Corporate Governance in Mexico

This paper looks broadly at the theme of corporate governance in Mexico. It begins with a brief analysis of the historical corporate governance model in Mexico, including the governance structures, the banking and financial systems, ownership and control patterns, industrial policy, and industrial relations. The paper then examines how and why these various aspects of corporate governance have been changing with processes of economic liberalization currently under way. Finally, it analyzes the consequences of changes in the model of corporate governance for the country's development (e.g. increased consumer goods for middle class consumers, increased disclosure by domestic corporations, less support for corporate social programs, etc.).     

Corporate Governance in Nigeria

In recent years, international economic pressures have induced Nigeria to adopt a program of economic liberalization and deregulation. Advocates of the reforms tout their potential not only for generating greater economic growth, but also for contributing to more responsible corporate governance. Sceptics abound. This paper provides an account of the nature of corporate governance in Nigeria and investigates the prospects for recent reforms contributing to more responsible governance and development.     

Corporate Governance Reforms in India

In recent years India has been moving further in the direction of adopting an Anglo-American model of corporate governance. This decision, the result more of international economic and political pressures than public debate, in effect represents a new development strategy for the world's most populous democracy. In light of this situation, it is important to ask two basic questions: 1) why has the Anglo-American model of corporate governance been adopted? and; 2) can it be justified? This paper addresses the first of these questions by distinguish and examining three historical models of governance in India: 1) the managing agency model in the colonial period; 2) the business house model that emerged after independence, and; 3) the Anglo-American model which has recently been adopted (and is still emerging). The second question is approached through an examination of the "development impact" of the new model, as indicated by such measures as growth, employment and respect for shareholder rights.     

Corporate Governance Reforms in Developing Countries

Corporate governance reforms are occurring in countries around the globe. In developing countries, such reforms occur in a context that is primarily defined by previous attempts at promoting "development" and recent processes of economic globalization. This context has resulted in the adoption of reforms that move developing countries in the direction of an Anglo-American model of governance. The most basic questions that arise with respect to these governance reforms are what prospects they entail for traditional development goals and whether alternatives should be considered. This paper offers a framework for addressing these basic questions by providing an account of: 1) previous development strategies and efforts; 2) the nature and causes of the reform processes; 3) the development potential of the reforms and concerns associated with them; 4) the (potential) responsibilities of corporate governance, including the (possible) responsibilities to promote development, and; 5) different approaches to promoting governance reforms with an eye to promoting development.     

公司财务治理研究综述

公司治理是一个国际性的前沿课题。财务治理是公司治理的核心。我国对公司治理的研究是从20世纪90年代开始的,财务治理的研究还处于初级阶段,深入研究财务治理理论和实践具有重要的理论和实践意义。其主要内容包括财务治理的研究背景;财务治理的研究动态;财务治理理论的发展方向。     

Authority and Democracy in Corporate Governance?

Although McMahon offers a potentially valuable extension of Joseph Raz's conceptualization of authority by distinguishing three different kinds of authority, this paper argues, first, that his account of the conditions and considerations that would justify managerial authority is problematic because it relies on a conception of reasons for action that excludes precisely the kind of rationality that plays an important role in the␣explanation and justification of authority in economic␣organization. This paper explains, second, why McMahon's thesis of the justificatory similarity of authority in governments and nongovernmental organizations can also be seen to hold for corporate governance of publicly owned firms more specifically. Finally, this paper raises some critical objections against McMahon's presumption of democratic governance in governments and NGO's alike. The thrust of these objections is that democratic corporate governance does not make sense in the publicly owned firms because: (1) it will not produce results that are fair or welfare maximizing, and (2) it will undermine the legitimacy of managerial authority in such firms. J. (Hans) van Oosterhout holds an M.A. in political science from Leiden University and a PhD in organization theory from RSM Erasmus University, where he is currently an associate professor. His research involves the positive and normative theory of organizations and institutions, with a current emphasis on corporate governance and comparative economic and political organization. Earlier publications have appeared in: Academy of Management Review, Organization Studies, Journal of Business Ethics and Futures.     

我国公司治理结构中存在的问题及其对策研究

公司治理结构是公司制的核心。目前我国公司治理结构存在的问题主要表现在几个方面:股权过于集中,大股东侵害小股东利益;董事会独立性不强;监事会有名无实等。现阶段,应通过加强董事会的独立性,完善董事责任;充分发挥监事会的监督职能;完善小股东诉讼权制度;引导、加强职工参与公司管理等,完善我国公司治理结构。     

公司治理与公司管理的关系研究

理顺公司治理与公司管理的关系是企业保持持久生命力的关键。两者相互依存,又互有区别。公司治理与公司管理的相互依存来自两者之间的匹配协调,两者的区别根源在于现代企业所有权与经营权的分离。公司治理与公司管理之间的匹配协调是动态的,随着企业内外部环境的变化,两者需经适时调整,以达到新的平衡。     

论西方机构投资者对公司治理的参与

有关机构投资者的研究在公司治理领域内对传统理论提出了强有力的挑战 ,但仍处于初步发展阶段 ,尚未形成逻辑一致、系统的分析框架。借鉴美英公司治理模式下机构投资者对公司治理的参与 ,为进一步深入开展机构投资者与公司治理关系系统研究提供一个理论框架     

