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刘明康：银行应计提留存和逆周期资本缓冲 中国银监会主席刘明康撰文指出,宏观审慎监管与微观审慎监管应有机结合。应结合对宏观形势和银行业风险状况的判断,要求商业银行在最低资本充足率要求基础上,计提留存和逆周期资本缓冲。根据经济发展不同阶段、银行业金融机构贷款质量差异和盈利状况的不同,对贷款损失准备进行动态化和差异化调整。他表示,要持续加强对系统重要性银行的监管。     

宏观审慎政策视角下商业银行系统性风险监管研究——基于VAR模型分析

宏观审慎监管政策框架作为系统性风险调控的重要方式,已成为世界各国金融监管体系研究的重要课题。为完善我国宏观审慎监管研究,本文基于商业银行2009—2017年数据,构建了逆周期资本缓冲模拟并运用VAR模型检验了我国宏观审慎政策对商业银行系统性风险的监管效果。研究表明,逆周期资本缓冲模拟与我国经济运行状况相符,VAR模型结果表明长期资本充足率存在逆周期效应,流动性比例在短期内有助于降低系统性风险,逆周期资本缓冲对系统性风险反应迅速,在降低系统性风险方面起关键作用。在此基础上,本文对完善我国商业银行宏观审慎监管、防范系统性风险提出建议。     

宏观审慎政策如何影响银行风险承担？——来自我国276家商业银行的经验分析

本文利用2007—2019年我国276家商业银行数据,采用固定效应模型和GMM广义矩估计实证检验了宏观审慎政策对银行风险承担水平的影响,并基于银行杠杆率和货币政策视角进一步分析其潜在的作用机理。结果表明：加强宏观审慎管理与紧缩性货币政策立场会显著降低银行风险承担水平,但不同宏观审慎政策衡量指标的影响不尽相同且受到银行杠杆率的影响;银行异质性对宏观审慎政策效果产生了显著的不同影响,“双支柱”调控在实施过程中存在一定的冲突,适度的宏观审慎政策会缓解货币政策立场对风险承担的冲击。     

关于宏观审慎监管框架下逆周期政策的探讨

理论和实务界总结此次国际金融危机的经验教训,一致认为应当对金融监管理念和方式进行重大调整。加强宏观审慎监管,并将其与微观审慎监管进行有机结合,将成为后危机时代各国金融监管的主要发展趋势。本文认为,现阶段实施宏观审慎监管的一项重要任务,就是要针对金融体系的顺周期性,特别是对资本监管、贷款损失准备计提和公允价值会计准则等外部规则强化金融体系顺周期性的机理进行研究,一方面对这些规则进行修改完善,降低其顺周期效应;另一方面引入逆周期政策工具,如逆周期资本要求、杠杆率指标和前瞻性的拨备计提规则等,在金融体系中建立适当的逆周期机制,从而通过降低信贷活动、资产价格以及整个经济的周期性波动来减小金融失衡,缓解系统性风险,最终达到维护金融稳定的目标。     

房价波动、金融稳定与最优宏观审慎政策

本文通过构建包含家庭住房抵押借款摩擦和银行贷款摩擦的动态随机一般均衡模型,重点考察了异质性冲击下房价波动对金融稳定的影响。研究发现,房价上涨会导致银行风险溢价及杠杆率显著上升,进而加剧金融体系的内在不稳定。为降低房价波动及维护金融稳定,选取两类宏观审慎政策工具进行逆周期调控实验,结果表明,在住房需求冲击下,金融管理部门应选取贷款价值比政策,且应对房贷积极调控,而对房价进行中性调控。在最终产品部门生产率冲击、房地产部门生产率冲击及跨期偏好冲击下,应选取资本充足率政策,但对房贷和房价调控力度的把握则存在差异。本研究为厘清房价波动对金融稳定的动态传导机制,以及金融管理部门如何选取宏观审慎政策工具以稳定房价并降低系统性金融风险提供了启示。     

货币政策、金融杠杆与银行风险承担

本文利用16家上市商业银行从2014年第四季度到2018年第三季度的季度面板数据,采用差分广义矩估计(DGMM)方法实证分析了货币政策和杠杆率对银行风险承担的影响。结果表明:第一,货币调控在金融稳定方面并非风险中性,它与银行风险承担呈现显著的负相关关系,即货币政策放松会相应提高银行的风险承担水平。第二,杠杆率作为资本充足率的有益补充是有效的,银行杠杆水平越低则其风险承担水平也越低,杠杆率监管会减缓或抑制货币政策对银行风险承担的影响,这也为2018年我国“宽货币紧信用”现象提供了合理解释。根据研究结论,本文就完善并协调货币调控、宏观审慎和微观监管提出政策建议。     

宏观审慎政策框架能否有效抑制金融风险?——基于宏观审慎评估的视角北大核心CSSCI

本文以破产风险Z值来代表商业银行的风险承担状况,基于宏观审慎评估视角实证分析宏观审慎政策框架的作用效果。结果表明:宏观审慎评估会降低商业银行的风险承担,因而宏观审慎政策能够显著抑制金融风险;由于存在显著非对称性,宏观审慎评估的效应差异显著存在,对于资本充足率相对较低、规模较小的银行,宏观审慎评估对其风险承担的影响更大。     

