Public Debt, Migration, and Shortsighted Politicians

We analyze a model where local public debt levels are set by politicians who are chosen in local elections. Migration causes an externality across districts, and leads to overaccumulation of local public debt. Since debt is a strategic substitute, the median voters in each district prefer shortsighted political leaders who “borrow and spend,” thereby exacerbating the problem of overaccumulation of local public debt.     

The effect of land tenure governance on technical efficiency: evidence from three provinces in eastern China

This study aims to identify the mechanisms through which land tenure governance affects the technical efficiency of grain production in an integrated framework and to examine the impacts of the public governance, village self-governance, and relational governance of land tenure on the technical efficiency of contracted land and rented-in land. Farm-level survey data collected from Liaoning, Jiangxi, and Jiangsu provinces covering the years of 2014 and 2015 is used for the empirical analysis. The findings indicate that (i) public governance associated with land certification significantly increases the technical efficiency of grain production; (ii) village self-governance and administrative land reallocations can serve as substitutes for the land rental market in optimizing the distribution of land resources and improving technical efficiency; and (iii) compared to multi-year transfer contracts, both annual and open-ended transfer contracts have negative impacts on technical efficiency.     

土地承载力与经济发展的动态效应和耦合协调*——基于京津冀城市群的实证研究

本文运用2000—2014年京津冀城市群面板数据,构建土地综合承载力与区域经济发展的PVAR模型,分析土地综合承载力、人均GDP、地均第二、第三产业增加值之间的动态影响效应;构建两者的耦合协调评价模型,实证解析土地综合承载力与区域经济发展的耦合协调程度。结果表明：（1）土地潜在综合承载力的挖掘能促进区域经济发展的水平增加和结构优化;（2）土地综合承载力、人均GDP、地均第二、第三产业增加值波动均受其自身变动冲击的影响最大;（3）两者的耦合协调度较低,从中度失调向轻度失调,再向勉强协调,然后向中度协调过渡。     

Property rights in land and output growth in Russia

This paper tests whether the implementation of a key market‐oriented reform in post‐Soviet Russia, property rights in land, proxied by the percent of privatized land by region, affected the pace of sub‐national economic growth during two unprecedented expansion periods: 2001–2008 and 2010–2014. Individuals gained the Constitutional right to own land in 1993, but implementation was stalled. The pace of land privatization can be explained by arguably exogenous factors such as distance to Moscow, as well as climate and also regional political culture, proxied by concentration of votes in the 2004 presidential election. We show that this rate of land privatization in Russia's regions was significantly associated with output growth in 2010–2014, confirming the policy importance of this measure for developing economies. Regions where private holdings expanded most rapidly with the enforcement of property rights in land, gained a competitive advantage in the growth process through increased investment in fixed assets and private consumption.     

The Cass criterion, the net dividend criterion, and optimality

Abel, Mankiw, Summers, and Zeckhauser [Assessing dynamic efficiency: theory and evidence, Rev. Econ. Stud. 56 (1989) 1-20] propose the net dividend criterion as an easy to use sufficient condition for optimality in general stochastic overlapping generations economies with production. We provide examples based on the criterion due to Cass [On capital overaccumulation in the aggregative neoclassical model of economic growth: a complete characterization, J. Econ. Theory 4 (1972) 200-223] and its extensions, the usual tools for such problems, to show that the net dividend criterion need not give the right answer. We identify the flaw in their proof. We also provide an alternative condition which, by an argument unrelated to theirs, is a sufficient condition for optimality when dividends are nonnegative and then argue that the condition is not innocuous since it cannot be verified in actual economies.     

