企业分红能力之理论研究

本文对企业分红能力进行理论研究。本文首先较为深入地研究了自由现金流之界定与计量问题,并创新性地提出和研究了自由现金和现金增加值的界定与计量问题,然后提出了关于净利润、留存收益和利润分配之本质的新见解。基于自由现金和留存收益概念及其本质理解,本文研究提出,企业分红能力是指,企业股东是否有在正值的留存收益边界内可持续地分走企业自由现金的能力;企业在某个时点具备分红能力的充要条件是企业留存收益为正值的同时还拥有源自自由现金流的自由现金,亦即,企业分红能力受制于源自自由现金流的自由现金和留存收益这双重边界。     

私募股权投资企业常见典型税务处理分析--以被私募股权投资企业扶持上市的H集团为例

本文以H集团分红、2013年净资产折股、未分配利润转增股本为例,分析了被投资企业分红、留存收益、资本公积转增股本时有限责任制私募股权投资企业和合伙制私募股权投资企业相关的税务处理。     

从债转股看国有企业融资行为的偏好

债转股是党中央、国务院为盘活商业银行不良资产 ,防范和化解金融风险 ,加快实现国有大中型亏损企业转亏为盈所做出的一项重大战略决策 ,受到社会各方的广泛关注 ,由此也反映出国有企业融资行为的偏好。通过对债权融资和股权融资的比较分析 ,可以得出债权融资成本低于股权融资成本的结论。国有企业之所以偏好股权融资 ,主要是由于存在认识原因、政策原因、现实导向、制度原因、市场原因、历史原因。只有建立和完善发达的资本市场 ,规范资本市场运作 ,国有企业才能找到债权融资和股权融资的最佳结合点。     

高管激励与债务资本成本——基于中国上市公司的经验依据

本文以2008-2016年中国上市公司为研究对象,对高管激励水平与债务资本成本的关系进行考察,对高管激励如何影响债务资本成本进行理论分析和实证检验。结果发现,薪酬激励和股权激励都对债务资本成本具有显著的负面影响,即随着薪酬激励和股权激励强度的提高,债务资本成本会降低。同时高管激励具有降低债务资本成本的积极作用。     

国有企业股权资本成本的现状探讨

随着中国社会主义市场经济理念的逐渐深入,我国的国有企业改革脚步也在逐渐加快。我国的国有企业要适应当前的市场条件,迎接新的挑战必须从有效估算企业的资本成本入手。本文通过分析国有企业股权资本现状并分析形成这一现状的成因来总结改善国有企业股权资本成本结构的策略。     

股权资本与区域经济增长的内生性实证检验

在Lucas(1988)模型基础上引入金融资本建立内生经济增长分析框架,研究分析表征区域股票市场发展的两个变量(股权资本和股东权益)对经济增长的影响,并重点强调对内生性问题的分析。借助省级面板数据进行实证检验后发现,经济增长动力的地区差异十分明显,股权资本对经济增长的贡献不显著。     

对国有企业业绩评价指标体系的思考

一、我国国有企业业绩评价指标体系现状及存在问题 首先,转变经济增长方式,走高效发展道路,要求我们提高资金的使用效率。而传统的业绩评价体系忽略了对股权资本成本的确认和计量,容易导致资本的浪费。现行的财务会计只确认和计量债务资本的成本,而对于股权资本成本则作为收益分派处理,使得作为企业净收益的净利润中包含了股权资本的成本,而报表阅读者则误以为所有的资本都得到了补偿。     

浅谈债务融资与公司治理效率

企业资本按其性质不同分为股权资本和债务资本，相对应形成了股权融资和债务融资两类融资方式。从理论上讲，企业对融资方式的选择在很大程度上受到融资成本的制约，一般来说，企业力救一成本最低的融资方式。国外的实证研究表明，上市公司一般先使用内部股权融资（即留存收益），其次是债务融资，最后是外部股权融资。     

基于自然资本的可持续发展经济问题研究

在当今世界经济的高速发展中,主流经济学的一些理论已逐渐不能适应时代的需要,它普遍忽视了自然资源的贡献。而随着自然资本的耗竭,经济增长的决定因素将由人造资本转向自然资本,而这也就否定了传统的以人造资本为依据来衡量可持续发展的方法,赋予了可持续经济发展以科学的内涵,动态地反映了可持续经济发展的能力。本文力求从自然资本着手,来分析代际之间自然资本的配置和实现,最终为中国经济的可持续发展提出合理的政策建议。     

