined as a security that is uncorrelated with stocks or bonds on average, or is it a safe haven, defined as a security that is uncorrelated with stocks and bonds in a market crash? We study constant and time‐varying relations between U.S., U.K. and German stock and bond returns and gold returns to investigate gold as a hedge and a safe haven. We find that gold is a hedge against stocks on average and a safe haven in extreme stock market conditions. A portfolio analysis further shows that the safe haven property is short‐lived.     

News-driven return reversals: Liquidity provision ahead of earnings announcements

This study documents a six-fold increase in short-term return reversals during earnings announcements relative to non-announcement periods. Following prior research, we use reversals as a proxy for expected returns market makers demand for providing liquidity. Our findings highlight significant time-series variation in the magnitude of short-term return reversals and suggest that market makers demand higher expected returns prior to earnings announcements because of increased inventory risks that stem from holding net positions through the release of anticipated earnings news. Collectively, our findings suggest that uncertainty regarding anticipated information events elicits predictable increases in the compensation demanded for providing liquidity and that these increases significantly affect the dynamics and information content of market prices.