寡占市场与国际竞争力

寡占市场结构中的大企业产品生产成本较低,抗风险能力较强,对大企业之间的竞争有着丰富的经验,所以,寡占市场结构更有利于一国企业国际竞争力的提高,且一般不会引起本国资源配置效率的降低。     

创新信号无效还是市场激励不足——风险投资市场对科技企业资源配置低效之谜

我国风险投资市场对科技企业资源配置效率偏低抑制初创企业技术创新。基于信号理论和激励理论,构建非完全信息下的动态博弈模型,求解使创新能力强的企业更倾向于发出信号并获得风险资本支持的分离均衡存在的前提条件,即创新信号的有效性和风险资本投资创新企业的激励相容性。基于2005—2020年上市科技企业数据进行实证检验,结果发现：(1)我国风险投资市场具备对科技企业的资源配置作用,但效率偏低;(2)专利申请行为作为创新信号能够有效反映企业创新能力,并可被风险资本识别;(3)风险资本投资创新企业的超额收益率偏低。风险资本对创新企业投资激励不足,导致风险投资市场无法实现分离均衡,从而降低市场资源配置效率。     

风险资本契约价格与市场均衡理论研究

文章从风险资本价格机制的研究角度,依据契约理论提出了风险资本契约价格概念,并进一步探讨了风险资本市场均衡过程中价格的微观作用机制(价格从非均衡趋向均衡过程中,参与主体的博弈)和宏观作用机制(不同均衡价格水平下,市场总收益的变动趋势).为参与主体面临市场现行价格采取主动应对策略及政府面对市场不同博弈状态制定旨在提高市场总体收益水平和资源配置效率的有效政策制定了具体操作原则.     

人口结构与金融市场风险结构:风险厌恶的生命周期时变特征

金融市场中要更多考虑参与主体"人"的因素。经典理论模型通常设定风险厌恶系数为不随年龄而变的常数。本文构建模型并运用微观和宏观数据,刻画和验证经济主体风险厌恶在生命周期中的时变特征。微观视角下风险厌恶受年龄正向影响,宏观视角下金融市场和行为风险厌恶均随平均年龄上升而上升。少年人口占比负向影响风险厌恶;中、老年人口降低风险偏好,风险态度趋于保守。风险厌恶在生命周期内存在时变性,表现为年龄越大风险厌恶越强,可谓"江湖越老,胆子越小"。这对于后续建模中设定风险厌恶可变系数有借鉴意义。年龄改变风险态度和风险资产组合,使得人口年龄结构系统性影响金融市场风险结构。因此,本文对于从人口学视角预判未来金融市场风险结构也具有一定参考价值。     

基于利润最大化的土地市场供求均衡分析

供求关系作为影响土地市场资源配置效率最主要、最直接因素,对于供求关系研究有助于更深入把握土地市场运行动向。文章在分析影响土地市场供给与市场需求相关因素基础上,以利润最大化为出发点,分析土地市场均衡问题以及供求与价格关系,认为土地市场只存在短期相对均衡     

基于平均收益和平均成本视角的利润最大化分析

边际收益等于边际成本是利润最大化的重要条件。但是,在平均收益等于平均成本、并且平均收益曲线与平均成本曲线斜率相等时,也能使企业实现最大利润。因此,如果边际收益与边际成本之间关系不容易确定时,企业也可以根据平均收益与平均成本之间的关系来确定利润最大化产量和价格,从而不致于错失市场良机。     

双头寡占企业竞争力与市场占有量的均衡选择

构建包括竞争力和市场占有量两个决策变量的博弈模型,给出双头寡占企业利益最大化原则下就竞争力和市场占有量展开静态博弈的纳什均衡解,分析了寡占企业竞争力和市场占有量选择的一般规律。     

企业并购财务风险控制研究

企业并购是实现资源配置的有效方式,是资本运作的主要方式,是企业实现快速扩张的重要途径.本文分析了企业并购可能产生财务风险的原因,提出防范和控制财务风险的措施建议,使企业并购充分发挥协同效应,迅速进入市场,提高经营规模,实现股东财富最大化.     

