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1.
Bribe-proof rules in the division problem 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their preferences and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtains a weakly preferred share and all agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonic rules. This class is larger than the set of sequential allotment rules identified in Barberà et al. [Barberà, S., Jackson, M., Neme, A., 1997. Strategy-proof allotment rules. Games Econ. Behav. 18, 1–21]. 相似文献
2.
We describe and characterize the family of asymmetric parametric division rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims on a divisible homogeneous good. As part of the characterization, we present two novel axioms which restrict how a division rule indirectly allocates between different versions of the same claimant. We also show that such division rules can alternately be represented as the maximization of an additively separable social welfare function. 相似文献
3.
Allocation rules for land division 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Christopher P. Chambers 《Journal of Economic Theory》2005,121(2):236-258
This paper studies the classical land division problem formalized by Steinhaus (Econometrica 16 (1948) 101-104) in a multi-profile context. We propose a notion of an allocation rule for this setting. We discuss several examples of rules and properties they may satisfy. Central among these properties is division independence: a parcel may be partitioned into smaller parcels, these smaller parcels allocated according to the rule, leaving a recommended allocation for the original parcel. In conjunction with two other normative properties, division independence is shown to imply the principle of utilitarianism. 相似文献
4.
Gustavo Bergantiños Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2021,23(2):376-401
We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference profile, each agent finds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. We study and characterize two individually rational and efficient families of rules, whenever agents' preferences are symmetric single-peaked on the set of possible allotments. Rules in the two families are in addition envy-free, but they differ on whether envy-freeness is considered on losses or on awards. Our main result states that (a) the family of constrained equal losses rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy justified envy-freeness on losses and (b) the family of constrained equal awards rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy envy-freeness on awards. 相似文献
5.
When resources are divided among agents, the characteristics of the agents are taken into consideration. A simple example is the bankruptcy problem, where the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm is divided among the creditors based on their claims. We characterize division rules under which no group of agents can increase the total amount they receive by transferring their characteristics within the group. By allowing agents’ characteristics to be multi-dimensional and choosing the meaning of variables appropriately, our model can subsume a number of existing and new allocation problems, such as cost sharing, social choice with transferable utilities, income redistribution, bankruptcy with multiple types of assets, probability updating, and probability aggregation. A number of existing and new results in specific problems are obtained as corollaries. 相似文献
6.
William Thomson 《Economic Theory》1995,5(2):229-246
Summary We consider the problem of fairly allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences. First, we examine the implications of the requirement that a change in the population affect all agents that are present before and after the change in the same direction. We show that this requirement is met by no selection from the no-envy solution. In the face of this impossibility, we limit our attention to changes that are not so disruptive, in the following sense: if initially there is not enough to bring all agents to their satiation points, then this still is the case after the change, and if initially there is so much that agents have to be brought beyond their satiation points, then again, this remains the case. The requirement is that such changes affect all agents that are present before and after the change in the same direction. Our main result is that there is essentially only one selection from the envy-free and efficient solution satisfying this property. It is the solution known as the uniform rule.The comments of T. Yamato, T. Sönmez and two referees, and support from NSF under Grant No. 8809822 and SES 9212557, are gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
7.
Taylor rules, which link short-term interest rates to fluctuations in inflation and output, have been shown to be a good guide (both positively and normatively) to the conduct of monetary policy. As a result they have been used extensively to model policy in the context of both closed and open economy models. Their determinacy properties have also been analysed in the context of closed and, to a more limited degree, in small open economy models. In this paper, we extend the analysis of the determinacy properties of Taylor rules to the case of a benchmark two-country model. When the rules are specified in terms of output-price inflation we confirm and extend the conventional results from the closed economy literature—satisfying the Taylor principle is the key to ensuring determinacy, although the presence of backward-looking price-setting can affect the determinacy properties of the two-country model. However, the conventional results do not hold when we replace output-price inflation with consumer price inflation in the specification of the rule. In this case, Taylor rules which satisfy the Taylor principle will be indeterminate, unless there is an unusually large home bias in consumption. Similar indeterminacy problems arise when one country targets CPI inflation and the other output-price inflation. In this case we show that, even if determinacy is achieved, large spillovers may occur between countries. 相似文献
8.
Aris Trantidis 《Constitutional Political Economy》2017,28(2):195-208
Proponents of electoral quotas have a ‘dependent interpretation’ of democracy, i.e. they have formed an opinion on which decision-making rules are fair on the basis of their prior approval of the outcomes these rules are likely to generate. The article argues that this position causes an irresolvable problem for constitutional processes that seek to legitimately enact institutional change. While constitutional revision governed by formal equality allows the introduction of electoral quotas, this avenue is normatively untenable for proponents of affirmative action if they are consistent with their claim that formal equality reproduces biases and power asymmetries at all levels of decision-making. Their critique raises a fundamental challenge to the constitutional revision rule itself as equally unfair. Without consensus on the decision-making process by which new post-constitutional rules can be legitimately enacted, procedural fairness becomes an issue impossible to resolve at the stage of constitutional choice. This problem of legitimation affects all instances of constitutional choice in which there are opposing views not only about the desired outcome of the process but also about the decision-making rules that govern constitutional choice. 相似文献
9.
《非货币性资产交换》准则变化及其问题探讨 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
非货币性资产交换准则是为适应证券市场的发展和企业经营方式的变化由财政部制定的,换入资产入账价值的计价引进了商业实质和公允价值理论,在损益的确认方面与国际惯例一致,更趋合理,但也存在判断的困难. 相似文献
10.
Per-Olov Johansson 《Journal of public economics》1982,18(1):121-137
The consequences of imbalances in markets for goods and factors are the prime issues in many project evaluations. This is so in evaluations of measures like migration, manpower training programmes and plant locations. In the present paper a general disequilibrium model of a small open economy is used to generate evaluation rules to be used when markets do not clear through price adjustments. 相似文献
11.