地方政府干预、土地价格扭曲与工业企业生产率

在高质量发展的背景下,深入剖析地方政府土地出让干预对微观企业生产率的影响具有重要意义。本文以土地价格扭曲为切入点,揭示地方政府土地出让干预对工业企业生产率的影响机理,并使用2007—2014年工业企业微观数据构建中介效应模型进行实证检验。研究表明,地方政府干预工业用地出让会造成土地要素价格的负向扭曲,进而导致工业企业生产率下降。分行业的异质性检验表明,相对于劳动密集型和技术密集型行业,这种负向传导影响在资本密集型行业中更为显著。对此,本文建议应继续深化土地要素市场配置、地方政府绩效考核等相关改革。     

Maximizing human development

The Human Development Index (HDI) is widely used as a measure of well‐being. We examine the allocations implied by the maximization of this index using a standard growth model. Maximization leads to consumption (excluding education and health expenditures) being pushed to minimal levels. It also leads to the overaccumulation of education and/or health capital and possibly physical capital, relative to the standard golden rule. We propose an alternative specification for the HDI, where consumption replaces income as a proxy for decent standard of living. Maximization of this alternative implies a ‘human development golden rule’ which balances consumption, education and health expenditure. We advocate the method of optimization subject to constraints for revealing the policy implications of taking an achievement measure and its underlying philosophy seriously.     

On the Phelps–Koopmans theorem

We examine whether the Phelps–Koopmans theorem is valid in models with nonconvex production technologies. We argue that a nonstationary path that converges to a capital stock above the smallest golden rule may indeed be efficient. This finding has the important implication that “capital overaccumulation” need not always imply inefficiency. Under mild regularity and smoothness assumptions, we provide an almost-complete characterization of situations in which every path with limit in excess of the smallest golden rule must be inefficient, so that a version of the Phelps–Koopmans theorem can be recovered. Finally, we establish that a nonconvergent path with limiting capital stocks above (and bounded away from) the smallest golden rule can be efficient, even if the model admits a unique golden rule. Thus the Phelps–Koopmans theorem in its general form fails to be valid, and we argue that this failure is robust across nonconvex models of growth.     

Inheritance and inequality when wealth enters the utility function

The distribution of wealth and its dynamic development are analyzed within a non-overlapping generations model. All individuals have identical preferences and abilities. Wealth is represented by land, which is available in fixed aggregate supply. Utility depends on a perishable consumption good and—due to a bequest and/or a prestige motive—in addition on land owned. Two configurations can occur as long run equilbrium: equality and two class dichotomy. All Two Class Equilibria are unstable. The Equality Equilibrium is unstable if and only if land is sufficiently productive. In the case of instability there is a process towards maximal concentration of wealth.For helpful discussions I am indebted to G. Clemenz, S. Krasa, and M. Winkler.     

Efficiency and prices in economies of overlapping generations

In a general economy of overlapping generations, I introduce a notion of uniform inefficiency, corresponding to the occurrence of a Pareto improvement with a small uniform destruction of resources [G. Debreu, The coefficient of resource utilization, Econometrica 19 (1951) 273-292]. I provide a necessary and sufficient condition for uniform inefficiency in terms of prices at a competitive equilibrium: an allocation is uniformly inefficient if and only if the relative price of the aggregate endowment in a given period into the aggregate endowment up to that period does not vanish over periods of trade, a sort of Modified Cass Criterion [D. Cass, On capital overaccumulation in the aggregative neoclassical model of economic growth: a complete characterization, J. Econ. Theory 4 (1972) 200-223]. Minimal assumptions on fundamentals are needed for such a complete characterization. Furthermore, proofs reduce to simple and short direct arguments. Finally, I verify that uniform inefficiency is preserved under perturbations, a property that might fail for the canonical notion of inefficiency. Remarkably, an allocation is uniformly inefficient if and only if a non-vanishing redistribution, like a social security mechanism, is welfare improving.     

The geography of market failure: Edge-effect externalities and the location and production patterns of organic farming

Perceptions of increasing land scarcity and negative impacts of chemical-based agriculture have led to increasing concern regarding the sustainability of food systems. Incompatible production processes among farming systems may lead to spatial conflicts and production losses between neighboring farms, and the magnitude of such losses may depend not only on the scale of each activity, but also on patterns of land use. Such conflicts can be classified as “edge-effect externalities”—spatial externalities whose marginal impacts decrease as distance from the border generating the negative impact increases. This paper tests the hypothesis that edge-effect externalities have influenced the location and production patterns of certified organic farms, using data from California Central Valley certified organic farmers. Using concepts from landscape ecology and spatial statistics, we investigate difference in parcel geometry and surrounding land uses between organic and non-organic parcels. Using a generalized method of moments (GMM) spatially autoregressive econometric model, we demonstrate that both parcel geometry and surrounding land uses influence the probability of a given parcel being certified organic. We conclude with suggestions for policies to encourage development of organic farming regions.     

