The pricing and performance of leveraged exchange-traded funds

Leveraged ETFs are a recent and very successful financial innovation. They provide daily returns that are in a multiple or a negative multiple of the daily returns on a market benchmark. In this paper, we examine the characteristics, trading statistics, pricing efficiency and tracking errors of a sample of leveraged ETFs. We find that these ETFs are traded mainly by retail traders with very short holding periods. Price deviations (from NAV) are small on average, but large premiums and discounts are prone to occur. More interestingly, the behavior of premiums is different between bull (i.e., those with a positive multiple) and bear ETFs (i.e., those with a negative multiple). Our findings are consistent with the argument that the end-of-day rebalancing of the funds’ exposures increases market volatility at the close of a trading day. As for tracking errors, they are small for holding periods of up to a week, but become increasingly larger for longer horizons.     

Why Does Performance Persistence Vary Among Closed-End Funds?

This study extends the research on closed-end fund performance persistence by investigating whether the persistence of both net asset value (NAV) and market price returns of U.S. registered closed-end funds is related to various fund characteristics. The sample consists of 505 closed-end funds, which are investigated over the period from January 1976 to December 1996. The analysis tests whether persistence is related to the fund characteristics size, goal, management fees, turnover, fund family membership, fund experience, and the exchange on which a fund is traded. The results vary across holding periods used to calculate persistence but are similar with respect to the NAV and market price returns. Funds with lower expense ratios and funds traded on the NYSE show more persistence of strong NAV and market price performance.     

Relative Performance Evaluation of Mutual Funds: A Non-Parametric Approach

We propose an alternative mutual fund performance index which addresses the benchmark problem and controls for economies of scale in managing mutual funds. We advance a new concept of 'return-cost' efficiency as another important element in evaluating portfolio management, in addition to the mean-variance efficiency concept. Our index based on a non-parametric estimation is shown to be similar to the Sharpe index with multiple slopes (or factors). We have shown that all fund categories, except income funds, have similar average efficiency scores after controlling for economies of scale. Most funds operate in increasing returns to scale and seem to be successful in holding mean-variance efficient portfolios, but unsuccessful in allocating transaction costs efficiently, evidenced by excessive turnovers and loads.     

Mutual Fund Performance: Measurement and Evidence1

The paper provides a critical review of empirical findings on the performance of mutual funds, mainly for the US and UK. Ex‐post, there are around 0‐5% of top performing UK and US equity mutual funds with truly positive‐alpha performance (after fees) and around 20% of funds that have truly poor alpha performance, with about 75% of active funds which are effectively zero‐alpha funds. Key drivers of relative performance are, load fees, expenses and turnover. There is little evidence of successful market timing. Evidence suggests past winner funds persist, when rebalancing is frequent (i.e., less than one year) and when using sophisticated sorting rules (e.g., Bayesian approaches) ‐ but transactions costs (load and advisory fees) imply that economic gains to investors from winner funds may be marginal. The US evidence clearly supports the view that past loser funds remain losers. Broadly speaking results for bond mutual funds are similar to those for equity funds. Sensible advice for most investors would be to hold low cost index funds and avoid holding past ‘active’ loser funds. Only sophisticated investors should pursue an active ex‐ante investment strategy of trying to pick winners ‐ and then with much caution.     

A Time to Scatter Stones,and a Time to Gather Them: The Annual Cycle in Hedge Fund Risk Taking

Analyzing a sample of hedge fund daily returns from Bloomberg, we find a seasonal pattern in their risk taking. During earlier months of a year, poorly performing funds reduce risk. The reduction is stronger for funds with higher management fees, shorter redemption periods, and recently deteriorating performance, consistent with a managerial aversion to early fund liquidation. Toward the end of a year, poorly performing funds gamble for resurrection by increasing risk. It is largely achieved by increasing exposure to market factors, and can be linked to stronger indirect managerial incentives during the second half of a year.     