多元外生冲击下双支柱调控的信号选择与制度安排 ——基于动态随机一般均衡模型

随着我国宏观杠杆率不断攀升,系统性风险成为政策制定者关注的重点,宏观审慎政策工具成为应对当前风险挑战的重要手段。本文构建了一个DSGE模型,将逆周期资本缓冲宏观审慎政策工具纳入其中,将宏观杠杆率作为宏观审慎政策调控的信号,以福利效应最大化为标准,研究在多元化的外生冲击环境下,货币政策和宏观审慎政策的最优制度安排。研究结果表明:一是通过货币政策防范金融风险的效果存在局限;二是宏观审慎政策和货币政策配合的双支柱调控框架有助于降低经济波动,改善社会福利;三是宏观审慎政策效果的充分发挥需要货币政策配合。根据上述结论,本文提出政策建议如下:一是货币政策和宏观审慎政策在目标、工具、手段上应该相互独立。二是要完善货币政策和审慎政策的协调配合,加快双支柱政策框架体系建设。     

中国版巴塞尔协议III对上市银行的影响

金融危机爆发后,为加强金融监管,巴塞尔委员会制定了新的国际金融监管新协议,即巴塞尔协议I I I。顺应国际金融监管新方向,结合中国银行业的现状,我国监管部门建立了逆周期的宏观审慎管理框架,推出资本充足率、杠杆率、贷款损失准备、流动性风险监管四大工具,被业内人士称为中国版的巴塞尔协议I I I。本文重点分析这四大监管工具对我国上市商业银行的影响,并提出相应的对策建议。     

中国版巴塞尔协议Ⅲ对我国上市银行的影响

金融危机爆发后,为加强金融监管,巴塞尔委员会制定了新的国际金融监管新协议,即巴塞尔协议Ⅲ。顺应国际金融监管新方向,结合中国银行业的现状,我国监管部门建立了逆周期的宏观审慎管理框架,推出资本充足率、杠杆率、贷款损失准备、流动性风险监管四大工具,被业内人士称为中国版的巴塞尔协议Ⅲ。本文重点分析这四大监管工具对我国上市商业银行的影响,并提出相应的对策建议。     

Evaluating the impact of macroprudential policies on credit growth in Colombia

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of two macroprudential policies in Colombia: marginal reserve requirements and dynamic provisions. The first measure was implemented to control excessive credit growth, while the latter was designed to increase systemic resilience by establishing a countercyclical buffer through loan loss provision requirements. To perform this analysis, a rich dataset based on loan-by-loan information for Colombian banks during the 2006–2009 period is used. Our identification strategy closely follows Khwaja & Mian (2008), so that only those observations with multiple banking relations are considered. Estimations are performed applying firm and firm-time fixed effects to control for demand factors, thus appropriately isolating loan demand from credit supply. Results from the econometric model suggest that dynamic provisions, the countercyclical reserve requirement and an aggregate measure of the macroprudential policy stance had a negative effect on credit growth, which varies according to bank and debtor-specific characteristics. Particularly, effects are intensified for riskier debtors, suggesting that the aggregate macroprudential policy stance in Colombia has worked effectively to stabilize credit cycles and reduce risk-taking.     

宏观审慎与货币政策双支柱框架研究——基于系统性风险视角

本轮国际金融危机之后,建立“宏观审慎政策专门盯住金融稳定目标,货币政策主要关注经济稳定目标”的双支柱成为国际社会的普遍共识。本文基于系统性风险视角,深入剖析系统性风险的累积和实现机制,从时间和空间两个维度梳理宏观审慎政策实现金融稳定的有效性,以及货币政策对系统性风险造成的潜在溢出性。目前从系统性风险的时间维度探讨双支柱政策的研究已较为丰富,可以总结为宏观审慎政策的“逆周期调节”机制和货币政策的“资本缺口”机制。从系统性风险的空间维度探讨双支柱政策的研究,也即对双支柱政策如何作用和改变金融机构内部关联网络的研究正成为研究热点。本文从政策工具和影响机制上对空间维度双支柱政策进行了系统梳理。基于以上分析,本文对双支柱政策的制定提出如下建议:时间维度宏观审慎政策要关注并消除货币政策对时间维度系统性风险的溢出性,同时要加强空间维度宏观审慎政策工具的创新力度。     

货币政策能够兼顾稳增长与防风险吗？——基于动态随机一般均衡模型的分析

为构建金融有效支持实体经济的体制机制,需平衡好稳增长、调结构和防风险三者间的关系。在此背景下,本文在两部门新凯恩斯主义动态随机一般均衡模型中引入异质性抵押约束,探讨货币政策如何兼顾稳增长和防风险,进而促进金融更好地服务实体经济。本文模拟结果显示:(1)降低利率和强化国企抵押约束可促进稳增长与稳杠杆。推动国企贷款利率趋于市场水平并降低非国企贷款成本,积极发挥结构性货币政策工具的作用,将增进其政策效果;(2)2008-2016年宏观杠杆率上升主要与国企抵押约束过松有关,2017年后利率对宏观杠杆率的调控增强;(3)宏观审慎政策框架下,货币政策盯住宏观杠杆率,并根据政策目标和经济背景适时调整利率与杠杆率的内生关系,能够优化货币政策效果。对于降低利率和强化国企抵押约束的政策组合,根据宏观杠杆率的变化同向调整利率水平有利于经济稳步增长和宏观杠杆率趋稳。     