Hang Keun Ryu 《Economic Modelling》2011,28(1-2):459-472
In this paper, the choice of a particular functional form based on the objective of the author is called the subjective model selection rule and the choice of a particular functional form using pre-selected model selection criteria is called the passive model selection rule. The objective of the author is the analysis of equilibrium, an efficient input choice, the study of the returns to scale function, the estimation of the elasticity of substitution, and the evaluation of the technical progress. Depending on the chosen objectives, economic restrictions such as the homogeneity, homotheticity, and regularity condition (positivity, monotonicity, and quasiconcavity) can be imposed. Various well-known functions beginning from the Cobb–Douglas (CD) to a globally well-behaved polynomial series are listed and the performances are compared with respect to the possibility of extracting economic interpretation, usefulness for advanced studies, computational easiness, and the potentiality of extending the given function to a more complex function. The isoquants and three dimensional output surfaces are plotted for a series of production functions using the transportation data of Zellner and Revankar (1969). Barnett and Jonas (1983) imposed the sufficient conditions for quasiconcavity of production functions while Gallant and Golub (1984) imposed the necessary and sufficient conditions. The strength and weakness of the above two methods are discussed. These methods are extended for three input cases using the U.S. electric power industry data of Nerlove (1963) and Greene (2008). 相似文献
12.
Can US monetary policy in the 1970s be described by a stabilizing Taylor rule when policy is evaluated with real-time inflation and output gap data? Using economic research on the full employment level of unemployment and the natural rate of unemployment published between 1970 and 1977 to construct real-time output gap measures for periods of peak unemployment, we find that the Federal Reserve did not follow a Taylor rule if appropriate measures are used. We estimate Taylor rules and find no evidence that monetary policy stabilized inflation, even allowing for changes in the inflation target. While monetary policy was stabilizing with respect to inflation forecasts, the forecasts systematically under-predicted inflation following the 1970s recessions and this does not constitute evidence of stabilizing policy. We also find that the Federal Reserve responded too strongly to negative output gaps. 相似文献
13.
In the backward-looking model, an explicit instrument rule is almost as efficient as a target rule. An explicit instrument rule leads to a more stable real rate of interest and hence an output stabilization bias compared to the target rule. 相似文献
14.
Alan Hamlin 《Constitutional Political Economy》2014,25(1):68-87
The Reason of Rules stands as a key text in the development of Constitutional Political Economy (CPE). While the achievements of the book in further shifting attention towards the constitutionalist perspective and providing a wide ranging discussion of the demand for rules are acknowledged, I suggest that the account of rules provided there and which still forms the core of much constitutionalist discussion in the Buchanan tradition seems limited. This paper revisits the analysis of rules in order to offer a broader perspective that is still consistent with the central ambitions of The Reason of Rules and CPE more generally. 相似文献
15.
We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (universities, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclic priority structure and the allocations are determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm. 相似文献
16.
This paper studies an aid allocation rule used by major development agencies, and investigates optimal allocations when recipients are neoclassical economies undergoing transition dynamics. When recipients face aid absorption constraints, allocations that favor poorer recipients are not always optimal, contrary to what is assumed in assessments of donor performance. The most quantitatively significant factors that determine the optimal sensitivity to recipient characteristics are the generosity of the aid budget and the extent of absorption constraints. In neoclassical recipients, aid can only accelerate growth where there is already growth, so the optimal rule places little weight on growth and optimality is largely a matter of balancing recipient need against absorption constraints. 相似文献
17.
《Review of International Economics》2018,26(2):322-338
This paper develops a model of international trade based on the division of labor under perfect competition. International trade, by eliminating the duplication of coordination costs, leads to a greater variety of tasks, each produced at a larger scale than in autarky. The greater variety of tasks implies greater division of labor and hence gains from trade. Extending the model to two factors of production yields the additional result that if the two countries are sufficiently similar in their relative endowments, then both factors of production can experience gains from trade. 相似文献
18.
George B. Tawadros 《Applied economics》2016,48(49):4758-4772
In this study, the hypothesis that the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) implements an asymmetric monetary policy rule is tested. We estimate both linear and asymmetric monetary policy reaction functions for the period before inflation targeting was adopted, for the period when inflation targeting was explicitly adopted and for the full sample period. The results of the linear monetary policy rules are consistent with the estimates reported from other studies that estimate linear monetary policy rules for Australia. On the other hand, the results of estimating the asymmetric monetary policy rules for the pre-inflation targeting period shows that the RBA had reacted symmetrically, suggesting that it had acted with the same aggressiveness towards both inflation and output gaps of the same magnitude, over both phases of the business cycle. However, for the inflation targeting period, the results show that the RBA had reacted asymmetrically in its policy response to the inflation gap, output gap or both. A similar result is found for the full sample period. This asymmetric response supports the view that a non-linear monetary policy rule emanated from asymmetric preferences, rather than from the existence of a non-linear Phillips curve. 相似文献
19.
20.
William A. Niskanen 《Constitutional Political Economy》1990,1(2):53-62
Massive changes in the effective constitution—primarily bearing on the economic powers of the federal government, primarily
in the past 60 years—have revived interest in the problem of constitutional maintenance. This paper finds the conventional
American theory of constitutional maintenance to have at least three major problems. The paper then suggests three propositions
about constitutional maintenance, building on the developing theory ofproprietary government. The most important conclusion is how little we know about this subject.
Paper presented at Panel on Constitutional Political Economy: Annual Meeting of the Southern Economic Association; Orlando,
Florida; 19–21 Nov. 1989 相似文献