公司治理与企业内生风险

本文在整理有关公司治理文献的基础上,指出公司治理与企业内生风险的关系;对企业委托人层面上的权力重构做出合理的静态分析,认为委托代理关系的融合是降低企业内生风险的关键;研究还表明,若干时期内,委托代理关系不可能调整到均衡状态。因此,委托人必须预设一个相对弹性的空间,使得内在风险与外在风险可调和,在“共同治理”模式下,当委托人与代理人拥有的信息随着时间推移互为“内外双层气泡”时,企业内生风险可以降低。     

公司治理结构中的利益相关者问题

本文认为,股份制改革是中国企业改革的方向,公司治理是股份制改革最核心的内容,而公司治理原则中不可缺少的一项就是利益相关者的安排问题,即他们的权利、作用及保护问题。职工持股从国际经验来看,主要是考虑三方面的因素:一是职工特别是高素质人才的积极性调动问题;二是充分利用职工在参与管理方面的能力及优势;三是充分发挥职工对于整个公司管理层在合规性、防止出现舞弊和恶性事件等方面所能够起到的监督和报警的作用。在我国,员工的地位和员工参与管理的程度应该能够做得更好。解决好利益相关者问题,有利于和谐增长,特别会有利于科技型企业、人才密集型企业和以知识为基础的企业的健康发展。     

公司治理与大股东利益侵占——桂林集琦药业股份有限公司案例研究

以“桂林集琦”为案例,以此来了解一些公司的治理情况,以及其对企业经营的一些重大影响。与国外成熟资本市场不同的是,我国非流通股和国有股的特殊制度背景,恶化了大小股东之间的利益冲突。大股东通过股权融资、占用资金、现金股利、资产交易、担保等多种方式攫取利益。     

商事经营判断规则与我国公司法人治理结构之完善

通过对商事经营判断规则的内容解读和问题分析,揭示了商事经营判断规则的基本涵义:一方面保障董事的经营决策权;另一方面也对董事的行为准则提出了严格的要求。进一步讨论我国应如何引入和借鉴商事经营判断规则的成功经验,以及该规则对完善我国公司法人治理结构的意义。     

基于机构投资者参与公司治理结构的研究

由于机构投资者能够有效地解决上市公司治理机制中个人投资者监督成本内化和收益外化的"搭便车"的现象,从而决定了机构投资者本身就是一种解决企业监控难题的制度。不同性质的机构投资者在证券市场中的功能定位、市场空间和实际作用的不同,完全可以考虑以机构投资者的多元化对企业内部控制和外部控制所能产生的市场互补和功能整合效应,来充分发挥机构投资者在公司治理中的作用。     

投资者保护与公司治理

公司治理是近 30年来理论研究的热点 ,但人们大多把注意力集中于对经理行为的研究 ,而忽视了对投资者保护的关注。随着以哈特为代表的新产权学派的兴起 ,特别是LLSV( 1 998)的实证数据使得人们把视角转为对投资者保护机制的关注。我们发现 ,在投资者保护的研究框架下 ,可以更好地理解公司治理 ,以及它们对一国金融市场和经济发展的重要性。     

公司治理机制与财务业绩:效率还是盈利

本文基于杜邦分析体系(DuPontAnalysis),以我国资本市场在2002-2004年期间的上市公司年度数据为研究样本,实证检验了公司治理水平的提高对促进企业绩效增长的实现路径。研究表明,上市公司的治理水平越高,高管人员也就越加重视通过公司内部资源整合、完善营销策略和客户管理等方式提高资产营运效率。而且公司治理水平对改善企业绩效的影响并没有突出体现在努力提高主营业务收入或降低生产成本环节,而主要是通过加强资产管理和提高营运效率来实现的。     

公司治理结构下的会计信息披露

会计信息披露与公司治理结构之间有积极的互动关系。从委托代理的博弈过程显示出经理倾向不充分披露会计信息。规范会计信息披露可以采取优化股权、完善独立董事制度、内部控制制度、建立约束激励机制和完善会计制度等加强社会监管的措施。     

公司治理结构与现金持有量

经理人‘自利动机’可能会影响到公司现金持有量以及现金使用。不同治理结构又会对‘自利动机’构成不同的约束,从股权集中度、经理人所有权以及董事会构成、外部投资者受保护的程度等角度分析公司现金持有量与公司治理结构的关系,进一步研究公司治理结构与现金持有量,对我国上市公司实现现代化管理有重要意义。     

民营上市公司的治理机制及治理效应分析

通过对民营上市公司常用的治理机制及治理效应的分析,我们发现:民营上市公司的各种治理机制无论对净资产收益率还是财务综合绩效,都没有太大的解释力,但对托宾Q值却具有极强的解释能力。即使是就托宾Q值而言,股东会议、独立董事规模、两职设置、高管人员薪酬等内部治理机制也没有发挥显著的作用,内部治理机制中的第一大股东具有特别重要的作用。     

建立现代公司法人治理结构之理论基石

现代公司组合主体的多元性必然导致公司权力与利益分配的不平衡,并可能降低公司的经济效益。因此,要提高公司经济效益并对现代公司各主体之间分配权力与利益实现制衡其最有效途径是建立“高效优质”的法人治理结构。由于公司法人治理结构是法学与经济学共同研究的一个基本问题,所以分别从法学和经济学两个角度对其理论基石进行了探讨。