Capital Accumulation in an Economy with Dynasties and Uncertain Lifetimes

This paper studies how the lack of an annuities market affects savings behavior and intergenerational transfers in a dynastic overlapping generations economy. I find that the answer to this question depends crucially on altruism. On the one hand, if the altruistic bequest motive is operative, then the lack of annuity markets enhances capital accumulation. On the other hand, if the altruistic bequest motive is not operative, the absence of annuity markets can either increase or decrease aggregate savings. I characterize under which conditions capital accumulation is enhanced. I also prove that an overlapping generations economy with altruism and uninsurable lifetime risk faces capital overaccumulation relative to the modified Golden Rule. The efficient allocation corresponding to the modified Golden Rule can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium by a pay-as-you-go social security system, and this can only be done if individuals are altruistic.     

National and international policies for tropical rain forest conservation—A quantitative analysis for Cameroon

This paper provides a numerical general equilibrium assessment of policies to reduce tropical deforestation in Cameroon. Market failure—mainly in the form of national and international externalities—and policy failures—such as highly distorted product markets—are identified as major sources of overexploitation. The ecological effects of deforestation control are shown to depend crucially upon its impact on land use patterns whereas its efficiency effects hinge on the manner in which a specified set-aside target is achieved. If the international community wants to ensure a higher level of protection of these forests, and to do so within a market-based system, the provision of conditional financial resources is neceassary.     

高密度和低密度城市的蔓延特征对比——中美大城市对比分析

对比研究高密度城市和低密度城市的蔓延特征有助于为城市规划和管理提供参考。以人口超过100万的12个中国城市、9个美国城市为样本城市,采用圈层分析法和反S方程,对比分析1990、2000和2014年以中国为代表的高密度城市和以美国为代表的低密度城市的蔓延特征。结果表明:①同等人口规模下,中国城市的建设用地面积较小,但土地扩张速度快。中国和美国城市的土地扩张分别主要发生在郊区和城市内部。②中国城市相对更为紧凑。高密度松散的城市土地扩张趋于紧凑,低密度城市蔓延程度在降低。③高、低密度城市的总体人口密度都呈下降趋势。高密度的中国城市尽管空间形态更紧凑,人口密度下降得较快,有必要遏制中国的城市蔓延趋势。④空间紧凑的城市人口密度下降得较慢;蔓延和紧凑的空间增长使高密度城市的人口密度下降变快和变慢,而对低密度城市没有表现出显著影响。     

Transfers and Bailouts: Institutions for Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline

The growing importance of local and provincial governments as providers of public services and the importance of those services for the overall performance of the national economy has led to a careful re-examination of how public resources are allocated by decentralized governments. While the Tiebout model promises efficient local resource allocations, the conditions necessary for such outcomes—many local governments, fully informed and costlessly mobile households, no spillovers, residential head taxes—are rarely met in practice. Lacking a sufficient number of competitive local governments, however, other institutional safeguards must be found. Four such institutions are identified here. First, a stable central government managed by nationally elected political parties or presidents capable of making (second-best) efficient interpersonal redistributions of income while at the same time denying inefficient intergovernmental transfers and /or access to non-resident taxation. Second, a mature banking system and fully integrated national capital markets to minimize the economic consequences of a single government's failure to repay its local debts. Third, informed and sophisticated municipal bond and local land markets capable of evaluating local services and finances so as to shift back onto local residents the full economic consequences of inefficient local government fiscal choices. Fourth, a politically independent judiciary capable of enforcing constitutional rules for spending and tax assignment, local debt repayment, and balanced local budgets. Efficient central governments and efficient land and capital markets are seen here as necessary institutional pre-conditions for an efficient local public sector.     