税收筹划争议

着企业改组改制的逐步完成,职工取得股份(股票或股权)的现象越来越多。在税收工作实践中,工取得股权缴纳个人所得税问题值得关注。在企业改组改制(是指将原国有、集体企业改组为限责任公司、股份有限公司,或者有限责任公司改组股份有限公司)过程中,职工取得的量化资产,即将于公司原股东拥有的一部分留存收益或资本公积,于给职工个人配股。根据《关于企业改组改制过程中人取得的量化资产征收个人所得税问题的通知》(国发[2000]60号)规定,对职工个人以股份形式取得仅作为分红依据,不拥有所有权的企业量化资产,不收个人所得税。对职工个人以股…     

Dividend Taxes and Implied Cost of Equity Capital

We estimate firm‐level implied cost of equity capital based on recent advances in accounting and finance research and examine the effect of dividend taxes on the cost of equity capital. We investigate whether dividend taxes affect firms' cost of capital by testing the relation between the implied cost of equity capital and a measure of the tax‐penalized portion of dividend yield, which we define as the product of dividend yield and the dividend tax penalty. The results generally support the dividend tax capitalization hypothesis. We find a positive relation between the implied cost of equity capital and the tax‐penalized portion of dividend yield that is decreasing in aggregate institutional ownership, our proxy for tax‐advantaged investors. The evidence in this study adds to the understanding of the effect of investor‐level taxes on equity value.     

A Re-examination of Disclosure Level and the Expected Cost of Equity Capital

This paper examines the association between the cost of equity capital and levels of annual report and timely disclosure, and investor relations activities. We estimate the cost of equity capital using the classic dividend discount model. We find that the cost of equity capital decreases in the annual report disclosure level but increases in the level of timely disclosures. The latter result is contrary to theory but is consistent with managers' claims that greater timely disclosures may increase the cost of equity capital, possibly through increased stock price volatility. We find no association between the cost of equity capital and the level of investor relations activities. We conclude that aggregating across different disclosure types results in a loss of information. Failing to include all disclosure types in regression analyses may lead to a correlated omitted variable bias and erroneous conclusions.     

Agency Cost,Dividend Policy and Growth: The Special Case of REITs

Dividend distribution enhances information transmission, and mitigates agency conflicts by restricting managers’ access to free cash flow, and exposing firms to the scrutiny and monitoring by market participants when raising external capital. The reduction in agency costs and improvement in information dissemination reduce the cost of funds, and investment at more competitive cost of capital enhances firm value. For REITs, because of the mandated high dividend distribution, growth depends on the availability of external capital at competitive rates, such that mitigation of agency costs is critical to sustain growth. We examine the relation between dividends and growth with a sample of U.S. equity REITs. Our data reveal a significantly positive relation between externally financed growth and dividend payments. The relation is stronger among REITs with more growth opportunities, and REITs that issue new equity and debt. We interpret this evidence as consistent with the notion that by reducing agency costs and facilitating capital raising, dividends enhance growth.     

Dividend change announcements,ROE, and the cost of equity capital

We hypothesize and present strong evidence that dividend increases (decreases) result in a general decrease (increase) in the opportunity cost of equity capital (K_e), measured by the discount rate implicit in analysts' forecasts. Estimates of K_e obtained from analyst forecast data likely capture priced information risk that is not reflected in cost of equity capital estimates customarily obtained from empirical excess returns data. In the presence of a full menu of control variables, our measured changes in the cost of equity capital are shown to provide high explanatory power for the market reaction to dividend change announcements. We also hypothesize and demonstrate that the impact of dividend changes on the cost of equity is conditional on how preannouncement K_e relates to preannouncement return on equity (ROE). Specifically, dividend increases result in a reduction in the cost of equity capital only when currently experienced ROE < K_e. This is consistent with shareholders preferring earnings to be reinvested by managers to earn a higher rate than their opportunity rate. When ROE > K_e, on the other hand, the cost of equity capital actually increases. For dividend decreases, the cost of equity capital increases only when ROE > K_e, consistent with firms currently experiencing positive economic income using dividend cuts to signal anticipated permanent earnings declines. Together with extensive robustness tests, our results indicate that dividend changes significantly affect shareholder value, contrary to the longstanding dividend irrelevance argument.     

