Systemic Bank Risk in Brazil: A Comprehensive Simulation of Correlated Market, Credit, Sovereign and Inter-Bank Risks

In this study we present a comprehensive forward‐looking portfolio simulation methodology for assessing the correlated impacts of market risk, private sector and Sovereign credit risk, and inter‐bank default risk. In order to produce better integrated risk assessment for banks and systemic risk assessments for financial systems, we argue that reasonably detailed modeling of bank asset and liability structures, loan portfolio credit quality, and loan concentrations by sector, region and type, as well as a number of financial and economic environment risk drivers, is required. Sovereign and inter‐bank default risks are increasingly important in the current economic environment and their inclusion is an important model extension. This extended model is demonstrated through an application to both individual Brazilian banks (i.e., 28 of the largest banks) and groups of banks (i.e., the Brazilian banking system) as of December 2004. When omitting Sovereign risk, our analysis indicates that none of the banks face significant default risk over a 1‐year horizon. This low default risk stems primarily from the large amount of government securities held by Brazilian banks, but also reflects the banks' adequate capitalizations and extraordinarily high interest rate spreads. We note that none of the banks which we modeled failed during the very stressful 2007‐2008 period, consistent with our results. Our results also show that a commonly used approach of aggregating all banks into one single bank, for purposes of undertaking a systemic banking system risk assessment, results in a misestimate of both the probability and the cost of systemic banking system failures. Once Sovereign risk is considered and losses in the market value of government securities reach 10% (or higher), we find that several banks could fail during the same time period. These results demonstrate the well known risk of concentrated lending to a borrower, or type of borrower, which has a non‐zero probability of default (e.g., the Government of Brazil). Our analysis also indicates that, in the event of a Sovereign default, the Government of Brazil would face constrained debt management alternatives. To the best of our knowledge no one else has put forward a systematic methodology for assessing bank asset, liability, loan portfolio structure and correlated market and credit (private sector, Sovereign, and inter‐bank) default risk for banks and banking systems. We conclude that such forward‐looking risk assessment methodologies for assessing multiple correlated risks, combined with the targeted collection of specific types of data on bank portfolios, have the potential to better quantify overall bank and banking system risk levels, which can assist bank management, bank regulators, Sovereigns, rating agencies, and investors to make better informed and proactive risk management and investment decisions.     

金融科技、最优银行业市场结构与小微企业信贷供给

小微企业融资问题一直备受各界关注,金融科技的发展或许会带来新变化,但相关研究尚不充分。本文构建包含贷款技术和银行业市场结构的理论模型,提出金融科技、银行业市场结构与小微企业信贷供给的关系假说。在此基础上,手工收集百度搜索指数数据,建立与银行小微企业信贷业务相关的各省金融科技发展水平指数,并利用2011-2018年省级面板数据进行相应的实证检验。研究结果表明:针对整个银行业体系,金融科技有助于促进银行小微企业信贷供给;银行业市场结构与小微企业信贷供给之间呈现“倒U”型关系,即推动银行增加小微企业信贷供给时,存在最优银行业市场结构;与此同时,金融科技发展水平将影响银行业最优市场结构,金融科技发展水平越高,促进小微企业信贷供给的最优银行业竞争程度越高。本文的研究结论能够进一步丰富小微企业信贷理论,补充中国经验证据,为促进银行小微企业信贷供给提供重要启示。     

Does adding up of economic capital for market- and credit risk amount to conservative risk assessment?

There is a tradition in the banking industry of dividing risk into market risk and credit risk. Both categories are treated independently in the calculation of risk capital. But many financial positions depend simultaneously on both market risk and credit risk factors. In this case, an approximation of the portfolio value function separating value changes into a pure market risk plus pure credit risk component can result not only in an overestimation, but also in an underestimation of risk. We discuss this compounding effect in the context of foreign currency loans and argue that a separate calculation of economic capital for market risk and for credit risk may significantly underestimate true risk.     

Incentive-Based Lending Capacity,Competition and Regulation in Banking

This paper studies moral hazard in banking due to delegated monitoring in an environment of aggregate risk and examines its implications for credit market equilibrium and regulation, in a model where banks are price competitors for loans and deposits. It provides a rationale for an incentive-based lending capacity positively linked to the bank's capital and profit margin, for an oligopolistic market structure wherever banks have market power, and for capital requirements. Social-welfare-maximizing capital requirements are lowered in recessions, are higher the more fragmented the banking sector, and are increased when anti-competitive measures are removed. In equilibrium banks earn excessive profits and credit may be rationed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G28, L13.     