Who benefits in a crisis? Evidence from hedge fund stock and option holdings

We use a unique data set of hedge fund long equity and equity option positions to investigate a significant lockup-related premium earned during the tech bubble (1999–2001) and financial crisis (2007–2009). Net fund flows are significantly greater among lockup funds during crisis and noncrisis periods. Managers of hedge funds with locked-up capital trade opportunistically against flow-motivated trades of non-lockup managers, consistent with a hypothesis of rent extraction in providing crisis era liquidity. The success of this opportunistic trading is concentrated during periods of high borrowing costs, in less liquid stock markets, and is enhanced by hedging in the equity option market.     

Real options and earnings-based bonus compensation

This study extends the works of Mauer and Sarkar (2005) and Andrikopoulos (2009) by incorporating a regime-dependent earnings-based bonus into managerial compensation. Examining the individual effects of ownership shares and earnings-based bonus compensation, we find that the former provides managers with incentives to issue debt, whereas the latter induces the opposite result, although consistent impacts are found for the two types of compensation on both agency costs and the optimal investment decisions of managers. When managerial compensation comprises both ownership shares and an earnings-based bonus, there are significant differences in the effects of these two types of performance compensation on managers’ optimal investment and financing decisions, agency costs, optimal debt ratios and credit spreads, as a result of the specific interactions between the investment and financing decisions.     

A model of emulation funds

Emulation funds are a potentially cost‐effective way for multimanager funds to improve their investment performance by delaying and netting trade signals from underlying managers. We develop a model to represent the expected sources of differential performance in an emulation fund relative to its underlying multimanager portfolio. The model formalises the expected interaction between potential savings and opportunity costs and allows us to observe complexities in the emulation process that are hidden without a benchmark. Finally, the functional representation of the model allows sensitivity analysis of the emulation fund to key parameters and enables us to determine theoretically optimal lag periods.     

Performance of Enhanced Index and Quantitative Equity Funds

We examine the performance of enhanced index and quantitative equity funds. Both types of funds use quantitative models in investment selection. Enhanced index funds set an explicit objective to outperform a benchmark index. Proponents of quantitative funds argue that their management style takes human emotions out of the investment decision‐making process and leads to more objective stock selection. We find evidence of outperformance by quantitatively managed growth funds, especially those investing in small cap stocks.     

Hedge fund liquidity and performance: Evidence from the financial crisis

We investigate how share restrictions affect hedge fund performance in crisis and non-crisis periods. Consistent with prior research, we find that in the pre-crisis period more illiquid funds generate a share illiquidity premium compensating investors for limited liquidity. In the crisis period, this share illiquidity premium turns into an illiquidity discount. Hedge funds with more stringent share restrictions invest more heavily in illiquid assets. While share restrictions enable funds to manage illiquid assets effectively in the pre-crisis period, they seem insufficient to ensure effective management of illiquid portfolios in the crisis. In a crisis period, funds holding illiquid portfolios experience lower returns and alphas, also when share restrictions are controlled for. Funds with an asset–liability mismatch perform particularly poorly and experience the strongest outflows. Share restrictions are also a proxy for incentives as investors cannot immediately withdraw their money after poor performance. We show that higher incentive fees can offset the share illiquidity discount in the crisis period.     

Explaining bank market-to-book ratios: Evidence from 2006 to 2009

This paper examines the market-price to book-value ratio for 6604 bank stock observations from December 31, 2006 through June 30, 2009. We relate each bank’s market-price to book-value ratio to several fundamental ratios and whether the bank took funds from the US Treasury under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The results of this study show that banks who took TARP funds have lower market-price to book-value ratios. In addition, lower relative costs, higher non-interest income, and lower assets in non-accrual or foreclosed status are associated with higher market-price to book-value ratios while controlling for size and other bank attributes.     

