Noise trading, transaction costs, and the relationship of stock returns and trading volume

This article constructs an economic model of a rational trader who operates in a market with transaction costs and noise trading. The level of trading affects the rational trader's marginal cost of transacting; as a result, trading volume (through its effect on marginal cost) is a source of risk. This engenders an equilibrium relationship between returns and volume. The model also provides a simple way to scrutinize this relationship empirically. Empirical evidence supports the implications of the model.     

Investor sentiment,trading behavior and stock returns

This article examines how investor sentiment and trading behaviour affect asset returns. By analysing the unique stock trading dataset of the Korean market, we find that high investor sentiment induces higher stock market returns. We also find that institutional (individual) trades are positively (negatively) associated with stock returns, suggesting the information superiority (inferiority) of institutional (individual) investors. Investor sentiment generally plays a more important role in explaining stock market returns than investor trading behaviour.     

Noise traders,firm-specific uncertainty and technical trading effectiveness

This is the first study to document evidence of technical trading effectiveness at firm level in the Chinese A-share market by investigating the relationship between excess profits of technical trading rules and firm-specific characteristics. Our results reveal that firms with higher excess profits from technical trading have more noise traders and higher institutional ownership and that those firms tend to be growth firms with lower liquidity and higher firm-specific uncertainty. Further analysis shows that the profitability of technical trading rules is unsustainable and the excess profits of the highest technical trading profit quintile portfolio disappear in the following year.     

Time,trading and algorithms in financial sector security

This article examines the financial security issues raised by the rapid development of high-frequency trading (HFT). HFT involves automated algorithmic trading of financial instruments where the objective is to reduce the time scale between the initiation and execution of trades to microseconds (or even nanoseconds) so as to reap competitive advantage. After outlining the contours of a HFT world, the presentation goes on to discuss some of its important consequences and implications. Several matters are discussed in this context: market manipulation, hacking, index construction and violence. Of particular significance for the notion of financial security is the issue of time as embodied in algorithmic trading. In turn this raises concerns over the regulation and management of this new field of financial innovation and trading activity.     

Herding,contrarianism and delay in financial market trading

Herding and contrarian behaviour are often-cited features of real-world financial markets. Theoretical models of continuous trading that study herding and contrarianism, however, usually do not allow traders to choose when to trade or to trade more than once. We present a large-scale experiment to explore these features within a tightly controlled laboratory environment. Herding and contrarianism are more pronounced than in comparable studies that do not allow traders to time their decisions. Traders with extreme information tend to trade earliest, followed by those with information conducive to contrarianism, while those with the theoretical potential to herd delay the most. A sizeable fraction of trades is clustered in time.     

Search cost,trading strategies and optimal market structure

The theory of Walrasian equilibrium yields a set of prices at which the aggregate competitive demand for each commodity equals its aggregate competitive supply. However, even at equilibrium prices the theory of competitive equilibrium does not explicitly offer explanation regarding the manner in which trades are actually executed. This paper considers a model where trade takes place in a decentralized fashion and examines in a dynamic game-theoretic framework, the role of social institution of money and markets in facilitating exchange. The steady state Nash equilibrium derived in the paper demonstrates how, depending on the level of transaction costs associated with a market setup (synonymously, trading posts to exchange possible pairs of goods) appropriate monetary trade emerges, which like a hub and spoke network (Starr and Stinchcombe, 1999) makes some markets non-functioning and in equilibrium only the markets having trade through the medium of exchange continue to exist. However, despite the obvious advantages of a market setup in reducing search costs, pure random search for a complementary trading partner (as considered by Ostroy and Starr, 1974; Kiyotaki and Wright , 1989; and others) prevails in many economies, especially, in many developing economies. This paper models this feature of developing economies by introducing differences in transaction costs across agents and shows why sustainable equilibria might exist exhibiting random search for certain commodities even in the presence of established markets.     

Insider trading and stock prices

We examine the informational content of insider trades and its value to market investors using a US dataset. Overall, our results support the view that insider actions have positive predictive power for future returns. However, these results may come with some caveats. First, it is not the actions of all insiders (directors, officers and large shareholders) that have predictive power for future returns, but typically only those of directors and officers (senior management). Second, while director actions have predictive power for firm of all sizes, officers only have predictive power for small firms. The signal emanating from buys is stronger than the signal emanating from sells. Finally, the trading actions of directors, and to a lesser extent, officers have significant effects on the trading behaviour of other groups of insiders.     

Vertical trading and uneven development

The phenomenon of vertical trading, in which the center exports a good involving a high degree of processing which leads to economy-wide learning and the periphery exports a good which does not generate such effects, is formalized in a simple dynamic model of trade. It is shown that the periphery can ‘lose’ from such trade relations. Conditions under which this can occur are shown to involve parameters of the learning functions, and the ‘sizes’ of the two countries.     

Insider trading with product differentiation

This paper investigates the effect of product differentiation on the real and financial decisions of a publicly-owned firm, competing $\grave{a}$ la Cournot with another privately-owned firm. The results show that the degree of product differentiation affects the stock price coefficients (i.e. the market maker’s response to the real signal and to the total order flow signal) and the output of the publicly-owned firm. It also appears to have a detrimental effect on the manager’s profits and compensation scheme. The paper then proposes an extension of the benchmark model to incorporate Cournot and Stackelberg competition between two insiders in the financial market. The type of the financial competition adopted has also an effect on the results of the benchmark model that sometimes depend on the degree of product differentiation.     