Financial crisis,structure and reform

In this study, we examine the relationship between the structure of financial systems and financial crises. Using cross-country data on financial structures and crises, we find that there is a significant short-term reversal in development of the banking sector and the stock market during both bank crises and market crashes, with the corporate bond market moving in the same direction as bank credit. However, the results are significant for countries with market-based financial systems but not for countries with bank-based financial systems. Emerging markets have mainly bank-based financial systems, which may explain why these markets require more time to recover from economic downturns after a financial crisis. Therefore, we argue that governments should emphasize a balanced financial system structure as it helps countries to recover from financial crises more quickly compared with countries that lack such balanced structures.     

The role of household and business credit in banking crises

Private credit expansions are an important predictor of subsequent banking crises. We revisit that result with a new dataset from developed and developing countries that decomposes private credit into household credit and enterprise credit. We argue that household credit growth raises debt levels without much effect on long-term income. Rapid household credit expansions generate vulnerabilities that can precipitate a banking crisis. Enterprise credit expansions can have the same effects but it is tempered by the associated increase in income. Our estimates show that household credit expansions have been a statistically and economically significant predictor of banking crises. Enterprise credit expansions are also associated with banking crises but their effect is weaker and less robust.     

Did the Market Signal Impending Problems at Northern Rock? An Analysis of Four Financial Instruments

The academic literature has regularly argued that market discipline can support regulatory authority mechanisms in ensuring banking sector stability. This includes, amongst other things, using forward‐looking market prices to identify those credit institutions that are most at risk of failure. The paper's key aim is to analyse whether market investors signalled potential problems at Northern Rock in advance of the bank announcing that it had negotiated emergency lending facilities at the Bank of England in September 2007. A further aim of the paper is to examine the signalling qualities of four financial market instruments (credit default swap spreads, subordinated debt spreads, implied volatility from options prices and equity measures of bank risk) so as to explore both the relative and individual qualities of each. The paper's findings, therefore, contribute to the market discipline literature on using market data to identify bank risk‐taking and enhancing supervisory monitoring. Our analysis suggests that private market participants did signal impending financial problems at Northern Rock. These findings lend some empirical support to proposals for the supervisory authorities to use market information more extensively to improve the identification of troubled banks. The paper identifies equities as providing the timeliest and clearest signals of bank condition, whilst structural factors appear to hamper the signalling qualities of subordinated debt spreads and credit default swap spreads. The paper also introduces idiosyncratic implied volatility as a potentially useful early warning metric for supervisory authorities to observe.     

Interbank Credit Lines as a Channel of Contagion

This paper assesses the potential for contagion in the Swiss interbank market using new data on bilateral bank exposures as well as on credit lines. A simulation approach is applied to assess the banking system's inherent instability. Moreover, the spill-over effects of a simulated default situation in the interbank market on the liquidity and solvency of banks are measured. The main findings are, first, that there is a substantial potential for contagion. Second, the exposure as well as the credit line contagion channel are relevant for Switzerland. Third, a lender of last resort intervention could reduce spill-over effects remarkably. Finally, the structure of the interbank market has considerable impact on its resilience against spill-over effects: Centralized markets are more prone to contagion than homogenous ones. JEL classification: C81, G21. The opinions expressed herein are my own and not those of the Swiss National Bank.     

Credit Scoring and the Availability of Small Business Credit in Low‐ and Moderate‐Income Areas

This paper estimates that credit scoring is associated with about a $3,900 increase in small business lending per sample banking organization, per low‐ and moderate‐income (LMI) area served, and this effect is roughly equivalent to that estimated for higher‐income areas. For our sample, this corresponds to a $536 million increase in small business credit in LMI areas in 1997 than otherwise would have been the case. This effect appears to be driven by increased out‐of‐market lending by banking organizations, as in‐market lending generally declines. Overall, it does not appear that credit scoring has a disparate impact on LMI areas.     

Securitized banking and the run on repo

The panic of 2007–2008 was a run on the sale and repurchase market (the repo market), which is a very large, short-term market that provides financing for a wide range of securitization activities and financial institutions. Repo transactions are collateralized, frequently with securitized bonds. We refer to the combination of securitization plus repo finance as “securitized banking” and argue that these activities were at the nexus of the crisis. We use a novel data set that includes credit spreads for hundreds of securitized bonds to trace the path of the crisis from subprime-housing related assets into markets that had no connection to housing. We find that changes in the LIB-OIS spread, a proxy for counterparty risk, were strongly correlated with changes in credit spreads and repo rates for securitized bonds. These changes implied higher uncertainty about bank solvency and lower values for repo collateral. Concerns about the liquidity of markets for the bonds used as collateral led to increases in repo haircuts, that is the amount of collateral required for any given transaction. With declining asset values and increasing haircuts, the US banking system was effectively insolvent for the first time since the Great Depression.     

