扶贫融资机制创新:村级互助金的发展探索

村级互助金作为我国农村融资与扶贫机制创新的重要路径,在2006年试点后范围不断扩大.然而,考察村级互助金在筹资、监管、借贷、控险等方面的制度构建,目前依然存在筹资渠道狭窄、村级互助金载体组织法律地位不明、目标瞄准机制偏移与监管滞后等难题.从村级互助金的可持续发展需要出发,今后需要加大政策扶持力度,拓宽融资渠道;明确村级互助金性质与组织法律地位,围绕中低收入农尸构建瞄准机制;强化风险防范与监督机制.     

信贷断点与政府守夜:陵县企业还贷周转金案例

2008年以来,受全球金融危机影响,企业因资金周转困难无法如期归还贷款的现象增多。山东省德州市陵县政府发挥"守夜人"职能,由财政出资设立"企业还贷周转金",有效弥补了信贷断点,确保了经济金融的稳定发展。本文以此为切入点,分析了信贷断点客观存在的原因和政府守夜的必然性、有效率和资金安全问题,并认为此类搭桥资金将长期存在,但应与市场化手段相辅相成。     

信贷断点与政府守夜:陵县企业还贷周转金案例

2008年以来,受全球金融危机影响,企业因资金周转困难无法如期归还贷款的现象增多.山东省德州市陵县政府发挥守夜人职能,由财政出资设立企业还贷周转金,有效弥补了信贷断点,确保了经济金融的稳定发展.本文以此为切入点,分析了信贷断点客观存在的原因和政府守夜的必然性、有效率和资金安全问题,并认为此类搭桥资金将长期存在,但应与市场化手段相辅相成.     

俱乐部机制下的淄博集中代收付中心

由人民银行引导建立集中代收付系统,依托中央银行现代化支付系统开展跨行集中代收付业务,对于解决市场失灵、完善支付手段、改善支付环境具有重要意义,但对集中代收付中心的治理则应依据其俱乐部产品的属性展开.本文通过对淄博集中代收付中心案例的剖析,提出了解决方案.     

“俱乐部”机制下的淄博集中代收付中心

由人民银行引导建立集中代收付系统,依托中央银行现代化支付系统开展跨行集中代收付业务,对于解决市场失灵、完善支付手段、改善支付环境具有重要意义,但对集中代收付中心的治理则应依据其俱乐部产品的属性展开。本文通过对淄博集中代收付中心案例的剖析,提出了解决方案。     

钢贸企业“俱乐部”担保模式创新：临沂案例

钢铁产业从起初的政策支持到产能过剩、行业性亏损,基本上经历了一个典型的经济周期,本文选取了两个样本对该行业产业链条中的中小企业信贷融资介入模式进行了考察和比较。本文认为,各种模式对中小企业融资问题的解决在不同历史阶段都起到了积极作用,但是基于担保圈的＂俱乐部＂模式无法消除行业面临的系统性风险,而第三方物流嫁接的＂俱乐部＂模式借助多种创新的制度机制可以有效阻断相关风险。     

小微企业“信贷断点”的修复机制问题研究

在经济下行背景下,小微企业经常发生还旧贷、续新贷之间的"信贷断点"上的资金链条断裂问题,由此伴生的资金困境甚至破产倒闭的风险愈加突出。山东省巨野县在当地人民银行主导下,确立了小微企业在贷款到期前一个月申请续贷、经贷款银行审查并承诺续贷的制度安排。研究结论表明:第一,"信贷断点"可以通过优化商业银行的内部信贷制度,实现有助于银行稳定优质客户群和企业稳健经营的自我修复;第二,当务之急是,需要确立层级更高的小微企业"信贷断点"外在干预和修复机制,以谋求更大范围的帕累托改进。     

银行信用下企业技术创新市场化运行特点、机制和途径

利用银行工具促进企业技术创新市场化运作是破解我国企业技术创新瓶颈的重要手段之一.从金融支持企业创新市场化运行状况、技术创新市场化运行工具特点及创新过程中对金融的有效选择等方面,特别研究银行信贷与企业创新之间的密切关系.然后,提出利用银行信贷工具促进企业技术创新市场化运行的机制和途径,即建立创新基金、形成以政府为主导的开...     

企业生命周期与信贷进退机制

企业生命周期是指从企业创建到衰亡所经历的全部时间过程.     

实施机制、信贷行为与农村产权抵押融资:成都案例

本文构建了关于制度实施机制的分析框架,并运用其分析金融机构介入农村产权抵押融资中的实施机制问题。同时本文指出,在现有土地制度框架下农村产权抵押物本身的完备程度并不是影响金融机构\"惜贷\"的主要因素,而与农村产权抵押派生的权利束(比如抵押债权)无法通过市场机制来实现,进而较弱的信贷契约实施机制无法对相关市场主体形成有效的约束等因素高度相关。因此政策导向上要加快农村产权流转市场机制建设,探索有利于增强信贷契约的实施机制的方式和手段,弥补正式制度供给不足,而不能仅限于明晰产权。     

Mutual Fund Family Size and Mutual Fund Performance: The Role of Regulatory Changes

We examine whether the previously documented positive association between fund family size and fund performance is affected by significant regulatory changes (i.e., Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), the Global Settlement (GS), and increased scrutiny as a result of trading scandals) that have occurred in the last decade. Using Reg FD as a beginning point for these structural changes, we find that, while fund family size was positively associated with fund performance in the period prior to the regulatory changes, this advantage is significantly weaker in the period subsequent to the regulatory changes. Consistent with the weakened advantage of fund family size in fund performance, we find that the greater stock‐picking skill of larger fund families, measured using the earnings announcement returns of the stocks they trade, also weakened subsequent to the regulatory changes. Using narrower event windows around the regulatory changes, we find that the previously documented superior return of large fund families was partly attributable to selective disclosure. We also find that fund families implicated in the trading scandals experienced a decline in their performance during the scandal period. Finally, we examine the role of large investment banks in providing an advantage to large fund families. Family size was positively associated with the extent to which funds traded in the same direction as forecast revisions by analysts from large investment banks in the period prior to Reg FD and the GS and this association declined significantly after the two regulatory events.     