Knowledge flows and insider trading

Much insider trading literature focuses on the redistribution of monetary rents. This focus has led to ambiguous and conflicting results, unable to identify who the clear winners and losers of insider trading legislation are. Lacking any clearly defined beneficiary, an analysis of the origins and continued support of such legislation is lacking. This paper rectifies this omission by reassessing the involved agents not in light of their relationship to a company, but from all roles of the knowledge transmission process: creator, distributor and user. Information distributors—large news companies and investment houses—are argued to be sufficiently well organized to lobby for maintained and strengthened legislation to protect rents that would otherwise be greatly diminished.     

Value theory with personalized trading

This paper extends existing general equilibrium theory to describe the competitive production and allocation of “personalized commodities:” commodities with only one potential buyer or seller. The basic, novel theoretic possibility introduced into value theory with the introduction of personalized trading—the trading of personalized commodities—is that price discrimination over quantity may occur under perfect competition. Theorems on the existence and optimality of competitive equilibria under discriminatory pricing are proved.     

The relationship between top trading cycles mechanism and top trading cycles and chains mechanism

In this paper, we show that there is a relationship between two important matching mechanisms: the Top Trading Cycles mechanism (TTC mechanism proposed by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1999) and the Top Trading Cycles and Chains mechanism (TTCC mechanism proposed by Roth, Sonmez, and Unver, 2004). Our main result is that when a specific chain selection rule proposed by Roth et al. is used, these two mechanisms are equivalent. While the equivalence is relevant for one specific case of the TTCC mechanism, it is a particularly interesting case since it is the only version identified by Roth et al. to be both Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof.     

成交风险、交易成本、逆向选择风险与投资者订单选择

本文利用多元对教条件自田归计数模型讨论了交易概率、交易成本以及选择成本等市场微观结构因素对中国证券市场投资者订单选择的影响.实证研究发现:(1)交易成本的增加会削弱投贵者递交指令的积极性,当成交风险较大时,投资者更偏好市价订单;(2)由于中国证券市场订单类型较为单一,逆向选择风险对投资者订单选择行为并无显著性的影响;(3)在同质信息的驱动下不同类型订单之间具有显著的持续和交叉相关性.     

Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading

We consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object. The seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other. We characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational, and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies. For a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade, and mechanisms that can maximize a broker's expected profit.     

Forward trading in exhaustible-resource oligopoly

We analyze oligopolistic exhaustible-resource depletion when firms can trade forward contracts on deliveries – a market structure relevant for some resource markets (e.g., storable pollution permits, hydro-based power pools) – and find that trading forwards can have substantial implications for resource depletion. We show that when firms’ initial resource-stocks are the same, the subgame-perfect equilibrium path approaches the perfectly competitive path as firms trade forwards frequently. But when the initial stocks differ, firms can credibly escape part of the competitive pressure of forward contracting. It is a unique feature of the resource model that equilibrium contracting and the degree of competition depends on resource endowments.     

Softening competition through forward trading

In the history of alleged manipulations on forward markets, it has been observed that high prices resulted from a cartel's long positions. The present paper addresses this issue in a simple model of price setting duopolists. We show that forward trading results in producers buying forward their own production, so that equilibrium prices are increased compared to the case without forward trading. This result contrasts with the social desirability of forward markets emphasized by the academic literature.     

An information theoretic analysis of stock returns,volatility and trading volumes

Information theory is used to examine the dynamic relationships between stock returns, volatility and trading volumes for S&P500 stocks. This provides an alternative approach to traditional Granger causality tests when dealing with nonlinear relationships. The article highlights the dominant role played by trading volumes in all of these relationships – even in the return–volatility relation – and finds evidence of a market level feedback effect from index returns to the return–volatility relation at the stock level. The article also produces a number of stylized facts from an information theoretic perspective.     

Emissions trading, point-of-regulation and facility siting choices in the electric markets

This paper examines the effects of emissions trading on firms’ capacity siting choices in the electric sector, considering three programs that are different by their point-of-regulation: source-, load and first-jurisdictional-deliverer approaches. We model each program by assuming electricity sales are through bilateral contracts, and analyze the solutions properties and economic and emissions implications. We have three central findings in this paper. First, when electricity sales in both directions (i.e., in-state to out-of-state and vice verse) are subject to an emissions cap, three programs will produce identical siting distribution. Second, the emissions leakage in the long-run could be lower than in the short-run case in which capacity expansion is not allowed. This is so because in the long-run power producers may opt for clean technologies in fear of the emission costs under a cap-and-trade program. Third, if compared to pure source-based program in which the import sales are not subject to an emissions cap, more pollution-intensive facilities are expected to build in uncapped states, where the regulation is less stringent. Our findings are therefore consistent with some empirical evidence of pollution haven hypothesis.     

Entry cost, the Tobin tax, and noise trading in the foreign exchange market

Abstract .  Two types of policy have been proposed to eliminate noise trading in the foreign exchange market: increasing the entry cost or imposing a 'Tobin tax' type of transaction tax. In this paper, we endogenize entry decisions of both informed traders and noise traders and show that these policies may be ineffective in reducing exchange rate volatility. This is because these policies will discourage the entry of all traders, so they may not change the relative ratio of traders, or they may affect informed traders disproportionately more, which increases the relative ratio of noise traders and exchange rate volatility.