STRATEGIC ADVERTISING AND DIRECTED SEARCH

Imperfect observability and costly informative advertising are introduced into a standard directed search framework. Capacity‐constrained sellers send costly advertisements to direct buyers' uncoordinated search by specifying their location and terms of trade. We show that the equilibrium advertising intensity is nonmonotonic in the buyer–seller ratio. In addition, we also find that price posting dominates auctions since both mechanisms yield the same expected revenue, but the latter results in higher advertising expense. Finally, we find a positive comovement between market transparency and price for low market tightness when the measure of informed buyers is endogenous.     

DIRECTED SEARCH ON THE JOB AND THE WAGE LADDER*

We model a labor market where employed workers search on the job and firms direct workers' search using wage offers and employment probabilities. Applicants observe all offers and face a trade‐off between wage and employment probability. There is wage dispersion among workers, even though all workers and jobs are homogeneous. Equilibrium wages form a ladder, as workers optimally choose to climb the ladder one rung at a time. This is because low‐wage applicants are relatively more sensitive to employment probability than to wage and thus forgo the opportunity to apply for a high wage, with a lower chance of success.     

DIRECTED SEARCH AND FIRM SIZE*

Standard directed search models predict that larger firms pay lower wages than smaller firms, contrary to the data. This article proposes one way to obtain this positive size–wage differential in a directed search setting. I posit that there is an optimal size associated with a firm: A firm suffers a penalty by not operating at its optimal size. I show that if this penalty is sufficiently large the size–wage differential will be obtained. My model also gives a new way to look at the data because it highlights the importance of the distinction between intended and realized firm sizes.     

DIRECTED SEARCH WITH PHANTOM VACANCIES

When vacancies are filled, the job ads often remain, creating phantom vacancies. Older listings more likely represent phantoms. We assume job seekers direct their search based on listing age. Forming a match with an age-a vacancy creates an age-a phantom with probability β and generates an externality affecting vacancies aged a and older. Thus, the externality decreases with the match's listing age. Relative to efficient behavior, job seekers overapply to younger listings. We calibrate using U.S. data. The contribution of phantoms to inefficiency is large, but, given their existence, the planner cannot improve much on the directed search allocation.     

有效就业理论与宏观经济增长悖论

1997年以后,中国出现了经济高速增长,就业压力不减,物价走低的宏观经济增长悖论。奥肯定律失效,宏观经济关系扭曲,产出对就业和物价的影响无法正常传递,是造成两个悖论的宏观原因。有效就业理论认为,企业储备了大量的无效就业人员,有效就业率低,因而奥肯定律失效。释放或充分使用无效就业人员,企业有效就业率的提高带来劳动生产率的上升,企业有了产出扩张的激励。这是两个悖论的微观成因。较低的有效就业率源自于已有就业制度安排下劳动力的企业内部储备。     

REDUNDANCY, NATURAL TURNOVER AND THE PARADOX OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE

The properties of the labour market are such that moderate employment shifts can be accommodated by, and might even encourage, the natural movement of labour between jobs. But the scale and extent of employment adjustments in recent years has produced an altogether different response. Voluntary movement has fallen dramatically as unemployment has risen. Redundancies have increased in importance in absolute and relative terms. The pace of adjustment in recent years has reduced the natural flexibility of the labour market and has created a serious impediment to the optimal distribution of labour. Moreover, an economic doctrine which emphasizes the importance of flexibility and personal choice in the labour market, has effectively reduced both.     

理性恐慌,流动性黑洞和国有股减持之谜

一个具有吸收态的状态转化模型表明国有股减持政策诱使股市状态转向所谓的“流动性黑洞”;同时,在股市行情大跌时追逐流动性的假说没有足够证据支持,因而股市大跌是整个市场的宏观现象。在这些实证结果的基础上,我们构建一个微观市场结构的理论模型来解释“国有股减持之谜”:它并非是一场简单的由消息所引发的股市行情大跌,其根源在于中国股市的功能缺陷,这进一步支持了我们先前关于“中国股票市场达不到弱式有效”的结论。     

DIRECTED SEARCH,COORDINATION FAILURE,AND SELLER PROFITS: AN EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF POSTED PRICING WITH SINGLE AND MULTIPLE PRICES

We experimentally examine posted pricing and directed search. In one treatment, capacity‐constrained sellers post fixed prices, which buyers observe before choosing whom to visit. In the other, firms post both “single‐buyer” (applied when one buyer visits) and “multibuyer” (when multiple buyers visit) prices. We find, based on a 2 × 2 (two buyers and two sellers) market and a follow‐up experiment with 3 and 2 × 3 markets, that multibuyer prices can be lower than single‐buyer prices or prices in the one‐price treatment. Also, allowing the multibuyer price does not affect seller profits and increases market frictions.     