外部增信与集合担保:中小企业助保金池案例

成长型中小企业抗风险能力较弱、有效抵押不足的特点,决定了传统的抵押和保证方式难以满足其贷款需求。解决成长型企业贷款担保难问题,必须内外兼顾,在保持内源性担保资源的基础上,探索与外源性担保资源相结合的新途径。建设银行淄博市分行借助政府增信平台和企业缴纳一定比例的助保金组成"助保金池",在山东省淄博市博山区试点推出了助保金贷款业务,开创了"政银企"三方合作融资的新模式。     

Mutual Fund Liquidity Costs

One dollar in purchases or redemptions generates an average cost of $0.006 for US equity mutual funds during the period 1997‐2009, approximately 70% lower than prior estimates derived from older data. However, large cross‐sectional differences exist between funds. Many funds have costs near zero, but funds that hold relatively illiquid equities, have relatively concentrated portfolios, and manage relatively large amounts of assets have average liquidity costs significantly greater than the full sample average. Furthermore, despite a large difference in underlying asset liquidity, US bond funds and US equity funds have similar average liquidity costs.     

Mutual Fund Tax Clienteles

Mutual funds are held by investors in taxable and tax‐qualified retirement accounts. We investigate whether the characteristics, investment strategies, and performance of mutual funds held by these diverse tax clienteles differ. Examining both mutual fund distributions and mutual fund holdings, we find that funds held primarily by taxable investors choose investment strategies that result in lower tax burdens than funds held primarily in tax‐qualified accounts. Despite these differences, we find no evidence that any investment constraints that may arise from these tax‐efficient investment strategies result in performance differences between funds held by different tax clienteles.     

持牌农村合作金融机构的制度成本:聚福源资金互助社案例

本文通过剖析山东省第一家拥有＂金融牌照＂的农村资金互助社——沂水县姚店子镇聚福源农村资金互助社个案,显示其由＂隐性存在＂到＂显性化经营＂后面临的一系列困难和问题,分析其成因,并提出了相应对策建议。     

Truth in Mutual Fund Advertising: Evidence on Future Performance and Fund Flows

We examine a sample of 294 mutual funds that are advertised in Barron's or Money magazine. The preadvertisement performance of these funds is significantly higher than that of the benchmarks. We test whether the sponsors select funds to signal continued superior performance or they use the past superior performance to attract more money into the funds. Our analysis shows that there is no superior performance in the postadvertisement period. Thus, the results do not support the signaling hypothesis. On the other hand, we find that the advertised funds attract significantly more money in comparison with a group of control funds.     

Short-Term Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance

We estimate parameters of standard stock selection and markettiming models using daily mutual fund returns and quarterlymeasurement periods. We then rank funds quarterly by abnormalreturn and measure the performance of each decile the followingquarter. The average abnormal return of the top decile in thepost-ranking quarter is 39 basis points. The post-ranking abnormalreturn disappears when funds are evaluated over longer periods.These results suggest that superior performance is a short-livedphenomenon that is observable only when funds are evaluatedseveral times a year.     

Mutual Fund Investment in Emerging Markets: An Overview

International mutual funds are key contributors to the globalizationof financial markets and one of the main sources of capitalflows to emerging economies. Despite their importance in emergingmarkets, little is known about their investment allocation andstrategies. This article provides an overview of mutual fundactivity in emerging markets. It describes their size, assetallocation, and country allocation and then focuses on theirbehavior during crises in emerging markets in the 1990s. Itanalyzes data at both the fund-manager and fund-investor levels.Due to large redemptions and injections, funds' flows are notstable. Withdrawals from emerging markets during recent criseswere large, which is consistent with the evidence on financialcontagion.     

Mutual Fund Manager Forecasting Behavior

I examine publicly released annual earnings forecasts issued in conjunction with stock recommendations by mutual fund managers of actively managed open-end mutual funds. I find that mutual fund manager annual earnings forecasts systematically overestimate the earnings number later disclosed at the annual earnings announcement. In further analyses, I attempt to distinguish between two explanations for this forecast bias: an untruthful reporting bias (market manipulation) and a truthful cognitive bias (optimism). These explanations generate different predictions about the timing of changes in fundholdings of forecasted securities between the forecast release and annual earnings announcement dates. I interpret my findings as more consistent with an optimism explanation for mutual fund manager annual forecast bias and less consistent with a market manipulation explanation for this bias. I am, however, unable to eliminate an unobservable selection bias either in the decision of the mutual fund manager to report a forecast publicly or in the media's decision to publish that forecast as an explanation for my finding that mutual fund manager forecasts are biased.