Can hedge funds time global equity markets? Evidence from emerging markets

This paper examines the ability of global hedge funds to time a particularly volatile asset class — emerging market equities. In particular, we study whether or not these funds can either time emerging markets as a whole, or time their exposures to different regions. Using both pooled and calendar-time approaches, we generally find no evidence of overall timing ability. However, we do find some evidence of period-specific timing ability during the financial crisis and subsequent recovery.     

How do IMF announcements affect financial markets in crises?: Evidence from forward exchange markets

We employ a theoretical model to interpret the liquidity and moral hazard effects of IMF support during a financial crisis. We then estimate the response of forward exchange markets to IMF-related announcements, using data on the 3-, 9-, and 12-month forward exchange rates. Our results indicate that the announcement of IMF negotiations is associated with a premium on the baht and the rupiah, where the premium is much larger on the latter. This result is largely consistent with the responses of stock and bond markets, especially when country-specific data are employed.     

Do firms have leverage targets? Evidence from acquisitions

In the context of large acquisitions, we provide evidence on whether firms have target capital structures. We examine how deviations from these targets affect how bidders choose to finance acquisitions and how they adjust their capital structure following the acquisitions. We show that when a bidder's leverage is over its target level, it is less likely to finance the acquisition with debt and more likely to finance the acquisition with equity. Also, we find a positive association between the merger-induced changes in target and actual leverage, and we show that bidders incorporate more than two-thirds of the change to the merged firm's new target leverage. Following debt-financed acquisitions, managers actively move the firm back to its target leverage, reversing more than 75% of the acquisition's leverage effect within five years. Overall, our results are consistent with a model of capital structure that includes a target level and adjustment costs.     

Are RiskMetrics forecasts good enough? Evidence from 31 stock markets

Academic research has highlighted the inherent flaws within the RiskMetrics model and demonstrated the superiority of the GARCH approach in-sample. However, these results do not necessarily extend to forecasting performance. This paper seeks answer to the question of whether RiskMetrics volatility forecasts are adequate in comparison to those obtained from GARCH models. To answer the question stock index data is taken from 31 international markets and subjected to two exercises, a straightforward volatility forecasting exercise and a Value-at-Risk exceptions forecasting competition. Our results provide some simple answers to the above question. When forecasting volatility of the G7 stock markets the APARCH model, in particular, provides superior forecasts that are significantly different from the RiskMetrics models in over half the cases. This result also extends to the European markets with the APARCH model typically preferred. For the Asian markets the RiskMetrics model performs well, and is only significantly dominated by the GARCH models for one market, although there is evidence that the APARCH model provides a better forecast for the larger Asian markets. Regarding the Value-at-Risk exercise, when forecasting the 1% VaR the RiskMetrics model does a poor job and is typically the worst performing model, again the APARCH model does well. However, forecasting the 5% VaR then the RiskMetrics model does provide an adequate performance. In short, the RiskMetrics model only performs well in forecasting the volatility of small emerging markets and for broader VaR measures.     

Do investors find carbon information useful? Evidence from Italian firms

The usefulness of carbon disclosures has been questioned in the literature because they do not truly reflect firm’s carbon performance, suggesting that they may not be useful for risk evaluation and investment decisions. This study empirically tests the usefulness of carbon information voluntarily disclosed by the Italian firms. Our results based on the price model show that there is a positive association between the stock price and carbon disclosures, suggesting that investors find carbon information useful for their investment decisions. We find similar results based on the market valuation model. Additionally, the results reveal that the positive association is especially strong for firms that have established environmental committees on a voluntary basis and also for firms from the highly polluting industries defined by the EU_ETS program, confirming that investors’ positive response is especially strong to carbon disclosures by firms from the highly polluting industries. We also find that the market reacts positively to carbon disclosures by firms with a higher percentage of independent directors on their corporate boards, but the positive association is marginally significant.     

When do firms adjust prices? Evidence from micro panel data

The price-setting behavior of manufacturing firms is examined using a large panel of quarterly firm survey data from 1984 to 2007, which allows changes in firms’ prices to be linked to several firm-specific variables. The results show that state-dependent pricing is clearly present in a low-inflation environment and that variables measuring the current situation of the firm, especially costs for intermediate products, are important determinants of price adjustments. Compared to purely time-dependent features, the state-dependent variables significantly add to the explanatory power of a price adjustment probability model. Macroeconomic factors are significant but contribute little in terms of the goodness of fit. Furthermore, when taking into account sticky plan models by excluding possibly predetermined price changes, the importance of state-dependent factors becomes even greater.     

