线性规划中资源的影子价格与边际价值

正确计算和分析资源的影子价格与边际价值,对企业生产和销售都有重要的指导作用。文中讨论了在原线性规划问题有多个最优解情况下影子价格的计算方法。     

影子价格在经济决策中的应用

<正> 在企业资源合理配置与利用的中层次战术性管理决策中,影子价格的理论与方法,不失为一个有利的工具。所谓“影子”价格(Shadow price),又叫会计价格,最优计划价格,是一种使用数学方法计算出来的最优价格。它不是市场价格。同一种资源,在不同的企业、不同的时期,其影子价格是不同的。正是这个差价及影子价格本身,是企业管理     

影子价格与产业结构合理化分析

影子价格来源于资源配置的最优化。在一个经济系统中,不同的产业部门很可能消耗同种资源,但不同产业部门消耗该资源的影子价格却可能存在差异。可根据影子价格的差异对资源在不同产业部门内的配置方案进行调整,整个系统的总体效益目标得到提高,从而实现资源的最优利用。影子价格难以真实地反映资源的使用价值,以及影子价格的不惟一性和稳定性差等问题。     

影子价格及其在投资项目评价中的应用

影子价格的概念,是由两位诺贝尔经济学奖金获得者——荷兰经济学家丁伯根和苏联经济学家康脱罗维奇,在本世纪三十年代末、四十年代初分别提出的。他们在用线性规划方法研究资源合理分配问题时发现,可以用这种方法求出一套与市场价格不同的,表达资源最优分配要求的价格。他们把这种价格称为影子价格,以区别于市场上的实际价格。     

经营决策中的定量分析——影子价格

影子价格(Shadow Price),也称最优价格或计算价格,是上世纪50年代荷兰数理经济学家、计量经济学家詹恩·丁伯根和前苏联经济学家、数学家康托罗维奇提出的,我国在80年代引进并将其应用于经济生活实践,是项目评估、自然资源价格评估中使用的基本方法。康托罗维奇认为,影子价格是对资源使用价值的定量分析,为最优计划价格,企业利用它控制产品的生产成本,社会利用其分配资源。1987年,国家计划委员会颁布了《建设项目经济评价方法与参数》,它要求对建设项目的主要投入物和产出物,必须用反映其真实价值的影子价格计算,以减少和避免决策的失误,实…     

完全竞争市场条件下的水资源影子价格测算

<正>影子价格内涵与计算方法影子价格是20世纪30年代末、40年代初由荷兰经济学家詹恩·丁伯根和前苏联经济学家、如贝尔经济学奖获得者康特罗维奇分别提出来的,是指当社会处于最优状态时,能够反映社会劳     

浅谈影子价格及其在经营管理决策中的应用

在影子价格基本理论的基础上,阐述了影子价格的经济含义与计算过程,并通过影子价格丰富的经济内涵,进而研究企业经营管理者如何通过影子价格来帮助自身提高管理决策的效用和效率。     

影子价格与产品成本

借用线性规划的数学模型,推导影子价格与实际价格及产品成本之间的关系,并运用此关系阐明了在各种情况下,如何利用影响子价格所提供的信息,作出正确调配资源的决策。     

简述影子价格在电力企业经济分析中的应用

主要说明线性规划的对偶理论在经济活动分析中的应用 ,以及影子价格在资源利用投资决策等方面的作用。     

简述影子价格在经济分析中的应用

主要说明线性规划的对偶理论在经济活动分析中的应用 ,以及影子价格在资源利用投资决策等方面的作用。     

Decision making and decision aiding: Defining the process,it representations,and support

We present a formalized account of decision making as a multistep process that involves several classes of participating entities. The purpose of this article is to lay the foundations for a conceptual framework in which decision support systems can be placed. A series of increasingly formal representations of the decision problem are developed, from a mental model conceived by the decision maker to a knowledge base that may be used in a decision support system. The reformulations of the decision problem lead us to contemplate different forms of support: for mental models, for formal models (this includes supporting measurement and representation), for solution, and for communication.     

CLOSED-FORM SOLUTIONS FOR OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO SELECTION WITH STOCHASTIC INTEREST RATE AND INVESTMENT CONSTRAINTS

We examine the portfolio choice problem of an investor with constant relative risk aversion in a financial market with partially hedgeable interest rate risk. The individual shadow price of the portfolio constraint is characterized as the solution of a new backward equation involving Malliavin derivatives. A generalization of this equation is studied and solved in explicit form. This result, applied to our financial model, yields closed-form solutions for the shadow price and the optimal portfolio. The effects of parameters such as risk aversion, interest rate volatility, investment horizon, and tightness of the constraint are examined. Applications of our method to a monetary economy with inflation risk and to an international setting with currency risk are also provided.     

Systems analysis: Aid to decision making: A method of investigation

Decision makers today face constraints that did not exist in the early part of this century-constraints related to labor, consumerism, and ecology, for example. The decision making process is also complicated by the number of alternatives available to attain a certain objective. This article describes the systems analysis approach to decision making and explains why it is needed. The approach involves nine basic steps and, finally, identification of the best solution by considering the facts, assumptions, and uncertainties for the problem. Systems analysis is not a panacea for the decision maker; it is a method of investigating, not solving.     