国有银行控股比例与管理授权——基于混合寡占模型的研究

本文结合中国银行业竞争日趋激烈的现实背景,从国有银行股份制改革和管理授权入手构建了银行业混合寡占、国有银行混合持股的两阶段古诺竞争模型,分析国有银行为达到既定目标如何选择国有控股比例及适当的管理激励合同。研究表明,国有银行会选择利润收益合同作为占优管理授权,而放弃相对表现激励合同;当国有银行将最大化社会福利作为目标时,国有银行成为市场垄断者,私有银行被挤出市场;仅在利润收益激励合同下,国有银行将最大化利润和消费者剩余之和作为目标。     

反倾销政策工具下市场均衡价格分析

成本优势是获取垄断利润的主要因素,政府政策介入会改变企业的成本优势,从而改变市场的均衡价格。不同的反倾销和补贴政策影响市场均衡价格和均衡利润的变化,反倾销税和价格承诺能削弱外国企业成本优势,降低对进口产品的需求,导致市场均衡价格上升;反倾销税使外国出口企业利润水平降低,一定程度会引致外国企业直接投资,价格承诺使外国企业完全保留了因提高价格所带来的利润;生产补贴降低了国内企业的边际成本,导致市场均衡价格下降,提高了国内企业的利润,但却减少了政府收入。采取适度的反倾销政策和补贴政策可以使国内外厂商的利润保持在竞争性利润水平上,进口国的利益目标应该是对本国消费者提供更低价格商品的基础上保护本国企业的利益。     

Do government owned banks trade market power for slack?

The ‘Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH)’ posits that banks with market power have less incentives to maximize revenues and minimize cost. Especially government owned banks with a public mandate precluding profit maximization might succumb to a quiet life. We use a unified approach that simultaneously measures market power and efficiency to test the quiet life hypothesis of German savings banks. We find that average local market power declined between 1996 and 2006. Cost and profit efficiency remained constant. Nonparametric correlations are consistent with a quiet life regarding cost efficiency but not regarding profit efficiency. The quiet life on the cost side is negatively correlated with bank size, quality of loan portfolio and local per capita income. The last result indicates that the quiet cost life is therefore potentially due to benevolent excess consumption of local input factors by public savings banks.     

Determinants of banks’ Nerlovian economic efficiency: a DEA-bootstrap approach

ABSTRACT

This study aims to evaluate the Nerlovian economic efficiency of Taiwanese commercial banks and its determinants by assuming the presence of an imperfectly competitive market using a two-stage estimation procedure: Nerlovian economic inefficiency and its components’ price, technical and allocative efficiencies computed and decomposed in the first stage, which are regressed on the explanatory variables with a bootstrapped truncated approach in the second stage. The estimation results show that in the first-stage analysis, the Nerlovian economic inefficiency of banks is primarily due to allocative inefficiency, and indicate the existence of price inefficiency in Taiwan. In the second-stage analysis, the results confirm that both the years in operation of the bank and the ratio of credit loans are the main determinants of banking profit efficiency. In addition, this study not only shows that publicly owned banks contribute to better price efficiency but also proves that loan loss reserve to total assets is negatively associated with technical efficiency. The equity ratio exerts an insignificant favourable impact on allocative efficiency. The findings of this research are essential for bank managers in Taiwan.     

当代经典论文对企业利润最大化目标的思考

古典经济学理论认为利润最大化是企业的根本目标,但是科斯、阿尔钦、FAMA、张五常等当代经济学家在其经典论文中分别对企业的本质、规模、相互关系、委托代理机制等方面进行分析时均从成本最小化的角度进行分析的。本文通过论证企业成本最小化和利润最大化的对称性和可转换性,解释了从成本最小化进行分析的原因。同时提出由于利润最大化的不确定性和成本最小化的易操作性,企业在相对确定的条件下,可将利润最大化目标转化为成本最小化形式进行实际运作。     

Bertrand vs. Cournot equilibrium with risk averse firms and cost uncertainty

Summary. In an oligopoly game with cost uncertainty and risk averse firms, we show that Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium have different convergence properties when the market is replicated. The Cournot equilibrium price converges to the competitive price. Under very typical and somewhat general conditions, the highest Bertrand equilibrium price converges to one higher than the competitive equilibrium. We also give examples to show how to compute the limit of the highest Bertrand equilibrium prices and illustrate the ideas of the proof. We explore conditions under which the supply curve is upward sloping, a useful condition for our results. Received: April 20, 2000; revised version: May 10, 2001     