Is there an optimally diversified conglomerate? Gleaning answers from capital markets

Motivated by recent productivity-based theories of diversification, we argue that only conglomerates with an optimal degree of diversification can utilize their comparative advantages across various industries and achieve economies of scope by eliminating redundancies. Evidence from both corporate bond and equity markets suggests that optimally diversified conglomerates consist of either (1) approximately five equally weighted divisions, or (2) one large core business segment that roughly accounts for 75 % sales. Moreover, the relative size of divisions has a critical impact on how diversification affects credit spreads and excess values. Nonparity among divisions correlates with greater costs that increase with the number of divisions.     

Do financial markets care about SRI? Evidence from mergers and acquisitions

Mergers and acquisitions offer a framework for shedding new light on the stock market performance of socially responsible investments (SRI). We use Innovest’s Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) ratings as a measure of firms’ ability to cope with social and environmental risks. The IVA ratings allow us to uncover a positive relation between acquirer gains and the level of the target’s social and environmental risk management practices. Our findings suggest that the stock market rewards the acquirer for making socially and environmentally responsible investments. We also document that the environmental and social performance of the acquirer increases following the acquisition of a SRI aware target. These results are consistent with acquirer learning from the target’s SRI practices and experiences.     

How do banks resolve firms’ financial distress? Evidence from Japan

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate how banks resolve firms?? financial distress in Japan. Our results show that distressed firms that have more unsecured bank debt are more likely to restructure debt successfully out of court. Second, private debt restructuring is conducted during the year in which a financially distressed firm would be compelled to report negative net worth because of substantial accounting losses if no debt restructuring plans were implemented. Third, firms that are already in a negative net worth situation are more likely to receive debt forgiveness and/or debt-for-equity swaps. Finally, both the 1-year-lagged total liabilities-to-assets ratio and accounting losses are positively related to the private workout level. These results suggest that banks resolve firms?? financial distress in shareholders?? and creditors?? interests. We argue that, along with bankruptcy laws, the stock exchange rules and the fact that banks are allowed to hold shares in these firms affect the resolution of firms?? financial distress.     

Are CEO stock option grants optimal? Evidence from family firms and non-family firms around the Sarbanes–Oxley Act

This paper investigates the optimality of stock option grants to Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) by examining a set of S&P 500 companies around the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). I find that stock option grants to non-founding-family CEOs decreased dramatically after the passage of SOX. In addition, non-family firms granted significantly more stock options than family firms before the SOX, but not after its passage. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that CEOs use stock option grants as tools to extract rents from shareholders. This interpretation is further supported by evidence that the large decrease in stock option grants after the SOX was passed is not detrimental to firm performance, and by evidence from a test of the trade-off between option and non-option compensation.     

Are good-news firms riskier than bad-news firms?

This paper examines the relative risk of good-news firms, i.e., those with high standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), and bad-news (low SUE) firms using a stochastic discount factor approach. We find that a stochastic discount factor constructed from a set of basis assets helps explain post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD). The risk exposures on the pricing kernel increase monotonically from the lowest to highest SUE sorted portfolios. Specifically, good-news firms always have higher risk exposures than bad-news firms in both 10 SUE sorted portfolios and 25 size and SUE sorted portfolios. However, the estimated expected risk premium is too small to explain the observed magnitude of returns on the PEAD strategy. Our risk adjustment can explain only about one-fourth of the total magnitude of the average realized return to the PEAD strategy. As a result, the average risk-adjusted returns of earnings momentum strategies are mostly positive and significant. Overall, our results support the view that at least some portion of the returns to the earnings momentum strategies examined represent compensation for bearing increased risk.     

Can corporate governance save distressed firms from bankruptcy? An empirical analysis

We examine financially distressed firms and document how governance characteristics affect (1) a firm’s ability to avoid bankruptcy and (2) the power of financial/accounting information to predict bankruptcy. Overall, our findings indicate that a distressed firm’s governance characteristics significantly affect its probability of bankruptcy. We find that smaller and more independent boards with a higher ratio of non-inside directors and with larger ownership stakes of inside directors are more effective at avoiding bankruptcy once distress is indicated. These results are consistent with the belief that these types of governance structures induce more effective monitoring. The results are also consistent with the view that the inclusion of governance characteristics enhances the power of financial accounting models in predicting bankruptcy.

Do initial public offering firms manage accruals? Evidence from individual accounts

We examine whether initial public offering (IPO) firms exercise discretion over an individual accrual account on the balance sheet—the allowance for uncollectible accounts—and an individual accrual account on the income statement—bad debt expense. Our research design exploits a unique disclosure requirement related to these accounts (i.e., the ex post disclosure of write-offs of uncollectible accounts), which enables us to develop refined expectation models. We provide evidence that IPO firms have conservative, not aggressive, allowances in the annual periods adjacent to their stock offerings. In fact, the average IPO firm has an allowance that is over four-times leading write-offs. We also provide evidence that IPO firms record larger, not smaller, bad debt expense and are less likely to record income-increasing bad debt expense than matched non-IPO firms. These results challenge the view that IPO firms understate receivables-related accrual accounts.     

