Comparing the spread of capitalism and democracy

We apply Leeson and Dean’s (2009) method for studying democratic dominoes to capitalist spillovers to compare the rates at which capitalism and democracy spread between countries. We find that capitalism and democracy spread at approximately the same modest rate.     

Political capitalism: The interaction between income inequality,economic freedom and democracy

We study the relationship between income inequality and economic freedom for a panel of 100 countries for the 1971–2010 period. Using a panel Granger non-causality approach, we reject the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality running from income inequality to economic freedom, but not vice versa. From a series of dynamic panel estimations we show that the effect of income inequality on economic freedom is negative and robust to the inclusion of additional controls. In particular, inequality is negatively associated with those components of economic freedom related to international trade, domestic market regulation as well as the rule of law and property rights protection. We argue that the negative effect of inequality on economic freedom is due to the economic elite converting its economic power into de facto political power to defend its economic interests; these interests run counter to economic freedom, discouraging innovation and competition as well as protecting the elite's rents. Finally, we show that economic freedom decreases with income inequality even in democratic countries, suggesting that democratic institutions do not prevent economic freedom from eroding. We argue that the latter finding corresponds to a system of political capitalism or captured democracy, where a powerful economic elite can nevertheless exercise de facto political power by cooperating with politicians and other decision-makers for their mutual benefit.     

State capitalism and the rent-seeking conjecture

The notion that state capitalism (an economic system “in which the state functions as the leading economic actor and uses markets primarily for political gain”) is a new form of capitalism emerging in the global arena has been recently advanced by several authors. This paper explores the problem of the nature of this system in the light of these claims to novelty. What are its main features as described by these authors? Is state capitalism distinctive from other forms of capitalism or other types of economic systems? Are we really witnessing the emergence of a new type of economic system? To address such questions the paper starts by trying to place the model of state capitalism within the traditional comparative economic systems framework. The inconclusive result leads to a different approach in which the concept of rent-seeking society is used to underlie the structural similarities between mercantilism, real life socialism and state capitalism. The article argues that the conjecture that what has been labeled “state capitalism” is yet another form of rent-seeking system is both robust and worth further investigating.     

Robert Brenner on political accumulation and the transition to capitalism

This paper is an immanent critique of Robert Brenner’s writings on the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The concept “immanent” is defined as a logic of implication, according to which a text or theory is evaluated within the terms that it sets for itself, to determine whether its objectives and assumptions are true in the way they are said to be true. Using this method of critique, the paper shows how Brenner’s concept of “political accumulation” undermines his own initial claim that the balance of class forces between lords and peasants determined the long-term trends of preindustrial Europe, in that this concept points toward intralord struggles dominated by military interests. The paper also discusses why Brenner’s account of France’s tax/office state seriously weakens his postulate that “surplus extracting relations” were the “fundamental” relation of fuedalism, on the grounds that office-holding reflected an unequal distribution of property based upon status. Finally, the paper draws out the theoretical implications of these contradictory instances, to delineate ways in which Brenner’s basic theory may be sublated within a more comprehensive account.     

Separating reputation, social influence, and identification effects in a dictator game

This study explores the ways in which information about other individual's action affects one's own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient's within-game reputation on the dictator's decision: Reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives is an important step in trying to understand how impulses towards selfish or generous behavior arise. The statistical analysis of experimental data reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than the social influence and identification.     

On the distribution of education and democracy

This paper examines the determinants of female autonomy within households in a developing country. In particular, we investigate the relative contributions of earned versus unearned income in enhancing women's autonomy and the role of employment outside of their husband's farm. In a simple theoretical model, it is demonstrated that earned income could be more important than unearned income in empowering women. Using data from rural Bangladesh, empirical estimations confirm this prediction and also reveal the surprising fact that it is not employment per se but employment outside their husbands' farms that contributes to women's autonomy. The data also point to the importance of choosing the correct threat point in theoretical analyses of female autonomy.     

Taxation, growth, and the spirit of capitalism

This paper uses a general two-sector model of endogenous growth to examine how the spirit of capitalism affects the relation between public finance and growth. The spirit of capitalism is defined as acquisitive personal objectives. We find that if the spirit of capitalism is present, an increase in the share of government spending in output reduces the long-run growth rate. The negative relationship between fiscal spending and growth is consistent with empirical evidence.     

On the distribution of education and democracy

This paper empirically analyzes the influence of education on democracy by controlling for unobservable heterogeneity and by taking into account the persistency of some of the variables. The most novel finding is that an increase in the education attained by the majority of the population is what matters for the implementation and sustainability of democracy, rather than the average years of schooling. We show this result is robust to issues pertaining omitted variables, outliers, sample selection, or a narrow definition of the variables used to measure democracy.     