ENDOGENOUS TIMING AND STRATEGIC CHOICE: THE COURNOT‐BERTRAND MODEL

Cournot establishes a Nash equilibrium to a duopoly game under output competition; Bertrand finds a different Nash equilibrium under price competition. Both treat the strategic choice variable (output versus price) and the timing of play as exogenous. We investigate Cournot‐Bertrand models where one firm competes in output and the other competes in price in both static and dynamic settings. We also develop a general model where both the timing of play and the strategic choice variables are endogenous. Consistent with the conduct of Honda and Scion, we show that Cournot‐Bertrand behaviour can be a Nash equilibrium outcome.     

CHOOSY SEARCH AND THE MISMATCH OF TALENTS*

This article proposes a multi‐sector matching model where workers have (symmetric) sector‐specific skills and the search market is segmented by sector. Workers choose the range of markets they are willing to participate in. I identify a composition externality: Workers do not take into account the impact of their choice on sector‐specific mean productivity among the pools of job‐seekers. Consequently, workers prospect too many market segments, and there is room for public policy even when the so‐called Hosios condition holds.     

"中国之谜"-文献综述和一个假说

本文首先就"中国之谜"产生的背景及其争论进行了总结分析。然后通过引入以资本市场为代表的虚拟经济部门将传统的局限于实体经济部门的货币数量论拓展为包括资本市场、商品市场和货币市场的广义货币数量论模型,在新模型框架下分析了"中国之谜"的生成机理;我们发现大量货币在资本市场的积聚是货币供应量与物价关系反常的直接原因。"中国之谜"是货币虚拟化过程中虚拟经济和实体经济关系失调的结果。     

"中国之谜"-文献综述和一个假说

该文首先就中国之谜产生的背景及其争论进行了总结分析.然后通过引入以资本市场为代表的虚拟经济部门将传统的局限于实体经济部门的货币数量论拓展为包括资本市场、商品市场和货币市场的广义货币数量论模型,在新模型框架下分析了中国之谜的生成机理;我们发现大量货币在资本市场的积聚是货币供应量与物价关系反常的直接原因.中国之谜是货币虚拟化过程中虚拟经济和实体经济关系失调的结果.     

THE PARADOX OF POWER*

In power struggles, the strong might be expected to grow ever stronger and the weak weaker still. But in actuality, poorer or smaller combatants often end up improving their position relative to richer or larger ones. This is the paradox of power. The explanation is that initially poorer contenders are rationally motivated to fight harder, to invest relatively more in conflictual activity. Only when the decisiveness of conflict is sufficiently high does the richer side gain relatively in terms of achieved income. Among other things, the paradox of power explains political redistributions of income from the rich to the poor.     

WHOLESALE PRICES AND COURNOT‐BERTRAND COMPETITION

This note considers the competing vertical structures framework with Cournot‐Bertrand competition downstream. It shows that the equilibrium wholesale price paid by a Cournot (Bertrand)‐type retailer is above (below) marginal costs of a corresponding manufacturer. This result contrasts with the one under pure competition downstream (i.e., Cournot or Bertrand), where the wholesale price is set below (above) marginal costs in case of a Cournot (Bertrand) game at the retail level.     

OPTIMUM-WELFARE AND MAXIMUM-REVENUE TARIFFS UNDER BERTRAND DUOPOLY

This article derives the maximum‐revenue tariff and the optimum‐welfare tariff under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. It is shown that both tariffs are lower under Bertrand duopoly than under Cournot duopoly. Also, the optimum‐welfare tariff may exceed the maximum‐revenue tariff under both Bertrand duopoly and Cournot duopoly. This result is more likely the lower the costs of the home firm relative to the costs of the foreign firm, and the greater the degree of product substitutability. Also, it is shown that the optimum‐welfare tariff is less likely to exceed the maximum‐revenue tariff under Bertrand duopoly than under Cournot duopoly.     

经济全球化与“新特里芬悖论”

当前的全球性国际收支失衡,是经济全球化条件下的制度性、结构性失衡,是“特里芬悖论”似的重现。根据国际货币体系稳定的条件,从关键货币的市场竞争结构、汇率调节的有效性、国际合作机制、金融全球化下的财富效应、发展中国家的金融脆弱性等角度看,全球国际收支失衡首先要解决发达国家,特别是美国的双赤字问题,改革不对称的国际货币体系,形成国际合作机制,减少发展中国家的福利损失。     

GIBSON'S PARADOX AND POLICY REGIMES: A COMPARISON OF THE EXPERIENCE IN THE US, UK AND ITALY

This paper compares the behaviour of long-term interest rates and prices in Italy, the UK and the USA, and seeks to shed light into what has become known as the 'Gibson Paradox'. We compare the various theoretical explanations for the observed positive correlation of interest rates and prices in the USA and the UK. Using both regression and frequency domain techniques, we demonstrate that there is little evidence for the occurrence of the paradox in the case of Italy. The key conclusion of the paper is that the comparative evidence from these three countries supports a gold standard interpretation of the Paradox.