Macroprudential policy transmission and interaction with fiscal and monetary policy in an emerging economy: a DSGE model for Brazil

We investigate the transmission of macroprudential (MaP) instruments in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model where foreign capital flows interact with financial frictions and banks are exposed to different sources of credit default risk. The model is estimated for Brazil with Bayesian techniques. We compute optimal combinations of simple MaP, fiscal and monetary policy rules that can react to the business and/or the financial cycle. We find that the gains from implementing a cyclical fiscal policy are only significant if MaP policy countercyclically reacts to the financial cycle. Optimal fiscal policy is countercyclical in the business cycle.     

货币政策与宏观审慎政策的协调

本文在梳理学术文献和国际经验基础上,讨论了货币政策与宏观审慎政策之间的潜在冲突和协调机制。国际文献的初步结论是,为了同时实现价格稳定和金融稳定目标,大部分情况下需要货币政策与宏观审慎政策反向操作(由于政策的替代性),但有时也需要两者同向操作(由于政策的互补性),最优政策组合取决于宏观冲击的类别和风险的来源。本文认为,选择最优组合是一个复杂的理论和实证问题,除了冲击类别和风险来源外,不同的金融体制和经济周期阶段也会影响选择结果。因此,货币政策当局与宏观审慎当局之间需要建立有效的协调机制,并加强对货币政策和宏观审慎政策“溢出效应”的分析能力。基于上述理论,针对我国“双支柱”决策的现状和问题提出如下改革建议:一是从法律上明确中央银行的金融稳定职责。二是建立在同一框架内分析货币政策与宏观审慎政策的方法和工具。三是将金融监管部门的主要宏观审慎政策决策权集中至中央银行。四是建立货币政策与宏观审慎政策的协调流程与机制。     

Basel III capital buffers and Canadian credit unions lending: Impact of the credit cycle and the business cycle

We take advantage of the long-standing regulation of the risk-based capital and the leverage ratio in Canada to provide empirical evidence on the relation between the credit unions' capital buffers and loans to members. Based on a unique sample of the 100 Canadian largest credit unions from 1996 to 2014, we find that both the risk-based capital buffer and the leverage buffer are positively related to changes in loans and loan growth. However, changes in these two types of buffers are negatively related to changes in the loans to assets ratios. This finding suggests that to adjust their capital buffers, Canadian credit unions curtail their loans and underscores the importance of the Basel III conservation and the countercyclical buffer requirements in fostering credit. Further, we show that the risk-based capital buffer is positively related to the credit cycle. However, a mechanical application of the rule based on the credit-to-gross domestic product (GDP) gap to activate the countercyclical buffer, would have misguided Canadian credit unions.     

Countercyclical prudential buffers and bank risk-taking

We investigate the effects of countercyclical prudential buffers on bank risk-taking. We exploit the introduction of dynamic loan loss provisioning in Spain, mandating that banks use historical average loss rates in their estimation of loan loss provisions. We find that dynamic loan loss provisioning is associated with reductions in timely loan loss provisioning. Banks that previously recognized loan losses in a timely fashion exhibit the greatest reductions in timeliness and consequently extend loans to riskier borrowers with lower accounting quality. Our results have policy implications for the debate on the use of financial reporting requirements in mitigating capital pro-cyclicality.     

Macroprudential regulation,credit spreads and the role of monetary policy

We study the macroprudential roles of bank capital regulation and monetary policy in a borrowing cost channel model with endogenous financial frictions, driven by credit risk, bank losses and bank capital costs. These frictions induce financial accelerator mechanisms and motivate the examination of a macroprudential toolkit. Following credit shocks, countercyclical regulation is more effective than monetary policy in promoting price, financial and macroeconomic stability. For supply shocks, combining macroprudential regulation with a stronger anti-inflationary policy stance is optimal. The findings emphasize the importance of the Basel III accords in alleviating the output-inflation trade-off faced by central banks, and cast doubt on the desirability of conventional (and unconventional) Taylor rules during periods of financial distress.     

Countercyclical contingent capital

We analyze the optimal capital structure of a bank issuing countercyclical contingent capital, i.e., notes to be converted into common shares in poor macroeconomic conditions. A comparison of the main effects produced by the countercyclical asset with the simple equity-debt capital structure, the non-countercyclical contingent capital and the countercyclical callable bond is conducted. We demonstrate that this type of asset reduces the spread of straight debt and is effective in reducing the asset substitution incentive. The reduction of bankruptcy costs is strong only when the countercyclicality feature is removed. Contingent capital is useful for macroprudential regulation and we show that the countercyclical feature is important depending on priorities (moderate the asset substitution incentive or reduce bankruptcy costs).