Information Collection Strategic Design in Experts-assisted Decision Making Paradigm

In an experts-assisted decision making paradigm, the information collection design becomes a strategic variable under a weak assumption that the final decision is dependent on the design used to collect information as well. As a result, the same information of the experts and the decision maker about the problem can potentially produce different final decisions for different information collection designs. The implication is that a decision maker can strategically select a design which serves his/her objective. This paper uses a Bayesian estimation methodology for combining experts' information with the decision maker's prior. An information collection process is designed by setting constraints on this model. Several designs are developed here using such controlled factors as a one-stage versus a two-stage decision process, experts' rank ordering, and group versus individual lobbying/consultation. An example is provided to illustrate the applicability of the concept. It is shown that the information produced in the process of producing a decision can also give insights into the impacts of the decision maker and the experts on the decision.     

Economic policy uncertainty,non-financial enterprises' shadow banking activities and stock price crash risk

At present, the structural contradiction between Economic Financialization and the real economy's long-term weakness has become increasingly prominent. As China enters a “new normal” stage of economic growth, the real investment rate drops, non-financial enterprises continuously allocate resources to the shadow banking system. The financial economy becomes increasingly divorced from reality. This leads us to the questions: will the shadow banking behavior of non-financial companies exacerbate the risk of stock price crash risk? How does the increase in economic policy uncertainty affect the relationship between non-financial companies' shadow banking activities and stock price crash risk?This article uses non-financial listed companies' data from 2007 to 2017 and conducts empirical analysis to answer this question. The study finds that companies engaged in high-leverage, high-risk shadow banking business exacerbate stock crash risk. This effect is only pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises and low social trust regions. The increase in the degree of economic policy uncertainty positively impacts the relationship between non-financial companies' shadow banking business and stock price crash risk. The theoretical mechanism is as follows: the rise in economic policy uncertainty amplifies the positive relationship between shadow banking activities of non-financial companies and stock price crashes by increasing bank loans, investors' sensitivity to external information, risk cross-contagion, and inefficient investment mechanisms. Various robustness tests do not change the research conclusion. This paper has important theoretical and policy guidance significance for reviewing the existing diversified shadow banking system and preventing systemic risks.     

PRICE SETTING OF MARKET MAKERS: A FILTERING PROBLEM WITH ENDOGENOUS FILTRATION

This paper studies the price‐setting problem of market makers under risk neutrality and perfect competition in continuous time. The classic approach of Glosten–Milgrom is followed. Bid and ask prices are defined as conditional expectations of a true value of the asset given the market makers' partial information that includes the customers' trading decisions. The true value is modeled as a Markov process that can be observed by the customers with some noise at Poisson times. A mathematically rigorous analysis of the price‐setting problem is carried out, solving a filtering problem with endogenous filtration that depends on the bid and ask price processes quoted by the market maker. The existence and uniqueness of the bid and ask price processes is shown under some conditions.     

From conventional to unconventional monetary policies: The failure of the market‐maker of last resort

This paper analyses the new role of market‐maker of last resort openly assumed by central banks since the 2008 financial crisis revealed the increasing impact of noninterest‐income activities on banks' balance sheets. A brief review of the distinction between conventional and unconventional monetary policies shows that the inflexion point from lender of last resort to market‐maker of last resort is given by the extension of central bank intervention to other markets than the bank reserves markets. Herein, it is explained how the market‐maker of last resort role is as counterproductive as its predecessor in putting the economy back on track. We show that the main problem of both conventional and unconventional monetary policies is that they distort price signals, particularly asset prices, in their attempt to reignite economic growth. Instead of correcting cyclical fluctuations, the policies of the market‐maker of last resort prevent the cyclical divergences between financial and goods sectors from readjusting.     

A Study on Aggregation of TOPSIS Ideal Solutions for Group Decision-Making

The technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) has become a popular multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) technique, since it has a comprehensible theoretical structure and is able to provide an exact model for decision making. For the use of TOPSIS in group decisions, the common approaches in aggregating individual decision makers’ judgments are the geometric and the arithmetic mean methods, although these are too intuitive and do not consider either preference levels or preference priorities among alternatives for individual decision makers. In this paper, a TOPSIS group decision aggregation model is proposed in which the construction consists of three stages: (1) The weight differences are calculated first as the degrees of preferences among different alternatives for each decision maker; (2) The alternative priorities are then derived, and the highest one can be denoted as the degree to which a decision maker wants his most favorite alternative to be chosen; (3) The group ideal solutions approach in TOPSIS is used for the aggregation of similarities obtained from different decision makers. A comparative analysis is performed, and the proposed aggregation model seems to be more satisfactory than the traditional aggregation model for solving compromise-oriented decision problems.     

Defining a right problem in group decision and negotiation: Feeling and evolutionary generating procedures

It is not unusual that decision makers define and solve a wrong problem. Here we develop an operational procedure for defining a right or correct problem. A problem may be represented as—a problem representation defining a problem consists of—two evolving hierarchies of relations, as discussed in the article. Rightness in a problem representation requires rightness in these relations which are beliefs held by a decision maker. Operational definition and validation of rightness in these relations, that is, retaining them as correct, is by feeling and by specified evolutionary generating procedures for examining, changing (evolving), and retaining these relations. Based on rightness in these relations, we discuss right group problem definition and solution in the general case where information is not fully shared (nonshared) among individuals in the group. Thus, our work contributes to procedural rationality—how decisions should be or are made—in individual and group decision-making and associated group decision and negotiation support systems (GDNSS).