The effect of risk-based capital requirements on profit efficiency in banking

The purpose of this paper is twofold: to show how to measure profit efficiency in banking using a newly developed technique, and to use that technique to determine the effect of risk-based capital requirements on the profit performance of US banks. The measure of profit efficiency used captures deviations from profit maximization arising from technical inefficiency, caused by a lack of managerial oversight and allocative inefficiency, which is caused by managers choosing a nonoptimal mix of inputs and outputs. A leverage ratio constraint and a risk-weighted capital ratio constraint are explicitly included in the model, which allows identification of the effect on profits of those constraints. The techniques are applied to random samples of US banks for 1990, 1992, and 1994. The results indicate that allocative inefficiency is a larger source of profit loss than technical inefficiency and that the risk-based capital standards have a significant effect on bank allocative efficiency.     

THE POTENTIAL FOR SHORT‐RUN SHIFTING OF A CORPORATE PROFITS TAX

Can the owners of a firm shift a corporate profits tax to consumers? Not in the short run if the tax is stated as a proportion of profits and the firm is a profit maximizer. But what if the firm wishes to pursue a strategy other than profit maximization, say revenue maximization subject to a profit constraint? Under such a condition the firm's reaction to a tax or tax increase might be a price rise that captures part of the foregone profits. We show that firms which operate at a point on their demand curve that differs from profit maximization have an incentive to raise price in response to the tax – and that high cost firms have a greater incentive to raise price than do low cost firms. Our empirical analysis of the US beer industry confirms this finding, and sheds light on the Krzyzaniak–Musgrave analysis of the 1960s which suggested that the corporation income tax produced significant short‐run shifting.     

Profit maximization mitigates competition?

Summary. We consider oligopolistic markets in which the notion of shareholders’utility is well-defined and compare the Bertrand-Nash equilibria in case of utility maximization with those under the usual profit maximization hypothesis. Our main result states that profit maximization leads to less price competition than utility maximization. Since profit maximization tends to raise prices, it may be regarded as beneficial for the owners as a whole. Moreover, if profit maximization is a good proxy for utility maximization, then there is no need for a general equilibrium analysis that takes the distribution of profits among consumers fully into account and partial equilibrium analysis suffices.     

Bank efficiency in South‐Eastern Europe

This study examines the cost and profit efficiency of banking sectors in six transition countries of South‐Eastern Europe over the period 1998–2008. Using a stochastic frontier approach, our analysis reveals that the average cost efficiency of South‐Eastern European banks is 68.59 percent, and the average profit efficiency is 53.87 percent. Regressions on the determinants of bank efficiency show that foreign banks are characterized by higher profit efficiency but lower cost efficiency, and government‐owned banks are associated with lower profit efficiency than domestic private banks. However, the efficiency gap between foreign‐, domestic private‐ and government‐owned banks narrows over time. We also find that the market power of a bank has a positive association with both cost and profit efficiency. Institutional development, proxied by progress in banking regulatory reforms, privatization and enterprise corporate governance restructuring, also has a positive impact on bank efficiency.     

Designing price caps for gas distribution systems

We examine the applicability of price-cap mechanisms to the regulation of gas distribution company rates for gas supply and transportation services. Although distribution companies will continue to be regulated for the foreseeable future, we argue that a hybrid of price and profit regulation of transportation rates will increase allocative efficiency and provide greater incentives for productive efficiency. The design of incentives for cost minimization in long-term gas supply contracts is more challenging, but an index cap, based on the cost of gas acquired by other distribution companies, merits attention.     

Supply function competition in a mixed electric power market

In this paper, we present a mixed oligopoly model where electric power generators compete in supply functions in a liberalized market. A former monopolist, the state‐owned generator, is assumed to be (partially) privatized. First, we obtain that there is a relationship between privatization and the number of electric power generators concerning the level of consumer surplus and total welfare. Indeed, a fully state‐owned generator is socially optimal, lowering private generators' profits and enhancing consumer surplus; that is, if the degree of privatization decreases, consumer surplus increases compensating the damage imposed on generators' profits. Second, as the number of generators increases, full privatization may provide similar levels of consumer surplus and social welfare than those observed in a mixed oligopoly. Moreover, it is also obtained that price‐cost margins increase as marginal cost increases. Overall, our results suggest that the state‐owned generator should be privatized when entry barriers are low enough, and competitiveness is enhanced. Otherwise, a state‐owned generator may protect consumers, enhancing consumer surplus.