Are exchange rates serially correlated? New evidence from the Euro FX markets

This paper examines the serial uncorrelatedness hypothesis in the Euro FX markets by testing for autocorrelation in daily FX returns of 82 countries over the period of 1999–2010. We use three newly developed tests that are robust to conditional heteroskedasticity of unknown forms and that do not choose a lag parameter arbitrarily. They are Escanciano &; Lobato (2009)'s automatic Box–Pierce Q_p test, Nankervis &; Savin (2010)'s generalized Andrews–Ploberger test and Deo (2000)'s robust Durlauf test. We find no significant autocorrelation in the FX returns of around 58 to 62 countries, suggesting that majority of the Euro FX markets are weak-form efficient.     

Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms?

Taxes represent a significant cost to the firm and shareholders, and it is generally expected that shareholders prefer tax aggressiveness. However, this argument ignores potential non-tax costs that can accompany tax aggressiveness, especially those arising from agency problems. Firms owned/run by founding family members are characterized by a unique agency conflict between dominant and small shareholders. Using multiple measures to capture tax aggressiveness and founding family presence, we find that family firms are less tax aggressive than their non-family counterparts, ceteris paribus. This result suggests that family owners are willing to forgo tax benefits to avoid the non-tax cost of a potential price discount, which can arise from minority shareholders’ concern with family rent-seeking masked by tax avoidance activities [Desai and Dharmapala, 2006. Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 79, 145–179]. Our result is also consistent with family owners being more concerned with the potential penalty and reputation damage from an IRS audit than non-family firms. We obtain similar inferences when using a small sample of tax shelter cases.     

Performance of closely held firms in Russia: evidence from firm-level data∗

This paper evaluates the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance in a weak institutional environment. Specifically, using new survey evidence, we seek to appraise quantitatively the performance of block-holder-controlled firms in Russia and to identify, within the domain of corporate governance theory, factors that may explain such performance. We find evidence of negative association between the size of the dominant owners’ shareholding and performance parameters such as investment, capacity utilization, and profitability. At the same time, we establish that control structures with multiple, large shareholders increase efficiency. The ambiguity of the effects of ownership concentration suggests that country-specific factors play an important role.     

Competition between financial markets in Europe: what can be expected from MiFID?

The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) could be the foundation of new trading platforms in Europe. This contribution employs insights from the theoretical and empirical literature to highlight some of the possible implications of MiFID. In particular, we argue that more competition will lead to more liquid markets, reflected in lower bid–ask spreads and greater depth. It will also lead to innovation in incumbent markets and stimulate the design of new trading platforms. MiFID has already introduced more competition, as evidenced by the startup of Instinet Chi-X, the announcement of new initiatives, including Project Turquoise and BATS, and the reactions of incumbent exchanges.

Does carbon emission of firms matter for Bank loans decision? Evidence from China

In the context of global climate governance, greater carbon emissions of enterprises often result in a higher potential risk of environmental violations. Taking the non-financial companies listed in China from 2008 to 2018 as research samples, this paper empirically examined the impact of firm carbon emission on their acquisition of new bank loans and its mechanism of action. This paper empirically finds that if the carbon emission of an enterprise is higher, it will be granted with less new bank loans. The results remain robust after pairing analysis and instrumental variable analysis. The mechanism analysis shows that corporate credit rating plays a significant moderating role in the relationship between corporate carbon emission and new bank loans. Carbon emission leads to the improvement of earnings management of enterprises and the significant decline in the conservatism and comparability of accounting information, which is likely to be an important channel for the reduction of corporate bank loans. Upon further analysis, we find that the carbon emission of enterprises will not significantly affect the cost of acquiring bank loans, but it will significantly reduce the loan term structure. The cross-sectional analysis shows that the effect of carbon emission on new bank loans is more obvious in state-owned listed enterprises, enterprises with high internal control quality and enterprises with strong environmental law enforcement. The research results of this paper enrich the research on the economic consequences of carbon emission, reveal the implementation effect of green credit policies, provide empirical evidence for bank credit to play a role in green governance, and promote enterprises to actively reduce carbon emission.     

When should firms share credit with employees? Evidence from anonymously managed mutual funds

We study the choice between named and anonymous mutual fund managers. We argue that fund families weigh the benefits of naming managers against the cost associated with their increased future bargaining power. Named managers receive more media mentions, have greater inflows, and suffer less return diversion due to within family cross-subsidization, but departures of named managers reduce net flows. Naming managers became less common between 1993 and 2004. This was especially true in the asset classes and cities most affected by the hedge fund boom, which increased outside opportunities for, and the cost of retaining, successful named managers.