Supply uncertainty of the bond investor base and the leverage of the firm

We examine the effect of the bond capital supply uncertainty of institutional investors (e.g., mutual bond funds and insurance companies) on the leverage of the firm using a novel data set. Our main finding is that the supply uncertainty of the firm's bond investor base — measured as (i) the average portfolio turnover, or (ii) the average flow volatility of investors holding the firm's bonds, or (iii) the prevalence of mutual funds among the firm's bondholders as opposed to insurance companies — has a negative and significant effect on the leverage of the firm. The supply uncertainty of the firm's bond investor base also has a negative and significant effect on the firm's probability of issuing bonds, and a positive and significant effect on the firm's probability of issuing equity and borrowing from banks. We take a multi-pronged approach to address potential endogeneity issues, including use of geography-based instruments and firm fixed effects, subsample analyses, and a placebo test. Our results highlight the fragility of access to the bond market for companies that depend on mutual funds with high turnover/ flow volatility as primary bond investors.     

Evaluating the Financial Performance of Pension Funds: An Individual Investor's Perspective

Pension funds require the managerial expertise of financial intermediaries, who must be paid a fee or spread. The spread significantly reduces the value of the pension fund over longer holding periods, and implies significantly greater incentive conflicts for defined contribution-funded pension funds than for defined benefit-funded pension funds. The magnitude of the intermediary spread and those factors affecting the demand for financial intermediary reputation and the marginal fee for this reputation are examined for a sample of 66 defined contribution and 54 defined benefit Australian pension funds during 1991–93. The intermediary spread significantly reduces the average net return provided to individual investors, particularly for defined contribution pension funds. Agency-related factors affecting the demand for financial intermediary reputation and its marginal fee reflect underlying contract-based differences between these types of fund.     

Performance persistence of international mutual funds

This study applies the “winner–winner, winner–loser” methodology developed by Brown and Goetzmann, Goetzmann and Ibbotson, and Malkiel to test for short-term performance persistence in international equity mutual funds over the 20-year period from 1977 to 1996. Persistence tests are applied to a database consisting of all international equity funds in existence during this period, varying from a low of 11 (1977) to a high of 473 (1996) funds, reflecting the extremely rapid growth of this asset class over the last 20 years. The authors are not aware of any other persistence studies of international equity funds. The results show statistically significant performance persistence for 1-year holding periods, but no persistence for 2-, 3- or 4-year periods. For 1-year periods, overall, performance persistence is statistically significant at the .001 level. This leads to the conclusion that international equity mutual funds exhibit strong performance persistence for short-term (1-year holding periods), but persistence generally fades after the first year. These results are generally consistent with results found by other researchers using this methodology. Survivorship bias is a concern in virtually all time series studies of mutual fund returns. This bias is minimal in this study because each new fund is added to the database, merging funds continue to be included and adjustments are made for funds that cease operations. The only bias is that if any fund closed and did not merge with an existing fund, that fund would not have returns to be included for the future periods. Only 28 funds ceased operations over the 20-year period during which 490 new funds were introduced.     

Mandatory Portfolio Disclosure,Stock Liquidity,and Mutual Fund Performance

We examine the impact of mandatory portfolio disclosure by mutual funds on stock liquidity and fund performance. We develop a model of informed trading with disclosure and test its predictions using the May 2004 SEC regulation requiring more frequent disclosure. Stocks with higher fund ownership, especially those held by more informed funds or subject to greater information asymmetry, experience larger increases in liquidity after the regulation change. More informed funds, especially those holding stocks with greater information asymmetry, experience greater performance deterioration after the regulation change. Overall, mandatory disclosure improves stock liquidity but imposes costs on informed investors.     