Constitutional democracy and the theory of agency

A unanimously adopted democratic constitution is a contract between the people as principal and the government as agent. However, none of the incentive devices employed in private principal-agent contracting assure enforcement of a constitution. Under majority voting, candidates for the job of agent cannot win the job without promising tobreak the contract, and the agent cannot be re-elected unless he keeps that promise. We thank Joseph Haslag for his comments and Beverly Young for her valuable assistance.     

A real and monetary analysis of capitalism

Building on ideas of Joseph Schumpeter, this paper constructs and compares a real and a monetary model of capitalism. The paper’s thesis is that real and monetary analysis are both necessary for describing the capitalist cycle. The real model is in four parts. The first part is a simplified static Walrasian exchange. The second part uses a time dynamic to show price and productivity equilibrium over time. The third part defines surplus-value, capital, accumulation, profit and producer’s surplus. The fourth part defines economic evolution and long-term analysis. Each of the four parts has a corresponding Mathematica program and a table of sample data. The real model shows a relationship between long term average profit, GDP and capitalization. A monetary model is then constructed which empirically defines monetary and real products, the capital-market, the real economy and investment. The monetary model is first described under conditions of laissez-faire. The concepts of appreciation, overinvestment and the capitalist cycle are defined with the aid of the real model. Finally, the post laissez-faire capitalist cycle is described with an emphasis on the government policies of post 1980 capitalism. The conclusion of the paper—based on the real and monetary models—is that post 1980 capitalism changes but does not eliminate the capitalist cycle because government policies do not address over-investment, rather these policies abet over-investment.     

略论科学的民主性

阐述了民主和民主性的内涵及科学与民主的相互关系,探讨了提高科学民主性的现实意义。     

Consent,democracy and the future of liberalism

The Review of Austrian Economics - In this paper, I examine the ways in which liberal theory and democratic procedure have sought to address the justificatory challenge posed by the existence of...     

Defective democracy and the political budget cycle

Using a panel of democracies from 1987 to 2016, this study examines the effect of a defective democracy on the political budget cycle. To separate defective democracies from embedded democracies, we apply cluster analysis to the central elements of democracy. We find that the political budget cycle is significant only in defective democracies. Our finding indicates that the electoral cycle can persist even though democracies become old and economies become advanced. We also find that, of the central elements of democracy, weak rule of law and an ineffective government mainly explain the political budget cycle in defective democracies.     

Economic factors in the democratization of socialism and the socialization of capitalism

Part I discusses Wlodzimierz Brus' neo-Marxian theory of social change: political democratization as a necessary requirement for socialization of public means of production, and socialization necessary for economic efficiency. Then there is a short discussion of some related features of Marxian theory. Part II gives a model of technological change and of the dynamics of long-run growth. This leads to a discussion of the role of capitalism and authoritarian socialism in rapid growth. The author concludes that for “true democratic socialism” to evolve, the growth explosion of the industrial revolution should have run its course.     

Workers' investment funds and the dynamic inefficiency of capitalism

This paper examines the effects of the partial transfer of control over the investment decision from capitalists to workers, which is an essential feature of plans to establish workers' investment funds, in a two-class model of capitalism formulated as a differential game. It is shown that the institutional change which provides the workers with means to invest their savings directly, instead of having to use the capitalists as agents for accumulation, improves economic efficiency. As a consequence, the economy saves, invests, grows and consumes more than the pure capitalist society, which is characterized by the Keynesian separation of saving and investment decisions.     

Lost in transition: Life satisfaction on the road to capitalism

In the 1990s transition from socialism to capitalism in Eastern Europe life satisfaction followed the collapse and recovery of GDP, but failed to recover commensurately. By 2005, with GDP averaging about 25 per cent above its early 1990s level, life satisfaction was typically back to its earlier level, but was arguably still below pre-transition values. Increased satisfaction with material living levels occurred at the expense of decreased satisfaction with work, health, and family life. In the decade of the 1990s, disparities in life satisfaction increased with those hardest hit being the less educated and persons over age 30; women and men suffered about equally.     

Crony capitalism,the party-state,and the political boundaries of corruption

We build a model that puts together crony capitalism, the hierarchy of the Chinese communist party-state, and the decision-making process inside the Party Center. We show that inefficient economic institutions create local corruption that raises realized productivity, while generating rents that flow along the party-state hierarchy up to the provincial level, threatening the Center’s control in potential crises. Although both stronger crisis control and higher economic performance help the Center’s goal to stay in power, we show that given a general fat-tailed risk of crisis, the Center will maximize crisis control at the expense of the economy when choosing its tolerance of local corruption. Power structure and corruption within the Center and reciprocal accountability between central and provincial leaders are also analyzed. Our analysis suggests conditions under which China’s communist regime will or will not deal with the existential threat presented by corruption.