Cross-border banking,bank market structures and market power: Theory and cross-country evidence

Patterns in cross-border banking have changed since the global financial crisis. This may affect domestic bank market structures and macroeconomic stability in the longer term. In this study, I theoretically and empirically analyze how different modes of cross-border banking impact bank concentration and market power. I use a two-country general equilibrium model with heterogeneous banks developed by DeBlas and Russ (2010a) to grasp the effect of cross-border lending and foreign direct investment in the banking sector on bank market structures. The model suggests that both cross-border lending and bank FDI mitigate concentration. Empirical evidence from a panel dataset of 18 OECD countries supports the theoretical predictions: higher volumes of bank FDI and of cross-border lending coincide with lower Herfindahl-indexes in bank credit markets.     

银行业市场集中度对货币政策传导有效性影响研究——基于信贷传导视角

选取我国17家商业银行2006－2017年数据构建固定效应面板数据模型进行实证分析,结果表明:银行业市场集中度的变化会对货币政策信贷传导有效性产生影响。当银行集中度较高时,银行集中度与货币政策信贷传导有效性间呈正向变动关系;但是反向关系存在于较低银行集中度时,临界点位于银行集中度为39.795%时。中小型银行的信贷增速较之大型国有商业银行受到货币政策影响更大。银行集中度越低意味着竞争程度越强,货币政策信贷传导的有效性越高。     

Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking, and Loan Repayment

How does information sharing between lenders affect borrowers repayment behavior? We show—in a laboratory credit market—that information sharing increases repayment rates, as borrowers anticipate that a good credit record improves their access to credit. This incentive effect of information sharing is substantial when repayment is not third‐party enforceable and lending is dominated by one‐shot transactions. If, however, repeat interaction between borrowers and lenders is feasible, the incentive effect of credit reporting is negligible, as bilateral banking relationships discipline borrowers. Information sharing nevertheless affects market outcome by weakening lenders' ability to extract rents from relationships.     

Contagion risk in the Australian banking and property sectors

The Australian banking system emerged from the global crisis virtually unhurt, with most banks still profitable, adequately capitalized, and with AA credit ratings. Are there any risks or vulnerabilities in this success story? This paper analyzes Australia’s systemic banking risk and attempts to determine if this risk increased with the recent global crisis and whether this risk is related to the downturn experienced in the real estate market. We use extreme value theory to measure banks’ and property firms’ univariate Value at Risk, as well as multivariate intra-sector and inter-sector contagion risks. Of the 13 sectors analyzed, we find that the property sector exhibits the highest level of extremal dependence with the banking sector. The credit crisis significantly increased the probability of a bank or property firm crashing. Moreover, contagion risks significantly increased not only within the banking and property sectors, but also between those sectors.     

Syndicated Leveraged Loans During and After the Crisis and the Role of the Shadow Banking System

In an article published in this journal in 1998, Nobel laureate Merton Miller argued that one of the best weapons available to national economies in their defense against the macroeconomic effects of banking crises is the availability of non‐bank financial institutions and products—or what we now refer to as the “shadow banking system.” Although Miller may have exaggerated the independence of bank‐ and market‐based sources of financing, the author argues that events during and after the recent crisis have shown Miller's claims about the importance of non‐bank investors in the provision of credit to be fundamentally correct. Critics of securitization and the shadow banking system tend to focus on the subprime mortgage story in which the sudden re‐pricing of credit risk and the resulting disappearance of investment demand for ABCP, private‐label mortgage‐related ABS, and ABS CDOs created unexpected and significant downward price pressure on those asset types. But the leveraged loan market tells a very different story. In contrast to the near complete disappearance of private mortgage securitizations, the extraordinary recovery of the U.S. syndicated leveraged loan market demonstrates that the relation between commercial and shadow banking has proved to be a highly productive and resilient one—and very much a two‐way street. When leveraged loans and CLOs experienced problems from 2007 through 2009 due primarily to the widespread liquidity and credit market disruptions that affected essentially all structured credit products, institutional investors in leveraged loans disappeared and the leveraged loan primary market imploded. But when institutional participants recognized the value of the underlying asset—corporate loans—and regained confidence in shadow‐banking products, leveraged lending by banks recovered quickly and dramatically. This outcome is viewed as vindicating Professor Miller's statement about the benefits of shadow markets and securitization— namely, the role of non‐bank investors in diversifying the risk of credit creation while at the same time improving the price discovery process in different markets. The recent history of the U.S. leveraged loan market demonstrates that shadow banking system participants play a critical role in meeting the total demand for such loans, and that the ebbs and flows from institutional leveraged loan markets are strongly connected with the health and integrity of the underlying leveraged bank loan market.     