Motivation and Performance of Seasoned Offerings by Closed-End Funds

We examine the motivation and performance of closed‐end funds that engage in seasoned public or rights offerings. We find that closed‐end funds are more motivated to engage in seasoned offerings when their shares exhibit a relatively high premium (compared to their corresponding NAV) and have a high degree of liquidity. We also find a significant negative valuation effect on average in response to seasoned offerings by closed‐end funds. Our cross‐sectional analysis reveals that the valuation effect at the time of the seasoned offering is more unfavorable for funds that have relatively high expense ratios and are relatively large. Furthermore, we find that the closed‐end funds experience significant negative valuation effects over the three‐year period subsequent to the seasoned offering, implying poor post‐offering performance.     

Better than the original? The relative success of copycat funds

We construct hypothetical copycat funds to investigate the performance of free-riding strategies that duplicate the disclosed asset holdings of actively managed mutual funds. On average, copycat funds are able to generate performance that is comparable to their target mutual funds, taking into account transaction costs and expenses. However, their relative success increased significantly after 2004 when the SEC imposed quarterly disclosure regulations on all mutual funds. We also find substantial cross-sectional dispersion in the relative performance of copycat funds. Free-riding on the portfolios disclosed by past winning funds and funds that disclose representative holdings generates significantly better performance net of trading costs and expenses than the vast majority of mutual funds. The results indicate that free-riding on disclosed fund holdings is an attractive strategy and suggest that mutual funds can suffer from the information disclosure requirements.     

Risk-taking and performance of government bond mutual funds

This paper investigates the risk exposures of government bond mutual funds and how risk-taking behavior affects fund performance. Government bond mutual funds often outperform their respective benchmark bond indexes before but not after adjusting for bond market risk factors. We show that the risk-taking behavior of fund managers helps to explain the different performances of government bond funds with and without controlling for the risk factors. Our results suggest that risk-taking leads to higher returns relative to benchmarks in normal risk periods but lower returns in high risk periods, suggesting that fund managers consistently take risky bets in fund management. We further show that the risk-taking of government bond funds is persistent and that investors typically have no ability to differentiate between the skill and risk components of fund performance. These findings suggest why fund managers have incentives to take consistently risky positions.     

Real Estate Fund Flows and the Flow-Performance Relationship

Convexity in the flow-performance relationship of traditional asset class mutual funds is widely documented, however it cannot be assumed to hold for alternative asset classes. This paper addresses this shortcoming in the literature by examining the flow-performance relationship for real estate funds, specifically open-end, direct-property funds. This investment vehicle is designed to provide the risk-return benefits of private market real estate and is available to retail investors in many countries across the globe. An understanding of fund flow dynamics associated with this investment vehicle is of particular interest due to the liquidity risk associated with holding an inherently illiquid asset in an open-end structure. Our analysis draws on the theoretical foundations provided in the literature on mutual fund flows, performance chasing, liquidity risk, participation costs and dynamics across market cycles. We focus on German real estate funds from 1990 to 2010 as this is the largest market globally and there is a high level of confidence in the data. The results show that real estate fund investors chase past performance at the aggregate level and the relationship between flows and relative performance is asymmetric (i.e., convex) at the individual fund level. Fund-level liquidity risk tends to weaken convexity, while sensitivity increases with higher participation costs. We find the flow-performance relationship varies across time, though our interpretation is asset and investment vehicle specific. The implications are applicable to investors and fund managers of open-end, direct-property funds and, more broadly, other alternative asset funds where the underlying asset may not be liquid.     

Speculators,commodities and cross-market linkages

We use a unique, non-public dataset of trader positions in 17 U.S. commodity futures markets to provide novel evidence on those markets' financialization in the past decade. We then show that the correlation between the rates of return on investible commodity and equity indices rises amid greater participation by speculators generally, hedge funds especially, and hedge funds that hold positions in both equity and commodity futures markets in particular. We find no such relationship for commodity swap dealers, including index traders (CITs). The predictive power of hedge fund positions is weaker in periods of generalized financial market stress. Our results support the notion that who trades helps predict the joint distribution of commodity and equity returns. We find qualitatively similar but statistically weaker results using a proxy for hedge fund activity based on publicly available data.