土地购置行为影响企业创新吗?——来自中国工业企业的证据

近来年,中国工业企业呈现出购置土地和金融资产的“脱实向虚”趋势,在一定程度上影响企业的研发创新行为。本文利用2006—2013年中国工业企业数据、创新专利研究数据及土地出让交易数据,利用PSM-DID模型,从土地购置行为和购置额度两方面探究工业企业土地购置对企业创新的影响。研究发现,工业企业土地购置行为显著促进企业创新,且这一促进作用呈倒“U”型趋势;工业企业购置工业用地行为对企业创新有促进作用,购置商住用地行为则显著抑制企业创新。本文研究还发现,工业企业适度的土地购置会通过缓解企业融资约束和财务风险,扩大企业研发投入而促进企业创新,高额的土地购置则会加剧企业融资约束和财务风险,从而挤占企业创新资金而抑制企业创新。本研究为政府合理监管工业企业购置土地行为提供依据,有助于引导工业企业合理协调“土地购置”和“研发创新”的关系。     

Another reconciliation between economists and forestry experts: OLG-arguments

Foresters often claim that the goal of good forest policy is to have a sustained forest yield, or even a maximum sustainable yield. They also claim that people wish to save a few extra trees for their children. This bequest motive is not modelled in the standard approach to the optimal rotation problem. In this paper, we present a standard version of an overlapping generation model augmented with a simple tree technology. We show in particular that the market equilibrium can be dynamically inefficient, and that a bequest motive in terms of trees can correct for the overaccumulation of capital that causes the inefficiency. The bequest motive also enables us to account for a harvesting intensity varying with age (young people typically cut more than elderly people) in spite of a perfect capital market.The crux of the argument is that a bequest motive is likely to increase the equilibrium interest rate and move the economy away from a maximum sustainable yield policy. It, however, improves efficiency and is able to explain empirical regularities that are not easily explained by a traditional perfect capital market approach to forestry.The author acknowledges comments from Karl-Göran Mäler, Stockholm School of Economics, participants in the economics-forestry economics seminar at the University of Umeå, and two anonymous referees.     

房价波动、调控政策立场估计及其影响效应研究--基于1998-2014年数据的实证分析

调控政策对房价的反应、立场和影响效应是政府政策设计的重要依据,2007年底金融危机爆发后,调控政策和房价波动都发生了显著变化。文章以2008年为界,构建了三个房价和政策变量的月度时间序列样本：1998-2007年、2008-2014年和1998-2014年,在此基础上,对2008年前后调控政策的反应、立场和影响效应进行了实证分析。结果表明：(1)实际贷款利率和货币供应量在2008年前后对目标变量的反应是交错变化的,货币供应量对房价的反应与假定相反,货币政策并未对房价做出充分反应,而财政和土地政策表现出了较好的反应结果。(2)货币供应量对房价波动的影响最大,是房价持续上涨的重要原因,2008年以来,固定资产投资的影响非常显著,脉冲响应分析发现利率只能在短期内对房价产生负向影响,除土地政策外,货币和财政政策皆会在长期内对房价产生稳定影响。文章的研究为推进房价政策调控和房地产市场健康稳定发展提供了可靠的经验支持。     

银行视角下农村土地承包经营权抵押融资探析

随着2014年中央一号文件的出台,农村土地承包经营权抵押融资问题再次引起广泛的关注。当前农村土地承包经营权抵押融资面临着法律禁止和政策突破的矛盾。在这个背景下,推行土地承包经营权抵押融资亦面临着一些不容忽视的困难,如抵押融资渠道不足、银行业金融机构面临高风险、相关配套机制不完善等。这就需要通过完善相关配套机制、完善以风险管理为核心的土地承包经营权抵押贷款银行管理体制、探索土地承包经营权抵押担保新模式等措施突破困境。     

Rat race, redistribution, and growth

Introducing locally negatively interdependent preferences into a simple AK growth model easily explains the often observed insignificant or positive correlation between distortionary redistribution and growth rates. Positive capital income taxes and lump sum transfers are harmful for growth, but people rationally vote for them in order to reduce “rat race” overaccumulation. A “neutrality proposition” holds if the pivotal voter is the mean voter, as in a representative agent case, but it fails if the pivotal voter is poorer than the average citizen.