Capital gains tax and the capital asset pricing model

This paper develops a version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model that views dividend imputation as affecting company tax and assumes differential taxation of capital gains and ordinary income. These taxation issues aside, the model otherwise rests on the standard assumptions including full segmentation of national capital markets. It also treats dividend policy as exogenously determined. Estimates of the cost of equity based on this model are then compared with estimates based on the version of the CAPM typically applied in Australia, which differs only in assuming equality of the tax rates on capital gains and ordinary income. The differences between the estimates can be material. In particular, with a high dividend yield, allowance for differential taxation can result in an increase of two to three percentage points in the estimated cost of equity. The overall result obtained here carries over to a dividend equilibrium, in which firms choose a dividend policy that is optimal relative to the assumed tax structure.     

Economic policy uncertainty and the cost of capital

This paper examines the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on the cost of capital in China. We find that an increase in EPU results in a significantly higher cost of capital and this impact is mainly through increasing the cost of equity instead of the cost of debt. There is no significant difference between the impact of EPU on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the one on private firms, but a stronger impact on large firms than on small firms is found. Further analysis suggests that the stronger impact on large firms occurs only in private firms instead of SOEs. We provide and test several channels through which EPU might affect the cost of capital. Our results suggest that EPU influences the cost of capital through increasing information asymmetry and reducing the quality of internal controls.     

THE COST OF CAPITAL,MACAULAY'S DURATION,AND TOBIN'S q

It is shown empirically that the cost of equity capital estimated from the dividend discount model and Tobin's q are negatively related. The theoretical relationship between these variables is exploited to determine alternative estimates of the cost of equity capital and Macaulay's duration without having to estimate the growth rate g in the conventional manner. This new approach can readily be implemented for large firms reporting SFAS No. 33 data.     

The Cost of Equity Capital at the Corporate and Investor Levels Allowing a Rational Expectations Model with Personal Taxations

This paper argues that the conventional definition of the cost of equity at the corporate level is likely to be fundamentally flawed under conditions of personal taxation. A 'dimensionally consistent' definition is developed utilising the pioneering contributions of Auerbach and Elton and Gruber. Consequent benefits are straight-forward expressions for the cost of equity capital at the corporate level (for both retained earnings and new equity) as well as at the investor level (post personal tax) in terms of both the dividend discount and CAPM-type models, which are applicable to classical and imputation tax systems. A fundamental framework is thereby provided which succeeds in illuminating investor pesonal tax liabilities as they might be expected to impact on a firm's investment and related dividend policies.     

An Investigation of the Dynamic Relationship between Agency Theory and Dividend Policy

Agency theory posits that the dividend mechanism provides an incentive for managers to reduce the costs associated with the principal/agent relationship. Distributing resources in the form of cash dividends forces managers to seek outside capital, thus causing them to reduce agency costs as they subject themselves to the scrutiny of the capital marketplace. Under this scenario the optimum level of dividend payout is that which minimizes the agency cost structure relative to the cost of raising needed funds. A test of this theory employing time-series cross-sectional analysis and more direct measures of the agency cost structure shows that these tenets of agency theory may be valid. Managers do appear to adjust the dividend payout in response to the agency cost/transaction cost structure, both through time as well as across firms.     

Terminal valuations, growth rates and the implied cost of capital

We develop a model based on the notion that prices lead earnings, allowing for a simultaneous estimation of the implied growth rate and the cost of equity capital for US industrial sectors. The major difference between our approach and that in prior literature is that ours avoids the necessity to make assumptions about terminal values and consequently about future growth rates. In fact, growth rates are an endogenous variable, which is estimated simultaneously with the implied cost of equity capital. Since we require only 1-year-ahead forecasts of earnings and no assumptions about dividend payouts, our methodology allows us to estimate ex ante aggregate growth and risk premia over a larger sample of firms than has previously been possible. Our estimate of the risk premium being between 3.1 and 3.9 % is at the lower end of recent estimates, reflecting the inclusion of these short-lived companies. Our estimate of the long run growth is from 4.2 to 4.7 %.