THE NEW LEVERAGED LOAN SYNDICATION MARKET

Over the past ten years, commercial lending has been transformed from a one-off, bilateral "market" in which issuers maintained one or more separate banking relationships into a capital market in which one or more underwriters structure and price loans for syndication to groups of investors. This market-driven evolution has been most dramatic in the leveraged lending segment (defined as loans priced at LIBOR plus 150 basis points or more), where wide margins have attracted a large and growing field of underwriters, intermediaries, and investors.
Liquidity is the overriding theme in today's syndicated loan market, making the market a more user-friendly one for corporate borrowers and deal sponsors. As a result, a record number of corporate issuers are taking advantage of the syndicated loan market to finance strategic transactions or simply to reduce their borrowing costs. Deal sponsors, too, are tapping the market to finance leveraged buyouts, recapitalizations, and acquisitions at a pace not seen since the late 1980s. But, although acquisition pricing has reached cash flow multiples that recall those of the late '80s, equity contributions by sponsors are larger and credit structures are more conservative.
For banks and other investors, reduced loan pricing and more flexible credit structures have been balanced by much greater access to a large volume of diversified assets, as well as the ability to manage asset-specific and portfolio risk more effectively. As a result of more effective portfolio management strategies, lenders today are less vulnerable to credit problems with individual issuers or a given industry segment, and the bank market as a whole should be much less subject to disruption than it proved to be in the early 1990s.     

Financial distress,information asymmetry,and syndicate structure: Evidence from Japanese borrowers

This paper examines how borrower firm characteristics affect syndicate size structure in the Japanese loan market for the 1999–2003 period when the banking system is undergoing a major consolidation. We find that syndicates are smaller when borrowers have higher credit risk and when borrowers present larger information asymmetries to the lending group. Interestingly, however, these results are primarily driven by keiretsu (business group) firms. This suggests that the benefits of enhanced monitoring and superior renegotiation prospects are especially useful for banks participating in syndicated loans to Keiretsu firms in Japan rather than informationally opaque, independent firms.     

论银行风险与信贷环境的关系以及对我国银行业的启示

通过对经济周期、金融危机和银行行为三者之间的关系进行考察发现:银行的风险水平以不对称的方式反映了信贷市场环境的变化。一般而言,当信贷市场环境出现恶化时,资本充足率和功能分散化程度较高的银行表现出较低的敏感度。这一结论对于我国银行业的改革有着重要启示。     

Potential Competitive Effects of Basel II on Banks in SME Credit Markets in the United States

We examine the likely competitive effects of implementation of Basel II capital requirements on banks in the market for credit to SMEs in the U.S. Similar competitive effects from Basel II may occur for other credits and financial instruments in the U.S. and other nations. We address whether reduced risk weights for SME credits extended by large banking organizations that adopt the Advanced Internal Ratings-Based (A-IRB) approach of Basel II might significantly adversely affect the competitive positions of other organizations. The analyses suggest only relatively minor competitive effects on most community banks because the large A-IRB adopters tend to make very different types of SME loans to different types of borrowers than community banks. However, there may be significant adverse effects on the competitive positions of large non-A-IRB banking organizations because the data do not suggest any strong segmentation in SME credit markets among large organizations. JEL classification: G21, G28, G38, L51     

Japan’s banking crisis: An event-study perspective

We calculate abnormal stock returns for Japanese non-financial companies around major events associated with the banking crisis (1995–2000), and find that not all companies were equally sensitive to the malaise of the banking sector: the most affected were small, leveraged, low-tech companies with low credit ratings and low market to book ratios. This is consistent with “credit crunch” theories (companies with limited access to financial markets are sensitive to changes in bank lending) and with claims that innovation is rarely financed by bank debt. We do not find much evidence on the alleged misallocation of loans to support ailing bank clients.